HOW MORALITY STRUCTURES THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PROPERTY

Abstract

To one aware of the persistence and severity of ancient and modern attacks on private property, the allegiance to private property characteristic of contemporary proponents of human rights may appear remarkable, indeed, mind‐boggling. However, I believe that philosophers committed to human rights identify private property with the human right to property because of their unwarranted confidence in the moral justifiability, and hence the moral acceptability, of private property. In company with John Locke, today's supporters of the view that persons have the human right to property believe that moral reasoning based upon the foundational beliefs of a doctrine of human rights ultimately establishes property to be a human right. Subsequently, they diligently seek morality's sanction for the appropriation, accumulation, and the use and disposal of things in the manner associated with private property. Private property is, therefore, virtually unopposed in its bid for the property chair in the exclusive human rights club. Though decried by opponents as robbery and massively unjust, in theory this form of ownership is remarkably unscathed behind a fortress of arguments. In practice, many societies currently purporting to have instantiated private property in their institutional arrangements have so mitigated property rights that the concept of private property is inapplicable. However, in combination with widespread and strong commitment to private property, the fortress of moral justification for a human right to private property is a serious obstacle to changing a society's property arrangements.