Diplomatic Confrontation Research Articles

Transnational Business and US Diplomacy in Late Nineteenth-Century South America: W. R. Grace & Co. and the Chilean Crises of 1891

AbstractThe final decades of the nineteenth century were marked by diplomatic confrontations between Chile and the United States. In 1891 the killing of US Navy sailors in a riot in Valparaíso threatened to provoke armed conflict, an event known as the Baltimore Crisis. This article investigates how William Russell Grace, the head of a merchant firm based in New York, played a central role in negotiating between Chile and the United States. By placing his activities in a transnational framework, Grace responded to the demands of multiple nation-states in the Americas. Observing changes in Grace's transnational economic infrastructure can help to identify larger long-term shifts in diplomacy and power on South America's Pacific coast in the late nineteenth century, especially Chile's emergence as a regional hegemon. The actions of Grace also raise larger questions regarding the power of business in the Americas in the late nineteenth century, especially with regard to growing US interests in the region.

The Macedonian name dispute and European Union accession

This essay assesses Greece role in determining the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s (FYROM’s) European Union (EU) accession process. Based on documentary evidence, extensive interviews with decision-makers and leaked diplomatic cables, it emerges that Skopje’s path towards Brussels has consistently passed through Athens, linked to disputes concerning the republic’s name and good neighbourly relations. When improvements in bilateral relations have been evinced (1995–2004, 2004–2006), FYROM signed a stabilization and association agreement and became an EU candidate state. During periods of diplomatic confrontation (1991–1994, 2006–2011), the new republic was non-recognized by Athens, did not accede to North Atlantic Treaty Organization and failed to get a date to begin accession negotiations. It is concluded that only if Greece’s relative gain concerns are adequately assuaged will FYROM’s Euro-Atlantic path be completed.

Pressing the fight: print, propaganda, and the Cold War

This title includes original essays on the role of the printed word in the ideological struggle between East and West. Although often framed as an economic, military, and diplomatic confrontation, the Cold War was above all a conflict of ideas. In official pronouncements and publications as well as via radio broadcasts, television, and film, the United States and the Soviet Union both sought to extend their global reach as much through the power of persuasion as by the use of force. Yet of all the means each side employed to press its ideological case, none proved more reliable or successful than print. In this volume, scholars from a variety of disciplines explore the myriad ways print was used in the Cold War. Looking at materials ranging from textbooks and cookbooks to art catalogs, newspaper comics, and travel guides, they analyze not only the content of printed matter but also the material circumstances of its production, the people and institutions that disseminated it, and the audiences that consumed it. Among the topics discussed are the infiltration of book publishing by propagandists East and West; the distribution of pro-American printed matter in postwar Japan through libraries, schools, and consulates; and, the collaboration of foundations, academia, and the government in the promotion of high culture as evidence of the superiority of Western values. At the same time, many of the qualities that made print the preferred medium of official propaganda also made it an effective instrument for challenging Cold War orthodoxies at home and abroad. Because printed materials were relatively easy to transport, to copy, and to share, they could just as well be used to bridge differences among people and cultures as to exploit them. They also provided a vehicle for disseminating satire and other expressions of dissent. In addition to the volume editors, contributors include Ed Brunner, Russell Cobb, Laura Jane Gifford, Patricia Hills, Christian Kanig, Scott Laderman, Amanda Laugesen, Martin Manning, Kristin Mathews, Hiromi Ochi, Amy Reddinger, and James Smith. Together their essays move beyond traditional Cold War narratives to gauge the role of a crucial cultural medium in the ideological battle between the superpowers and their surrogates.

Storiografi, diplomatici e mitografici secenteschi tra Italia e Portogallo

This article examines the exchange that took place between Portugal and the Italian intellectual community during the 17th century from an historiographical, political and literary viewpoint. In particular, it investigates Italy’s response to the asymmetry that had traditionally characterized Portugal as peripheral nation on the one hand and empire on the other. An analysis is made of Italian historiographical works connected with the ‘union’ and the ‘disunion’ of Portugal with respect to Castile between 1580 and 1640, including the monographs of Girolamo Conestagio and Giambattista Birago Avogadro, as well as travel writings, historical and political essays (Bentivoglio, Botero, Venetian ambassadors, Laffi, Leti, Siri and Buonfiglio Costanzo) and literary works (Boccalini, Tassoni, Salvetti and Battista). Lastly, a detailed analysis is presented of the diplomatic confrontation between Fulvio Testi and F.M. de Melo, together with a look at how Sebastianism was received in Italy, focusing on the “faux Sébastien” and such renowned intellectuals as Sarpi, Pallavicino, Spontone, Torsellini and Conestagio, who wrote in verse.

