Space Station Design Research Articles

Space Station Design Up in the Air

Space Station Design Up in the Air

Intelligent, autonomous systems in space

Systems autonomy will be an important ingredient of future space systems. The Space Station, in particular, is expected to be equipped with intelligent, autonomous capabilities. To achieve and incorporate these capabilities, the required technologies need to be identified, developed and validated within realistic application scenarios. The critical technologies for the development of intelligent, autonomous systems are discussed in the context of a generalized functional architecture. The present state of this technology implies that it be introduced and applied in an evolutionary process which must start already during the Space Station design phase. An approach is proposed to accomplish design information acquisition and management for knowledge base development.

2001 to 1994: Political Environment and the Design of NASA's Space Station System

The U.S. civilian space station, a hope of numerous NASA engineers since before the agency was founded in 1958 and promoted by NASA as the country's 'next logical step' into space, provides an excellent case study of the way public-sector research and development agencies continuously redefine new technologies in the absence of the market discipline that governs private-sector technological development. The number of space station design studies conducted since 1959, both internally by NASA or contracted by the agency to the aerospace industry, easily exceeds a hundred. Because of this, three clearly distinguishable examples are selected from the almost thirty-year history of space station design in NASA. Together these examples illustrate the difficulty of defining a new technological system in the public sector as that system becomes increasingly subject, for its development, to the vagaries of federal research and development politics.

2001 to 1994: Political Environment and the Design of NASA’s Space Station System

2001 to 1994: Political Environment and the Design of NASA’s Space Station System SYLVIA D. FRIES Not the least of the many questions raised about the U.S. space program in the aftermath of the Challenger explosion on January 29, 1986, was whether political pressures impinged on what should have been a purely technical judgment: How reliable were the joint seals on the space shuttle’s solid rocket boosters in the then-prevailing tem­ perature of 38° F?1 The noticeable degree to which the decision to build the space shuttle had been shaped by American politics was, of course, not news; John M. Logsdon and more recently Walter A. McDougall have shown that technology cannot be isolated from pol­ itics if our picture of the space program is to be complete.2 But what did distress many—including the worldly-wise William P. Rogers, chairman of the presidential commission that investigated the Chal­ lenger accident—was that subsystem engineering decisions appeared to have been affected by politically derived pressures, in this case NASA’s ambitious launch schedule intended to sustain an economic justification for the shuttle program itself.3 A new automobile design in Detroit or Osaka must run the gauntlet of oil-price predictions, tariffs, changing safety standards, and the ever-elusive market (to name only a few nontechnical considerations). Notwithstanding the complexities of the current regulatory environDr . Fries is director of the History Office of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. She is indebted to Nathaniel B. Cohen, John D. Hodge, Charles J. Donlan, Howard E. McCurdy, A. Michal McMahon, and Russell I. Fries for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay, and to Lee D. Saegesser of the NASA History Office for invaluable archival assistance. 'Report of the Presidential [Rogers] Commission on the Spaa' Shuttle Challenger Accident (Washington: U.S. Superintendent of Documents, June 6, 1986). ‘(John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Co to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge, Mass., 1970); “The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure,” Science 232 (May 30, 1986): 1099-1 105; Walter A. McDougall, . . . the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985). ^Rogers Commission Report (n. 1 above), pp. 164—65.© 1988 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. 0040-165X/88/2903-0001 $01.00 568 The Design of NASA’s Space Station System 569 ment, technological development in the private sector must hew to a discipline that imposes the ultimate test of marketability on any new product. The amount of time that any private sector firm can sustain or “push” an unproved product or system on an unreceptive market is limited. Similarly, the design of a major technological system in the public sector—and not simply the choice of that system itself—is affected by its own highly complex political environment. The public sector, how­ ever, imposes no comparable discipline on the bureaucratic propo­ nents of new technological systems. The ongoing uncertainties of congressional and presidential politics, combined with the internecine struggles of federal R&D bureaucracies for influence over the nation’s total R&D budget, significantly reduce the likelihood that any new public-sector technology will be the result of systematic planning to­ ward clearly defined technological or utilitarian objectives. Thus his­ torians of technology, in recognizing the role of extrinsic (nontechnical) factors in the shaping of any new technology,4 must be prepared to distinguish, for explanatory purposes, the kinds of extrinsic effects, especially in the public sector, that can alter the logic of a new tech­ nological system. The U.S. civilian space station—a gleam in the eye of numerous NASA engineers since before the agency was founded in 1958 and promoted by NASA as the country’s “logical next step” into space— provides an excellent case study of the way public-sector R&D agencies continuously redefine new technologies in the absence of the market discipline that governs private-sector technological development.5 The number of space station design studies conducted since 1959, both internally by NASA or contracted by the agency to the aerospace industry, easily exceeds a hundred.6 Because of this, I have selected three clearly distinguishable examples...

