Reactor Coolant System Depressurization Research Articles

RELAP5/MOD3.3 Analyses of Core Heatup Prevention Strategy during Extended Station Blackout in PWR

The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant demonstrated the vulnerability of the plants on the loss of electrical power for several days, so called extended station blackout (SBO). A set of measures have been proposed and implemented in response of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The purpose of the study was to investigate the application of the deterministic safety analysis for core heatup prevention strategy of the extended SBO in pressurized water reactor, lasting 72 h. The prevention strategy selected was water injection into steam generators using turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TD-AFW) or portable water injection pump. Method for assessment of the necessary pump injection flowrate is developed and presented. The necessary injection flowrate to the steam generators is determined from the calculated cumulative water mass injected by the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump in the analysed scenarios, when desired normal level is maintained automatically. The developed method allows assessment of the necessary injection flowrates of pump, TD-AFW or portable, for different plant configurations and number of flowrate changes. The RELAP5/MOD3.3 Patch04 computer code and input model of a two-loop pressurized water reactor is used for analyses, assuming different injection start times, flowrates and reactor coolant system losses. Three different reactor coolant system (RCS) coolant loss pathways, with corresponding leakage rate, can be expected in the pressurized water reactor (PWR) during the extended SBO: normal system leakage, reactor coolant pump seal leakage, and RCS coolant loss through letdown relief valve unless automatically isolated or until isolation is procedurally directed. Depressurization of RCS was also considered. In total, six types of RCS coolant loss scenarios were considered. Two cases were defined regarding the operation of the emergency diesel generators. Different delays of the pump injection start following the station blackout were assumed and analysed. For each scenario, two kinds of SBO calculations for two-loop PWR were performed, base and verification. Base calculations were needed to determine necessary minimum flowrate for steam generators feeding in such a way that they are not overfilled or emptied. Namely, it was assumed that instrumentation is not available during extended SBO. The verification calculations have been then performed to verify if the determined minimum flowrates are sufficient to prevent the core heatup. The calculated results show effectiveness of the proposed extended SBO prevention strategy provided that the water injection is available in the first two hours after SBO occurring at full power. If diesel generator is running after loss of offsite power for some time, e.g. one hour, the available time for steam generator water injection is significantly longer. The obtained results demonstrate the need for assessment of the pump injection flowrates before the utilization of the pump for mitigation of the event. The applicability of the developed method for assessment of the required pump injection flowrate has been validated on PWR.

A study of RCS depressurization strategy of CPR1000 SAMG

Abstract CPR1000 severe accident management guideline (SAMG) is a product of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) SAMG and the French SAMG (called GIAG) combination. It adopts the structure of WOG SAMG. However, it follows the approach of GIAG performing reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurization immediately after entering SAMG. This is a special feature of CPR1000 SAMG. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate this RCS depressurization strategy. The simulations of a station blackout (SBO) accident are performed for CPR1000 with RCS depressurization strategy adopted at both core exit temperature (CET) of 650 and 1100 °C together with opening different number of safety relief valves (SRV) using an integral severe accident analysis code. The optimized RCS depressurization strategy is provided to delay the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) failure time. And some comments are provided for future improvement.

Performance analysis of automatic depressurization system in advanced PWR during a typical SBLOCA transient using MIDAC

The aim in the present work is to simulate accident scenarios of AP1000 during the small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) and investigate the performance and behavior of automatic depressurization system (ADS) during accidents by using MIDAC (The Module In-vessel Degradation severe accident Analysis Code). Four types of accidents with different hypothetical conditions were analyzed in this study. The impact on the thermal-hydraulic of the reactor coolant system (RCS), the passive core cooling system and core degradation was researched by comparing these types. The results show that the RCS depressurization becomes faster, the core makeup tanks (CMT) and accumulators (ACC) are activated earlier and the effect of gravity water injection is more obvious along with more ADS valves open. The open of the only ADS1-3 can't stop the core degradation on the basis of the first type of the accident. The open of ADS1-3 has a great impact on the injection time of ACC and CMT. The core can remain intact for a long time and the core degradation can be prevent by the open of ADS-4. The all results are significant and meaningful to understand the performance and behavior of the ADS during the typical SBLOCA.

