Dewey, Hegel, and Causation

Abstract

Dewey, Hegel, and Causation Jim Good and Jim Garrison [Cause and effect], if they are distinct, are also identical. Even in ordinary consciousness that identity may be found. We say that a cause is a cause, only when it has an effect, and vice versa. Both cause and effect are thus one and the same content: and the distinction between them is primarily only that the one lays down, and the other is laid down.1 In the quote above, Hegel claims that cause and effect are only distinct from a particular point of view. A cause only becomes a cause when it has an effect, thus the two apparently opposing terms reverse their roles. The effect is the cause of the cause, and the cause is the effect of its own effect. This article begins with a discussion of what we believe to be an effect, Dewey's theory of causation, and then proceeds to Hegel's theory, arguing that the two philosophers clarify one another. Both philosophers' ruminations on causation provide a provocative challenge to the standard view that cause and effect are discrete and independent from one another. Although both philosophers accept the utility of analyzing events as cause and effect [End Page 101] for particular purposes, both contend that a more complete view of such events shows that they are reciprocal moments within an ongoing process. By drawing attention to the similarities in their theories of causation we also hope to advance our larger project of promoting a rapprochement between present-day Dewey specialists and Hegel specialists. In the context of the long-standing debate about Dewey's debt to Hegel, we emphasize the Hegelianism of Dewey's mature philosophy much more than most Dewey scholars.2 Nonetheless, an essay by Alan Hance may well pinpoint an important sticking point for both groups.3 Hance correctly criticizes Richard Rorty's claim that pragmatism is "naturalized Hegelianism" by showing that Rorty incorrectly assumes that Hegel's rejection of Kant's thing-in-itself commits him to subjective idealism.4 Although we choose to leave Rorty aside in our article, we agree with Hance's argument that Hegel rejects representational epistemology much more successfully than Rorty. We disagree, however, with Hance's apparent equation of naturalism with the reduction of reality to efficient causes and the subjects studied by the natural sciences. Whether this characterization is true of Rorty's naturalism or not, it is not true of Dewey's. It is possible, however, that whenever Hegel scholars think of Dewey most of them think of his "instrumentalism" and his "naturalism" as reductionistic (the Frankfurt school's critique of instrumental reason may be in the back of their minds).5 Conversely, when Dewey scholars think of Hegel, it is possible that most of them think of reductionistic subjective idealism. Perhaps both groups see the other philosopher as trapped on one side of Cartesian dualism and believe that their philosopher successfully bridges that divide. If this generalization is accurate, we are convinced that both groups err because Dewey and Hegel share a nonreductionist, emergent conception of process that is apparent in their theories of causation. Hegel's potential alliance with pragmatism is more evident to those familiar with the nonmetaphysical interpretation of his thought, now accepted by many contemporary Hegel scholars.6 Whether or not this reading is correct, there is compelling evidence that it is the way Dewey himself in fact read Hegel.7 On the nonmetaphysical reading, the moment of "absolute knowing" at the end of The Phenomenology of Spirit is not perfect knowledge of eternal truth; it is knowledge that does not reach beyond itself to posit a metaphysical foundation for itself. Hegel's absolute knowing sublates the dualism between the self and its objects by seeing those two terms as moments within an ongoing, unified process. Both knower and the known are constructs, momentarily posited for specific purposes [End Page 102] in the process of knowing. This standpoint is absolute precisely because it is a complete whole that does not exceed itself; Hegel's idealism is absolute because, contra Kant, he refuses to posit anything that transcends experience in order to explain thought.8 For...