Electoral Connection Research Articles

Gender role and political culture: The electoral connection

Gender role and political culture: The electoral connection

The Legislature and Distributive Policy Making in Formal Perspective

This article considers recent formal models of distributive policy making in the legislature. The article is divided into two major sections. The first section focuses on the theoretical questions underlying the models and highlights their central results. The second section evaluates the models in terms of five main topics. First, the conditions under which a universalistic as opposed to a minimum-winning coalition theoretically prevails are reevaluated. Second, I examine the role of uncertainty in the models and the questions it raises for both modeling and empirical research in this area. Third, the electoral connection among constituencies, legislators, and the distribution of federal benefits is examined and, fourth, the predictions of the models are juxtaposed with empirical research. Finally, the perspectives of distributive policy associated with empirical and formal research are compared and contrasted.

Regulation and Legislative Choice

Regulation has economic and political dimensions, both of which I endogenize in this hierarchical model in which a legislature chooses by majority rule the mandate of an agency that faithfully regulates a firm with private information about its costs. Sufficient conditions are given for an equilibrium to exist. If there is a strong electoral connection between the benefits delivered to constituents and their electoral support, the legislature will choose a regulatory mandate that favors consumer over producer interests and results in regulation that does not maximize expected total surplus. Political interest in delivering benefits to constituents through factor employment results in a regulatory mandate that yields greater expected total surplus.

The Electoral Connection Meets the Past: Lessons from Congressional History, 1789–1899

As with the puzzle that all dynamic, complex political organizations present, the modern U.S. Congress has fascinated scholars with the number and variety of its pieces: the decline of involuntary congressional turnover; the increase in members who make Congress their career; the weakening of institutional leadership; the decrease in party voting and other manifestations of party discipline; and the growth in individual legislator's staff, perquisites, and other resources. To solve this puzzle would require making sense of a variety of trends in virtually every dimension of legislative life including members' accountability to the electorate, legislative voting patterns, internal organizational structure, and distribution of institutional and political, power. David Mayhew's remarkable 1974 book, Congress: The Electoral Connection, not only took up the task, but gained wide and lasting acceptance as one of the most important theories of the contemporary Congress. According to Mayhew, the key to the congressional puzzle lies in understanding members' goals of careers in Congress and by extension their goals of reelection. How is it that incumbents are able to win reelection and so make Congress their professional base? Mayhew sketches his argument, an application of rational choice theory, as follows:

The Electoral System and Constituency-Oriented Activity in the European Parliament

A common system of election to the European Parliament is called for in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, but this clause has never been implemented. Most proposals for a common system abolish the single-member districts of the British MEPs. This may have some important consequences for the future development of the European Parliament as an institution. The literature on constituency service and the perceptions of representatives suggests that representatives from single-member districts should have a stronger constituency orientation and electoral connection than representatives from multi-member districts. The attitudes and behavior of British and French MEPs are used to test this assertion. The evidence presented indicates that British MEPs are more constituency oriented, have a stronger electoral connection, and participate in constituency-oriented activities more frequently than the French. If the behavior of the French MEPs is any indication of the responsiveness of MEPs in general, the European Parliament may not be very responsive to the needs of their Euro-constituents. In the future, a common electoral system may decrease this responsiveness even more as the incentive to engage in constituency-oriented activities also decreases.