Space station as a vital focus for advancing the technologies of automation and robotics

A major guideline for the design of the United States's Space Station is that the Space Station address a wide variety of functions. These functions include the servicing of unmanned assets in space, the support of commercial laboratories in space and the efficient management of the Space Station itself: the largest space asset. For the Space Station to address successfully these and other functions, the operating costs must be minimized. Furthermore, crew time in space will be an exceedingly scarce and valuable commodity. The human operator should perform only those tasks that are unique in demanding the use of the human creative capability in coping with unanticipated events. The technologies of automation and robotics (A & R) have the promise to help in reducing Space Station operating costs and to achieve a highly efficient use of the human in space. The use of advanced automation and artificial intelligence techniques, such as expert systems, in Space Station subsystems for activity planning and failure mode management will enable us to reduce dependency on a mission control center and could ultimately result in breaking the umbilical link from Earth to the Space Station. The application of robotic technologies with advanced perception capability and hierarchical intelligent control to servicing systems will enable us to service assets either at the Space Station or in situ with a high degree of human efficiency. This paper presents the results of studies conducted by NASA and its contractors, at the urging of the Congress, leading toward the formulation of an automation and robotics plan for Space Station development.

Assessment of space station design and operation through bioastronautics

The paper reviews the main elements and major issues affecting human productivity and discusses some selected factors which might not be sufficiently identified and/or considered from the Bioastronautics point of view at the present stage of planning Space Station design and operation.

Liquid helium servicing from the space station

The current concept of liquid helium resupply from the space station is discussed with regard to user and space station requirements, as well as requirements of the liquid helium servicing facility itself. A number of trade-offs which will affect both the hardware and the operation of the facility are presented. A total of 12 potential users have been identified. The users are divided into two groups: large volume users which are serviced every one to two years and small volume users which are serviced every few months. Both groups have a very strong impact on the definition of the liquid helium servicing facility. The facility components will be based on results of the Superfluid Helium On Orbit Transfer flight demonstration being conducted by NASA. Currently, the space station design includes a customer servicing bay which provides electrical power, thermal and contamination control, and connections for control and data handling systems. Restrictions on venting and vibrational disturbances on the space station may preclude servicing during quiescent periods when accelerations are minimal.

The impact of launch vehicle constraints on U. S. space station design and operations

The assembly of the Space Station is examined in terms of user and operational requirements. The Space Shuttle/Space Station interface is analyzed. The effect of the changing space transportation environment on the Space Station assembly requirements and the lift capabilities of the Shuttle are investigated. Consideration is given to crew replacement and the Shuttle launch rate; the use of the advanced solid rocket motor to increase the lifting capability of the Shuttle to 52,000 lbs; and the use of ELVs for launching modules of the Space Station.

A concept for a future autonomous European space station

Investigating a follow-up of current European manned space programs, a concept for a second-generation European Space Station for 2030 was generated. Its main features are a completely autonomous European Scenario and an emphasize on subsystem synergism. This paper presents the main parts of the study logic and a general overview of the Space Station design.

