European Defence Policy Research Articles

The EU's Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives?

EUFOR Chad/CAR, a European Union-led military operation deployed in Chad and the Central Africa Republic (CAR) between 2008 and 2009, was officially justified as a humanitarian operation. Critics argue that next to this motive there were French geo-strategic and economic interests. Other explanations are derived from the neo-realist approach and frameworks of analysis that focus on the EU and Western powers' internal dynamics. The results suggest that the goal of the operation was not humanitarian. The French government, with the support of pro-Darfurian lobbyists, used humanitarian concerns to ‘Europeanise’ its military commitments to Chad and CAR and attempt to beef up the deployment of 50,000 Africa Union–UN troops in Darfur. EU officials used the language of humanitarianism to attempt to strengthen key aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy. Overall, the findings provide evidence that there is a lack of EU strategic vision because of internal dynamics: a political decision was taken to launch a military operation without EU member states having a firm commitment to engage militarily or a vision of how it could provoke resistance on the ground. EUFOR Chad/CAR contributed to the escalation of the conflict.

EU–U.S. Military Relations and the Question of the Transnational Capitalist Class

This research note examines whether the status of EU–U.S. military relations confirms the increasingly popular notion of a transnational capitalist class, integrated on a global scale and accompanied by the cessation of interimperialist rivalry. It focuses on two cases: formation of the European Security and Defense Policy and the setting-up of an EU armaments policy as well as the respective transatlantic struggles over the nature of these two policies. It concludes by highlighting empirical inconsistencies in the transnationalist argument, as demonstrated by the continuation of transatlantic competition over the formation of a separate EU military-industrial identity. Instead of the formation of a global capitalist class, current developments in EU–U.S. military relations point to a territorially bounded capitalist internationalization. Heralded as a new leap in Marxist theory, transnationalism is in fact a dead end, to the extent that it is unable to interpret a new wave of political, economic, and strategic competition among the great capitalist metropolises of our time.

An ocean apart: The legacy of the Bush years in transatlantic security

The foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration is commonly credited with contributing to a significant alienation of Europe from the United States, possibly unprecedented since the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. The sources of estrangement cited are both manners of style, in the administration's often bellicose or messianic rhetoric, and matters of substance, in its casual disregard for multilateral policymaking in principle, accompanied by its explicit embrace of preemption in the National Security Strategy of September 2002. However, this article argues that the sources of strategic drift between Europe and the United States are structural and wholly predictable, if regrettable, products of post-Cold War change. Although strained transatlantic relations ought in theory to have stimulated the development of a European Security and Defence Policy, substantive progress in this area has been surprisingly modest. Indeed, it is as reasonable to talk of a measure of strate...

Converging, Diverging and Instrumentalizing European Security and Defence Policy in the Mediterranean

This article addresses the degree of convergence, divergence and in some cases indifference of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries towards the European Security and Defence Policy. Focusing on two cases, Morocco and Turkey, but also referring to other Mediterranean partners, this contribution analyses the dynamics of this specific issue area, arguing that policy convergence in the field of security and defence has reflected process-oriented goals rather than a substantive convergence of strategic interests. The article concludes by exploring how the EU's differentiated geographical approach in security and defence cooperation in the Mediterranean impacts on the broader region-building endeavour.

Washington, Sarkozy, and the Defence of Europe

With the onset of the Sarkozy presidency, an ‘era of good feeling’ has set in for the often fraught French–American relationship. But it is also a hyper presidency, as there is no way of predicting what surprise initiatives Sarkozy will think up next, and this may create problems, or at least adjustments, in the way Washington views him. Sarkozy's stated aim to bring France fully back into NATO was fulfilled at the NATO summit in April 2009, although his ‘condition’ that the European Security and Defence Policy first be strengthened clearly fell short of his expectations, due in part to the current financial and economic crisis.

Blair's First Government (1997–2001) and European Security and Defence Policy: Seismic Shift or Adaptation?

Tony Blair's New Labour government came to power in 1997, promising a new attitude towards Europe, distinct from the ‘Euroscepticism’ associated with its predecessors, the Conservative party. Analysts were keen to highlight this as a significant shift in British politics, pointing in particular to Blair's instrumental role in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as evidence of the change. This article examines Labour attitudes towards both the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ESDP in comparison with those of its Conservative predecessors to argue that Blair's actions represented more a policy of adaptation than a momentous change in UK policy.

EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons: A Common Deterrent for Europe?

