Abstract

AbstractAudience costs theory posits that domestic audiences punish political leaders who make foreign threats but fail to follow through, and that anticipation of audience costs gives more accountable leaders greater leverage in crisis bargaining. We argue, contrary to the theory, that leaders are often unaware of audience costs and their impact on crisis bargaining. We emphasise the role of domestic opposition in undermining a foreign threat, note that opposition can emerge from policy disagreements within the governing party as well as from partisan oppositions, and argue that the resulting costs differ from audience costs. We argue that a leader's experience of audience costs can trigger learning about audience costs dynamics and alter future behaviour. We demonstrate the plausibility of these arguments through a case study of the 1863–4 Schleswig-Holstein crisis. Prime Minister Palmerston's threat against German intervention in the Danish dispute triggered a major domestic debate, which undercut the credibility of the British threat and contributed to both the failure of deterrence and to subsequent British inaction. Parliament formally censured Palmerston, contributing to a learning-driven reorientation in British foreign policy.

Highlights

  • The Danish king’s declaration of a change in the status of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in March 1863, in apparent violation of the terms of the 1852 Treaty of London, triggered British concerns that Prussia and Austria might intervene militarily in the largely German-speaking duchies

  • Contrary to the theory, that leaders are often unaware of audience costs and their impact on crisis bargaining

  • We emphasise the role of domestic opposition in undermining a foreign threat, note that opposition can emerge from policy disagreements within the governing party as well as from partisan oppositions, and argue that the resulting costs differ from audience costs

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Summary

Introduction

The Danish king’s declaration of a change in the status of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in March 1863, in apparent violation of the terms of the 1852 Treaty of London, triggered British concerns that Prussia and Austria might intervene militarily in the largely German-speaking duchies. We demonstrate that British leaders learned from their policy failure in the Schleswig-Holstein crisis and from the ensuing censure debate and significantly changed their policies as a result This discussion of learning about audience costs raises the prior question of whether leaders, when they make external threats, are aware that they are generating the potential for audience costs, with their important consequences for crisis bargaining. A leader’s lack of awareness of the domestic implications of an external threat would raise questions about the validity of many audience costs theory propositions, including the basic argument that public threats enhance the bargaining leverage of the more accountable leader. Borghard and Jack Snyder, ‘Evading invasion: Syria’s chemical weapons and Obama’s audience costs’, Political This discussion of the extent of a leader’s awareness of potential audience costs raises questions about the leader’s other calculations when making a foreign threat. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). 32Erik Lin-Greenberg, ‘Backing up, not backing down: Mitigating audience costs through policy substitution’, Journal of Peace Research, 56:4 (2019), pp. 559–74

Historical background
The initiation of the crisis
The German invasion and the British response
The censure debate
The public and media response
Impact of the crisis and censure debate on British foreign policy
Findings
Theoretical implications

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