Space station design for growth

This paper reviews the current status of Space Station planning for growth as the basis of an assessment of potential Space Station evolution directions in the 21st Century to meet the challenges of the report of the U.S. National Commission on space, “Pioneering the Space Frontier”. Thus future mission requirements are reviewed and assessed. Based on these requirements, evolution scenarios and potential configurations are developed. It is concluded that the Space Station, as a multi-purpose facility, should evolve to a capability of 300 kW, crew of 18 and 5 lab modules. Beyond this capability it will be necessary to separate functions and establish two separate Space Stations, one for research and one for operational activities (e.g., transportation node, servicing, etc.). If the U.S. National Commission on Space's recommendations are adopted, this separation or “branching” could occur as early as 2005 to meet the needs of a permanent lunar base.

Space Station Operations Management System

A description is provided of an Operations Management System (OMS) for the planned NASA Space Station. The OMS would be distributed both in space and on the ground, and provide a transparent interface to the communications and data processing facilities of the Space Station Program. The allocation of OMS responsibilities has, in the most curent Space Station design, been fragmented among the Communications and Tracking Subsystem (CTS), the Data Management System (DMS), and a redefined OMS. In this current view, OMS is less of a participant in the real-time processing, and more an overseer of the health and management of the Space Station operations.

Space Station evolution: Planning for the future

The need for permanently manned presence in space has been recognized by the United States and its international partners for many years. The development of this capability was delayed due to the concurrent recognition that reusable earth-to-orbit transportation was also needed and should be developed first. While the decision to go ahead with a permanently manned Space Station was on hold, requirements for the use of the Station were accumulating as ground-based research and the data from unmanned spacecraft sparked the imagination of both scientists and entrepreneurs. Thus, by the time of the Space Station implementation decision in the early 1980's, a variety of disciplines, with a variety of requirements, needed to be accommodated on one Space Station. Additional future requirements could be forecast for advanced missions that were still in the early planning stages. The logical response was the development of a multi-purpose Space Station with the ability to evolve on-orbit to new capabilities as required by user needs and national or international decisions, i.e., to build an evolutionary Space Station. Planning for evolution is conducted in parallel with the design and development of the baseline Space Station. Evolution planning is a strategic management process to facilitate change and protect future decisions. The objective is not to forecast the future, but to understand the future options and the implications of these on today's decisions. The major actions required now are: (1) the incorporation of evolution provisions (hooks and scars) in the baseline Space Station; and (2) the initiation of an evolution advanced development program.

Real-time simulation for space station

Real-time, man-in-the-loop simulation has served an important function in the NASA manned-space-flight program by providing the means to evaluate systems design and integrated systems performance on the ground in a simulated flight environment. The Space Shuttle Program has relied heavily on simulation throughout all phases of development and into Space Shuttle operations. The simulation facilities in the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) Engineering Directorate used in support of Space Shuttle development and operations have been upgraded throughout the 16-year program and reflect near current technology in both computer systems and simulation software design. Operations of the JSC engineering simulation facility, the Systems Engineering Simulator, were expanded in 1985 to support Orbiter-related Space Station design activities such as Orbiter docking scenarios and the use of the Orbiter remote manipulator system in Space Station berthing scenarios. Development of a new Space Station simulation designed to provide long-term support to the Space Station Program is well under way. A description of the two Engineering Directorate simulation facilities, the Systems Engineering Simulator and the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory, is presented. The function of each in support of the Space Shuttle Program is discussed, with emphasis on functions applicable to Space Station. The function of the Systems Engineering Simulator in Space Station development is described. Finally, a comprehensive and detailed description of the new Space Station simulation under development on the System Engineering Simulator is presented.

Function, form, and technology: The evolution of space station in NASA

Analysis of four major space station designs developed by NASA and its contractors during the agency's first twenty-five years indicates that changing space station configurations have been a result of changing (1) space station functions and (2) available or anticipated technological capabilities.

Former NASA Astronaut and Engineer Working With Lockheed on Conceptual Design of Space Station

A former NASA astronaut and a former NASA crew systems engineer are helping Lockheed with its bid to design the United States' first permanent space station.

