Dewey's Theory Research Articles

Dewey's Theory of Moral (and Political) Deliberation Unfiltered

In this paper, I argue that many recent interpretations of John Dewey's vision of democracy distort that vision by filtering it through the prism of contemporary deliberative democratic theories. An earlier attempt to defend Dewey's theory of moral deliberation is instructive for understanding the nature and function of this filter. In James Gouinlock's essay "Dewey's Theory of Moral Deliberation," he argues that Morton White and Charles L. Stevenson's criticisms of John Dewey's ethical theory are based upon fundamental misinterpretations of Dewey's theory of moral deliberation. In the spirit of Gouinlock's 1978 essay, I show how this historical debate relates to a claim of political philosophers and political theorists that is currently in vogue, namely, that Dewey's writings contain a nascent theory of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democratic theorists contend that deliberation is the group activity that transforms individual preferences and behavior into mutual understanding, agreement, and collective action. Once Dewey's vision of democracy is identified with this theory of deliberative democracy, the strategic question for Deweyans arises: If Deweyan democracy is identified too closely with deliberative democracy, will Dewey scholars risk making Dewey's democratic vision an outmoded approach to theorizing about democracy in the wake of an expired deliberative turn? One way to see our way clear of this strategic question is to remove the deliberative democracy filter and appreciate Dewey's vision of democracy as a unique and free-standing contribution to democratic theory.

From Judgment to Rationality: Dewey's Epistemology of Practice

In this paper I explore John Dewey's theory of judgment and discuss its expressive dimension. I claim that Dewey's understanding of rationality depends upon a conception of thinking as being expressive, and of expressivity as being composed by logically distinct moments of articulation and transformation. I show that this expressive understanding of rationality provides the central clue for understanding Dewey's conception of inquiry. I then conclude the article by drawing some implications of Dewey's theory of judgment for a broader epistemology based upon the acknowledgment of the primacy of practice.

Dewey, Hegel, and Causation

Dewey, Hegel, and Causation Jim Good and Jim Garrison [Cause and effect], if they are distinct, are also identical. Even in ordinary consciousness that identity may be found. We say that a cause is a cause, only when it has an effect, and vice versa. Both cause and effect are thus one and the same content: and the distinction between them is primarily only that the one lays down, and the other is laid down.1 In the quote above, Hegel claims that cause and effect are only distinct from a particular point of view. A cause only becomes a cause when it has an effect, thus the two apparently opposing terms reverse their roles. The effect is the cause of the cause, and the cause is the effect of its own effect. This article begins with a discussion of what we believe to be an effect, Dewey's theory of causation, and then proceeds to Hegel's theory, arguing that the two philosophers clarify one another. Both philosophers' ruminations on causation provide a provocative challenge to the standard view that cause and effect are discrete and independent from one another. Although both philosophers accept the utility of analyzing events as cause and effect [End Page 101] for particular purposes, both contend that a more complete view of such events shows that they are reciprocal moments within an ongoing process. By drawing attention to the similarities in their theories of causation we also hope to advance our larger project of promoting a rapprochement between present-day Dewey specialists and Hegel specialists. In the context of the long-standing debate about Dewey's debt to Hegel, we emphasize the Hegelianism of Dewey's mature philosophy much more than most Dewey scholars.2 Nonetheless, an essay by Alan Hance may well pinpoint an important sticking point for both groups.3 Hance correctly criticizes Richard Rorty's claim that pragmatism is "naturalized Hegelianism" by showing that Rorty incorrectly assumes that Hegel's rejection of Kant's thing-in-itself commits him to subjective idealism.4 Although we choose to leave Rorty aside in our article, we agree with Hance's argument that Hegel rejects representational epistemology much more successfully than Rorty. We disagree, however, with Hance's apparent equation of naturalism with the reduction of reality to efficient causes and the subjects studied by the natural sciences. Whether this characterization is true of Rorty's naturalism or not, it is not true of Dewey's. It is possible, however, that whenever Hegel scholars think of Dewey most of them think of his "instrumentalism" and his "naturalism" as reductionistic (the Frankfurt school's critique of instrumental reason may be in the back of their minds).5 Conversely, when Dewey scholars think of Hegel, it is possible that most of them think of reductionistic subjective idealism. Perhaps both groups see the other philosopher as trapped on one side of Cartesian dualism and believe that their philosopher successfully bridges that divide. If this generalization is accurate, we are convinced that both groups err because Dewey and Hegel share a nonreductionist, emergent conception of process that is apparent in their theories of causation. Hegel's potential alliance with pragmatism is more evident to those familiar with the nonmetaphysical interpretation of his thought, now accepted by many contemporary Hegel scholars.6 Whether or not this reading is correct, there is compelling evidence that it is the way Dewey himself in fact read Hegel.7 On the nonmetaphysical reading, the moment of "absolute knowing" at the end of The Phenomenology of Spirit is not perfect knowledge of eternal truth; it is knowledge that does not reach beyond itself to posit a metaphysical foundation for itself. Hegel's absolute knowing sublates the dualism between the self and its objects by seeing those two terms as moments within an ongoing, unified process. Both knower and the known are constructs, momentarily posited for specific purposes [End Page 102] in the process of knowing. This standpoint is absolute precisely because it is a complete whole that does not exceed itself; Hegel's idealism is absolute because, contra Kant, he refuses to posit anything that transcends experience in order to explain thought.8 For...

