Elections Of February Research Articles

Unnatural Allies? The Oxfordshire Élite from the Exclusion Crisis to the Overthrow of James II

Unnatural Allies?The Oxfordshire Élite from the Exclusion Crisis to the Overthrow of James II* Robin Eagles Overshadowed by the greater national upset of the winter of 1688 was an apparently minor event that goes some way towards explaining the rapidity with which James II was displaced from his throne. Towards the end of November, Captain Henry Bertie marched into Gloucester at the head a troop of renegade Oxfordshire militia, and to the rescue of the notorious 'hot whig' John, 3rd Lord Lovelace, who had been imprisoned in the city gaol following his capture at Cirencester.1 Lovelace and the Berties had long been rivals for political authority in Oxfordshire, and the coming together at this juncture of the largely royalist Berties with men of Lovelace's stamp signifies the extent to which James II had alienated those on whom he should have been able to rely implicitly. As another member of the Bertie clan, Robert, Lord Willoughby de Eresby (later 1st duke of Ancaster) explained, it 'was the first time any Bertie was engaged against the crown . . . but there was a necessity either to part with our religion and properties or do it'.2 Released from his captivity, on 5 December Lovelace led a ragtag and bobtail back into Oxford, securing the city for the revolution without a shot being fired.3 This paper will attempt to analyze the broader implications of this unholy alliance within the political élite of Oxfordshire, but with particular reference to Lovelace and the head of the Oxfordshire Berties, James, Lord Norreys (later 1st earl of Abingdon). While it is not a particularly controversial thesis to suggest that James II alienated too many differing interest groups, and by his policies encouraged alliances that would otherwise previously have been thought unconscionable, local studies of the events leading up to his overthrow remain relatively few and far between.4 By [End Page 346] examining these figures within Oxfordshire, a county densely populated by significant political brokers from the period of the Exclusion crisis to James's fall, it is hoped to arrive at a clearer understanding of the mechanics by which James II destabilized local administration to the extent that when invasion was upon him, the local élites failed him both through apathy and active opposition. It will also be seen that in his assumption that Oxfordshire was a county that would hold firm for him automatically, James miscalculated dreadfully. Throughout the late 1670s and 1680s, the county was the focus of a series of potentially explosive contests, and by dabbling with the lieutenancy, and the independence of the university, James upset the very fragile foundation upon which royal control in the county was grounded. 1 Oxfordshire had long been divided in its political loyalties. During the civil war, the north of the county, dominated by peers such as William Fiennes, 1st Viscount Saye and Sele at Broughton Castle (known to generations as 'Old Subtlety' for his slippery political canniness), had been largely parliamentarian in its sympathies, while the south was broadly royalist. Oxford itself, of course, both as university city, and as the king's capital for much of the conflict bore the heavy stamp of royalism upon it. But conflicts between 'town' and 'gown', between colleges of differing traditions, and the elections at the time of the Exclusion crisis and beyond demonstrate only too clearly the stark divisions here too. One need only consider the sheer numbers of parliamentary candidates to stand for the city to understand the intensity of political debate within Oxford itself. The election of February 1679 attracted six parliamentary hopefuls, that of August the same year eight, while the poll in February 1681 witnessed no less than nine candidates standing for election, making Oxford one of the most hotly contested seats in the country during the exclusion years.5 Only Shaftesbury in Dorset attracted more, with 11 candidates for the February poll of 1679 and seven in September.6 Elsewhere, six hopefuls contested Westminster in September 1679,7 with New Romney also witnessing a field of six the following month,8 but no other constituency came close to Oxford's dense population of would-be members of parliament. The poll...

