Abstract
In this paper I explore John Dewey's theory of judgment and discuss its expressive dimension. I claim that Dewey's understanding of rationality depends upon a conception of thinking as being expressive, and of expressivity as being composed by logically distinct moments of articulation and transformation. I show that this expressive understanding of rationality provides the central clue for understanding Dewey's conception of inquiry. I then conclude the article by drawing some implications of Dewey's theory of judgment for a broader epistemology based upon the acknowledgment of the primacy of practice.
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