デューイ「社会的探究理論」が生涯教育論に示唆するもの

デューイ「社会的探究理論」が生涯教育論に示唆するもの

Transaction in Dewey's Theory of Experience

본 논문은 듀이 경험이론의 핵심 개념의 하나인 교변작용(transaction)을 입체적으로 분석하는 데에 목적을 두고 있다. 특히, 본 연구에서는 ‘연속성’이라는 개념을 중심으로 주체와 대상 사이의 교변작용과 그 교변작용을 통해서 주체가 이르고자 하는 이상적인 경지를 설명하는 데에 초점을 두고 있다. 본 연구에 따르면, 주체와 대상은 아이스테티카를 실체로 하고 있는, 질성과 정서를 바탕으로 교변작용한다. 즉, 질성은 아이스테티카를 세계의 측면에서 기술하는 용어이며, 정서는 그것의 심리적 대응물에 해당한다. 주체와 대상은 이와 같이 각기 다른 이름으로 존재하는 아이스테티카에 의해서 하나로 연결되어 있으며, 그럼으로써 주체가 대상을 경험하는 것이 가능하게 된다. 듀이의 이론체계 내에서 주체는 그러한 대상과의 교변작용에 열정적으로 참여하는 과정에서 아이스테티카 혹은 그것의 종교적 대응물인 신으로 규정되는 이상적인 경지를 내변화하는 것으로 설명되고 있다.

A reflective essaying model for higher education

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to outline a reflective essaying model as a useful way of encouraging learning in higher education. It aims to define reflective essaying as the free and serious play of mind on an interesting topic in an attempt to learn.Design/methodology/approachReflective essaying is first introduced as a unifying concept in the model. Second, the model is introduced and justified especially in connection with De Montaigne's invention of the essai as a process of trying out opinions and testing responses. Third, the role of teachers as essaying mentors is discussed. Fourth, mentoring for essaying is examined as a learning transaction which exemplifies Dewey's transactional theory of experience and knowing.FindingsReflective essaying is promoted as an important way of letting students try to learn. Reflective mentors should promote student learning through reflective essaying which would encourage students to develop their own criticality.Practical implicationsThe paper has implications for both teachers and students. Teachers are urged to become more like mentors and less like didactic instructors. As mentors they should be encouraging students to see academic writing as trying out, as essaying, as experimenting with, and as learning through the ideas and materials they reflect upon.Originality/valueThe paper is original in its approach in that it draws on a wide range of historical and contemporary sources on essaying in order to re‐evaluate and resurrect essaying as an experimental process of learning.

Socialization into a Civilization: The Dewey–Kaplan Synthesis in American Jewish Schooling in the Early 20th Century

This historical study focuses on how John Dewey's theory of education as socialization and Mordecai Kaplan's theory of Judaism as a civilization together served as an ideological base and pedagogical framework for the creation of “progressive,” “reconstructed” American Jewish school programs in the early 20th century (1910s–1930s). In the main, progressive Jewish educators no longer conceived of Jewish education merely as a program of religious education designed to impart the ways and dictates of Judaism. Rather, Jewish education was conceptualized as a total program of socialization designed to prepare children for active and intelligent participation in American Jewish life.

Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given

Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given The doctrine of the Given is that subjects have direct non-inferential awareness of content of their experiences and apprehensions, and that some of a subject's beliefs are justified on the basis of that subject's awareness of her experiences and apprehensions. Pragmatist criticisms of the Given as a myth are shown here not only to be inadequate but to presuppose the Given. A model for a pragmatist account of the Given is then provided in terms of refinements of Dewey's theory of experience. The doctrine of the Given is implicated in the functions of inquiry insofar as one must take it that experience is a source of justification.

Toward A Pragmatic Discourse of Constructivism: Reflections on Lessons from Practice

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Of course, constructivist ideas have existed for a long time, perhaps since the ancient Greeks. Yet a formal discourse that uses the term constructivism, presents the characteristics, and argues for the merits of this approach is a relatively new phenomenon. In this context, it is noteworthy that neither Piaget nor Vygotsky, who are considered constructivists, used this term in their writings. 2. Some of these constructivist theorists are discussed in Brent Davis and Dennis Sumara's (2002) essay “Constructivist Discourses and the Field of Education: Problems and Possibilities;” others are analyzed in Rebecca Oxford's (1997) “Constructivism: Shape-Shifting, Substance, and Teacher Education Applications.” 3. Dewey considered the content knowledge or “scholarship” that teachers possess as not merely theoretical, remote from the practical issues that teachers face. He believed that teachers' practical knowledge can serve as a tremendous resource for enhancing educational theory. See his essay “The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education,” in John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings ([1904] 1974). 4. This statement was made by Joe Kincheloe in a private conversation with the author in 1999. 5. For a discussion of Vygotsky's influence on cooperative learning, see Kenneth A. Brufee's Collaborative Learning: Higher Education, Independence, and the Authority of Knowledge, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 144. 6. I am aware that both Freire's and Dewey's constructivist theories have recently come under attack by Chet Bowers (2005) Bowers, Chet A. 2005. The False Promises of Constructivist Theories of Learning, New York: Peter Lang. [Google Scholar] for failing to appreciate “the complex ways in which culture influences values, ways of thinking, behaviors, built environments, and human/nature relationships” (IX). However, my basic point here is not to defend the value of Freire's and Dewey's individual theories of learning, but rather to begin to develop a pragmatic constructivist discourse based on their theories. My argument does not, in any way, diminish from Bowers' powerful critique of some of the major limitations of Freire's and Dewey's constructivist views in particular, and constructivist theories of learning in general. See his book The False Promises of Constructivist Theories of Learning (2005).

Deweyan Democracy and Pluralism

What Talisse refers to as his objection states that Deweyan democracy, or John Dewey's theory of democracy as contemporary Dewey scholars understand it, resembles a thick account, that is, a theory establishing a set of prior restraints on the values that can count as legitimate within a democratic community, and thus is incompatible with pluralism, at least insofar as contemporary political theorists define that term. In this paper, I argue that by undermining the pluralist objection, a reunion of Deweyan democracy and pluralism-two ideas that have been torn asunder by Talisse's misreading of Dewey and Deweyans-becomes possible.

Toward a Fully Realized Human Being: Dewey's Active-Individual-always-in-the-Making

This essay explores the conception of the individual in Dewey's democratic writings. Following Dewey's lead, I argue that it is human individuality, including our impulses, habits, and capacities, along with an appropriate environment, that represents the uniqueness and power of every individual. In achieving our individuality, we form habits to live and to grow; we strive toward a fully realized human being, while we perform a unique function in keeping the community growing. Dewey's theory of self-construction provides a theoretical foundation for an active-individual as-a-societal-contributor-always-in-the -making that in turn contributes to the improvement of educational opportunities for all people.

Instrumentalism and the Clichés of Aesthetic Education: A Deweyan Corrective

When we defend aesthetic education in instrumental terms or rely on clichés of creativity and imagination, we win at best a pyrrhic victory. To make a lasting place for the arts in education, we must critique the transmission model of education and the instrumentalist view of life that undergirds it. To help us perceive anew the nature and value of the aesthetic, I explore John Dewey's distinction between recognition and perception. Through a series of examples drawn from painting and poetry, I embody Dewey's theory and describe a number of artistic strategies for interrupting recognition and cultivating perception.