Sąjudis a Partia Komunistyczna Litwy

The paper describes in detail the Lithuanian path to independence, concentrating on the role of the Sàjûdis party and its relations with the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL). The CPL leaders had been observing the activity of Sàjûdis with anxiety since its very beginning. The party, founded on October 22, 1988 was in favor of the restoration of the Lithuanian state. Consequently, the victory of Sàjûdis in the election of February 24, 1990 accelerated the activities leading to the proclamation of Lithuanian independence. On March 12 the Second Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR was to commence in Moscow, where the USSR President was to be elected and the Law on secession from the USSR was to be enacted that could have made it impossible for the Lithuanian republic to depart from the USSR. Therefore the session of the newly elected Supreme Council was scheduled to commence on March 10, 1990. It was then that the Supreme Council passed the Law on the Name and National Emblem which officially promulgated the country’s name as the Republic of Lithuania, and reintroduced the historic emblem depicting a mounted knight: Vytis. By this token, the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Socialist Soviet Republic was transformed to become the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, via an intermediary Lithuanian Supreme Council. What followed was the proclamation of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania Act on the Re-establishment of the State of Lithuania. By this token the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania proclaimed that the execution of the sovereign powers of the State of Lithuania, „abolished by foreign forces in 1940”, was re-established, and henceforth Lithuania became an independent state.

The Turkish Cypriot Legislative Election of February 2005: The Rise of CTP/BG

In the 24 April 2004 referenda on the Cyprus peace plan, 65% of the Turkish Cypriots voted Yes while 76% Greek Cypriots voted No. Subsequently, the international community has failed to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots as it promised in the pre-referenda period. It was against this background that on 20 February 2005 the Turkish Cypriot electorate went to the polls in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus's eighth legislative election. The election results clearly indicate that the Turkish Cypriots are still committed to the Annan Plan and EU membership.

The Foreign Policy of the Voronin Administration

Moldova, which declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, is a young and very poor state with few diplomatic resources and with little in foreign policy compared with Romania, for example. (1) Moldova is a small state, consisting of a population of about 4.3 million. (2) Moldova also is a multiethnic society) with a population that is approximately 65 percent Romanian extraction, with the remainder consisting of Russians (about 13 percent) and Ukrainians (about 14 percent), numbering approximately 650,000 of Ukraninians. (4) There also are approximately 150,000 Gagauz, a Turkic--Christian group of people who live in the southern part of the country and have managed to acquire a certain degree of political autonomy. Moldova, which no longer shares a border with Russia (separated from Russia by Ukraine), is located in the former Soviet West and shares close historic and cultural ties with Romania, underscoring the existence of a special or privileged relationship between the two states. Most of current-day Moldova, previously known as Bessarabia, was once part of historical Greater Romania. (5) As a small state, Moldova finds itself in a weak and vulnerable position in the post-cold war international system. Moldova faces the problem of trying to preserve its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity while undergoing a difficult transition to democracy and a market economy. The victory of the Party of Moldovan Communists in 2001 marked a major change in the internal power structure of Moldova. The Communists gained control of a majority of seats in parliament in the elections of February 25, 2001. This occurred after parliament had been dissolved by President Petru Lucinschi, following the legislature's failure to elect a president on three separate occasions) On April 4, 2001, the single-chamber legislature elected the leader of the Moldovan Communist Party as president by a vote of seventy-one out of one hundred one. (7) The triumph of the Party of Moldovan Communists underscores the need to realize the importance of the relationship between the historical and cultural context of a country, especially the legacies of the approach, and to understand the foreign policy behavior of the Voronin administration. The historical legacy or path dependency of a country's past has an important effect on the foreign policy behavior of a state, as argued by the realist school of thought known as neoclassical realism. In short, the foreign policy of a country clearly has domestic roots. (8) An example of the influence of path dependency on Moldora occurred at the Fourth Congress of the Party of Moldovan Communists in April 2002, when President Voronin talked about the rebirth of socialism and the historic mission of the Communist Party of Moldova, the only country in Europe that returned the Communists to power. (9) As a further example of the grip of the Communist legacy on Moldova. President Voronin also expressed his great interest in the experience of the Communist parties of China, North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. (10) The return of the Communists to power in Moldora reflects the need to consider the importance of path dependency by previous rulers of the country, specifically by the Communists, to understand the nature and scope of Moldova's foreign policy. Voronin apparently believed that the collapse of Communism in Europe was only temporary and that the socialist system would be restored. Realism and Moldovan Foreign Policy Concepts Voronin's foreign policy also can be explained by classical realism and its variations, such as neoclassical realism and neorealism. Classical realism always has stressed the primary importance of the state as a rational, unitary actor, focusing on the pursuit of its foreign policy goals in the international system. The classical realist believes that the state is the most important actor in the international system; (11) however, classical realists have been criticized for not paying enough attention to the role of domestic factors to explain a state's foreign policy behavior. …

