Economic Self-interest Research Articles

Globalizing opposition to pro-environmental institutions: The growth of counter climate change organizations around the world, 1990 to 2018.

More than two decades of social scientific research has identified the growing network of corporations, think tanks, nonprofits, and advocacy organizations that aim to obstruct climate change action within the United States. Conventional arguments emphasize the role of economic self-interest (e.g., wealthy and powerful corporations) in shaping the rise of an organized "counter climate change movement" that seeks to discredit evidence about anthropogenic climate change and derail solutions to address the problem. In this paper, we track the growth of counter climate change organizations around the world and emphasize the role of reactionary cultural dynamics in driving their emergence. As climate change discourse is infused in more areas throughout society, climate change issues become more salient in the public sphere, generating adversarial grievances, identities, and mobilization among oppositional groups. Drawing on panel logistic regression models for 162-164 countries from 1990 to 2018, we find that counter climate change organizations are most likely to develop in countries with more extensive state policies and structures oriented toward protecting the natural environment, net of a variety of factors that account for a country's economic interests or its overall capacity to produce domestic associations.

The Politics of Social Welfare: The BJP and the Discerning Voter

Voting studies tell us that voters reward incumbents who take care of the economic self-interest of voters. However, is the relationship between services and votes simple and straightforward? Are there conditions when welfare provisioning does not convert into votes for the incumbent? Data from the National Election Studies 2024 appears to suggest that voters are discerning and concerned about access issues when it comes to welfare delivery. Voters do not cast their votes only on whether they received private (welfare) benefits but also consider factors such as their experience and well-being while accessing those goods and services. Examining the relationship between welfare services and voting, the article demonstrates that individual-level processes are politically significant enough to influence vote choices between the benefits and the votes. These findings could inform scholarly studies and policy debates on social service delivery and vote choice.

Ideology, financial circumstances, and attitudes toward public and private foreign aid

Does ideology influence voter preferences for foreign aid in the same way it does for domestic redistribution? Economically vulnerable left-leaning citizens, who are normatively strong proponents of government aid, may not be as committed to increasing actual spending. Such citizens may see themselves as competing with the foreign poor for domestic resources. Similarly, while affluent right-leaning citizens may oppose increasing foreign aid due to skepticism about government spending, this might not extend to private donations. Instead, they may view non-governmental organizations and charities as alternatives that leverage private expertise to assist poor countries. Using four years of public opinion data from 15 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development donor countries, I find support for the conditional effect of ideology and economic self-interest on both public and private aid attitudes. By focusing on three different measures—the morality of aid, public aid spending, and private donations—I further explore variations in aid attitudes.

National Dependence and Public Perceptions: Understanding the Economic Determinants of Foreign Policy Preferences Toward China

The relationship between economic dependence and foreign influence has become an increasingly prominent topic in International Relations. However, academic studies and public discussion largely overlook that dependence could influence not only states’ official policies but also the foreign policy preferences of their populations. In addition, they simplistically assume that material dependence directly establishes influence without considering additional complexities brought on by actors’ perceptions of such realities. This could lead to misunderstandings regarding the mechanisms through which economic dependence leads to foreign influence. The problem is especially glaring in relation to China, whose economic clout has been argued to represent a key vector of its global influence. This article studies how economic dependence shapes the foreign policy preferences of populations around the world and, thereby, constitutes a vector of China’s international influence. We use novel public opinion data from more than 79,000 respondents in 54 countries to clarify the relative weight of material economic realities and public perceptions of them in shaping foreign policy preferences toward China. In doing so, we also establish the relative extent to which individuals base their preferences on an egoistic or sociotropic sense of economic self-interest. Our results illustrate that perceptions outweigh economic realities in shaping preferences on China. Furthermore, economic dependence has no uniform effects on national populations, suggesting that its effects are primarily expressed through egotropic ways. Our results suggest that the disconnect between perceptions of China’s economic importance and material realities needs to be closely considered when studying China’s international influence.