The Electoral Connection in the 99th Congress

Participant observation has provided some of our most impressive insights into the contemporary Congress. In particular, two scholars relied upon this method for results that must be regarded as shaping our current paradigm on Congress and its members: David Mayhew, who, six years after serving as an APSA Congressional Fellow, published his essay, Congress: The Electoral Connection (1974), and Richard Fenno, who traveled with representatives and senators in order to assess how members of Congress interact with their constituents and the impact of those interactions upon their performances in Washington in Home Style (1978) and its companion volume on the Senate (1982).Despite the influence of these works, some ambiguities remained when I began my stint as a Congressional Fellow in the fall of 1984. For one thing, Mayhew and Fenno had reached different conclusions regarding the impact of the need to run for reelection. Mayhew asserted that congressional behavior and congressional outcomes could be explained solely by the goal of getting reelected; on the other hand, Fenno contended that members could establish separate “home styles” and “Washington styles,” as leeway in the latter increased with more successful presentations of self back home. Likewise, whereas Mayhew made no distinction between the strength of the electoral incentive for representatives and senators, Fenno argued that having longer terms than representatives provided much more temptation for senators to do something besides merely run for reelection. A second ambiguity was that most of Mayhew's and Fenno's fieldwork was accomplished in the early to mid 1970s, before the sea-change in American politics best symbolized by Ronald Reagan's election and the dramatic shifts in policy and in political style that ensued (see especially Edsall, 1984; Chubb and Peterson, 1985). While studies suggest that congressional decision-making has changed only slightly in the Reagan years (e.g., Smith, 1985), the altered electoral environment may have produced far-reaching changes in how the electoral connection shapes Congress.

The Electoral Connection in the 99th Congress

Participant observation has provided some of our most impressive insights into the contemporary Congress. In particular, two scholars relied upon this method for results that must be regarded as shaping our current paradigm on Congress and its members: David Mayhew, who, six years after serving as an APSA Congressional Fellow, published his essay,Congress: The Electoral Connection(1974), and Richard Fenno, who traveled with representatives and senators in order to assess how members of Congress interact with their constituents and the impact of those interactions upon their performances in Washington inHome Style(1978) and its companion volume on the Senate (1982).Despite the influence of these works, some ambiguities remained when I began my stint as a Congressional Fellow in the fall of 1984. For one thing, Mayhew and Fenno had reached different conclusions regarding the impact of the need to run for reelection. Mayhew asserted that congressional behavior and congressional outcomes could be explained solely by the goal of getting reelected; on the other hand, Fenno contended that members could establish separate “home styles” and “Washington styles,” as leeway in the latter increased with more successful presentations of self back home. Likewise, whereas Mayhew made no distinction between the strength of the electoral incentive for representatives and senators, Fenno argued that having longer terms than representatives provided much more temptation for senators to do something besides merely run for reelection. A second ambiguity was that most of Mayhew's and Fenno's fieldwork was accomplished in the early to mid 1970s, before the sea-change in American politics best symbolized by Ronald Reagan's election and the dramatic shifts in policy and in political style that ensued (see especially Edsall, 1984; Chubb and Peterson, 1985). While studies suggest that congressional decision-making has changed only slightly in the Reagan years (e.g., Smith, 1985), the altered electoral environment may have produced far-reaching changes in how the electoral connection shapes Congress.

The Electoral Connection in the 99th Congress

Participant observation has provided some of our most impressive insights into the contemporary Congress. In particular, two scholars relied upon this method for results that must be regarded as shaping our current paradigm on Congress and its members: David Mayhew, who, six years after serving as an APSA Congressional Fellow, published his essay, Congress: The Electoral Connection (1974), and Richard Fenno, who traveled with representatives and senators in order to assess how members of Congress interact with their constituents and the impact of those interactions upon their performances in Washington in Home Style (1978) and its companion volume on the Senate (1982).Despite the influence of these works, some ambiguities remained when I began my stint as a Congressional Fellow in the fall of 1984. For one thing, Mayhew and Fenno had reached different conclusions regarding the impact of the need to run for reelection. Mayhew asserted that congressional behavior and congressional outcomes could be explained solely by the goal of getting reelected; on the other hand, Fenno contended that members could establish separate “home styles” and “Washington styles,” as leeway in the latter increased with more successful presentations of self back home. Likewise, whereas Mayhew made no distinction between the strength of the electoral incentive for representatives and senators, Fenno argued that having longer terms than representatives provided much more temptation for senators to do something besides merely run for reelection. A second ambiguity was that most of Mayhew's and Fenno's fieldwork was accomplished in the early to mid 1970s, before the sea-change in American politics best symbolized by Ronald Reagan's election and the dramatic shifts in policy and in political style that ensued (see especially Edsall, 1984; Chubb and Peterson, 1985). While studies suggest that congressional decision-making has changed only slightly in the Reagan years (e.g., Smith, 1985), the altered electoral environment may have produced far-reaching changes in how the electoral connection shapes Congress.

Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection

Congressional scholars have frequently reported dramatic shifts in the mood of Congress toward federal spending. In seeking to explain these fluctuations in congressional moods, we develop and estimate an "electoral connection" model of the congressional appropriations process. In this model appropriations decisions are seen to be the product of the responses of reelection-seeking members of Congress to the key political and economic variables in their environment. Analyses of appropriations for thirty-seven federal agencies between fiscal years 1948 and 1979 provided broad support for our hypotheses. First, Congress has been more generous in awarding appropriations during election years than during nonelection years. Appropriations are also influenced by prevailing economic conditions. Higher unemployment leads to higher levels of appropriations, especially for public works agencies. Conversely, Congress has responded to high rates of inflation by holding down appropriations. And as in other areas of public policy, parties matter: the larger the percentage of Democrats in the House of Representatives, the more funds agencies were appropriated. The strong empirical support garnered by our electoral connection model thus adds some much needed balance to the conventional incrementalist view of federal government spending.

An expected-utility model of electoral competition

The idea that candidates are interested not solely in the attainment of office, but also care about the policy to which they pledge themselves, is natural and appealing. Indeed, it was not until such works as Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook's "An expository development of a mathematical model of the electoral process" (Davis et al., 1970) and Mayhew's Congress: The Electoral Connection (Mayhew, 1974) employed the assumption that Congressmen were "single-minded seekers of re-election" that the usefulness of an approach which ignored the personal policy preferences of Congressmen became apparent. Now, of course, the assumption of policy-indifferent candidates is used widely in formal models of the electoral process. While the specific behavior of candidates may vary from maximizing votes (e.g., Kramer, 1977), to maximizing plurality (e.g., Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970), to choosing according to a uniform distribution from amongst the winning strategies (Ferejohn et al., 1981), and so on, the basic assumption that candidates care chiefly about winning elections is generally retained. There have, however, been a few attempts to reinstate policy motivations for candidates (Wittman, 1973, 1977; Petry, 1982). Indeed, these attempts do more than reinstate an element of policy concern; they posit that candidates care not at all about which candidate wins but only about which policy wins (i.e., is advocated by the winning candidate). In the models both of Wittman and of Petry, a candidate chooses a position x (when his opponent is at y) which will maximize his expected utility--the probability of his winning times the utility of x plus the probability of his opponent winning times the utility of y. Since both use the traditional assumption that voters have ideal points and vote with certainty for the candidate closer to this ideal point, maximizing expected utility given y is equivalent to maximizing utility by choice of x subject to the constraint that x be in the set of points which defeat y by majority vote. Unfortunately, this maximization problem does not necessarily have a solution, since the set of points defeating a given point

The Electoral Connection and the Decline of Partisanship in the 20th Century House of Representatives

In this article we document the decline in party strength in the U.S. House of Representatives from the 19th to the 20th century. The decline holds both at the aggregate levels of party voting and across specific policy dimensions. The demise of party in the U.S. House of Representatives is viewed as a function of several factors, the most important being that political parties lost their sanctions over members. Some policy consequences of the loss of sanctions and the decline of party strength in the House are outlined. The most important consequences are the shifting nature of policy coalitions and the inability of the electorate to hold the House responsible for public policy.

Congress: The Electoral Connection.David R. Mayhew

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook SectionCongress: The Electoral Connection. David R. Mayhew Delmer D. DunnDelmer D. Dunn Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 37, Number 4Nov., 1975 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2129195 Views: 11Total views on this site Copyright 1975 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Congress, The Electoral Connection

Congress, The Electoral Connection

Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew

In this second edition to a book that has now achieved canonical status, David R. Mayhew argues that the principal motivation of legislators is reelection and that the pursuit of this goal affects the way they behave and the way that they make public policy. In a new foreword for this edition, R. Douglas Arnold discusses why the book revolutionized the study of Congress and how it has stood the test of time. The book also contains a new preface by the author.

