Cold War Crises Research Articles

Cybernetic States: Communication, Control, and State-Space in the Advanced Research Projects Agency

While political geographers have researched state restructuring extensively over the past forty years, few have explored the role of cybernetics in this process. Conversely, although a wide spectrum of scholars outside of geography have shed light on aspects of cybernetic governance, they have yet to incorporate insights from political geography. In both cases, the political geography of cybernetic state power remains largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, the article explores the nexus of cybernetics and state restructuring in the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), a Cold War US defense research agency, circa 1958 to 1969. It analyzes Congressional testimonies by ARPA-sponsored scientists and engineers alongside their academic publications and other papers to grasp how they conceived of and actively sought to transform state-space. The article makes two arguments. First, while geographers treat state restructuring as a function of neoliberalization or War on Terror securitization, the process was set in motion near the start of the Cold War. It was then that ARPA's appeal to cybernetics to resolve geopolitical conflicts cemented the logical, organizational, and technical foundations for neoliberal and War on Terror state mutations. Second, the main thrust of ARPA responses to Cold War crises involved restructuring state-power in the mode of a cybernetic feedback control system. These efforts bring into relief a distinct object of analysis, the state control system (SCS), which offers geographers fresh perspectives on state restructuring and opens new pathways for interdisciplinary research.

From craft to industry and back: transnational efforts in reconstructing tin’s social meaning to the retail consumer (1950s–1960s)

PurposeCommodity histories generally posit colonies’ roles as mere producers but have overlooked their roles in shaping global consumption. This study aims to investigate how Malayan tin producers and British colonial institutions used public relations and advertising strategies as entrepreneurial tools to fend off competition from substitutes amid global economic and geopolitical transitions during the height of the Cold War crisis and post-war boom in the 1950s and 1960s.Design/methodology/approachThis study draws on archival research of newspaper reports written in Singapore, the USA and Britain from the inter-war years until the 1960s. It also consults advertisements placed by the Malayan Tin Bureau on Time and Scientific American, data and views on tin scarcity by US congressional reports and commodity trends data published by the US Department of Commerce and the US Department of the Interior.FindingsThis paper demonstrates how the value of tin is recreated by manipulating its symbolic meanings and embedding them within the national and political contexts of the targeted consumer markets. This creative resistance against tin substitution was enacted through a transnational collaboration among colonial institutions, entrepreneurs in colonies and marketing strategists across geographies and territories.Research implicationsThis paper provokes further reflections on the importance of socially constructed meanings in shaping the market value of a product and the understanding of embedded political value systems in marketing generic commodities. Future research may adopt this perspective to reassess the framing of meanings of commodities in the contemporary setting, especially against rising concerns on the sustainability of mining natural resources, including minerals.OriginalityThis study integrates the perspectives of Malayan tin producers in reframing the meaning of a commodity and so, widens the scope of historical analyses of commodities beyond the industrialized global North. It reassesses how a commodity’s marketing value evolves and interacts with colonial politics. It also highlights the collaborative nature of colonial governments and local producers in developing new uses and representations of a generic commodity to create new markets for its consumption.

Ballet in the Cold War: A Soviet-American Exchange, by Anne Searcy

Over the past two decades, one of the most vibrant subfields in the history of US foreign relations, as well as international history more broadly, has been the study of ‘cultural diplomacy’—that is, efforts by nation states to deploy cultural artefacts to serve diplomatic ends. We now have excellent studies of the way that various nations (though particularly the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War) used art, music, dance and film to advance their geopolitical objectives. Anne Searcy builds on much of this literature to offer a new history of the role that ballet played in Soviet–American relations during the critical Cold War window of the late 1950s and early 1960s. In four chapters, plus an introduction and epilogue, Searcy tells the story of four ballet tours—two Russian and two American—that took place against the backdrop of the extraordinary tensions of the late Eisenhower and Kennedy years. Prominent Cold War crises during this period included the Sputnik launch of 1957, the communist revolution in Cuba in 1958, the American U-2 plane shot down in Soviet airspace in 1960, the Bay of Pigs and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and, of course, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962—the most dangerous moment in the roughly 45-year history of the Soviet–American stare-down. Amazingly, there were Russian dancers touring the United States and American dancers touring the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. The book includes a chapter on each of these tours, as well as a chapter on the earlier tour of the United States by the Bolshoi Ballet in 1959 and the little-known tour of the Soviet Union by the American Ballet Theater in 1960, the first such visit by an American ballet company to the USSR.