Nuclear weapons remain the unquestioned core of the defence postures of both France and the United Kingdom. At the same time, the European Union is progressively enhancing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), notably through the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Yet, despite evident progress in the CFSP, whose ultimate purpose is to lead to a ‘common defence policy’, EU member-states still deal with nuclear issues on a predominantly national basis. What is the alleged purpose of European nuclear forces? How is the raison d’être of the French and British nuclear deterrents conceptualized against the background of progressing European (defence) integration? This article examines the construction of the rationale of the French and British nuclear forces and their compatibility with the emerging European defence policy, particularly with regard to a hypothetical integration of both arsenals into a common deterrent. Could and should a ‘European nuclear deterrent’ be envisaged as the final stage in the framing of a European defence?

COUNTRY SURVEY XXI: THE UNITED KINGDOM

The UK defence economy has some distinctive features. Its Armed Forces have a worldwide capability reflected in modern air, land and sea forces with an expeditionary role. Its world role is further reflected in a nuclear capability and a high technology defence industrial base, substantial defence R&D with the UK as a major arms exporter. This survey focuses on the period 1970 to 2008. It explains the military‐industrial complex and estimates a demand for military expenditure function. There follows an analysis of procurement and defence industrial policy. Future policy issues are outlined, namely, the costs of the UK’s world role and its relations with European defence policy. It is concluded that the UK faces some difficult defence choices.

The Future of European Defence Policy

Although ESDP has made considerable progress in the past ten years, it will soon have to make choices on its final aims: either to make the European Union a subcontractor of international security or to become the major instrument of the EU's strategic interests in the world. In any case, EU states should preserve ESDP's specific nature among other EU policies if they want to secure its future, as it would lose its value if diluted in institutional machinery incompatible with the moral and operational requirements of military engagement.

The US–Russian security ‘reset’: implications for Central-Eastern Europe and Germany

The article examines the reactions of selected European states to the US-performed ‘reset’ in relations with Russia and explores the ways in which they have been adapting to the new set-up. The article is divided into three parts: after the discussion of the substantive continuity and limited change in US foreign and security policy (USFSP), the multilateral and bilateral dimensions of USFSP procedure are examined through John Ruggie's theoretical observations. The second part of the article deals with implications of the USFSP for Central-Eastern European countries. This part begins with a discussion of Russian attempts to wheedle Europe into embracing its plans for new European security architecture. The next section sheds light on the unexpected process of strategic realignment of the region (USA/NATO/EU/CSDP) and simultaneous transformation of the special relationship with the USA into ‘normal life’. The third part of the article tackles the implications of heightened US–Russian bilateralism for Germany. Authors' findings, many of them based on conducted elite interviews, suggest the contrary process, namely Germany's strengthened multilateral commitment to the EU and specifically to European Security and Defence Policy, limiting the bilateral option to energy trade with Russia. What follows are concluding remarks.

Is Riker Right? - Explaining Preferences for Common Defence

Survey results show a broad support for a common European defence policy. The causes for this observation, however, are ambiguous. Therfore, two competing hypotheses are tested: the preferences for common defence can be explained either i.) by public demand for security or ii.) by ideological factors. Using multilevel modelling, no empirical evidence is found that the Europeanisation of defence is driven by voters' quest for security. Instead, public opinion on common defence can be explained quite well by Europhilia and anti-Americanism.

A convenient framework: the Western European Union in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988 and 1990–1991

One important discussion about European security focuses on what types of institutions will enable Europe to effectively intervene in regional crises. Thus far, the consensus has been that a European Security and Defense Policy should possess, for its military component, a highly institutionalized and integrative inter-governmental structure. Ironically, Europe's greatest collective foreign military successes were obtained under the organizational auspices of the Western European Union (WEU), whose ill-defined mandate and weak institutional structures contrast markedly from current policy prescriptions. In two campaigns, the WEU coordinated efforts to protect maritime commerce and swept sea lanes for naval mines during the Iran–Iraq War (1987–1988), enforced the United Nations embargo of Iraq during the 1990–1991 Gulf Crisis, and cleared the naval mines left behind after the 1991 Gulf War. The lesson to be drawn from these successful interventions is that Europe profited from a structure capable of limiting the political and diplomatic costs of intervening abroad and not, as is often assumed, an organization designed to maximize military efficiency.