Presidential Vetoes from Washington to Nixon

Previous articleNext article No AccessArticlesPresidential Vetoes from Washington to NixonJong R. LeeJong R. Lee Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 37, Number 2May, 1975 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381600041268 Views: 24Total views on this site Citations: 27Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1975 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Philipp K?ker Introduction, (May 2017): 1–20.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_1Philipp Köker Determinants of Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 23–54.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_2Philipp Köker The Use of Presidential Vetoes in Central and Eastern Europe, (May 2017): 55–90.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_3Philipp Köker Patterns and Specifics: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Findings on Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 211–243.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_7Tobias T. Gibson, Lake Moore Institutional Presidency, (Jul 2016): 1–6.https://doi.org/10.1081/E-EPAP3-120052595Dave Bridge Return to Spender: The Electoral Connection’s Effect on Veto Challenges and Overrides, The Forum 13, no.22 (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2015-0017Dean Keith Simonton The Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders: Quantitative Multiple-Case Assessments, (Jan 2014): 53–69.https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472038_4B. DAN WOOD Pontificating About Moe's Pontifications, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39, no.44 (Dec 2009): 805–818.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2009.03708.xChristopher S. Kelley, Bryan W. Marshall Assessing Presidential Power, American Politics Research 37, no.33 (Oct 2008): 508–533.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X08324426Nolan McCarty Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic: Changing Constitutional Norms or Electoral Reform?, The Journal of Politics 71, no.22 (Jul 2015): 369–384.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609090331Carl E. Klarner, Andrew Karch Why Do Governors Issue Vetoes? The Impact of Individual and Institutional Influences, Political Research Quarterly 61, no.44 (Dec 2008): 574–584.https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908314200Eric Magar Executive Vetoes as Electoral Stunts: A Model with Testable Predictions, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486804Eric Magar The Incidence of Executive Vetoes in Comparative Perspective: The Case of American State Governments, 1979-1999, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1491112David R. Mayhew Suggested Guidelines for Periodization, Polity 37, no.44 (Nov 2016): 531–535.https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300025 John B. Gilmour Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto, The Journal of Politics 64, no.11 (Oct 2015): 198–218.https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.00124Richard S. Conley Presidential Influence and Minority Party Liaison on Veto Overrides, American Politics Research 30, no.11 (Jul 2016): 34–65.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X02030001002Richard S. Conley, Amie Kreppel Toward a New Typology of Vetoes and Overrides, Political Research Quarterly 54, no.44 (Dec 2001): 831–852.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290105400408Todd Shields, Chi Huang Executive Vetoes, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 431–457.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500402George A. Krause, David B. Cohen Presidential Use of Executive Orders, 1953-1994, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 458–481.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500403Todd G. Shields, Chi Huang Presidential Vetoes: An Event Count Model, Political Research Quarterly 48, no.33 (Sep 1995): 559–572.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299504800305Samuel B. Hoff The Presidential Pocket Veto: Its Use and Legality, Journal of Policy History 6, no.22 (Oct 2011): 188–208.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030600003717Samuel B. Hoff Saying No, American Politics Quarterly 19, no.33 (Nov 2016): 310–323.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9101900303Donald A. Gross GOVERNORS AND POLICYMAKING: THEORETICAL CONCERNS AND ANALYTIC APPROACHES, Policy Studies Journal 17, no.44 (Jun 1989): 764–787.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00818.xEric B. Herzik, Charles W. Wiggins GOVERNORS VS. LEGISLATURES: VETOES, OVERRIDES, AND POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES1, Policy Studies Journal 17, no.44 (Jun 1989): 841–862.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00822.xDean Keith Simonton Presidential Inflexibility and Veto Behavior: Two Individual-Situational Interactions, Journal of Personality 55, no.11 (Mar 1987): 1–18.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1987.tb00425.xDean Keith Simonton The vice-presidential succession effect: Individual or situational basis?, Political Behavior 7, no.11 (Jan 1985): 79–99.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00987263 Gary W. Copeland When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto Legislation, The Journal of Politics 45, no.33 (Oct 2015): 696–710.https://doi.org/10.2307/2130711

