Imperialism and Profit in the Guise of BenevolenceMizuno, Moore, and DiMoia, eds., Engineering Asia Yulia Frumer (bio) There is an unchallenged myth about the postwar Japanese economic recovery. According to the myth, after the end of WWII Japan cut ties with its imperial past and, as Aaron Moore put it in his chapter, “reinvented itself as a democratic, peaceful nation, dedicated to high-speed economic growth” (p. 85). In this narrative, the economic miracle Japan experienced in the 1960s and ’70s was a result of the Japanese work ethic combined with American aid. Once Japan became prosperous, the myth continues, it benevolently began dispersing its wealth by dispensing technical aid to neighboring countries. The contributors to Engineering Asia: Technology, Colonial Development, and the Cold War Order (edited by Hiromi Mizuno, Aaron S. Moore, and John DiMoia, London: Bloomsbury, 2018, pp. 272, $122) directly challenge this myth by making two interconnected claims. One claim is that the legacy of Imperial Japan was still very strong in the postwar period and, in fact, formed the basis for the postwar network of international development. From this follows the second and more damning claim: that it was this international development, codified as “technical aid,” that brought economic prosperity to Japan, and not the other way around. In order to highlight the ways international projects benefited the supposed “giving” party, Hiromi Mizuno frames the book by using the metaphor of the kula ring. A classical term in anthropology, “kula ring” refers to a system of symbolic circulation of gifts between islands in the Pacific. Having no intrinsic economic value, the circulated objects nevertheless establish a gift economy, and eventually make a full circle to come back to the original owner, albeit with added economic and political benefits. [End Page 333] The kula ring metaphor, which stressed circulation instead of a powerful “center,” allows authors in Engineering Asia not only to exemplify how “giving” benefited Japan, but also how similar economic and political dynamics existed in South Korea. Why haven’t we heard about this gift economy before? The authors in this volume have an answer. They document and historicize the deliberate construction of the received narrative, according to which the Japanese work ethic resulted in economic prosperity, and that economic prosperity, in turn, resulted in benevolent technical aid to others. This narrative was promoted by Japanese policy-makers, conservative economists, and intellectuals, and served to feed postwar nationalist sentiments all while depoliticizing the Japanese economic presence in Asia. The fact that only in 2018 is there a new publication decisively dispelling this myth suggests that the depoliticization project succeeded. What allows the authors to dismantle the “miracle economy” myth is the rigorous use of historical methods. According to Eric Dinmore, one of the reasons the myth has gone unchallenged is that discussions of post-WWII economic development have been left to economists and journalists. And, as we see in Masato Karashima’s chapter, the field of economics in Japan has been controlled by conservative factions who have actively— and successfully—promoted the narrative of a miracle recovery followed by Japanese benevolent technical aid in Asia. Looking at GDP charts alone—as these economists did—one gets the impression that Japanese postwar economic success was a national story. And once the “miracle economy” is framed as a national story, it is easy to be convinced by the conservative explanation that ascribes success to the “insightful maneuvering of economic policy by elite bureaucrats, a skilled labor force, a superb work ethic, peaceful dedication to economic prosperity under the pacifist constitution, and perhaps American aid” (Mizuno, p. 29). It is only the intervention of historians—with their expertise in multiple languages, familiarity with remote archives, and ability to uncover non-privileged voices—that allows us to see the postwar Japanese economic recovery as a large, inter-Asian affair with a strong legacy of imperialist past and an ugly, violent underside. And underside there is. It is easy to recognize the oppressiveness of Imperial Japanese rule; it is much harder to see oppressive dynamics in industrial and agricultural activities that are presented as Japanese benevolence, Korean nation-building, or Burmese scientific progress. But, as almost every single chapter...
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Oct 27, 2020
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