He USSR and the Cold War Crises in Black Africa

The article examines the peculiarities of Soviet policy in Africa and its evolution in the 1960s and 1970s by the example of three regional crises of the Cold War — the Congolese crisis of 1960—1965, the Angolan crisis of 1975 and the Ogaden War of 1977—1978. The USSR worked its way up from the defeat in the Congo, when the Soviet leadership had a vague idea of African realities, to participation in repelling foreign intervention in Angola in 1975 and providing massive military assistance to Ethiopia in 1977—1978. The scale of these operations, which were carried out at a considerable distance from the borders of the Soviet Union, testifies not only to the increased military and logistical capabilities of the USSR, but also to its more thoughtful approach to choosing allies on the African continent. The participation of Cuban troops in the armed conflicts in Angola and Ogaden became an important success factor as well.

Berlin – Cuba: The Interrelationship of the Cold War Crises in the Strategic Assessments of the Superpowers1961–1962

The purpose of this study is to identify real and potential interconnections between the Berlin and the Cuban crises in the strategic assessments of the Soviet and US leadership in 1961-1962. Author demonstrates that the contemporaries (political leaders, diplomats, military and intelligence experts of the two superpowers) saw the two, the most dangerous crises of the Cold War not as separate events but as those ones which could intensify each other. Essay is based on the variety of published and archival evidence on the Soviet and U.S. estimates made in 1961–1962. Article concludes that Moscow and Washington judged the Berlin and the Cuban Crises as interrelated in many ways. The Kremlin, being vigorously determined to solve the “Berlin question” before August 1961, changed the tactics after the construction of the Wall and tried to use the situation around the West Berlin as a means to camouflage the Soviet actions in regard to Cuba. For the White House, the August 1961 wasn’t the clear termination of the Berlin Crisis. In 1961–1962, there were numerous voices in Washington which speculated that USSR didn’t abandon its attempts to force the Western troops out of Berlin. For a long period of time, the U.S. decision-makers regarded the “Cuban question” through the lens of the Berlin one. Though the relationship between Berlin and Cuban Crises didn’t materialise, it influenced seriously the strategic estimates of the superpowers and, through the estimates, made an impact on the Soviet and U.S. actions at the height of the Cold War.

The War of Nerves: Inside the Cold War Mind by Martin Sixsmith

<i>The War of Nerves: Inside the Cold War Mind</i> by Martin Sixsmith

What a Cold War crisis over Taiwan could tell us about China-Russia relations today

ABSTRACT The crisis today in Ukraine between Russia and the West has uncanny parallels to an often-overlooked Cold War conflict between China, the Soviet Union, and the United States known as “The Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958” or “The Second Taiwan Straits Crisis” – which some analysts have referred to as the first serious nuclear crisis. In addition to worries about nuclear escalation, there are other similarities: Russia and China viewed themselves, then and now, as exceptional nations, superior to a decadent, materialist America thought to be in decline – but still carrying dangerous military clout. Faced with a strong West, the leaders of China and Russia in the 1950s tried to present a united, Sino-Russian public front, even if their two countries were fundamentally split over the issues that led to the Taiwan Straits Crisis. If the past is any guide, then despite economic pressure from the United States and the loss of international reputation, China is unlikely to ever join the US-led sanctions against Russia. As the conflict deepens, both dictators’ assessments of the strength and intentions of the United States might begin to diverge, opening a way for their rivals to drive a wedge between them.