Numerical investigation of in-vessel core coolability of PWR through an effective safety injection flow model using MELCOR simulation

A safety injection (SI) flow model predicting target depressurization was developed in the previous study. The model estimated the sum of the decay heat and oxidation heat using the core exit temperature increase rate and core water level decrease rate during the accident progression. However, in the old model only the heat transfer to the coolant was considered but the heat accumulation in the structures was not included in detail. To resolve this issue, therefore, a new mechanistic model was developed by considering heat sources accumulated in the core heat structures. The accuracy of the new model was validated through the prediction of core total heat using the MELCOR 1.8.6 code. It was confirmed that the new model resulted in a relatively small error less than 10% in almost all sections while the old model exhibited a large error exceeding 50% since the start of oxidation for postulated SBO severe accident scenario. Through the model validation, an improved SI flow map was developed to predict more accurate target depressurization of the reactor coolant system (RCS) needed for maintaining core coolability. This study suggests that new SI flow map can effectively assist operator’s execution related to the RCS depressurization and SI injection into the RCS implemented in the severe accident management guideline under various severe accident scenarios.

Efficacy assessment of independent severe accident mitigation measures in OPR1000 using MELCOR code

ABSTRACTIn-vessel and ex-vessel mitigation strategies have been revisited to improve the severe accident management (SAM) for operating nuclear power plants. Because independent mitigation measures tend to produce positive and adverse effects simultaneously, it is necessary to investigate the efficacy of individual measures by means of proper quantification. Thus, in the present study we investigated the overall efficacy of existing SA mitigation strategies prepared for the Optimized Power Reactor 1000 MWe (OPR1000) by means of MELCOR 1.8.6 code. The numerical evaluation showed that the Mitigation-01, feeding water into the steam generators, is the most effective among the other mitigations. In addition, Mitigation-02, reactor coolant system depressurization, could not mitigate the SA sufficiently when applied individually. Among the four ex-vessel mitigation strategies, execution of containment spray was effective in removing most of the aerosol fission product but also intensified hydrogen combustion by increasing the partial hydrogen pressure owing to steam condensation. Mitigation-07, operation of passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs), could reduce the hydrogen concentration, though the catalytic reaction was predicted to increase the containment pressure. In conclusion, this study suggests that mitigation measures should be carefully selected, and that counteracting measures should be prepared to minimize potential adverse effects.

Experimental simulation of liquid entrainment in ADS-4 depressurization line in AP1000

The fourth stage Automatic Depressurization System is an important passive safety feature in Westinghouse AP1000 which enables controlled depressurization of reactor coolant system in small break LOCA. However, large amount of coolant can be carried to the containment via the ADS-4 branch entrainment and the upper plenum entrainment during the depressurization process, which poses great threats to core uncovering and melting. The automatic Depressurization and Entrainment TEst Loop (ADETEL) modeled after AP1000 with a scaling ratio of 1:5.6 was constructed to investigate the entrainment and depressurization behavior after the actuation of ADS-4 valves. The entrainment and depressurization features were investigated under different initial pressure, mixture liquid level in the pressure vessel and heating power. The entrainment deposition effect of the reactor internals was also investigated. The test data reveals that large amount of water are entrained through the ADS-4 branch line within a short period of time. The liquid entrainment rate and the reduced rate of the mixture liquid level in the pressure vessel increase with the initial system pressure. It is notable that the core uncovery was experienced when the initial pressure was set to 0.5 MPa in current experimental conditions. The reactor internals have little effect on the entrained mass and the mixture liquid levels in the pressure vessel.

Development of safety injection flow map associated with target depressurization for effective severe accident management of OPR1000

ABSTRACTIf any severe accident occurs, application of the Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG) is initiated by the Technical Support Center (TSC). In order to provide advisory information to the TSC, required safety injection flow rate for maintaining the coolability of the reactor core has been suggested in terms of the depressurization pressure. In this study, mechanistic development of the safety injection flow map was performed by post-processing the core exit temperature (CET) data from MELCOR simulation. In addition, effect of oxidation during the core degradation was incorporated by including simulation data of core water level decrease rate. Using the CET increase rate and core water level decrease rate, safety injection flow maps required for removing the decay and oxidation heat and finally for maintaining the coolability of the reactor core were developed. Three initiating events of small break loss of coolant accidents without safety injection, station black out, and total loss of feed water were considered. Reactor coolant system depressurization pressure targeting the suggested injection flow achievable with one or two high pressure safety injections was included in the map. This study contributes on improving the current SAMG by providing more practical and mechanistic information to manage the severe accidents.