Econometric Determinants of Chinese Developmental Finance in Sub-Saharan Africa; Further Evidence using a Flow-Type Decomposed Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Model

Chinese “aid” has long engendered criticism. Western pundits and policymakers posit it as a political tool employed by Beijing to asway foreign policy concessions and secure natural resources access for its domestic industries, often atthe expense of the recipient country. However, we argue that large amounts of these claims lack empirical scrutiny or have been hindered by enduring conceptual, methodological, and data-centric constraints. This paper thus aims to refine and integrate prevailing methodological practices to produce a more nuanced understanding of Chinese motivations. Using empirical regression analysis and a newly released granular dataset spanning 48 Sub-Saharan African countries from 2000-2021, we: (1) decompose Chinese “aid” into flow types of relative concessionality; (2) utilize a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator to mitigate log-transformation and heteroskedasticity concerns present within traditional modeling of zero-inflated datasets; (3) retain a subset of contemporary values to deal with issues related to simultaneity in our regressors. Our findings suggest that while developmental goals primarily drive concessional aid, commercial lending is moreso influenced by economic self-interest, which is often incorrectly conflated with “aid” in the traditional sense. Further, Chinese “aid” does not flow disproportionately to corrupt or authoritarian regimes. This challenges the dominant “rogue donor” narrative and contributes to a more comprehensive perspective on China's emerging role in global developmental finance.

Fairness predispositions towards the rich and the poor and support for redistribution in the Nordic welfare state

The impact of individuals’ fairness predispositions on public support for the welfare state receives less attention than the effect of economic self-interest on this support. Amid growing income differences even in previously egalitarian Nordic countries, predispositions about what is fair in society are rapidly becoming more politically salient. We examine how fairness predispositions towards the rich and the poor are linked to the support for three dimensions regarding how redistribution ought to be organised: access, conditionality and contribution. We then disaggregate these links for different income brackets and between elites who hold leadership positions and the rest of society (citizens). Using data pertaining to Finnish citizens and elites in 2018 and 2020, respectively, we show that the two fairness predispositions are related in various ways to the support for these three dimensions, with differences across income brackets and tentative differences between elites and citizens. These findings underline the importance of considering fairness predispositions even in welfare states emphasising economic equality.

Standing with Ukraine? How citizens trade off self-interest and principles in supporting war-torn international partners

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an attack on democracy, human rights, and the international order. While European democracies have supported their war-torn partner, Russia has sought to undermine public support by stopping its gas supply and imposing economic costs on European citizens. In consequence, Europeans find themselves caught between economic self-interest and principles. We present a theoretical argument and test how corresponding arguments for and against continued backing of Ukraine affect citizens’ support using experimental and observational data collected while concerns with gas shortage and inflation mounted in Germany and Denmark. We find that support for Ukraine does not falter due to economic concerns. In contrast, citizens become more supportive when presented with arguments related to human rights, democracy, and respect for territorial boundaries. We discuss implications for understanding citizens’ responses to autocratic power strategies and how support likely depends on the type of partner and domestic elite rhetoric.

The gender gap in attitudes toward workplace technological change

Abstract We provide the first systematic analysis of how attitudes toward workplace automation and artificial intelligence (AI) vary by gender, using survey data from ten countries. Our analyses reveal a significant gender gap in the perceived fairness of automation and AI, similar in magnitude to that of job offshoring. Drawing on the literature on economic shocks, we examine four explanations based on gender differences in (a) economic self-interest, (b) technological knowledge, (c) sociotropic concerns and (d) social status perceptions. Including these variables in our models, however, narrows the observed gender gap by only 40%. To better understand the sources of attitudinal variation by gender, we rely on Kitagawa–Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, which shows that distributional differences in group characteristics, specifically women’s lower levels of technological knowledge and self-reported social status, account for approximately one-third of the gap, while the other two-thirds are explained by differences in how specific variables differentially influence attitudes.

Nonstandard consumption forms: A comparative analysis

The author introduces a category of nonstandard consumption, which remarkably differs from conventional patterns of pursuing economic self-interests. Based upon previous studies, a comparative analysis of panic, impulsive and compulsive buying as well as status and ethical consumption is conducted. Empirically, spread of these forms of consumption and their associations with the consumer preferences are revealed along with antecedents of each form. Data were collected from a nationwide representative survey of the Russian population aged 18+. The survey was conducted by the HSE University in June—July 2023 in 55 regions of Russia as face-to-face interviews by place of residence. The sample includes 6,000 respondents. Apart from descriptive statistics, factor analysis is used for structuring consumer preferences and logistic regressions are used to estimate the main predictors of nonstandard forms of consumption. It has been revealed that all five forms of nonstandard consumption are associated at a high level of significance and characterize more active groups of consumers. Significant relations of each consumption form are investigated with the social and demographic parameters, per capita income, types of residence, involvement into online shopping, use of various information channels, and the level of psychological distress.