International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China: Translation, Reception and Discourse, 1847-1911 (review)

Reviewed by: International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China: Translation, Reception and Discourse, 1847-1911 Thomas Buoye (bio) Rune Svarverud . International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China: Translation, Reception and Discourse, 1847-1911. Leiden: Brill, 2007. x, 322 pp. Hardcover $99.00, ISBN 978-90-04-16019-4. Rune Svarverud's International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China: Translation, Reception and Discourse, 1847-1911 is an impressive work of scholarship that deserves a serious reading from scholars of legal as well as intellectual history of late imperial China. Svarverud wants to show "how international law was translated, interpreted and received in China as a theoretical framework for conducting international relations, and how a Chinese discourse on questions related to China's role and identity in international relations developed from and within the theories of international law" (p. 3). At the outset, Svarverud clearly notes that his work is not diplomatic history but intellectual history. The author is interested in the discourse of international law in China and how this discourse changed from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the end of the Qing. Deftly sidestepping the simple dichotomy of Western international law and traditional Chinese views of inter-state relations, Svarverud acknowledges the complexity of traditional diplomacy and posits four competing perspectives on international relations in the late Qing. Adopting a relatively compact historical narrative, Svarverud takes the Lin Zexu's pre-Opium War efforts to translate works as his starting point and the Sino-Japanese War as the critical turning point in the Chinese discourse on international law. According to the author, the intellectual adaptation of international law as a theory, which began in the wake of Sino-Japanese War, was consolidated during the Russo-Japanese War. Chapter 1 addresses linguistic issues, defines the intellectual pedigree, and frames the meta-narrative of the work. Wisely acknowledging that a number of studies "reveal that the Chinese court conducted their foreign relations on a much more flexible basis with larger fluctuations over time" (p. 12), the author delineates two traditional frameworks—the tribute system and an analogous system of private trading—and two modern frameworks—social Darwinism and international law—for interstate relations. Aside from a gentle remonstrance of John Fairbank's claim that "the great traditions of the Chinese world order" made adjustments to Western international law difficult, Svarverud's work broadens the field of inquiry rather than toppling existing interpretations. Chapter 2 primarily provides a succinct overview of the history of international law in the West. While the chapter offers nothing new or controversial, it will likely be a welcome tutorial for Sinocentric scholars. The tension between theory and practice, which is always just below the surface in this work, comes to the fore in this chapter. By insisting on focusing on the "processes of intellectual adaptation of international law as a theory in the Chinese discourse" (p. 27), the author does not feel compelled to address lessons that Chinese intellectuals may [End Page 163] have learned from diplomatic confrontations that occurred prior to the translation of major works on international law in the nineteenth century. Comparing Chinese translations of legal terminology in three major Western works on international law, chapter 3 demonstrates the author's formidable linguistic skills. The work of foreign translators in the employ of Chinese officials, Peter Parker, W. A. P. Martin, and John Fryer, provided the first comprehensive Chinese versions of major Western works on international law. Svarverud's painstaking analysis of these works illustrates the linguistic hurdles that Western international law posed for early translations. Chapter 4 looks at the early discourse on international law prior to the Sino-Japanese War. The author examines the opinions of an array of Chinese observers including Guo Songtao, first ambassador to London and Paris; Zheng Guangying, merchant and reformer; Wang Tao; and Zhang Zhidong. While Chinese opinion varied on key points, many agreed that a relatively weak China might gain some protection from adherence to international law. Svarverud concludes that prior to the Sino-Japanese War, experience and knowledge in international law were lacking. However, the realization "that China can only be recognized in international affairs if she...