Socialism with Unclear Characteristics: The Moldovan Communists in Government

Back to the USSR. (1) So ran a typical headline after the overwhelming victory of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) in the parliamentary elections of February 2001. By winning 50 percent of the vote and seventy-one of the hundred parliamentary seats, the PCRM had been able to form the kernel of the government and successfully nominate its first secretary, Vladimir Voronin, for the indirectly elected presidency. But this party was somewhat of an unknown quantity on coming to power, not covered at all by the voluminous literature on former Communist ruling parties in Eastern Europe. (2) All the same, many analysts and Moldovan politicians were quick to identify its political profile: This was a undemocratic force, one of the most backward and certainly most Red group[s] in power anywhere in the post-Soviet world, (3) which aimed to transform Moldova into a pro-Russian Re-Sovietised backwater and would involve redrawing the regional map. (4) Some of the new Communist government's key policies (such as the proposed upgrade of Russian to a second state language and the re-introduction of Sovietera administrative districts) have caused internal tension and international consternation and initially do appear to be an incontrovertible confirmation of incipient authoritarianism. On closer inspection, the party's profile appears far more enigmatic: far from turning East, on several occasions President Voronin has declared European integration the primary aim of Moldova's foreign policy and initiated a federalization project that has had the support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the U.S. State Department. Domestically, the party has presided over economic growth and sporadic privatization, while its most controversial policy proposals (for example, to join the Russian-Belarus Union) remain unimplemented. Consequently, my aim here is to unravel the enigma of the PCRM by focusing on the party's aims and achievements as it ends its first term in office. To do so, I first analyze what the party, stands for, account for its return to power in 2001, and then assess its policy performance and wider role in democratization and socioeconomic transformation. Seeing the party as and unconditionally authoritarian clearly is very simplistic. The party is far more pragmatic than prevailing views contend, yet its transformation into a post-Soviet democratic party remains incomplete, and in government it has provided a stern test of Moldova's fragile post-Soviet pluralism. Policy Profile: Principle, Pragmatism, Eclecticism On its surface, the PCRM certainly looks like the completely unreconstructed organization it claims to be. (5) After all, the party flies the red flag, flaunts the Communist name and hammer and sickle symbol, and openly celebrates revolutionary holidays. Its party program, traditionally an objective statement of the party's long-term aims, is a clear statement of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, with claims about the ultimate goal of communism, internationalism, the temporary victory of capitalism, and the class basis of the party's support coexisting with commitments to free welfare, state control over banks, at least partial recollectivization, working class participation in public administration, and a voluntary and renovated union of republics. The party unapologetically claims that it is the heir to the ideas and traditions of the Soviet-era Communist Party of Moldavia (KPM) and remains a member of the umbrella post-Soviet forum for Communist parties, the Union of Communist Parties-Communist Party of the Soviet Union (SKP-KPSS). (6) However, even in the party program there are signs of a more pragmatic, eclectic, and contradictory policy stance. Although there is no explicit commitment to democracy, there is rejection of dogmatism, totalitarianism, ideological monopoly, and the Stalinist cult of personality, with commitments to reformed socialism, political rights and freedoms, and entrepreneurship, except in the strategic branches of industry. …

A New Beginning? Manipur's State Elections: 2002

The state elections held in Manipur in 2002 need to be understood against the background of the merger with India in 1949, and of the protests against the India-Naga cease fire agreement in June 2001. The elections in February 2002 demonstrated popular disillusionment with corruption, underdevelopment, self-seeking politicians, party-hopping and changing coalitions, which had characterized previous governments. The newly elected Secular Progressive Front alliance set out credible policies which promise to address these issues, as well as those of human rights abuses and geographical integrity.