Do Parties Matter? Party Positions and European Voters’ Attitudes toward Economic and Political Globalization

Abstract To what extent do party positions influence voters’ attitudes toward the economic and political aspects of globalization? Initially an issue following a left-right dimension of conflict, globalization increasingly divides mainstream from nonmainstream parties. In this study, I argue that parties help citizens form opinions on globalization issues. I then use data on voters’ attitudes and party positions on globalization to test this supply-side theory of globalization attitudes on both economic and political dimensions. Holding demand-side factors such as economic self-interest and predispositions/values constant, I find that party positions strongly affect voters’ views on economic and political globalization, with the effect being similar to that of education. Moreover, I find that the effect of cues from left- and right-populist parties is much more negative than that of mainstream parties, replicating previous elite-level findings on the positioning of these party families. Finally, green party cues show conflicting results for the economic and political dimensions, with green cues affecting voters negatively on economic globalization but positively on political globalization. The findings in this study call for a deeper exploration of the supply-side determinants of globalization attitudes.

Women's Employment, Husbands’ Economic Self-Interest and Domestic Violence

Women's Employment, Husbands’ Economic Self-Interest and Domestic Violence

Political Activities of Roman Senators during the Visigothic Siege of Rome (408–410 AD)

This article analyses the position of the Roman senatorial aristocracy in the early fifth century, namely in 408–410 AD. Based on a set of sources, primarily, information obtained from the works of Zosimus and Olympiodorus, the author concludes that representatives of the Roman Senate were independent subjects of the political process, especially after the fall of the Stilicho regime, when the aristocrats lost their usual patronage from the central government due to Alaric’s siege of Rome in 408. In their new position, senators needed to quickly get used to performing a wide range of political, primarily diplomatic, functions, and mainly, find ways to reach a compromise on various issues within the class. The actions of the senators, led by Alaric's protйgй Priscus Attalus, to resolve the food crisis in Rome, normalise the situation in the capital and reach a consensus with Honorius' government in Ravenna were unsuccessful. The Roman senators were unable to fulfil their duties because of the discrepancy between their ideas about the conduct of political affairs and reality, the habit of acting on the basis of personal interests, the refusal to act in the interests of the corporation and of Rome as a whole, and ethnic hostility towards the Visigoths. It should also be taken into account that the failure of the Roman senators to pursue an independent policy could be linked to the lack of leaders recognised by all, or at least most, of the senators. Finally, Zosimus' comments on the political incompetence of Roman senators and their economic self-interest in the early fifth century should be treated with caution.

On the preferences for an environmentally friendly and fair energy transition: A stated choice experiment for Germany

Based on data from a stated choice experiment in Germany, this paper empirically examines individual preferences for several components of three hypothetical energy policy packages and the status quo policy package of the German energy transition. Our econometric analysis with mixed logit and latent class logit models reveals a high preference for higher targeted shares of renewable energies and for the nuclear phase-out. With respect to the allocation of energy policy costs, we find that the polluter-pays rule is significantly preferred over the ability-to-pay and equal-pay rules. Furthermore, citizens have a significantly positive preference for the financial support for low-income households. These results suggest a strong support for environmentally ambitious energy policy measures that are additionally associated with a fair burden sharing of the corresponding costs. In terms of preference heterogeneity, our empirical analysis reveals that political identification plays an important role for the preferences for environmentally ambitious energy policy measures. Furthermore, high equivalent income has a significantly negative effect on the preferences for the ability-to-pay rule, suggesting the relevance of economic self-interest. In addition, our empirical analysis reveals a strong relevance of trust (besides altruism and perceived unfair cost distribution) for the preferences for social cushioning. This result suggests that it is important for policymakers to convince the population that such social cushioning measures are actually implemented.

Geographic divides in protectionism: the social context approach with evidence from Japan

Though many studies have analyzed public opinion of trade liberalization, they do not fully explain regional disparities in people’s preferences with regard to trade. To explain such a geographic division, this paper focuses on differences in social contexts that exist between regions, which is composed of social networks of different characteristics and distinct news coverage from local media. By utilizing multiple recent public opinion surveys conducted in Japan, we confirm that individuals in rural areas are less likely to support trade liberalization and Japan’s membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) independent of individuals’ economic self-interest or skills. With multiple surveys and data on Japanese national and local newspapers, we investigate the mechanisms, showing that (a) individuals whose communication network includes people working for a sector vulnerable to trade liberalization tend to oppose free trade regardless of the industry they work for and that (b) newspapers circulated in rural and urban places tend to cover TPP differently, which also impacts people’s attitudes toward the agreement. By analyzing the mechanisms of sociotropic considerations, our social context approach could eventually lead to further uncovering the formation of public opinion on trade.