A War with No Winners

It is difficult to understand what prompted Mikheil Saakashvili to transform the Russian–Georgian cold war into a hot one. The Georgian leader would have been better off rallying a diplomatic coalition to pressure Moscow. His attack, whether provoked or not, has undermined his international credibility. Now some of his allies in the United States and Europe blame him for igniting a crisis which has cost his nation dearly and lowered the threshold for Russian military intervention in Russia's ‘near abroad’. The conflict also became a diplomatic confrontation between Russia and the West. In this test of wills, none of the parties – Georgia, Russia or the West – has emerged as a winner. The post-Cold War world order, built on the assumption that Russia and the West could settle all their differences by peaceful means, has been challenged.

Oil and the Origins of the Great War

AbstractThis article looks at the strategic if little‐known role of oil and construction of the Berlin to Baghdad railway link between the German Reich and the Persian Gulf through what is today Iraq, in igniting an economic, military, and diplomatic confrontation in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and how it ultimately contributed to the move to war in 1914. This article will set down the background to this contentious issue, and analyze the various interpretations that authors have set down in the past. It will argue that despite appearances, the British Empire was in decline after about 1873 while the new German economic colossus presented an entirely new challenge to British hegemony. To secure future domination of the seas, after 1882 leading British circles around Admiral Fischer and Winston Churchill pushed through the conversion of the Royal Navy from coal to oil. The article goes into how the Berlin‐Baghdad presented an unacceptable strategic threat to that vital strategy. The various phases in the buildup to the Great War will be examined, along with the role of oil within this broad framework. Finally, the author will posit his own conclusions to this debate.

Reporting the 2001 textbook and Yasukuni Shrine controversies: Japanese war memory and commemoration in the British media

In the summer of 2001 there were two major controversies concerning Japanese memory and commemoration of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific: a textbook controversy triggered by the nationalist group, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Tsukurukai) and a row triggered by Prime Minister Koizumi's worship at Yasukuni Shrine. This article presents a critique of how the two controversies were reported in the British quality media. It argues that the British media's reportage was a representative example of the ‘orthodox’ interpretation of Japanese war memory. By focusing on ‘newsworthy’ controversies, the stance of the Japanese government and diplomatic confrontation between Japan and China/South Korea, the British media's reportage presented a largely stereotypical and biased version of Japanese war memory that under-represented its complexity and contested nature. The media's reportage is critiqued using the theoretical frameworks of media theory, war memory theory and orientalism, as well as Japanese accounts of the crises.

Famine and Reform in North Korea

North Korea has been experiencing a food emergency for more than a decade, and in the 1990s experienced a famine that may have claimed one million lives. The crisis is distinguished by its protracted nature, and while conditions have eased somewhat in recent years, the situation remains quite precarious and the country could lapse back into famine. This paper examines the origins of the food crisis, the impact of the 1990s famine, and the prospects for resolution of the North Korean emergency in light of economic reforms initiated in 2002 and the subsequent diplomatic confrontation over the country's nuclear program.

Famine and Reform in North Korea

North Korea has been in a food emergency for more than a decade and in the 1990s experienced a famine that may have claimed one million lives. The crisis is distinguished by its protracted nature, and although conditions have eased somewhat in recent years, the situation remains precarious, and the country could lapse back into famine. This paper reviews the origins of the North Korean food crisis, the impact of the 1990s famine, and the prospects for resolution of the emergency in light of economic reforms initiated in 2002 and the subsequent diplomatic confrontation over the country's nuclear weapons program.

International Law and the Dispute over the Spratly Islands: Whither UNCLOS?