Explaining systemic failure: The direct elections system and Israel's special elections of February 2001

Explaining systemic failure: The direct elections system and Israel's special elections of February 2001

The muzzling of the liberal press in Iran

One of the major and tangible achievements of President Khatami's reform movement was the freedom that the press enjoyed in Iran in recent years. Not since the 1940s had the press been so free and so diverse in its coverage of sociopolitical topics. However, when the conservatives lost the parliamentary elections of February 2000 to the reform candidates, they blamed, to a degree correctly, the press for their crushing defeat. The hard-line conservatives then decided to strike back by punishing the press. In May Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, accused the liberal press of acting as bases of the nation's enemies, ie the USA. His attack on the press served as a green light to the conservative-dominated judiciary to ban the pro-reform newspapers and to jail journalists and editors. This article will examine and analyse the reasons behind the press crackdown, and the inability of the president and the reform-dominated parliament either to prevent the closure of the newspapers or to revive the banned ones.

Metternich, Pope Gregory XVI, and Revolutionary Poland, 1831-1842

On June 9, 1832, in the aftermath of the Polish Revolution of 1830, Pope Gregory XVI addressed the brief Cum primum to the bishops of Russian Poland, reminding them of their duty to obey legitimate authority and to instruct the faithful in that obedience! The brief was among the most controversial acts of the nineteenth-century Papacy. It stirred up a firestorm of criticism, not only from the Poles, but from both liberal and Catholic opinion in western Europe, as well as later historians. This paper will examine the motives that led Gregory first to issue the brief and then gradually to retreat from it, with a particular focus on the role of the Austrian chancellor, Prince Metternich. The prime mover behind the brief was Tsar Nicholas I, for very good reasons. In 1772-1795, Poland had disappeared from the map, partitioned among Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The Poles, bitterly resentful, had welcomed Napoleon, who in 1807 won their loyalty by creating a Duchy of Warsaw in a small part of the former Kingdom of Poland. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Tsar Alexander I obtained most of the Duchy; but in hopes of placating Polish opinion, he had given it a separate status as the Kingdom of Poland (Congress Poland) with himself as king. The experiment failed to satisfy the Poles while arousing the hostility of the Russians, and after Nicholas I became Tsar in 1825, he set about restricting the rights and special status of the Kingdom. He thereby provoked the Polish Revolution of November, 1830, put down only with difficulty. Among the reasons for the strength of the revolution was the strong support given it by the Polish clergy. It seemed obvious to Nicholas that the best way to end the clergy's support for the Polish cause would be a Papal directive to them to obey his legitimate authority; such a declaration would also be discouraging for the Poles in general. Nicholas made his first move immediately after Gregory XVI's election in February, 1831, ordering his minister at Rome, Prince Gregori Ivanovich Gagarin, to complain of the aid that Polish clergy were giving the rebels and asking him to remind them that they had no right to interfere in political matters, much less aid revolt against legitimate authority.' The request put the Pope in a difficult position. He could see reasons to agree, even aside from the normal Papal wish not to offend a powerful ruler whose anger could do great harm to the Church. He already knew of the part that the clergy were playing in the revolt, which offended his deep conviction that the Church should not become involved in political affairs, as well as his dislike of revolution, now being reinforced by the outbreak of revolt in the Papal States; he knew too that many of the Polish leaders were anticlericals whose revolt was inspired by liberal ideals rather than religious devotion.' At the same time, he was not without sympathy for the Poles and was well aware of the Tsar's persecution of Catholicism. In the end, he decided on a limited compliance: a brief, Impensa caritas, to the Polish bishops admonishing them in general terms to remember that they are ministers of the God of peace and should not take part in secular affairs, except to counsel the faithful to submit to lawful authority:'4 Limited to such platitudes, the brief is such as not to compromise us, the Secretary of State declared with satisfaction.5 However, for that very reason, the brief was too mild to satisfy the Tsar, who never published it.6 Meanwhile, the Poles too had begun to seek Papal support. In June a Polish emissary, Count Sebastian Badeni, arrived in Rome to ask the Papacy to persuade the Powers to hold a conference to discuss Polish independence. The Pope felt that compliance would take him too far away from his spiritual realm into the political. However, he decided that a second request, to urge Austria to use its influence to bring about a peaceful settlement, was in keeping with his spiritual character, especially since it was a question of the Poles,so praiseworthy for their fervent Catholicism, and since he had already addressed their bishops on the duties of obedience to a legitimate sovereign even if schismatic: Metternich, however, had no wish to embroil himself with the Tsar, whose alliance was vital to Austria, for the sake of a revolution whose victory would have been a major blow to the conservative order and a threat to Austria's position in Galicia. …