Historical Review

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration began space station studies in 1959 during its first year of existence. Since that time, numerous space station designs have been studied. A wide range of configurations and sizes that would accommodate from two to tens of crew members in space for orbital stay times from weeks to years was created. These designs were influenced by two major factors. First, the Earth launch vehicles available to place the station and logistics vehicles in orbit; and second, the intended purpose or mission of the station. Early designs were heavily influenced by the uncertainty of human performance in space, particularly zero gravity. Consequently, mission emphasis moved from research on humans to research in general and ultimately to industrial operations in space. The resultant design evolution is reviewed with emphasis on technology requirements in light of launch vehicle and mission constraints. The Skylab and Salyut programs are reviewed as a prologue to current planning. Both United States and Soviet experiences greatly influence current thinking. Finally, an overview of current plans attempts to scope the range of space station architectures under consideration in view of the ongoing space shuttle program and future mission needs.

Human response to vibroacoustic environments of space vehicles

To insure efficient utilization of the system, space station design and operations will require special habitability considerations for the occupants and crew because of the relatively long duration missions. Of particular concern is the environment in which the personnel will live and work, and how it affects both the performance and comfort of the occupants. Current criteria do not consider possible effects of reduced gravity, long duration, and confinement. Preliminary to developing space station vibroacoustic habitability criteria, the adequacy of criteria for other space vehicles has been reviewed. In this paper, specific responses to the noise and vibration environments of both Skylab and Shuttle will be discussed. Some astronauts have reported sleep interference, communication interference, distraction, and general annoyance as noise related complaints. In addition, information from the Russian Salyut missions, as well as similar earth based situations (e.g., submarines, remote military outposts), will be reviewed.

Vibroacoustic habitability of space stations

The prediction and control of noise and vibration is essential in the design and operation of future space stations to ensure maximum crew efficiency and utilization. On a number of previous space vehicles, noise and vibration levels have exceeded design specifications and have evoked crew complaints, particularly in the areas of sleep and communication, thus suggesting the need for better vibroacoustic prediction and control techniques. In other cases, adverse reactions have resulted despite design specifications being met which suggests that earth based design criteria may be inadequate for space applications. A technology program is being formulated to develop prediction methods and control techniques for use in the design and operation of space stations to ensure acceptable vibroacoustic levels for bearing, communication, performance, comfort, and sleep. The goals include: accurate vibroacoustic prediction and assessment models for space station design; criteria for assessing the effects of different space station crew exposure levels; and new techniques for controlling the vibroacoustic environment within a space station.

Vibroacoustic Habitability of Space Stations

To insure efficient utilization of the system, space station design and operations will require special habitability considerations for the occupants and crew because of the relatively long duration missions. Of particular concern is the environment in which the personnel will live and work, and how it affects both the performance and comfort of the occupants. The vibroacoustic aspect of that environment is the subject of this forum session. Although noise and vibration exposure criteria have been developed for earth-based work and living situations, several factors make the application of these criteria questionable in the context of space station design and operation. The interior noise and vibration environment of a space station is different in level and frequency than a comparable earth-based system. Complicating factors associated with reduced gravity, long duration and confinement are not included in existing criteria. In applying the criteria to space system designs, these factors either have been neglected or considered unimportant. The need for improved habitability is evidenced by physical and subjective assessments of previous missions. Astronauts have reported sleep interference, communication interference, distraction, and general annoyance as noise related complaints. The goal of the discussion is to establish, as Human Factors Specialists, where we are; what we should consider; and what the problems are as well as possible approaches and solutions. In other words, the aim is to stimulate thinking about space station vibroacoustic habitability that could ultimately lead to new research and technology in this area. Effects of the vibroacoustic environment on performance, hearing, communication, sleep, health, and annoyance will be discussed, as well as the results of interactions between the vibroacoustic environment and duration, weightlessness, and confinement.

Habitability factors in a rotating space station.

The ease with which a crew can habituate to rotation will be a major criterion in determining the habitability of an artificial gravity space station. The factors which contribute to that habituation include rotation rate, stability, and crew orientation. Problems associated with each of these factors can be alleviated by proper space-station design.