The two global norms that are most widely recognized in our world are human rights and the principle of national self-determination. Sometimes these norms are presented as complementary, sometimes as rivals. Of the two, national self determination seems to have secured more widespread acceptance. No doubt the uncertain meaning of national self-determination has aided its widespread popu larity. Quite what sort of entity (or 'self') does the adjective 'national' describe? What sort of arrangements does 'self-determination' demand? Those who apparently share a common commitment to the principle of national self-determination can nevertheless give markedly different answers to these questions. Moreover, whatever meaning we give to national self-determination, its reality has long been questioned and is increasingly challenged by the forces of globalization. Yet, although the idea of national self-determination is fraught with problems, it is not one that seems to trouble people's consciences in quite the same way as the idea of human rights. People may feel more or less warmly towards the principle of national self-determination, but nowadays they do not generally wring their hands about the global reach of the principle. They do not feel that it constitutes an imposition by one part of the world upon another. By contrast, many people do entertain reservations about the global pretensions that accompany the doctrine of human rights. Even if they themselves are won over by the doctrine, they often hesitate about the propriety of implementing it in a comprehensively global fashion. In this article, I want to track down the thought that seems to underlie this unease and to examine how far that thought should really make us hesitate about giving the idea of human rights a truly universal status.