From Cartesian towards non-Cartesian pragmatics

Abstract

This paper focuses on the philosophical and methodological problems of modern cognitive science and linguistic pragmatics in the context of their interdependence and a growing convergence of goals and methods. First of all, it introduces the distinction between a Cartesian and non-Cartesian view of doing science. The traditional Cartesian paradigm associated with (1) the idea of nativism, (2) Noam Chomsky's approach to linguistics and (3) computationalism in cognitive science has to face strong opposition from non-Cartesian trends both in cognitive science and linguistic pragmatics. The Cartesian autonomous agent (speaker-hearer) is replaced by a pancontextualized cognitive agent dependent on a number of internal (mental) factors, such as pertaining to the cognitive-affective-conative system, and external ones, e.g., socio-cultural, interactional, and relational. Such an agent has to participate in ‘joint actions’, ‘collective cognition’, ‘dynamic cognition’ and be aware of a plethora of emergent phenomena in social interaction. The integrative approaches in linguistic pragmatics reveal different degrees of integration, theoretical justification, empirical corroboration and methodological advances. It has been noted that progress in such a ‘holistic pragmatics’ seems to depend on developments in cognitive science and vice versa. Finally, it has been suggested that the construction of a holistic approach to linguistic pragmatics should satisfy a number of ‘minimal requirements’ that so far have not been met. The discussion is closely related to important philosophical problems, such as (1) rationalism vs. empiricism; (2) the reductionism vs. holism dichotomies; and the debates on (3) the unity vs. diversity of science and (4) the role of context in contemporary research.