Concept Of Fundamental Rights Research Articles

Facing the Future: Conceiving Legal Obligations Towards Future Generations

Conceiving legal obligations towards future generations is challenging—especially from a positivist stance and if obligations and claims are understood as being correlative in nature. Legal obligations towards future generations are often rejected from the outset if (and insofar as) there is no explicit acknowledgement or established doctrine. This neglects the power of sound legal interpretation. I argue that obligations towards future people and generations are grounded in the relational character of human rights and that their positivity is not a problem in a legal order containing norm texts that can reasonably be interpreted as acknowledging human rights; no additional enactment is necessary for these obligations to be part of the positive law. This claim is based on a (novel) concept of fundamental rights which is compatible with legal positivism.

Universal Origin of Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution

Indian constitution has been referred to as “a bag of borrowings” since its first draft back in 1948. However, “slavish imitation” is an accusation that Dr. Ambedkar denied in the constitutional debate on 4 Nov 1948. Indeed, with the fine mix of features from multiple constitutions across the globe, taken with judicious discretion as fits our nation best, is more a borrowing in spirit, as the mixture of these features results in a very original composition. Among such ‘borrowed features’, the USA Constitution is considered the source of Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution. It needs to be considered, however, that a shift of such magnitude, of the conception of fundamental rights in such a form that lasts almost unaltered for centuries, requires a long gestation period of rising awareness and shift in mindset of the society marked by outliers whose work influences this shift over centuries, like that of John Locke, whose work can be directly attributed to the rise of Fundamental Rights across the world. It is to this process that the origin of Fundamental Rights can be traced.

Law and Recognition of Constitutional Legal Personality of Forests: a Few Remarks on Fundamental Principles and Values

The legal subsumption of biosphere processes necessitates recognition of the fact that the timescales on which nature reproduces itself are disparate from those of human life and societies. Additionally, nature exhibits variations in conformity across space. In the face of these challenges, the law must be able to integrate the aspects of complexity that characterize the construction of legal systems, the conception of fundamental rights, and the foundational values of legal systems with the facets fundamental to nature’s welfare. Therefore, due to the ambiguous nature of granting legal subjectivity and associated rights to nature, which could impede social inclusion and diversity, the author suggests granting constitutional legal personality to forests. This would enable precise definition and the application of established legal and managerial knowledge for the conservation of nature.

Continental Constitutionalism, Systemic Legitimacy, and Judicial Review

Abstract This article elaborates on the justification and legitimacy of judicial review in continental constitutionalism. After the Second World War, continental constitutionalism shifted from a Kelsenian conception of constitutional courts to a strong model of judicial review whose legitimacy requires maintaining distance both from the U.S. model built around checks and balances and from the model embodied by the New Commonwealth constitutionalism. I suggest that the legitimacy of continental judicial review should not depend on the degree to which it resists the countermajoritarian objection, but rather that it should follow a logic of protective efficacy that takes a systemic perspective. On this basis, I propose coordinating judicial review in terms of a weak form of constitutionalism that I call “cooperative constitutionalism”, whose three main axes are: a democratic culture of justification, a conception of fundamental rights as qualified mandatory goals and a systemic approach to the proportionality test.

El principio de proporcionalidad en el derecho de acceso a la información pública: usos y potencialidades para mitigar la discrecionalidad estatal al invocar una excepción legal

The principle of proportionality is a procedure for applying rules on fundamental rights. Although it was born in Germany, today and thanks to the contribution of Robert Alexy, it migrated to other legal systems. Generally, their implementation is approached from the judicial perspective; that is, as a mechanism of constitutional review. This paper addresses the principle of proportionality from another perspective. My intention is to evaluate its effectiveness in the particular field of the right of access to public information and, therefore, applicable within the framework of decisions taken by political power. In this way, and given that for Alexy, the conception of fundamental rights as requirements for optimization is inseparable from the principle of proportionality, I will analyse each of its sub-requirements – suitability, necessity and proportionality in the strict sense – taking into account such characterization. In particular, I will emphasize in "principalism" – recognition of principles and values in constitutions – as a determining element of the examination. Finally, I will conclude that the principle of proportionality presents an adequate argumentative structure to support the exceptions to the right of access to public information that, in light of the principle of maximum disclosure, must be interpreted restrictively.