Evaluation of RCS injection strategy by normal residual heat removal system in severe accident management

Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) suggests mitigating the consequence of severe accident scenarios by using the non-safety systems if the safety systems are unavailable. For 1000MWe advanced passive pressurized water reactor (PWR), the normal residual heat removal system (RNS) is proposed to implement the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) injection strategy during severe accidents if safety systems fail. Therefore, evaluation of the effectiveness and negative impact of RNS injection strategy is performed, in which two typical severe accident sequences are selected, which are the typical low-pressure core melt accident sequence induced by Large-break Loss of Coolant Accident (LLOCA) with double-ended guillotine break at cold leg and the typical high-pressure core melt accident induced by Loss of Feed Water (LOFW), to analyze RCS response using the integrated severe accident analysis code. The plant model, including RCS, Engineering Safety Features (ESF), containment and RNS, is built to evaluate the effectiveness of RNS injection by comparing the sequences with and without RCS injection, which shows that RNS injection can terminate core melt progression and maintain core cooling in these accident sequences. However, hydrogen generated during the core reflooding is investigated for the negative impact, which shows that RNS may increase the hydrogen concentration in the containment. For the sequence induced by LOFW, two different RCS depressurization measurements are compared, which shows that opening ADS stages 1–3 valves can cause a rapid increase of hydrogen concentration in the In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) compartment and may lead to hydrogen detonation risk if hydrogen igniters are unavailable, while hydrogen can be well dispersed into the containment by intentionally opening ADS stage 4 valves, which is suggested as the preferred measure.

Experimental investigation of liquid entrainment in ADS-4 depressurization line with steam–water

The fourth stage Automatic Depressurization System (ADS-4) is an important part in Westinghouse AP600/AP100 which enables controlled depressurization of reactor coolant system during small break LOCA. However, the coolant may be entrained into the containment through the ADS-4 branch line simultaneously, which poses great threats to reactor core uncovering and melting. To investigate the entrainment phenomenon of ADS-4 in AP1000, ADS-4 Depressurization and Entrainment TEst Loop (ADETEL) with a scaling ratio of 1:5.6 was constructed and visualization experiments were conducted with steam–water. The experiment were conducted at atmospheric pressure with the maximum steam flow rate of 700kg/h. The entrainment processes were recorded by a high speed camera and analyzed in detail. Onset of entrainment and entrainment rate data were obtained and compared with existing test data and correlations. Empirical correlation of ADS-4 branch entrainment onset has been developed. A clear difference exists between ADETEL entrainment onset data and available correlations, which may caused by the differences in fluids physical properties, horizontal pipe flow conditions, determination of entrainment onset and d/D ratios. The entrainment onset is more likely to be reached in small d/D ratios conditions due to the stronger Bernoulli effect. Besides, AP1000 has a higher branch quality than AP600 at the same liquid level in the hot leg.

Effectiveness and adverse effects of reactor coolant system depressurization strategy with various severe accident management guidance entry conditions for OPR1000

Severe accident analysis for Korean OPR1000 with MELCOR 1.8.6 was performed by adapting a mitigation strategy under different entry conditions of Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG). The analysis was focused on the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy and its adverse effects. Four core exit temperatures (CETs) were selected as SAMG entry conditions, and Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA), Station Blackout (SBO), and Total Loss of Feed Water (TLOFW) were selected as postulated scenarios that may propagate into severe accidents. In order to delay reactor pressure vessel (RPV) failure, entering the SAMG when the CET reached 923 K, 923 K, and 753 K resulted in the best results for SBLOCA, SBO, and TLOFW scenarios, respectively. This implies that using event-based diagnosis for severe accidents may be more beneficial than using symptom-based diagnosis. There is no significant difference among selected SAMG entry conditions in light of the operator's available action time before the RPV failure. Potential vulnerability of the RPV due to hydrogen generation was analyzed to investigate the foreseeable adverse effects that act against the accident mitigation strategies. For the SBLOCA cases, mitigation cases generated more hydrogen than the base case. However, the amount of hydrogen generated was similar between the base and mitigation cases for SBO and TLOFW. Hydrogen concentrations of containment were less than 5% before RPV failure for most cases.