Presidential Vetoes from Washington to Nixon

Previous articleNext article No AccessArticlesPresidential Vetoes from Washington to NixonJong R. LeeJong R. Lee Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 37, Number 2May, 1975 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381600041268 Views: 28Total views on this site Citations: 27Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1975 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Philipp K?ker Introduction, (May 2017): 1–20.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_1Philipp Köker Determinants of Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 23–54.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_2Philipp Köker The Use of Presidential Vetoes in Central and Eastern Europe, (May 2017): 55–90.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_3Philipp Köker Patterns and Specifics: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Findings on Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 211–243.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_7Tobias T. Gibson, Lake Moore Institutional Presidency, (Jul 2016): 1–6.https://doi.org/10.1081/E-EPAP3-120052595Dave Bridge Return to Spender: The Electoral Connection’s Effect on Veto Challenges and Overrides, The Forum 13, no.22 (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2015-0017Dean Keith Simonton The Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders: Quantitative Multiple-Case Assessments, (Jan 2014): 53–69.https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472038_4B. DAN WOOD Pontificating About Moe's Pontifications, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39, no.44 (Dec 2009): 805–818.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2009.03708.xChristopher S. Kelley, Bryan W. Marshall Assessing Presidential Power, American Politics Research 37, no.33 (Oct 2008): 508–533.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X08324426Nolan McCarty Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic: Changing Constitutional Norms or Electoral Reform?, The Journal of Politics 71, no.22 (Jul 2015): 369–384.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609090331Carl E. Klarner, Andrew Karch Why Do Governors Issue Vetoes? The Impact of Individual and Institutional Influences, Political Research Quarterly 61, no.44 (Dec 2008): 574–584.https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908314200Eric Magar Executive Vetoes as Electoral Stunts: A Model with Testable Predictions, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486804Eric Magar The Incidence of Executive Vetoes in Comparative Perspective: The Case of American State Governments, 1979-1999, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1491112David R. Mayhew Suggested Guidelines for Periodization, Polity 37, no.44 (Nov 2016): 531–535.https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300025 John B. Gilmour Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto, The Journal of Politics 64, no.11 (Oct 2015): 198–218.https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.00124Richard S. Conley Presidential Influence and Minority Party Liaison on Veto Overrides, American Politics Research 30, no.11 (Jul 2016): 34–65.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X02030001002Richard S. Conley, Amie Kreppel Toward a New Typology of Vetoes and Overrides, Political Research Quarterly 54, no.44 (Dec 2001): 831–852.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290105400408Todd Shields, Chi Huang Executive Vetoes, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 431–457.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500402George A. Krause, David B. Cohen Presidential Use of Executive Orders, 1953-1994, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 458–481.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500403Todd G. Shields, Chi Huang Presidential Vetoes: An Event Count Model, Political Research Quarterly 48, no.33 (Sep 1995): 559–572.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299504800305Samuel B. Hoff The Presidential Pocket Veto: Its Use and Legality, Journal of Policy History 6, no.22 (Oct 2011): 188–208.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030600003717Samuel B. Hoff Saying No, American Politics Quarterly 19, no.33 (Nov 2016): 310–323.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9101900303Donald A. Gross GOVERNORS AND POLICYMAKING: THEORETICAL CONCERNS AND ANALYTIC APPROACHES, Policy Studies Journal 17, no.44 (Jun 1989): 764–787.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00818.xEric B. Herzik, Charles W. Wiggins GOVERNORS VS. LEGISLATURES: VETOES, OVERRIDES, AND POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES1, Policy Studies Journal 17, no.44 (Jun 1989): 841–862.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00822.xDean Keith Simonton Presidential Inflexibility and Veto Behavior: Two Individual-Situational Interactions, Journal of Personality 55, no.11 (Mar 1987): 1–18.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1987.tb00425.xDean Keith Simonton The vice-presidential succession effect: Individual or situational basis?, Political Behavior 7, no.11 (Jan 1985): 79–99.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00987263 Gary W. Copeland When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto Legislation, The Journal of Politics 45, no.33 (Oct 2015): 696–710.https://doi.org/10.2307/2130711

Financing Elections: the politics of an American ruling class, Building Coalitions: American Politics in the 1970s and Congress: The Electoral Connection

Financing Elections: the politics of an American ruling class, Building Coalitions: American Politics in the 1970s and Congress: The Electoral Connection

Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1890-1910: Elements of a Responsible Party System

Previous articleNext article No AccessArticlesParty Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1890-1910: Elements of a Responsible Party SystemDavid W. Brady and Phillip AlthoffDavid W. Brady Search for more articles by this author and Phillip Althoff Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 36, Number 3Aug., 1974 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2129254 Views: 11Total views on this site Citations: 28Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1974 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Alessandro Saia Random interactions in the Chamber: Legislators' behavior and political distance, Journal of Public Economics 164 (Aug 2018): 225–240.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.06.009Adam Silver Consensus and Conflict: A Content Analysis of American Party Platforms, 1840–1896, Social Science History 42, no.33 (Jun 2018): 441–467.https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2018.14Jean-François Godbout, Bjørn Høyland Unity in Diversity? The Development of Political Parties in the Parliament of Canada, 1867–2011, British Journal of Political Science 47, no.33 (Aug 2015): 545–569.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000368 Bibliography, (Jan 2017): 454–506.https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118913994.biblioMark Wahlgren Summers CONGRESS IN THE GILDED AGE AND PROGRESSIVE ERA, (Jan 2017): 339–349.https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118913994.ch26Pamela Ban Leadership Power in Congress, 1890-2014: Evidence from PAC Contributions and Newspaper Coverage, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2016).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2765092Jamie L. Carson, Joel Sievert Electoral Reform and Changes in Legislative Behavior: Adoption of the Secret Ballot in Congressional Elections, Legislative Studies Quarterly 40, no.11 (Jan 2015): 83–110.https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12066Frank C. Thames The Party System and Legislative Cohesion in the Early U.S. House of Representatives, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2014).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2400558Jean-François Godbout, Bjørn Høyland The Emergence of Parties in the Canadian House of Commons (1867–1908), Canadian Journal of Political Science 46, no.44 (Sep 2013): 773–797.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423913000632Frank C. Thames Party Systems and Legislative Cohesion in Post-Communist Ukraine, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2013).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2353476Jeffery A. Jenkins, Eric Schickler, Jamie L. Carson Constituency Cleavages and Congressional Parties, Social Science History 28, no.44 (Jan 2016): 537–573.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200012840Nelson W. Polsby, Eric Schickler L ANDMARKS IN THE S TUDY OF C ONGRESS SINCE 1945, Annual Review of Political Science 5, no.11 (Jun 2002): 333–367.https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.011002.115655Brinck Kerr Party Voting in the U.S. Senate, 1877-1990: An Assessment of Long- and Short-Term Effects, Congress & the Presidency 27, no.22 (Mar 2010): 189–206.https://doi.org/10.1080/07343460009507768Herbert F. Margulies James R. Mann's Apprenticeship in the House of Representatives, 1897-1908, Congress & the Presidency 26, no.11 (Mar 1999): 21–40.https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469909507790Ludger Helms Parteiorganisationen und parlamentarische Parteien in der amerikanischen Präsidialdemokratie, (Jan 1999): 307–329.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-95072-7_13Howard L. Reiter The Bases of Progressivism within the Major Parties, Social Science History 22, no.11 (Jan 2016): 83–116.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200021714John A. C. Conybeare Voting for protection: an electoral model of tariff policy, International Organization 45, no.11 (May 2009): 57–81.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300001399 Eileen L. McDonagh Issues and Constituencies in the Progressive Era: House Roll Call Voting on the Nineteenth Amendment, 1913-1919, The Journal of Politics 51, no.11 (Oct 2015): 119–136.https://doi.org/10.2307/2131612JON R. BOND, RICHARD FLEISHER, MICHAEL NORTHRUP Public Opinion and Presidential Support, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 499, no.11 (Sep 2016): 47–63.https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716288499001004Samuel C. Patterson, Gregory A. Caldeira Party Voting in the United States Congress, British Journal of Political Science 18, no.11 (Jan 2009): 111–131.https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712340000497XDavid W. Brady A Reevaluation of Realignments in American Politics: Evidence from the House of Representatives, American Political Science Review 79, no.11 (Aug 2014): 28–49.https://doi.org/10.2307/1956117David Brady, John Ettling The Electoral Connection and the Decline of Partisanship in the 20th Century House of Representatives, Congress & the Presidency 11, no.11 (Mar 2010): 19–36.https://doi.org/10.1080/07343468409508005J. RICHARD PIPER PARTY REALIGNMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL CHANGE, American Politics Quarterly 11, no.44 (Nov 2016): 459–490.https://doi.org/10.1177/004478083011004005Jeffrey E. Cohen, Gregory G. Brunk A dynamic test of the marginality hypothesis, Political Behavior 5, no.33 (Jan 1983): 293–307.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00988579Joseph Cooper, David W. Brady Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress, American Political Science Review 75, no.44 (Aug 2014): 988–1006.https://doi.org/10.2307/1962298Joseph Cooper, David W. 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Role Orientations and their Sources Among Elected Representatives in English Local Politics

