Crisis Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Opportunism

Abstract

Abstract The prospect of a rival opportunistically pressing for gains while one is at war with another rival highly influenced Britain's “two-power standard” as well as the US's “two-war standard.” Conflict scholars have documented numerous instances of third-party opportunism. I analyze a game-theoretic model of crisis bargaining in the shadow of third-party opportunism. Under complete information, a country with multiple rivals, that lacks overwhelming military power, incurs bargaining vulnerabilities with each rival due to potential opportunism by the others. Under incomplete information, uncertainty across dyads can lead to war even if there is complete information within dyads, adding more uncertainty to the interaction can actually reduce the likelihood of war, resolve across disputes can be endogenously correlated in equilibrium (in contrast to the exogenous assumption of reputational models), and a commitment problem can be conducive to peace rather than war.