Validation of RCS depressurization strategy and core coolability map for independent scenarios of SBLOCA, SBO, and TLOFW

Severe accident analysis for Small Break (SB), Middle Break (MB), and Large Break (LB) Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (LOCA), Station Black Out (SBO), Total Loss-Of-Feed-Water (TLOFW) was performed and effectiveness of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurization strategies of OPR1000 was analyzed using MELCOR 1.8.6 code. Required injection flow rate has been derived using Core Exit Temperature (CET) information obtained from MELCOR calculation and a simple model and corresponding coolability map have been suggested to assist effective operator action. The depressurization strategies using secondary Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV) for SBLOCA, pressurizer Safety Depressurization System (SDS) for SBO and TLOFW were introduced in 5 min since the initiation of Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG). Respective mitigation strategy employed leads to significant delay of the reactor pressure vessel failure and RCS pressure at Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) failure was lower than the SAMG target pressure of 2.86 MPa. Thus, possibility of High Pressure Melt Ejection (HPME) and impair of containment building is expected to avoid effectively. Using CET information obtained from MELCOR calculation, a simple model and a coolability map for the required injection flow rate were developed for recovery of core coolability. It is suggested that the coolability map based on MELCOR calculation results may provide decisive and intuitive information to operators for more effective safety management.

Long-Term Station Blackout Accident Analyses of a PWR with RELAP5/MOD3.3

Stress tests performed in Europe after accident at Fukushima Daiichi also required evaluation of the consequences of loss of safety functions due to station blackout (SBO). Long-term SBO in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) leads to severe accident sequences, assuming that existing plant means (systems, equipment, and procedures) are used for accident mitigation. Therefore the main objective was to study the accident management strategies for SBO scenarios (with different reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) leaks assumed) to delay the time before core uncovers and significantly heats up. The most important strategies assumed were primary side depressurization and additional makeup water to reactor coolant system (RCS). For simulations of long term SBO scenarios, including early stages of severe accident sequences, the best estimate RELAP5/MOD3.3 and the verified input model of Krško two-loop PWR were used. The results suggest that for the expected magnitude of RCPs seal leak, the core uncovery during the first seven days could be prevented by using the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and manually depressurizing the RCS through the secondary side. For larger RCPs seal leaks, in general this is not the case. Nevertheless, the core uncovery can be significantly delayed by increasing RCS depressurization.

The Application of RCS Depressurization to Prevent Core Melting in Case of Very Small LOCA in Nuclear Reactors

The Application of RCS Depressurization to Prevent Core Melting in Case of Very Small LOCA in Nuclear Reactors A very small LOCA (in capacity of Pressure and Inventory Control (PIC) system) along of reactor coolant system (RCS)-outside core area and without operator actions to earliest and manual shutdown the reactor (not so much time for action), even all the safety systems are available, can go to a severe phase. The previous work describes a new method to prevent the core melting in the pressure tube reactors. The accident analysis using the developed model (ASQR) strengthens the importance of the inside cooling of the fuel channels in order to prevent severe accidents, despite those methods related to moderator as the last heat sink, these are not sufficient. The method concerns the use of a safety auto-depressurization of the pressurizer (ADS) by means of a new safety valve block located on the line to the degasser-condenser (DC).

DETAILED EVALUATION OF THE IN-VESSEL SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR SBLOCA USING SCDAP/RELAP5

As part of an evaluation for an in-vessel severe accident management strategy, a coolant injection into the reactor vessel under depressurization of the reactor coolant system (RCS) has been evaluated in detail using the SCDAP/RELAP5 computer code. A high-pressure sequence of a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) has been analyzed in the Optimized Power Reactor (OPR) 1000. The SCDAP/RELAP5 results have shown that safety injection timing and capacity with RCS depressurization timing and capacity are very effective on the reactor vessel failure during a severe accident. Only one train operation of the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) for 30,000 seconds with RCS depressurization prevents failure of the reactor vessel. In this case, the operation of only the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) without a HPSI does not prevent failure of the reactor vessel.

Optimum RCS depressurization strategy for effective severe accident management of station black out accident

Plant specific severe accident management guidelines (SAMG) for operating plants are developed and implemented in Korea as was required by government policy on severe accident. Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) has recently reviewed feasibility of the developed SAMG for Ulchin unit 1 plant. Among the strategies referred in SAMG, we have intensively analyzed the reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurization strategy during station black out (SBO) accident scenario, which has a high probability of occurrence according to Ulchin unit 1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). In depressurization strategy of the current SAMG, operators need to depressurize rapidly RCS pressure below 2.75 MPa using pressurizer (PZR) pilot operated safety relief valves (POSRVs) for high pressure accident like SBO. The rapid depressurization is effective in allowing the water of safety injection tank (SIT) to be injected into the core, but an excessive discharge of the SIT water is not desirable for an economical use of SIT inventory. Lack of SIT water accelerates the core damage in case the failed electric power do not recover in due to time. The SIT inventory economy means here that we should not waste the water inventory of SIT and use it in the most efficient way to cool the core. In case we do not use it in an economical way, the SIT might be depleted too rapidly, thus leaving an insufficient reservoir for post-depressurization cooling. The quantification of this SIT inventory economy for plant specific situation is of interest to develop an optimum depressurization strategy. In this study we have analyzed an effectiveness of current depressurization strategy for SBO accident with the severe accident analysis code MELCOR 1.8.5 which has been used for regulatory purpose in KINS. The entry time of severe accident management, a grace time gained by the current strategy, and the economy of the discharge mass flow rate for Ulchin plant were evaluated. Moreover, through a simple energy balance equation we could find an optimum strategy for RCS depressurization. The proposed strategy is based on finding an optimum discharge rate for an efficient use of the SIT inventory and it allows us to handle an SBO accident with higher confidence. The proposed strategy is yet a theoretical one, but possibilities of how to incorporate this strategy into engineered safety features are also discussed.

Detailed evaluation of coolant injection into the reactor vessel with RCS depressurization for high pressure sequences

A coolant injection into the reactor vessel with depressurization of the reactor coolant system (RCS) has been evaluated as part of the evaluation for a strategy of the severe accident management guidance (SAMG). Two high pressure sequences of a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) without safety injection (SI) and a total loss of feedwater (LOFW) accident in Optimized Power Reactor (OPR)1000 have been analyzed by using the SCDAP/RELAP5 computer code. The SCDAP/RELAP5 results have shown that only one train operation of a high pressure safety injection at 30,000 s with indirect RCS depressurization by using one condenser dump valve (CDV) at 6 min after implementation of the SAMG prevents reactor vessel failure for the small break LOCA without SI. In this case, only one train operation of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) without the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) does not prevent reactor vessel failure. Only one train operation of the HPSI at 20,208 s with direct RCS depressurization by using two SDS valves at 40 min after an initial opening of the safety relief valve (SRV) prevents reactor vessel failure for the total LOFW.

Evaluation of the RCS depressurization strategy for the high pressure sequences by using SCDAP/RELAP5

As part of the evaluation for a severe accident management strategy, a reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurization in optimized power reactor (OPR)1000 has been evaluated by using the SCDAP/RELAP5 computer code. An indirect RCS depressurization by a secondary depressurization by using a feed and bleed operation has been estimated for a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) without a safety injection (SI). Also, a direct RCS depressurization by using the safety depressurization system (SDS) has been estimated for the total loss of feed water (LOFW). The SCDAP/RELAP5 results have shown that the secondary feed and bleed operation can depressurize the RCS, but it cannot depressurize the RCS sufficiently enough. For this reason, a greater direct RCS depressurization by using the SDS is necessary for the 1.35 in. break LOCA without SI. A proper RCS depressurization time and capacity leads to a delay in the reactor vessel failure time from 7.5 to 10.7 h. An opening of two SDS valves can depressurize the RCS sufficiently enough and the proper RCS depressurization time and capacity leads to a delay in the reactor vessel failure time of approximately 5 h for the total LOFW. An opening of one SDS valve cannot depressurize the RCS sufficiently enough.

Mihama Unit 2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis

A steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) incident occurred in Mihama Unit 2 on February 9, 1991. This is the first SGTR incident where the emergency core cooling system was actuated in Japan. With some measures being taken to improve the model, the precise simulation of the SGTR using RETRAN-02/MOD4 was conducted. A nonequilibrium model was applied to the secondary side of the damaged SG to obtain a reasonable response of the secondary pressure. The model of the reactor upper head was improved to simulate void generation during reactor coolant system depressurization, and there was good agreement with the actual plant data.