The Electoral System and Constituency-Oriented Activity in the European Parliament

Abstract

A common system of election to the European Parliament is called for in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, but this clause has never been implemented. Most proposals for a common system abolish the single-member districts of the British MEPs. This may have some important consequences for the future development of the European Parliament as an institution. The literature on constituency service and the perceptions of representatives suggests that representatives from single-member districts should have a stronger constituency orientation and electoral connection than representatives from multi-member districts. The attitudes and behavior of British and French MEPs are used to test this assertion. The evidence presented indicates that British MEPs are more constituency oriented, have a stronger electoral connection, and participate in constituency-oriented activities more frequently than the French. If the behavior of the French MEPs is any indication of the responsiveness of MEPs in general, the European Parliament may not be very responsive to the needs of their Euro-constituents. In the future, a common electoral system may decrease this responsiveness even more as the incentive to engage in constituency-oriented activities also decreases.