Informing the Leader: Bureaucracies and International Crises

Whether international crises end in conflict frequently depends on the information that leaders possess. To better explain how leaders acquire information, I develop and test an informational theory of bureaucracies during crises. Time-constrained leaders delegate information collection to advisers who lead bureaucracies. A division of labor between bureaucracies breeds comparative specialization among advisers. Some emphasize information on adversaries’ political attributes, which are harder to assess; others stress military attributes, which are easier to assess. Bureaucratic role thus affects the content and uncertainty that advisers provide. I use automated and qualitative coding to measure adviser input in 5,400 texts from US Cold War crises. As hypothesized, advisers’ positions affect the information and uncertainty they convey but not the policies they promote as canonical theories suggest. For individuals advising leaders during crises, what you know depends on where you sit. Consequently, the information leaders possess hinges on which bureaucracies have their attention.

Razvitie torgovyh otnoshenij mezhdu Respublikoj Kipr i Sovetskim Soyuzom (1960—1963 gg.)

This article studies the development of Soviet-Cypriot trade relations in 1960-63, based on research at the Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). Concurrently, a historical analysis follows the events after the creation of the new Cypriot state and the two major Cold War crises (the building of the Berlin wall and the Cuban missile crisis). The efforts made by both governments to develop bilateral trade, the aftermath of the two major international crises and the results of the two governments’ policies have been identified and analyzed.

Cold War Crises: Foreign Medical Graduates Respond to US Doctor Shortages, 1965–1975

Cold War Crises: Foreign Medical Graduates Respond to US Doctor Shortages, 1965–1975

"Substantial progress has taken place in [the]United States-Rumanian relations": The Road to Upgrading the Level of Diplomatic Missions from Bucharest and Washington 1961-1964

This study represents an analysis of the United States-Romanian relations during 1961-1964, focusing on the background process that led to the elevation of diplomatic missions to embassy status in June 1964. Primarily based on documents from the American and Romanian archives, it reveals the path to diplomatic ties’ improvement during the Kennedy years and the Johnson Administration’s first year. While Romania was seeking to distance itself from the Moscow’s economic and political control and to strengthen its domestic and foreign position, the United States started to reexamine her relations with the satellite – countries from Eastern Europe. In this regard, the study explains how the US’ perception toward Romania started to change, what gestures and actions influenced this change and how the bilateral relations registered progress amidst Cold War crises and international tensions.

Kubrick’s Approach to Burgess: The Significance of Costume in A Clockwork Orange

Based on the 1962 novel by Anthony Burgess, Stanley Kubrick wrote a screenplay, produced and directed film A Clockwork Orange in 1971. Made as decadent and nihilistic (Denby), designed in such a way as to enable viewers to enjoy scenes of rape and beatings (Kael), the film was shown in London theaters until 1974, when Kubrick withdrew it from the circulation due to the copy-cat murders in England and anonymous death threats that director’s family began to receive. This text focuses on Kubrick’s specific approach to the adaptation of Burgess’s novel through his significant use of costumes and artworks as important part of the set design, which helps the viewers to understand complex social circumstances of the late 1960s and early 1970s that caused the crucial cultural and political changes in the world. The Cold War crises, uneven economical development and the Vietnam War (1954-1975) moved young people in their teens and twenties to protest against the (unacceptable) way of life they were offered by their patriarchs. Burgess sets the story in England, in near future, after the enlightening changes initiated by the Mods and Rockers in the 1960s, announcing the emergence of the radical punk style in the second half of the 1970s. Opposing to this utopian world and the class society, Burgess’s main character Alex will have to fight against the state in order to retain his freedom of choice. By virtue of an actor Malcolm McDowell, in the Kubric’s version of the story, Alex becomes charismatic, conscious and powerful person, strong enough to confront the society and eventually retain his free will.