‘A milestone in the history of the EU’: Kosovo and the EU's international role

The Kosovo war was a decisive catalyst in the development of the EU's international security role. The escalating crisis in Kosovo confirmed that the EU was still unable to prevent, contain or end violent conflict along its own borders. This led the EU to augment both its hard and soft power through the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy and the Stabilisation and Association Process. These initiatives endowed the EU with the potential to make a distinct contribution to international conflict management. Unsurprisingly, this continuing transformation has encountered significant obstacles relating to capabilities, political will and coordination. Concerns have also been raised about how the development of a military dimension has changed the nature of EU power. However, the EU has not abandoned the core principle upon which its international role was founded, namely the need to transcend conflict. Ten years after its failings in Kosovo, the EU is assuming increasing responsibility for conflict management and becoming a more capable international security actor.

European Security and Defence Policy Deceleration: An Assessment of the ESDP Strategy

This article assesses the political and structural obstacles that have affected the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Furthermore, the article aims to identify and examine the measures that need to be introduced by the EU in order to accelerate the smoothness of ESDP's operability.

Forward march on European defence

The debate on European security and defence has been dominated over the past ten years by institutional bickering about the proper relationship between the European Union's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the NATO alliance. In the last year, however, there have been some positive moves towards greater cooperation between member states, as well as increasing Europe's performance in global expeditionary missions. France is at the forefront and the United States is talking more about EU-NATO coordination. The United Kingdom, however, remains hesitant.

A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE BURDEN SHARING ASPECTS OF A EUROPEAN UNION COMMON DEFENCE POLICY

The move towards a common European defence policy raises a multitude of multidimensional and complex issues. As pointed out in a recent paper (Hartley, 2003), these issues include economic aspects ranging from the role of the European defence industrial base to the costs of a common defence policy, and therefore the issue of burden sharing. This paper, assuming that the provision of common European defence to the participating members has the characteristics of a pure public good, approaches the burden sharing issue raised by Hartley (2003) by calculating a simple benefit share index that is then compared with the contribution made by each country to the costs of the common defence. Assuming the existence of a European Defence Union, the results indicate that some members are under‐contributing while others are over‐contributing in relation to the benefits derived.

A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF THE NEXUS BETWEEN DEFENCE SPENDING AND GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A COMMENT

In a recent paper of this journal (Vol. 18(1), 2007, pp. 75–85)], Kollias, Mylonidis, and Paleologou (henceforth KMP) examined the relationship between the GDP growth rate (denoted as gdp) and military expenditure as a share of GDP (denoted as milex) using panel data from the 15 countries of the European Union (EU15), 1961–2000 (T=40 annual observations from each country). Given that a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) is under consideration in the EU15 group, this is an interesting paper. My comments relate to its econometrics and are organized according to the standard three stages of econometric analysis: specification, estimation, and diagnostic checking.

Growing without a Strategy? The Case of European Security and Defence Policy

Contrary to the expectations of many experts and politicians, one of the most politically sensitive sectors of the European integration process, the common foreign and security policy, has seen remarkable growth in recent years. The pressure of crises and conflicts beyond the EU's borders and the need to deal with them in a unitary way has driven the governments of member states and the community institutions to take development of CFSP/ESDP more seriously. The process has been pragmatic, establishing the mechanisms and policies required to respond to the challenges. It is this bottom-up, disorderly growth that the Constitutional Treaty had attempted to rationalise in a coherent framework, completing the work of the preceding treaties. With the stalled ratification of the CT, this growth has continued. But it cannot go on indefinitely. In order to bring order and coherence into CFSP/ESDP bodies and procedures, the substance of the Constitutional Treaty must be saved and approved rapidly.

The Interconnection between the European Security and Defence Policy and the Balkans

Stability in the European Union (EU) and the Balkans are tightly interconnected. Following the re‐emergence of ethnic conflicts and division in the Balkans, the EU increasingly has assumed greater responsibility in shaping post‐Yugoslav security. Indeed, in the context of the growing scope of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), expectations are rising. As this article points out, however, major problems persist. There is a need to define more substantive priorities and mould a coherent policy. Many lessons can be learned from previous Balkan experiences, both in terms of achieving coherent operational success on the ground and by combining Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Community instruments. This article draws on such lessons to elaborate criteria for the deployment and foreign engagement of ESDP missions.

A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF THE NEXUS BETWEEN DEFENCE SPENDING AND GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The nexus between economic growth and military expenditure has attracted considerable attention and has been the subject of extensive theoretical and empirical work. Given the move towards the development of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), this paper, using panel data analysis, addresses the causal ordering issue between growth and defence spending in the case of the European Union (EU15). Results reported herein suggest the presence of a positive feedback between growth and military expenditure in the long run and a positive impact of the latter on growth in the short run.