Some Remarks on Dewey's Metaphysics and Theory of Education

Introduction In a famous and much misunderstood passage in Democracy and Education, Dewey (1916/1980) proclaims: If we are willing to conceive education as process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow-men, philosophy may even be defined as general theory of education (338; emphasis in original). My article examines some of what he means by this statement. We know Dewey as philosopher of reconstruction. His most ambitious and overlooked reconstruction is that of Western metaphysics, which disrupts entire framework of western thought and is a major source of deep discomfort many have with his philosophy of education. I approach Dewey by examining standard ingredients of western metaphysics that he rejects or reconstructs. They are: Fixed form or essence (eidos), ultimate origin, foundation, or first principle (arche), completion or purpose (telos), state of completion, perfection, or complete actualization (entelecheia), and substance or subject (ousia). I will also consider actuality, activity, or function (energeia) and potential for change (dynamis). Metaphysics seems recondite and remote until we ask existential and educational questions as: What is ultimate essence of a human being? What is absolute foundation of human development? What is telos and perfection of a human life? What are limits of human potential? What actualizes human potential and how may we use it to create a better individual and collective destiny? For Dewey, there is no fixed and final human essence, no ultimate foundation, no perfect telos, and no substantial subject. We have potential for change, but not latent potential. In my article, I urge reader to acknowledge educational inevitability and importance of these metaphysical questions, even if you completely reject Dewey's answers. The elements of Western metaphysics tend to collapse into each other. Frequently substance is essence that exists as an innate latent potential actualized through appropriate activities that allow being to achieve its perfect telos. Many theories of educational development are like this. Perhaps most influential of is that of Jean Piaget. In his genetic epistemology, Piaget departs from a foundation of innate biological structures that undergo distinct linear stages of development, or what he calls mental embryology, to achieve perfect teleological actualization of human essence; that is, a rational animal. Dewey completely rejects embryological metaphors of human development along with hidden metaphysics that makes them so plausible. Dewey's social constructivism diverges widely from Piaget's subjective constructivism. Dewey separates metaphysical existence from logical essence while insisting that language joins them. He urges us to avoid three fallacies. First, we should shun what Dewey (1925/1981) calls the philosophic fallacy; that is, conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existences (p. 35). For Dewey, essences, teloi, foundations, substances, and so on are contingent social constructions of language and logic. Language provides us with meanings (e.g., there is a seven foot snake in this room). Logic, what Dewey calls theory of inquiry, determines if we can, in fact warrant linguistic meanings as knowledge (hopefully, inquiry will show there are no snakes in this room). Dewey believes we get our ontology (essences, including human essence) through constructive processes of our language and logic, not other way around. The second fallacy Dewey wishes us to avoid is intellectualism, by which he means notion that all experiencing is a mode of knowing, and that subject-matter, nature, is, in principle, to be reduced and transformed till it is defined in terms identical with characteristics presented by refined objects of science as such (p. …

How Rules Shape Experience

Rules guide and constrain participants' actions as they participate in any educational activity. This ethnographically driven case study examines how organizational rules—the implicit and explicit regulations that constrain actions and interactions—influence children to use science in the experiential educational activity of raising 4-H market animals. Observations, interviews, and artifacts gathered are interpreted using Dewey's (1938) theory of an experiential continuum, with a focus on how social control in the form of explicit organizational rules influenced the children to use science. This study provides examples of two explicit organizational rules, market animal weight restrictions and record book rules, and analyzes the influence of these rules on bringing science into the children's 4-H experience. This study provides evidence that children involved in 4-H are influenced by organizational rules to incorporate skills and processes of science into their actions.