Fugitive Leverage: Commercial Banks, Sovereign Debt, and Cold War Crisis in Poland, 1980–1982

This article examines a familiar Cold War event, the Polish Crisis of the early 1980s, but from an unfamiliar perspective: international financial history. Historians have yet to examine how the growing international activity of Western commercial banks and the Eastern Bloc’s heavy borrowing on international capital markets during the 1970s influenced the course of the late Cold War. This article covers the history of the Eastern Bloc’s largest borrower—Poland—and its road to sovereign default in 1981. It examines how financial diplomacy among banks, communist countries, and the U.S. government catalyzed the formation of the labor unionSolidarność(Solidarity). Ultimately, this article speaks to an important theme in the history of U.S. capitalism since World War II; namely, how the construction of global finance influenced U.S. foreign policy. The end of the Cold War in the fall of 1989 was the result not only of communism’s loss of legitimacy among the peoples of Eastern Europe, but also its loss of creditworthiness on global financial markets.

‘Strong, United and Independent’: the British Foreign Office, Anglo–Iranian Oil Company and the internationalization of Iranian politics at the dawn of the Cold War, 1945–46

ABSTRACTThis article challenges traditional accounts of the 1946 Cold War Crisis in Iran by moving beyond Soviet–American confrontation to focus on British policy. In contrast to the United States, Britain was a major stake-holding power in Iran due to the valuable holdings of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). By comparing the reactions of the AIOC and Foreign Office, continuity between the events of the 1946 Crisis and later developments in the Mosaddegh premiership becomes apparent. Soviet interference in Azerbaijan prompted great concern from representatives in Iran, but the central Foreign Office pursued a more cautious policy. Only concerns relating to the growth of domestic Iranian communism in the form of the Tudeh Party and the threat this entailed to the British concession prompted the Foreign Office and AIOC to take measures rendering them partially complicit in the internationalization of Iranian politics, setting an important precedent for future action. This article evaluates the policy-making process and its impact on Anglo–Iranian relations by utilizing records from the UK National Archives, British Petroleum Archive and diplomatic personal papers.

“To have its cake and eat it too:” US policy toward South Africa during the Kennedy administration

The assumption that US policy toward Africa was characterized by continuity during the cold war has recently been challenged by scholars who argue that President John F. Kennedy embarked on an African policy that was distinct from his predecessors. This may be true for black Africa, but Kennedy’s support for African nationalism did not extend to South Africa. This article reveals that Kennedy’s cold war priorities ensured continuity in US policy toward the apartheid state and, in some cases, additional cooperation as cold war crises increased the perceived importance of South Africa as an ideological and strategic ally and bastion against communism on a rapidly changing continent. This article also explores the role South Africa’s apartheid government played in this cold war alliance. The ruling National Party recognized its importance to US foreign policy goals and used this to stave off serious American criticism of its racial policies, deflect attention in the United Nations, and ensure continued economic and military cooperation with the United States.

Sino–US Relations and the Role of Emotion in State Action: Understanding Post–Cold War Crisis Interactions, by Taryn Shepperd. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. xii + 216 pp. £57.50/US$90.00 (hardcover).

<i>Sino–US Relations and the Role of Emotion in State Action: Understanding Post–Cold War Crisis Interactions</i>, by Taryn Shepperd. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. xii + 216 pp. £57.50/US$90.00 (hardcover).