Iranian politics and conservative/reformist conflict: Civil society and the state in contemporary Iran

Do the results of recent elections herald the development of a more modern and open political system in Iran? Terence Duffy assesses the prospects for political change there. Terence Duffy argues that Iran's parliamentary elections of February 2000 are likely to further consolidate the process of political modernisation which was encouraged by the 1999 local elections. While conservative influences still exert considerable power in Iranian society, President Khatami's recent foreign policy successes have bolstered his support‐base at home. Khatami has been able to open discussions on civil society, and will continue to endorse a limited ‘reform process’ as long as conservative clerics maintain overwhelming control in Iranian society. However, as circumstances have not allowed Khatami to implement wide‐ranging governmental and social reforms, it is difficult to assess either the political direction or the long‐term aspirations underlying his ‘reform process’.

‘Bruce Plan’ and Marshall Plan: The United States's Disguised Intervention against Peronism in Argentina, 1947–1950

United States' s charge d'affaires at Buenos Aires, John Moors Cabot, remarked in 1946 of the Argentine presidential candidate Colonel Juan Domingo Peron: 'Whenever we look around for a really good stick with which to beat a certain gent, we never seem to be able to find one handy.'1 The statement illustrates how Good Neighbor pledges of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Latin American states handcuffed the administration of Harry S. Truman as it sought to combat the Peronist movement in the late 1940s. Although Carlos Escude and C. A. MacDonald show how the United States and Britain used economic boycott and political manipulation to lever Peronist Argentina away from a statist economic programme,2 the Truman administration, which wished to draw all of the Latin American states in its train, saw that an open attack on or condemnation of Peron would backfire and tried to hide its leverage behind the facade of non-intervention. Peron won the Argentine election of February 1946 by advocating 'social justice' for working people and national development through 'populist' statism.3 At the heart of his economic programme was the Instituto

Civil Society, the Challenge to the Authoritarian State, and the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria

The victory for democracy resulting from General Olusegun Obasanjo’s election in February 1999 is as hollow as it is contrived. For many analysts and political aspirants, Obasanjo’s victory is not a triumph for democracy but merely a eulogy to formal military rule. Obasanjo is viewed as the “ordained” military successor with more continuity to the tradition of authoritarian rule than to genuine democracy. His known autocratic leadership style and his less-than-progressive stance on the media and women make him difficult to accept as a champion of democracy. Furthermore, the legality of his victory is challenged by his alleged contravention of the qualification regulations of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), a factor that has led his opponent to contest the election results.Given this imperfect situation, this article considers how Nigeria can build on the gains of the transition and consolidate democracy. The evidence from the new wave of democracy sweeping through the developing world suggests that “democracy makes sense” when civil organizations are prepared to challenge the right of autocratic regimes to rule.