Previous articleNext article No AccessArticlesRole Orientations and their Sources Among Elected Representatives in English Local PoliticsK. NewtonK. Newton Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 36, Number 3Aug., 1974 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2129247 Views: 9Total views on this site Citations: 16Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1974 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Kelly Blidook, Royce Koop, Jack Lucas Municipal Representation Style and Focus: Evidence from Canadian Mayors and Councillors, Representation 32 (Oct 2021): 1–20.https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2021.1993317Catherine Needham, Catherine Mangan, Karin Bottom, Steven Parker Elected Officials in an Era of Austerity: Stewards, Mediators, and Catalysts, (Jun 2021): 955–973.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29980-4_18Catherine Needham, Catherine Mangan, Karin Bottom, Steven Parker Elected Officials in an Era of Austerity: Stewards, Mediators, and Catalysts, (Mar 2020): 1–19.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03008-7_18-1Olle Folke, Johanna Rickne Who wins preference votes? An analysis of party loyalty, ideology, and accountability to voters, Journal of Theoretical Politics 32, no.11 (Jan 2020): 11–35.https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819893028Chloé Janssen, Mihail Chiru, Lieven De Winter Between Parties and Voters: Candidates’ Role Conception in the Belgian Partitocracy, (Nov 2018): 313–339.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96460-7_11Tristan Klingelhöfer Politische Rollenbilder, (Apr 2017): 255–295.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-16398-3_8Michael Thrasher, Galina Borisyuk, Mary Shears, Colin Rallings Councillors in Context: The Impact of Place upon Elected Representatives, Local Government Studies 41, no.55 (Mar 2015): 713–734.https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2015.1020372David Karlsson The Hidden Constitutions: How Informal Political Institutions Affect the Representation Style of Local Councils, Local Government Studies 39, no.55 (Oct 2013): 681–702.https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2012.670748David Karlsson Who do the local councillors of Europe represent?, (Mar 2013): 97–119.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-01857-3_6James W. Lamare Representational roles and proportional representation in New Zealand, The Journal of Legislative Studies 4, no.33 (Sep 1998): 17–32.https://doi.org/10.1080/13572339808420562Donley T. Studlar, Ian McAllister The electoral connection in Australia: Candidate roles, campaign activity, and the popular vote, Political Behavior 16, no.33 (Sep 1994): 385–410.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01498957Donald D. Searing Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism, American Political Science Review 85, no.44 (Aug 2014): 1239–1260.https://doi.org/10.2307/1963944David Rosenberg The politics of role in local government: Perspectives on the role set of treasurers in their relationships to chief executives∗, Local Government Studies 10, no.11 (Jan 2008): 47–62.https://doi.org/10.1080/03003938408433126Yogendra K. Malik Role Perceptions and Role Evaluation of Indian Urban Political Elites: A Punjab Case Study, Asian Survey 23, no.99 (Sep 1983): 1062–1080.https://doi.org/10.2307/2644107 Herbert M. Kritzer Sources of Role Orientations: "Reality or Chance?", The Journal of Politics 37, no.44 (Oct 2015): 1048–1055.https://doi.org/10.2307/2129189R. A. W. Rhodes The lost world of British local politics?, Local Government Studies 1, no.33 (Jan 2008): 39–59.https://doi.org/10.1080/03003937508432655