Where does the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sit vis-a-vis the ongoing disputes over the Spratly Islands? The present row between the Philippines, China, and Malaysia over their respective claims to the Spratly archipelago highlights the tendency of policy officials and the political leadership to invoke the name of UNCLOS to either justify their claims and/or to cast aspersions on the behaviour of other claimants. This discourse, however, reveals the poor understanding that many have of UNCLOS, its provisions and the extent to which it can provide a workable framework for resolving this particular jurisdictional dispute. This article reviews the relevant terms and articles contained in UNCLOS and provides a realistic assessment of its potential contribution. In addition to highlighting the strengths of UNCLOS, the discussion will also point to its very real limitations. Introduction The recent tension between China and the Philippines over their respective claims to the Spratly Islands is the latest round in a territorial dispute that has plagued the Asia-Pacific region for several decades. Thus far, the Spratlys conflict has eluded any sort of lasting settlement. Instead, the frequent (almost annual) diplomatic confrontations and the occasional military tensions over the islands have been managed in a piecemeal and ad hoc way by the six states involved - Brunei, Malaysia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Philippines, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, and Vietnam (the Spratly six). Whenever tensions arise, there is a flurry of activity -- Philippine air force jets fly over Mischief Reef taking pictures of China's latest renovations to its structures on the reef, communiques are sent, and diplomats are dispatched. While a region-wide military crisis has been averted thus far, many analysts and policy-makers agree that this annual pattern is too risky to continue indefinitely. The threat that this ongoing dispute presents to regional stability calls for a more stable mechanism to resolve it peacefully. In the midst of the accusations and the ongoing search for solutions, officials from virtually all of the concerned governments have invoked the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter referred to as UNCLOS or the Convention) to justify their own behaviour while also casting aspersions on the behaviour of the other(s). Having been signed and ratified by all of the Spratly six, [1] UNCLOS represents the only framework/set-of-rules that has been commonly agreed upon for establishing oceanic boundaries. As a result, it offers the claimants a common foundation from which to begin their negotiations. UNCLOS, however, is not without its own shortcomings. While it is a useful piece of international legislation, it cannot be applied blindly to the Spratly conflict. Although the Spratlys conflict is in many ways a straightforward territorial dispute, it is also a function of the region's unique set of historical and geopolitical considerations that challenge the ability of the Convention to provide an authoritative framework that all the parties can use. Consequently, applying the Convention to this particular issue requires special consideration. UNCLOS, of course, does not seek to resolve territorial disputes. Rather, it is meant to provide a standard against which any co-operative arrangement regarding the Spratlys should be measured. The purpose of this article is to discuss whether or not the Convention is, on its own, an appropriate guide. In order to do this, the article will provide an overview of the history and genesis of the Spratlys dispute and, in doing so, review each government's claim. The article will then examine some of the Convention's key provisions. Set against this backdrop, the assessment will highlight some of the challenges UNCLOS confronts in trying to provide the claimants with a workable framework. …

Doing business in Macedonia: Greek problems in British perspective (1912–1921)1

British financial concerns in Greek Macedonia in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars were four: the status of the port and the city of Salonica after the partition of its hinterland and under Greek law; the regular conduct of trade; the sufficient provisioning of the allied expeditionary forces (from the fall of 1915 onwards) under the auspices of the Greek Provisional Government of Eleftherios Venizelos; and business, not necessarily related directly to the war effort. None of these cares was an isolated target nor were they the consequent stages of a single plan. They were simply aspects of a global financial interest which aimed to restore British influence in the region as well as to safeguard the spoils of victory against Bulgaria. After considerable difficulties in the region, foreign interest failed to take the shape of British investments. Moreover, the inability of the Greek state to provide sufficiently for the development of the Macedonian economy and the integration of its society led to diplomatic confrontations with its neighbours.

Obstacles to a Political Settlement in Indochina

ROM THE ONSET of the 1984-85 dry season in Indochina, the I Vietnamese seized the military initiative. By the time their offensive had run its course, their expeditionary force in Kampuchea had captured the major base camps of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, the Khmer Rouge and the Sihanoukists along the border with Thailand. Notwithstanding this military achievement, they did not destroy the military structure of the Khmer resistance. In the most important case, the Khmer Rouge, their main forces dispersed rather than give battle and regrouped in smaller units. They have continued to pose an insurgent challenge in the interior of Kampuchea, particularly in the fertile Tonle-Sap region, and to strike at Vietnamese lines of communication to the Thai border.' Whatever the effect of that dry season offensive on the international standing of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and on the credibility of China as its principal patron, the military outcome in Kampuchea has not been conclusive. Moreover, at the level of diplomatic confrontation between the Indochinese states and ASEAN, attitudes have hardened, so that Indonesia is now less of a dissenting member of the association.2 As a consequence, the underlying obstacles to a political settlement of the Kampuchea issue have not been overcome in any sense. The object of this article is to identify those obstacles which have made the Third Indochina War a more complex and intractable, if less dramatic, problem than its two predecessors. The prime obstacle to a political settlement in Indochina is a fundamental conflict of security priorities expressed with reference to the appropriate political identity and external affiliations of Kampuchea.