The Intergenerational Effect of Fundamental Rights: A Contribution of the German Federal Constitutional Court to Climate Protection

Abstract By a recent judgment, the German Federal Constitutional Court enhanced the concept of fundamental rights to climate protection in three dimensions: their number, content and temporal reach. While previously fundamental rights to health, occupation and property have been trialled in domestic climate litigation, the Court here propounds almost all fundamental rights to being inflicted insofar as their enjoyment hinges upon the availability of fossil energy and thus the emission of greenhouse gases. Developing an intertemporal dimension of those rights, the Court finds an imbalance of permissible greenhouse gas emissions in that most of the emission budget available within a temperature increase of well below 2°C will be spent by 2030, leaving only a minimum use of fossil fuels for subsequent years and generations. This analysis summarises the Court’s legal reasoning, positioning it in the broader spectrum of fundamental rights doctrine, and reflects on the contribution of the case to the growing number of transnational climate jurisprudence.

Chapitre 2. Le principe de dignité : un principe universel de portée limitée.

Internationally, as in many national texts, human dignity is repeatedly invoked as the cardinal reference in bioethics. In reality, this principle has particular legal characteristics linked to its dual nature of objective principle and subjective principle. However, insofar as it constitutes, in its objective dimension, an obstacle to the instrumentalization of the human being, it sometimes seems to present an incantatory and rhetorical character. In this sense, the conception of fundamental rights organized exclusively on the basis of the freedom of a self-centered individual turns out to be less protective than the principle of dignity as it is the basis of prohibitions.

A EFETIVIDADE DOS DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS SOCIAIS E A PROTEÇÃO DO CONTEÚDO MÍNIMO PARA GARANTIA DA DIGNIDADE DA PESSOA HUMANA

A presente pesquisa teve como objetivo tratar da efetividade dos Direitos Fundamentais Sociais, protegendo o conteúdo mínimo existencial a fim de garantir o Princípio da Dignidade da Pessoa Humana. Para tanto, abordou-se sobre o conceito geral dos direitos fundamentais, identificando as suas principais características e a diferença com Direitos Patrimoniais, enfocando, brevemente, os princípios constitucionais da proporcionalidade e razoabilidade na aplicação dos direitos fundamentais e a fiscalização de normas perante a violação deste. Após, partiu-se para uma aplicabilidade específica, explicando o que são os direitos fundamentais sociais para, então, tratar sobre o conteúdo mínimo existencial e a justiciabilidade de tais direitos, relacionando-se com a Teoria da Reserva do Possível e o seu uso perante o Poder Judiciário como alegação do Estado para afastar o conteúdo mínimo existencial do dever deste em aplicar os direitos fundamentais sociais. Tratou-se também sobre a eficácia social de tais direitos, já que demandam a distribuição de recursos do Estado e a prática de políticas públicas para torná-los efetivos socialmente. O Princípio da Dignidade da Pessoa Humana foi tratado para explicar a sua relação com os direitos fundamentais sociais. Por isso, faz-se necessária uma análise da efetividade dos direitos fundamentais sociais, pois, não sendo efetiva a aplicabilidade deles, não há o que se falar em Dignidade da Pessoa Humana, já que aqueles são precursores desta. Quanto à metodologia, foram utilizadas as técnicas do referente, da pesquisa bibliográfica, da categoria e do conceito operacional.