Civil Society, the Challenge to the Authoritarian State, and the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria

The victory for democracy resulting from General Olusegun Obasanjo’s election in February 1999 is as hollow as it is contrived. For many analysts and political aspirants, Obasanjo’s victory is not a triumph for democracy but merely a eulogy to formal military rule. Obasanjo is viewed as the “ordained” military successor with more continuity to the tradition of authoritarian rule than to genuine democracy. His known autocratic leadership style and his less-than-progressive stance on the media and women make him difficult to accept as a champion of democracy. Furthermore, the legality of his victory is challenged by his alleged contravention of the qualification regulations of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), a factor that has led his opponent to contest the election results.Given this imperfect situation, this article considers how Nigeria can build on the gains of the transition and consolidate democracy. The evidence from the new wave of democracy sweeping through the developing world suggests that “democracy makes sense” when civil organizations are prepared to challenge the right of autocratic regimes to rule.

Elite Solidarity, Communal Support, and the 1999 Presidential Election in Nigeria

Modeled after the U.S. presidency, the office of the president of Nigeria is easily the most powerful position in the land. The president is both the chief of state and the head of government. The authority of the nation’s chief executive expanded greatly during the patrimonial regimes of General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha. Indeed, not only was power concentrated in the hands of these despots, its exercise was also marked by massive corruption, brazen nepotism, and sustained brutality. Against this background, it was perhaps natural that the presidential election of February 27, 1999, would excite keen interest among the Nigerian populace, elite groups, ethnoregional blocs, and the international community. This article highlights some of the ethnoregional forces and elite interests that influenced the election and examines their possible implications for the sustenance of democracy and good governance in Nigeria.

Elite Solidarity, Communal Support, and the 1999 Presidential Election in Nigeria

Modeled after the U.S. presidency, the office of the president of Nigeria is easily the most powerful position in the land. The president is both the chief of state and the head of government. The authority of the nation’s chief executive expanded greatly during the patrimonial regimes of General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha. Indeed, not only was power concentrated in the hands of these despots, its exercise was also marked by massive corruption, brazen nepotism, and sustained brutality. Against this background, it was perhaps natural that the presidential election of February 27, 1999, would excite keen interest among the Nigerian populace, elite groups, ethnoregional blocs, and the international community. This article highlights some of the ethnoregional forces and elite interests that influenced the election and examines their possible implications for the sustenance of democracy and good governance in Nigeria.

The Punjab legislative assembly elections of February 1997: The BJP's regional road to power?

Since 1984, the Indian state of Punjab has become synonymous with political disorder, violence, and counter‐insurgency. The February 1997 election of a popular state government coalition made up of the Akali Dal (Badal), and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) marks a radical development in the ‘Punjab problem’. As well as providing a popular mandate for the former, a moderate Sikh political party, the elections have created a model for the regional expansion of the Hindu nationalist BJP. Although their alliance initially was tactical and continues to be fraught with tensions, it has significant strategic value for both the Akali Dal (Badal) and the BJP, especially in the latter's policies towards the minorities and its quest to form a stable government at the national level.

The 1994 Fiji general election

Fiji held a general election in February 1994. It was the second general election under the new constitution promulgated in 1990 after the two military take-overs in 1987. The election was notable for two reasons. First, coup-leader and incumbent Prime Minister, Major General Sitiveni Rabuka, was not expected to do well as dissidents in his party had broken away to form new political parties to challenge his rule. Second, Rabuka's personal standing was at a low ebb as a result of being implicated in a financial scandal. Additionally, the Indo-Fijian question was still unresolved. Despite these factors, Rabuka won the elections and strengthened his position.

