Crisis Bargaining Research Articles

Audience Costs and the Credibility of Public versus Private Threats in International Crises

Abstract The credibility of public versus private threats in international crisis bargaining has received scholarly attention. While public threats are often believed to be more credible than private ones because of audience costs, others contend that private threats should be equally credible or even more. Also, the effect of public threats can be conditioned by other domestic factors such as domestic hawkishness and a leader’s unpopularity. To test these competing expectations, I conducted a conjoint survey experiment that examines how observers assess resolve to fight in an international crisis with a sample of US citizens (N = 1,203). Three major findings stand out. First, evidence suggests that both types of threats increase the perceived likelihood that a country will stand firm. Second, though their effect size is small, public threats are more effective than private ones. Lastly, I find support for the conditional effect of public threats, indicating that the underlying mechanism of the credibility of public threats is domestic audience costs.

Weak sovereignty and interstate war

Abstract International agreements save the costs of war, but complying with their terms can be costly. We analyse a model of interstate crisis bargaining in which one state may be unwilling or unable to make a costly investment that guarantees its subjects’ compliance. In equilibrium, peace is assured when the domestic government is militarily strong enough to demand terms that its subjects tolerate. When the domestic government is militarily weaker, peace requires that the foreign state compensate it for either the costs of enforcement or its subjects’ violations, and these prospective costs of peace may also lead the foreign state to solve the enforcement problem with war because peace is relatively costly. We also show that war due to enforcement problems is more common in militarily weak states and that equilibria at which the foreign state subsidizes enforcement are more common when the costs of violation fall disproportionately on the domestic state. The American invasion of Mexico in 1916 and the Red Army's peaceful withdrawal from East Germany in 1989 demonstrate the model's usefulness.

Crisis bargaining, domestic politics and Russia's invasion of Ukraine

How do domestic political considerations constrain or enable the initiation of interstate wars? We answer this question in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While prominent theories predict that domestic constraints reduce the likelihood of conflict, we show how structural features of Putin's regime rendered these concerns moot. Fighting was not likely to shift the domestic distribution of power favorably for Putin, although invading stood to enrich certain domestic groups and Putin himself. Instead, the invasion is more consistent with evidence that Putin perceived Ukraine to be bluffing, or expected fighting to yield pro-Russia shifts in Ukrainian domestic politics.

Hand-Tying through Military Signals in Crisis Bargaining

Abstract Theories of crisis bargaining suggest that costly signals can enhance the credibility of one’s coercive threats. In particular, engaging in conspicuous military mobilizations or demonstrations of force are thought to communicate one’s resolve in a crisis. Yet, there is disagreement about why this might be the case. One set of theories emphasizes the hand-tying political and reputational effects of visible military action. A different collection of theories argues that mobilizations create bargaining leverage by shifting the balance of power in favor of the mobilizing side. This article uses new data on coercive threats in international crises to discriminate between these two explanations. It makes two key contributions. First, it presents systematic evidence that military mobilizations during a crisis bolster the effectiveness of compellent threats. Second, it demonstrates that such signals are likely effective because they alter the local balance of military power, not because of their political effects.

Do States Really Sink Costs to Signal Resolve?

Abstract Sinking costs to signal resolve has become a vital part of how the field of international relations (IR) understands crisis bargaining. The logic of a resolved state “burning money” to distinguish itself from an unresolved state is well established in theory. But do states choose to sink costs and burn money in practice? We address the question on two fronts. First, we collect and analyze the examples of sinking costs in the mainstream IR literature. We find almost no clear-cut cases of sunk-cost signals. Second, we argue that this is because states typically prefer other signaling strategies. Rather than burning money, states can expend those resources more constructively. In particular, states can invest in improving the probability of victory in war (“balance tilting”), or they can downpay the costs of war. We conclude that balance tilting and downpaying costs plausibly explain a great deal of state behavior in peacetime, in crises, and even in wartime.

Microfoundations of domestic audience costs in nondemocratic regimes: Experimental evidence from Putin’s Russia

Do leaders in nondemocratic regimes face public backlash when they threaten to use military force and back down? Whether citizens disapprove of empty threats is central to studying the domestic ‘audience costs’ in international crisis bargaining, but there is little experimental evidence of this phenomenon from autocracies. In this research article, I present the results of an original survey experiment investigating the microfoundations of domestic audience costs in the Russian Federation. My findings showed that even in Putin’s Russia, the citizens expressed attitudes in line with the audience costs theory. However, I also demonstrate that the effect of audience costs treatments was significantly stronger for the opponents of the current Russian leadership than for the supporters. The results of this study represent an important contribution to the existing literature by providing micro-level empirical evidence from a personalist nondemocratic regime.