From complexity theory to transactionalism: Moving occupational science forward in theorizing the complexities of behavior

Over the past decade, the notion of complexity has assumed increasing importance in conceptions of occupational engagement. Several scholars in occupational science and occupational therapy have employed theories of complexity (including chaos theory, dynamic systems theory, and complexity theory) for various ends; however, few have analyzed the continued explanatory utility of these theories vis‐à‐vis occupational constructs. This paper offers one such analysis, and further posits the superiority of Dewey's theory of transactionalism over the systems‐based theories of complexity that currently inform the discipline and profession. Although complexity theory and transactionalism address many similar concepts, their respective ontologies generate notably distinct implications for their application in scholarship on occupation. Upon review, the problems inherent in behavioural applications of complexity theory appear to unnecessarily limit the future theoretical development of occupational science and occupational therapy. Transactionalism, in contrast, more readily lends itself to behavioural applications, and together with its emphasis on interpenetration and co‐constitution, offers greater opportunity for the continued theorization of the complexity of occupation.

A Study on Practical Fallibilities of Dewey's Educational Theory - focus on open-mindedness, cooperation and politicization -

A Study on Practical Fallibilities of Dewey's Educational Theory - focus on open-mindedness, cooperation and politicization -

Dewey's philosophy of questioning: science, practical reason and democracy

John Dewey's ideas on politics derive from his epistemology of inquiry as practical problem-solving. Dewey's philosophy is important for democratic theory because it emphasizes deliberation through questioning. However, Dewey's philosophy shares with positivism the same conception of answering as exclusively the dissolution of questions. While Dewey's ideas are distinct from positivism in important respects, he rejects a constitutive role for questioning by constructing knowledge as problem-solving via experience. The problem-solving ideal lends itself to a scientific conception of politics. Applying Michel Meyer's philosophy of questioning, problematology, to Dewey's logic, reveals that Dewey's theory of inquiry is itself the product of an inquiry, confirming that questioning plays a constitutive role in knowledge. This suggests a problematological reconstruction of knowledge which extends Dewey's ideas by affirming an enhanced status for questioning. Grounding knowledge in the principle of questioning provides the basis for extending the rhetorical analysis of politics.

Dewey on Art as Evocative Communication

In his work on aesthetics, John Dewey provocatively (and enigmatically) called art the universal and freest form of and tied his reading of aes- thetic experience to such an employment. I will explore how art, a seemingly obscure and indirect means of communication, can be used as the most effective and mov- ing means of communication in certain circumstances. Dewey's theory of art will be shown to hold that art can be purposively employed to communicatively evoke a certain experience through an auditor's experience of an art object. Such a use is shown to be an extension of Dewey's conceptions of scientific method and the role of experience in criticism and communication, and is discussed in light of examples drawn from contemporary film, sculpture, and classical Japanese poetry.

John Dewey and the Question of Artful Communication

The American pragmatist John Dewey included tantalizing sections praise the power communication in his important work on commu nity, experience, and their improvement, noting in 1925 that of all affairs, communication is the most wonderful (1988a, LW 1:132) and in 1927 that communication plays an important part in the individuals attempt learn to become human (1984, LW 2:332).1 Some in the field commu nication have sensed the important, but undeveloped, role that commu nication plays in his thought and have attempted to use Dewey s work in analyzing rhetorical practice, cultural studies, and the role journalism in society.2 While such studies strive to clarify the value and process com munication in Dewey s thought, they fall short explaining one seemingly simple thing that is implied in these passages?that communication can be experienced as aesthetic or artful. Nathan Crick identifies such a lacuna in the literature and notes that beyond its utility as an argument against elite forms academic criticism, the value Dewey's aesthetic theory for communication studies remained underdeveloped (2004, 303). Although he does an admirable job tracing the relation aesthetics to communi cation in Dewey s evolving thought, Crick comes no closer than others in answering the fundamental question how communication can be artful or aesthetic?he merely argues for the general point that communication,

How Rules Shape Experience

Rules guide and constrain participants' actions as they participate in any educational activity. This ethnographically driven case study examines how organizational rules—the implicit and explicit regulations that constrain actions and interactions—influence children to use science in the experiential educational activity of raising 4-H market animals. Observations, interviews, and artifacts gathered are interpreted using Dewey's (1938) theory of an experiential continuum, with a focus on how social control in the form of explicit organizational rules influenced the children to use science. This study provides examples of two explicit organizational rules, market animal weight restrictions and record book rules, and analyzes the influence of these rules on bringing science into the children's 4-H experience. This study provides evidence that children involved in 4-H are influenced by organizational rules to incorporate skills and processes of science into their actions.