International Organizations & Democracy: The OAS-Putting Principles into Practice

Peter Hakim is the acting president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based center for policy analysis and exchange on Western Hemisphere relations. He authors a regular column for the Christian Science Monitor on international affairs. This essay draws heavily on Chapter H of the Dialogue's recent policy report, Convergence and Community: The Americas in 1993. The notion that violations of democratic practice and human rights in any one country of the Americas should be the concern of all countries is not a wholly new concept in inter-American affairs. This idea, as the preceding article by Heraldo Mufioz explains, has a long history and, indeed, is embedded in the legal framework of the Organization of American States (OAS). In one form or another, it has served to justify a variety of OAS actions. Over the past few years, the OAS has become a far more active and influential institution. During the 1970s and 1980s, it had been largely irrelevant and ignored in inter-American relations. Stymied by continual friction and mutual suspicion between the United States and Latin America, the prevalence of military rule in much of the region, and Washington's unilateralist impulses and Cold War preoccupations, the OAS sat on the sidelines as the major issues played themselves out in other forums. Called upon to help resolve the Panama crisis in 1989, the Organization suffered a humiliating setback when it was unable either to end General Manuel Noriega's rule or to prevent the United States from invading in order to depose him. Only a few months later, however, the OAS began a remarkable turnabout, starting with the Nicaraguan presidential elections of February 1990. At first, the nations of the hemisphere appeared to confirm the impotence of the OAS by recruiting the United Nations to take the lead role in monitoring the elections. Yet in a show of surprising resilience, the OAS joined forces with the UN in Nicaragua and ended up playing

Japan's 1990 general election: explaining the historic socialist victory

Abstract In the general election of February 1990 the conservative Liberal Democratic Party retained power under seemingly the worst possible circumstances, thus perpetuating the idea of its invulnerability and the idea that the Japan Socialist Party can never win. In fact, the conservatives rebounded from a series of defeats in 1989 and might have been defeated in a general election in that year. By the 1990 election, however, the window of opportunity had passed for the JSP. Nevertheless, the most important result of the election was not the conservative victory but the ability of the Socialists to draw most of the anti-conservative protest vote under its own banner. The current situation contains a significant potential for change.

Protection, economic war and structural change: the 1930s in Ireland

If I were an Irishman, I should find much to attract me in the economic outlook of your present government towards greater self-sufficiency. (J.M. Keynes)The 1930s were years of political turmoil and economic crisis and change in Ireland. Economic activity had peaked in 1929, and the last years of the Cumann na nGaedheal government (in power since the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922) saw substantial drops in output, trade and employment. The policies pursued after Fianna Fáil’s victory in the election of February 1932 were therefore influenced both by immediate economic pressures and by the party’s ideological commitments. The highly protectionist measures associated with de Valera and Lemass — key men of the new régime — sought both to create jobs quickly and to build more gradually a large indigenous industrial sector, producing primarily for the home market.Political controversy complicated matters. De Valera was regarded as a headstrong fanatic by the British establishment. His government’s refusal to hand over to Britain the so-called ‘land annuities’ — a disputed item in the Anglo-Irish settlement of 1921 — led to an ‘economic war’, in which the British Treasury sought payment instead through penal ‘emergency’ tariffs on Irish imports. The Irish imposed their own duties, bounties and licensing restrictions in turn. The economic war hurt Irish agriculture badly; the prices of fat and store cattle dropped by almost half between 1932 and mid-1935. Farmers got some relief through export bounties and the coal-cattle pacts (quota exchanges of Irish cattle for British coal) of 1935-7, but Anglo-Irish relations were not normalised again until the finance and trade agreements of the spring of 1938, and the resolution of the annuities dispute did not mean an end to protection. The questions ‘Who won the economic war?’ and ‘What was the impact of protection on the Irish economy?’ are analytically distinct, but they are not that easy to keep apart in practice.