Sustainable Digitalization in Public Institutions: Challenges for Human Rights

The modern world is bound not only by global flows of information, capital, services, and movement of goods and people but also by the wide range of opportunities to exert both positive and negative effects on these flows. Already, most of the aforementioned global flows, stationary and variable objects are protected (organized, coordinated, controlled) by digital technology and in the foreseeable future digitization will encompass the most diverse aspects and processes of existence. Access to the development, deployment, management and use of relevant digital technologies has expanded to such an extent that it has become virtually difficult and even impossible to provide timely protection against a wide range of actors, ranging from unauthorized specialized gathering to varying degrees of security. The development of information technology, which increasingly embraces various aspects of the existence of different security entities, calls for a new rethink of the philosophical - ideological, political, economic, social and cultural foundations of public security. In recent decades human rights have dominated in the discourse of legal and political systems. Now the balance between protection of human rights and public safety in the context of digitalization imposes necessity to reflect the concept of fundamental rights once again. Keywords: Sustainable digitalization, public and private security, human rights

Marxismo, ecologia e costituzione

Questo saggio analizza le origini del consolidamento progressivo della sensibilità ecologica negli ultimi cento anni, le rapporti tra l’ecologia e la costituzione e l’ampiezza teorica dei concetti di diritti fondamentali, diritti umani, democrazia, socialismo per evitare la catastrofe, non dimenticando che il discorso ecologico è nato nelle tradizione socialisti sovietici. Analizza anche dalla guerra come fonte di diritto e la legittima difesa ambientale nel diritto internazionale al ‘ambiguo’ ma necessario corollario del principio internazionale di solidarietà come uscita possibile alla crisi. La costruzione di altre nozioni come “beni pubblici globali” sembra, da molti, un’altra conseguenza di questa opposizione tra la protezione ambientale e gli interventi umanitari, entrambi su scala globale e planetaria. Salvare l’ambiente e salvare l’economia è il secondo grande problema: che cos’è la produzione ambientale e come funziona al di là delle tante assunzioni di responsabilità e dei tanti committments che non hanno séguito? Esiste un “capitale naturale del mondo”? è l’ultima questione del saggio, come da una decina d’anni si è legittimato un modo di vedere che punta alla valorizzazione del “capitale naturale del mondo”. Dinanzi una somma di argomenti critici e historici a tutti questi concetti, l’articolo tende a concludere che l’atteggiamento politico è proprio invece quello di un “evasionismo” dal Pianeta, di un abbandono cioè nei confronti di un pianeta ormai in crisi irreversibile.

Controle de constitucionalidade como mecanismo assecuratório dos direitos fundamentais à luz da teoria discursiva do Direito de Habermas

O presente artigo busca examinar a concepção dos direitos fundamentais segundo a Teoria Comunitarista e os riscos existentes em virtude de sua utilização, sobretudo, pela ausência de legitimidade democrática. Em seguida, à luz da Teoria Discursiva do Direito de Habermas, será demonstrado como os direitos fundamentais devem ser enfrentados para alcançar maior legitimidade democrática. Após assentadas essas bases, o controle de constitucionalidade será abarbado com o fito de demonstrar seu ínsito caráter assecuratório para os direitos dos cidadãos. Colima-se, ainda, através do estudo do voto do Ministro Luís Roberto Barroso, proferido nas Ações Declaratórias de Constitucionalidade 43 e 44, demonstrar como o emprego de fundamentos comunitaristas nas decisões judiciais podem ensejar a violação de direitos fundamentais, razão pela qual sua adoção deve ser abandonada. A pesquisa bibliográfica será a via principal para elaboração do presente trabalho acadêmico, além do estudo de caso aludido.

Meinungsfreiheit in der digitalen Welt

The communication via internet is simple. Thanks to low access barriers and widespread occasions for unimpeded development it is almost an ideal medium for the exchange of ideas and therefore seems particularly suited for the exercise of constitutional freedom. Yet, wherever the freedom of expression is exercised it must also be able to develop its protective functions and it is within this context that the open structure constitutes a challenge to the interpretation of fundamental rights. In order to counteract the premature conclusion that new situations require new solutions, it is advisable to first take a closer look at established structures and ways of interpreting fundamental rights. In particular the approaches and structural concepts inherent in Helmut Ridder’s concept of fundamental rights and its evolution to the transsubjective dimension of fundamental rights could be of use for a concept of fundamental rights that appears to be adequate to these and possibly also future challenges.

