Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism

Abstract

In 1979 and 1982, Peter Schwab and I coedited two volumes on human rights which challenged the prevailing view as to the universality of the Western liberal concept of individual human rights.1 A debate ensued between advocates of relativism and those of universalism. Within each paradigm, there are variations with regard to the roots of rights, the priority of specific rights, and their very substance.2 However, these are not of critical importance for my purpose. More than a decade has passed since the cultural relativist argument was first put forth, and it behooves one to evaluate its continuing theoretical and empirical validity. The passage of time has not diminished the salience of the early claim that in many societies-Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe (including Russia), and the Middle East-the liberal doctrine of human rights does not speak to the people's world view. The ontological foundations of their cultures and society, often reinforced by the political regime on matters such as the nature of man/woman, her/his identity, and the person's relatedness to others and to society, differ in significant ways. Belief systems, values, and basic concepts, frequently articulated in nontranslatable words (hence the concepts are nontransferable),3 were and remain markedly different from those in the West.