Eyvind Johnson’s Hybrid North

The article explores the depiction and understanding of the Swedish North in memory sketches and travelogues, published between 1943 and 1963, by the author Eyvind Johnson, who was born in 1900 in Svartbjörnsbyn in Sweden’s northernmost county, Norrbotten, and went on to win the Nobel Prize for literature in 1974. The overarching argument of the article is that a creative interplay between places, “traffic,” time and memory in Johnson’s writing shapes a hybrid picture of the Swedish North as a dynamic, inclusive and multidimensional domain, making Johnson’s articulations of the North of heightened relevance today. While frequently preoccupied with the past, Johnson’s representations of the North are always also, explicitly or implicitly, grounded in a contemporary political, economic or environmental context, be it world-war preparedness, welfare development, cold-war crisis, or increased utilisation of natural resources. The article begins by focusing on memory sketches that belong to official anthologies celebrating milestones in the history of administrative structures and demarcations in the North. In these contexts, Johnson operates as an ambassador for the North, while providing incisive, at times critical, perspectives on past and present in the region. Drawing on theories of travel writing as a hybrid and “freer” form of writing, the article goes on to discuss how Johnson in travelogues such as Winter Journey in Norrbotten (1955) and “Summer Diary from Norrbotten” (1963) journeys into contemporary landscapes and townscapes that, at the same time, contain the traces or contours of his personal past. In these texts, Johnson acts both as a child of the North and as a special reporter approaching from the South in order to familiarise external audiences with the region. The article concludes by demonstrating how Johnson in Winter Journey uses contexts and concepts of travel to explore the relationship more broadly between his literary activity and the northern experience. In its finishing argument, the article suggests that notions of hybrid creativity and “transport” of motifs, material and perspectives are key to Johnson’s literary practice and “programme” in relation to the Swedish North.

A Cold War Crisis: Finding Meaning in a Most Uncertain Term

A Cold War Crisis: Finding Meaning in a Most Uncertain Term

United States Responses to the Soviet Suppression of Rebellions in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia

Under Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson, the United States refrained from intervening during the three major Cold War crises in the Soviet bloc in 1953, 1956, and 1968. The uprisings in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary came at a contentious stage of the Cold War. In 1968 East–West relations were again groping towards détente and, the Czechoslovak Communist Party unleashed an ambitious reform agenda under Alexander Dubček. On 20 August, a massive military invasion by Warsaw Pact forces squashed the reform spirit. All three challenges to Soviet control on the periphery of its Cold War empire followed power struggles in the Kremlin and intimations of a slackening of the reigns of control in Moscow. Eastern Europe was terra incognita for most Americans, and the United States had never pursued an active policy in Eastern Europe. All three crisis scenarios were overshadowed by crises in other parts of the world—part of larger arcs of crises the superpowers were confronting simultaneously. The three crises also coincided, domestically, with intense presidential election politics. Washington ultimately respected the Yalta arrangements and tolerated the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Next to grudging respect for the Yalta outcomes, the ultimate spectre of mutual destruction in a nuclear war “compelled” the superpowers towards co-existence and, ultimately, in 1989, the satellite states had to liberate themselves.

Soviet Studies, National Security and the Production of “Useful” Knowledge

Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts. By David C. Engerman. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 480p. $34.95.Know Your Enemy is a sociology of knowledge of the rise of post–World War II Russian and Soviet Studies, written by intellectual historian David C. Engerman. While it is not a work of political science, it offers an important historical analysis of a foundational episode in the history of the political science discipline. It is an account of the evolution of a specific field—Soviet Studies—but it is more than this, because this particular field was at the heart of the development of post–World War II area studies in general, and the intellectual and political engagements linked to the evolution of area studies were crucial to the development of modern political and social science. This symposium thus brings together scholars of Soviet Studies, contemporary post-Soviet Russian politics, comparative politics and international relations more generally, and the history of the discipline, to reflect on this book. While participants were asked to critically evaluate the book's analysis, they were also asked to comment more generally on the rise (and fall?) of area studies, and the history of political science more broadly. The issues raised by the book relate to the history and evolution of the current discipline, but also bear upon its future. For in response to post–Cold War crises (many connected to the discourse of the “war on terror”), there have been new calls for security-related area research made by such institutions as the Department of Defense (the Minerva Program, administered by the National Science Foundation), the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Education (in connection with Title VI funding of area studies). What does the history of Soviet Studies tell us about these recent developments, and about how individual political scientists and indeed the institutions of professional political science should respond to them?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor