As in other recent cases of momentous political change after long years of stalemate and stagnation, the pace of reform in the six counties of the north of Ireland has quickened since the mid 1990s. The current peace process has its roots in the Anglo-Irish agreement of 1985, which established an Intergovernmental Conference of Irish and British ministers to discuss political and legal matters relevant to Northern Ireland. Despite considerable Protestant Unionist opposition to the agreement, five years later the British government launched an initiative to convene discussions between the parties of the north and south and themselves about a possible future settlement framework. However, the late 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by burgeoning paramilitary atrocities and political intransigence. It was not until the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993 that the horizon brightened and negotiations 'between all significant actors began to be a real possibility. The Declaration outlined structures for peace negotiations, allowed for the possibility of a united Ireland, and unequivocally accepted the legitimacy of self-determination within the province. After nine months of wrangling, the initiative of British Prime Minister John Major and the Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds intrigued the Irish Republican Army (IRA) sufficiently for it to announce a cessation of violence, which was accompanied by loyalist paramilitary cease-fires.1 In December 1995, the framework was given teeth in discus-