Preference Constellations in EU–Russian Crisis Bargaining over Syria and Ukraine

AbstractThe Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 and the ensuing EU–Russian clash over the fate of Ukraine highlight the importance of explaining the outcomes of EU–Russian crisis bargaining. Complementing existing accounts, we argue that favourable preference constellations are key: The more determined, united and focused side prevails over its less interested, divided or unfocused counterpart. We first establish the inferiority of Russia's influence assets (economic, military, normative and allies) relative to the EU. We then use congruence analysis to reverse‐engineer crisis bargaining outcomes in key cases of EU–Russian crisis bargaining, showing that favourable preference constellations allowed Russia, despite inferior assets and EU opposition, to ensure Syrian dictator Assad's political survival, finalize the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and keep Donbass out of Kyiv's control since then. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for related areas, as well as for current and future EU–Russian crisis bargaining, specifically over Ukraine.

Endogenous military strategy and crisis bargaining

When states fight wars, they choose between multiple military strategies, e.g. whether to place boots on the ground or restrict efforts to an air campaign. We modify the standard crisis bargaining model to account for this by endogenizing a state's war strategy. Intuitively, states choose the more powerful strategy when the additional strength gained covers the additional costs of doing so. However, there is a counterintuitive second-order consequence of this. When stronger campaigns are expensive but still credible, states are more likely to reach a negotiated settlement to avoid the corresponding high costs. As the cost of the more powerful option increases, states substitute their actions with cheaper but weaker alternatives. Because of these lower costs, states become less likely to reach a settlement. In some cases, both parties may be worse off as a result.

Crisis Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Opportunism

Abstract The prospect of a rival opportunistically pressing for gains while one is at war with another rival highly influenced Britain's “two-power standard” as well as the US's “two-war standard.” Conflict scholars have documented numerous instances of third-party opportunism. I analyze a game-theoretic model of crisis bargaining in the shadow of third-party opportunism. Under complete information, a country with multiple rivals, that lacks overwhelming military power, incurs bargaining vulnerabilities with each rival due to potential opportunism by the others. Under incomplete information, uncertainty across dyads can lead to war even if there is complete information within dyads, adding more uncertainty to the interaction can actually reduce the likelihood of war, resolve across disputes can be endogenously correlated in equilibrium (in contrast to the exogenous assumption of reputational models), and a commitment problem can be conducive to peace rather than war.

The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats

AbstractIn this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a “commitment trap” for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of US declaratory policy.

Bargaining power in crisis bargaining

Bargaining power in crisis bargaining

Great Power Intervention and War

Abstract Great powers often extract concessions whether they intervene during or after other states’ wars. I analyze crisis bargaining between two primary disputants and a great power that may intervene to extract concessions from the victor. When disputants face commitment problems, the threat of intervention discourages declining states from attacking and enables rising states to make otherwise-incredible commitments to avoid war. When disputants face information problems, uninformed states find risking war less attractive, and informed states accept less favorable proposals, regardless of their private information. The mechanism by which the threat of intervention discourages war depends on great powers’ military reach and the side(s) against which they intervene. The model shows how (i) changing great power capabilities can lead to the outbreak of war between other states, (ii) these effects are mediated by hierarchical relationships, and (iii) great powers can create international order not with principle but with selfishness.

Domestic constraints in crisis bargaining

This paper analyzes an agency model of crisis bargaining where two states have private information about war payoffs. In the model, two leaders bargain on behalf of their own states. Importantly, owing to political bias and audience costs, a leader’s war payoff and peace payoff differ from those of her state at large. I establish general results about leaders’ bargaining strategies and the possibility of peaceful resolution. By examining incentive compatibility constraints, I show that in any equilibrium that has zero probability of costly war, a leader’s payoff net of audience costs cannot vary with their private information. After that, I identify the size of resource necessary to appease both states. If this necessary condition holds, which is affected by political bias, there exist properly specified audience costs that guarantee peaceful bargaining outcomes.

The Brinkmanship Game: Bargaining Under the Mutual Risk of Escalation

This article describes a simple two-player game which illustrates basic concepts of brinkmanship, to include calculations of probability and expected outcomes, and risk-taking profiles. The game befits a single 50-minute class period with introduction, gameplay, and discussion. The game can supplement the study of conflict from classic Cold War case studies of crisis bargaining, to arms control, or negotiating international protocols for global climate change such as the Paris Agreement. The Brinkmanship Game was developed for the seventh week of a 10-week graduate course called Game Theory and Decisionmaking: Exploring Strategic Situations. The course features a flipped classroom with class time devoted to experimentation, gameplay, and discussion of readings and games; lectures are online. The Brinkmanship Game would be appropriate for students in any advanced undergraduate or graduate level course in international relations, security studies, negotiation, or game theory. The Brinkmanship Game provides an active learning opportunity that can be valuable for encouraging students to come to their own understanding of concepts of mutual risk-taking. The authors have found the game to be effective in the classroom and hope it may prove valuable to those searching for ways to motivate students and to help them learn.

Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises

Signaling is a core element of international crisis bargaining and coercive diplomacy. To succeed in crises, a state must convey to its opponent that it possesses the capability to impose an advantageous outcome and that it is resolved to do so, while also managing the risks of unintended escalation and war. However, less studied in signaling literature is how states can use signals for the purposes of managing escalation risks or even de-escalating crises. In this article, we develop a theory of signaling in cyberspace. We argue that, although cyber operations are not particularly well suited as costly signals of resolve or capabilities in the context of coercive diplomacy, they have a distinct utility for signaling to manage escalation risks. We build a framework organized around the causal mechanisms of accommodative signaling in cyberspace and test it against a set of comparative case studies. We find that cyber operations can act as accommodative signaling under some conditions, particularly when decision makers are faced with managing tensions between simultaneously signaling to domestic audiences and adversary governments.

Gender, sexism, and war

We analyze a model of leader gender and crisis bargaining under asymmetric information. There are no essential differences between the sexes in their willingness to use force, but sexist leaders receive a subjective boost for defeating female leaders in war and pay a subjective cost for defeat. We show that this hostile sexism can lead to war for two reasons, first by offering sufficient private benefits to make peace impossible and second by influencing an uninformed leader’s willingness to risk war. We also show that (a) the effect of leader sex on disputes and war depends on the distribution of power, (b) sexist leaders may initiate disputes at less favorable distributions of power than non-sexist leaders, and (c) sexist leaders adopt bargaining strategies that make it difficult for women to cultivate and benefit from reputations for resolve, even in the absence of sex differences in the willingness to use force.

Risk preferences, uncertainty, and war

ABSTRACT In the game-theoretic literature on international conflict, risk-acceptance leads to war if it is severe enough to eliminate the bargaining range, in which case war occurs even under complete information. I analyze the effect of varying risk-propensities in incomplete-information crisis bargaining. In this setting, an additional lottery (beyond just the war lottery) is involved due to the proposer’s uncertainty about whether the proposal will be accepted. This has the effect that even small increases in either side’s willingness to take risks increase the probability of war, as opposed to the all-or-nothing, eliminating-the-bargaining-range mechanism. This result holds regardless of whether either side is risk-averse or risk-acceptant on the whole, and even if no bargaining range is being eliminated. I also show that uncertainty about the opponent’s risk-propensity can lead to war via a standard risk-return tradeoff, which is another way that risk-preferences can affect war and peace.

Nuclear Coercion, Crisis Bargaining, and The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict of 1969

The claim that President Donald Trump’s “fire and fury” pressure campaign coerced North Korea to return to the bargaining table has renewed debates about coercion among nuclear powers. This article contributes to these debates by refining our understanding of the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis. Drawing on Romanian archival documents and Chinese-language sources, this article challenges the assertion that Soviet nuclear threats coerced the Chinese to return to the bargaining table. Further, it explains China’s otherwise puzzling intransigence when border negotiations resumed. After China’s leaders agreed to return to the bargaining table, they became fearful of a Soviet nuclear attack and fled Beijing; despite this fear, however, the Chinese resisted a border deal for decades. Why did the fear of a Soviet nuclear attack fail to compel the Chinese to accept a border deal? By improving our understanding of the 1969 crisis, this article sheds new light on the conditions under which nuclear compellence succeeds.

Politics, audience costs, and signalling: Britain and the 1863–4 Schleswig-Holstein crisis

AbstractAudience costs theory posits that domestic audiences punish political leaders who make foreign threats but fail to follow through, and that anticipation of audience costs gives more accountable leaders greater leverage in crisis bargaining. We argue, contrary to the theory, that leaders are often unaware of audience costs and their impact on crisis bargaining. We emphasise the role of domestic opposition in undermining a foreign threat, note that opposition can emerge from policy disagreements within the governing party as well as from partisan oppositions, and argue that the resulting costs differ from audience costs. We argue that a leader's experience of audience costs can trigger learning about audience costs dynamics and alter future behaviour. We demonstrate the plausibility of these arguments through a case study of the 1863–4 Schleswig-Holstein crisis. Prime Minister Palmerston's threat against German intervention in the Danish dispute triggered a major domestic debate, which undercut the credibility of the British threat and contributed to both the failure of deterrence and to subsequent British inaction. Parliament formally censured Palmerston, contributing to a learning-driven reorientation in British foreign policy.

Reputations for Resolve and Higher-Order Beliefs in Crisis Bargaining

Reputations for resolve are said to be one of the few things worth fighting for, yet they remain inadequately understood. Discussions of reputation focus almost exclusively on first-order belief change— A stands firm, B updates its beliefs about A’s resolve. Such first-order reputational effects are important, but they are not the whole story. Higher-order beliefs—what A believes about B’s beliefs, and so on—matter a great deal as well. When A comes to believe that B is more resolved, this may decrease A’s resolve, and this in turn may increase B’s resolve, and so on. In other words, resolve is interdependent. We offer a framework for estimating higher-order effects, and find evidence of such reasoning in a survey experiment on quasi-elites. Our findings indicate both that states and leaders can develop potent reputations for resolve, and that higher-order beliefs are often responsible for a large proportion of these effects (40 percent to 70 percent in our experimental setting). We conclude by complementing the survey with qualitative evidence and laying the groundwork for future research.