Abstract

The article examines the peculiarities of Soviet policy in Africa and its evolution in the 1960s and 1970s by the example of three regional crises of the Cold War — the Congolese crisis of 1960—1965, the Angolan crisis of 1975 and the Ogaden War of 1977—1978. The USSR worked its way up from the defeat in the Congo, when the Soviet leadership had a vague idea of African realities, to participation in repelling foreign intervention in Angola in 1975 and providing massive military assistance to Ethiopia in 1977—1978. The scale of these operations, which were carried out at a considerable distance from the borders of the Soviet Union, testifies not only to the increased military and logistical capabilities of the USSR, but also to its more thoughtful approach to choosing allies on the African continent. The participation of Cuban troops in the armed conflicts in Angola and Ogaden became an important success factor as well.

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