Fundamental Rights in Early American Case Law: 1789-1859

Abstract Fundamental Rights Law is a ubiquitous feature of modern American jurisprudence. Where did the term “Fundamental Rights” come from, and how was it applied in early American case law? This article outlines the genesis of fundamental rights law in early 17th century England and how this law developed and was applied over time. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 was the first attempt to codify these rights in English law. When the English legal system emigrated to America along with the early American colonists, it included the English conception of fundamental rights. The framers of the United States Constitution incorporated and expanded these rights. Early American Case law kept strictly within this tradition for the most past, and used the term “fundamental rights” usually for rights which had long been recognized in Anglo-American society. This article notes the concordance between the application of fundamental rights in early American case law and the long tradition of fundamental rights which ripened in the Anglo-American legal tradition.

Use and Abuse of the Concept of Fundamental Rights: an Obstacle for Judicial Cooperation?

The focus of this article is on the challenge to which extent EU Member States cooperate. It describes the current landscape of judicial criminal cooperation in the EU, taking into account available data. Hence, one can state that cooperation tools are being increasingly used, but this creates imbalances, which naturally crop up in any cooperation system. This is the starting point for addressing a proper understanding of the various possible reactions in order to tackle these imbalances. One reaction relates to the breach of fundamental rights by the issuing Member State. The article outlines that the results of this strategy, however, could be negative in the long term. Merely mentioning fundamental rights will not make Member States more respectful of them. It is further argued that problems involving fundamental rights should be solved with already existing and tailor-made instruments for this purpose and not by altering the cooperation rationale. On the contrary, by taking the latter route, we risk destroying trust as the basis of mutual cooperation. This risk emerges because it is exclusively linked to the reaction of the authorities of executing Member States. This hypothesis is confirmed by examining the “fundamental rights clauses” in the different cooperation instruments as well as by analysing the CJEU’s recent judgment in the Aranyosi/Caldararu case. In conclusion, the author suggests other ways to arrive at a possible limitation of the abusive application of cooperation. Any solution to the abusive use of cooperation tools should involve the issuing Member States, which must be the first to be convinced of the beneficial effects of self-restraint in the application of cooperation tools

The European Union and the absence of fundamental rights in the Eurozone: A critical perspective

Despite the development of fundamental rights mechanisms in the European Union, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the governance of the Eurozone has led to policies that have undermined basic social rights. The purpose of this article is to explain why it is that the European Union has been able to act in this manner despite the assurances supposedly enshrined in its own rights guarantees. To do this, recent advancements in critical integration theory that posit European integration as the outcome of competing hegemonic projects are drawn upon. The construction of fundamental rights is conceptualised within the context of the institutional framework of the European Union and the current dominant neoliberal project. It is argued that the process of construction of rights has led to a highly restrictive understanding of what the concept of fundamental rights entails in the European Union. This has allowed European Union institutions to rhetorically commit to rights while simultaneously acting to undermine rights in practice.

Soviet Union and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

This essay examines the Soviet role in the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, drawing distinctions between the Soviet and the Western models of fundamental rights up to 1948, with the Soviet context put into perspective via a comprehensive historical review of its origins and development. Furthermore, the supposed characteristics of the Soviet concept of fundamental rights are applied to the 1948 debate, with Soviet speeches and proposals thoroughly examined from that standpoint. It is argued that the disagreement displayed between both sides of the negotiation stemmed from the Soviet understanding of human rights being more collectivist and focused on economic and social rights. Hence, the essay intends to challenge the common perception of the USSR as only being hostile to human rights and opens a conversation about firstly fundamental, and then human rights as diplomatic devices.