Economic Self-Interest or Cultural Threat? Migrant Unemployment and Class-based Support for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

Labor market competition theory has traditionally analyzed the threat perceived by lower and middle class’ natives on competition over jobs with immigrants. However, in this article we focus on the fiscal burden and competition for social benefits generated by unemployed immigrants and its impact on the vote for Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs). Combining individual-level data and aggregate unemployment indicators for over 60 regions from 10 EU countries, we show that, on the one hand, upper class natives seem to support PRRPs when migrant unemployment rates are higher, irrespective of migrants’ origin, which is consistent with the fiscal burden model. On the other hand, lower and middle class natives are more likely to support PRRPs only in contexts of higher unemployment rates among non-EU migrants (but not among migrants from other EU member states), pointing towards an interaction between cultural and economic explanations. These findings underscore the need to account for migrant populations’ characteristics and to consider not only labor competition, but also the fiscal burden to better understand how unemployment may impact PRRP voting.

Reputation and commercialism: Did accounting have a golden age? The US audit profession 1929–1990

This paper argues that maintaining the CPA’s reputation, along with a collegial professional environment, were the central goals of the American audit profession through most of the twentieth century. Matthews (2017) and Lee (1995) contend that economic self-interest has always been the profession’s goal. This paper, based on extensive study of primary sources largely unused by accounting historians, argues that the existing record is not consistent with an economic self-interest thesis. Magali Larson argued in The Rise of Professionalism that professionals tend to pursue social status and collegiality over profit seeking. Auditors worked to maintain the quiet, collegial profession that enhanced their self-image as professionals, not businessmen. But this proved to be unsustainable as the American economy expanded and a market-based ethic pervaded American culture and government in the last third of the twentieth century.

Dewey, Implementation, and Creating a Democratic Civic University

Dewey, Implementation, and Creating a Democratic Civic University

Foundering on fallacies: theorizing the Eurozone’s self-harming mercantilism

The Eurozone’s export-oriented policy regime and pursuit of trade surpluses remains thoroughly puzzling. Rooted in overly strict fiscal policies, inequality and underinvestment; undermining growth and contributing to trade tensions– it defies economic self-interest. This paper develops an analytical framework to confront this puzzle. It argues that these policies are self-harming, but are nonetheless pursued, because of three fallacies that obscure the cost-benefit calculus attached to them. These fallacies are rooted in the empirical problem of observational equivalence: the same observed surplus can be driven by different underlying processes, and its net benefit will depend on our assumptions about these drivers. The first fallacy is mistaking external enablers for domestic competitiveness—interpreting export success to be linked to domestic reform, when it was largely explained by better links to faster growing trading partners. The second fallacy is mistaking weak imports for strong exports—interpreting surpluses as ‘winning’, even when they are not driven by superior exports but sluggish imports. The third fallacy is mismeasuring multinational firms’ contributions to national exports—interpreting profit shifting and assets stashed in low tax jurisdictions as export performance. Germany and Ireland, as paradigmatic ‘success cases of austerity’, are used to expand the argument.

Activating Self-Interest: The Role of Party Polarization in Preferences for Redistribution

Although extensive research has analyzed the factors that moderate economic self-interest—the relationship between individuals’ income positions and their preferences for redistribution—there is little crossnational research that analyzes the role of political parties. This article argues that political parties play a considerable moderating role in (de-)activating economic self-interest based on the polarization they display in their economic and cultural positions. By combining the World/European Values Survey, the World Income Inequality Database, and the Comparative Manifesto Project datasets, the analyses estimate the moderating effect of party polarization on economic self-interest. The results suggest that economic polarization enhances self-interest for the poor (respondents below the mean income), even when controlling for income inequality, but not for the rich. Moreover, cultural polarization also appears to reinforce self-interest for the poor, rather than supplanting it. The findings have important implications regarding ability for political parties to activate issues among the public.

Authorship and individualization in the digital public sphere

Authorship and individualization in the digital public sphere