Notes, Documents, and Bibliographies

Princess Lieven's Last Diplomatic Confrontation; Daniel H. Thomas Faisal Ibn Husairi and the Zionists: A Re-examination with Documents; Neil Caplan

Germany and the Fashoda Crisis, 1898–99

Historians have generally limited their interest in the Fashoda Crisis to the Anglo-French diplomatic confrontation, which they believe ultimately led to a general understanding on African matters and to the Entente Cordiale. The crisis itself, however, had ramifications which went far beyond the complexities of British-French relations and which historians have yet to appreciate fully. The incident on the Nile precipitated a complete, if temporary, turnabout in France's revanchist policy toward Germany, and equally important, it offered Germany two possible options to defuse the antagonism France had held toward her since the treaty of Frankfurt twenty-seven years before: Germany could encourage war between the two nations or she could join France in an understanding, if not an alliance, against Great Britain in order to counter British dominance in Africa.

Sino-Soviet State Relations 1969-1982: An Attempt at Clarification

Although relations between the Communist parties of the USSR and the PRC were broken off in 1964, 'state-to-state' relations never ruptured completely. Since the severe crisis of 1969, caused by the Cultural Revolution and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, both governments have called for a 'normalization' of state relations but have accompanied such appeals with a great deal of mutual vituperation, hostile diplomatic maneuvering and military confrontation. During this period the Sino-Soviet conflict has changed character and new issues have emerged replacing old ones as obstacles to friendly relations. This article reviews developments in strictly bilateral state relations since 1969 in an effort to make clear precisely what negotiations have taken place, what proposals and demands have been made by either side, and what the issues currently are. In the concluding section some explanations are offered for why relations have developed as they have, and the prediction is made that Sino- Soviet relations will continue to improve moderately, but that the main issues are likely neither to be solved nor shelved.

Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits

In light of the growing concern over Turkey's future in the NATO alliance at a time when Soviet interest and influence in the eastern Mediterranean have increased, the postwar test of diplomatic strength between the United States and the Soviet Union over the status of the Turkish Straits acquires greater significance. Since much of the 1946 debate concerning revision of the Montreux Convention involved an interpretation of Turkey's role as custodian of the Straits during the war, it is necessary to review in detail the origins of Turkish neutrality, Turkey's wartime record as guardian of the Straits, and discussions among the Allied powers relative to revision of the Montreux Convention. These episodes in the complex history of the Straits question constitute the immediate background and framework for the 1946 political and diplomatic confrontation; and the origins, outcome, and significance of that confrontation are critical to any understanding of the substance and texture of Soviet-American rivalry in Europe and the Middle East after World War II.

Soviet fishery jurisdiction in the Arctic

The creation of a 200-nautical mile [370-km] fishing zone in December 1976 for certain marine areas off the coast of the USSR, including Arctic waters, is a significant development for a subject which has given rise in the past to diplomatic exchanges and confrontations with foreign powers.

British Economic Interests in Siberia during the Russian Civil War, 1918-1920

Throughout 1918 and 1919, the British government considered breaking up the former Russian empire. Separate development was particularly favored for Siberia. The main reason for this can be found in the historic diplomatic confrontation between Russia and Britain along the length of Russia's southern frontier.1 But there were other reasons. The one most frequently disregarded concerns British economic interests. Siberia was known to be rich in natural resources, and even before the war Britain had invested in its economic life. The evidence is not clear on Britain's plans for the future of Siberia. Most likely there were no specific plans, only vague notions. But it is clear that British officials, politicians, and corporations, both at home and in Siberia, did attempt to turn Britain's presence and influence in Siberia to protracted economic advantage.