El debido proceso en la ley de habeas data

In order to analyze how the due process is immersed in Habeas Data Law, this article is structured on the basis of the very conception of fundamental rights in the Social State of Law, allowing to locate and to develop more easily the concept of Due Process and its application in different areas to judicial and administrative instances. Subsequently a deepening of the Habeas Data concept is carried out, resorting to the antecedents in which its inclusion in the Political Constitution of Colombia originates and its subsequent development through Statutory Law 1266 of 2.008. With both concepts in mind, finally, we look at the ways in which the Due Process is indissolubly part of both the general structure of the Habeas Data Act and, in particular, the procedure for producing negative reports in The central ones of risk. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21615/cesder.8.1.10

Constitutional social rights without a social security philosophy

Brazilian constitutional law has a broad and multidimensional conception of fundamental rights. The so-called Welfare Rights are part of them. They are not only formally grounded on Title II, the Bill of Fundamental Rights, but are also protected by particular Constitutional Actions established as means for judicial implementation thereof. Welfare Rights as healthcare, social insurance and social care services for the most vulnerable, enjoy, therefore, a preferential position within the Brazilian system of constitutional rights. This article maintains that in spite of adopting a strong constitutional framework for healthcare, social insurance and socialcare services, the lack of a consistent and coherent political philosophy for welfare state seriously undermine the progressive implementation of these constitutional rights. In the first part the manuscript seeks to clarify the causes of this circumstance of recognition of health, socialcare and social insurance as fundamental rights without equivalent recognition of social security as a proper human right. Afterwards, the article is particularly concerned with the features of the judicialization of social rights. As a matter of conclusion, the article points out this situationas a paradox by addressing the lack of a proper philosophy of social security in a context of strong constitutional protection for health, social insurance and social care services.

OS LIMITES DO DISCURSO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONÔMICO E OS DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS: O CASO DA LIBERDADE NA PÓS-MODERNIDADE

O artigo estuda a relação entre desenvolvimento econômico e direitos fundamentais, especialmente a liberdade na pós-modernidade. O trabalho pesquisa o desenvolvimento econômico por óticas contrapostas e a evolução conceitual de direito fundamental como categoria. Investiga também sua conexão com o Direito Fundamental da Liberdade na pós-modernidade. Demonstra que os processos de transformações ocorridas nos pilares que fundaram a modernidade, e sua posterior crise, com o passar dos anos, influenciaram as dinâmicas sociais, atingindo, por consequência, os campos das liberdades individuais e do desenvolvimento econômico. As modificações no conceito dos direitos fundamentais ao longo deste processo alteraram a compreensão da própria categoria, e, embora o termo desenvolvimento seja usualmente utilizado de forma descuidada, este constitui um conceito controverso e complexo. O estudo aponta que a liberdade, enquanto direito humano e fundamental, é significativamente impactada pelo desenvolvimento econômico.

A Previdência Social à Luz da Teoria dos Direitos Fundamentais: Um Direito da Personalidade

Este artigo consiste em estudo realizado sobre a Teoria dos Direitos Fundamentais e o sistema de Previdência Social atualmente existente no ordenamento pátrio com objetivo de abordar a classificação dos direitos fundamentais em suas principais dimensões e respectivas características, alocando-se a previdência social dentre aqueles denominados de segunda dimensão. Isto porque, o sistema previdenciário consiste num conjunto de normas que impõe o dever de prestação material para o Estado em face de seus beneficiários quando expostos a determinados riscos sociais que submetem a pessoa a uma situação de vulnerabilidade social. A previdência social se apresenta, assim, como verdadeiro direito da personalidade, pois busca conferir meios de subsistência à pessoa humana. Nessa linha, buscou-se, a partir de pesquisa teórica e legislativa, identificar os conceitos de direito fundamental, previdência social e risco social, conjugando-se com sua previsão no ordenamento jurídico, a fim de se identificar a adequada proteção jurídica que deve ter o instituto da Previdência Social à luz da Teoria dos Direitos Fundamentais.