Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975 by Natalia Telepneva

Abstract

The Russian term “mezhdunarodniki,” which refers to the middle-ranking Soviet experts on international affairs who helped to implement Soviet policy toward Africa, Asia, and Latin America, drives Natalia Telepneva's Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975. These bureaucratic and military officials, the benefactors of African nationalist leaders Amílcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau, Samora Machel of Mozambique, and Agostinho Neto of Angola, came to the fore in Soviet foreign policy under Nikita Khrushchev. Looking to resurrect Soviet Marxism-Leninism grounded in “Leninist principles that included a commitment to socialist internationalism,” men such as Petr Evsyukov and Boris Putilin left Moscow to develop relationships with African revolutionaries fighting against the refusal of the Portuguese to proceed toward self-government in the waning days of their colonial empire (p. 429). Leading figures in Africa play key roles in this new Cold War historical account of colonized people emerging from the thrall of Western powers desperate to hold on to their colonial possessions. These intellectuals were educated in Portugal in the 1950s and then received Soviet assistance after the Angolan uprising in 1961. They used various diplomatic strategies to manipulate the Soviet policy of “interventionism” in Africa and thereby gain military support for their own liberation efforts (p. 36).In Telepneva's words, “Cold War on the cheap” typified Soviet efforts prior to the 1970s, when Moscow lacked hard power in sub-Saharan Africa. Based on extensive research in Russian and East European archives, as well as interviews with key actors, Telepneva presents new information about the extent of the Czechoslovak State Security (Státní Bezpečnost) service's involvement with revolutionary groups such as Cabral's African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, or PAIGC) in Guinea-Bissau. However, the lack of archival access has denied her equally rich information on the role of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) and the Soviet General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).The book starts by placing Khrushchev's views of Soviet aims in Africa within the context of his broader foreign policy goals, then situates the African leaders and their transition from student activism in the late 1940s to their first trips to Communist countries in the 1950s, where they were impressed by what they saw. In chapter three, the Angolan uprising in 1961 and its contextual relationship to the Berlin crisis sees an initial hesitation in Moscow to condemn Portuguese actions at the United Nations. But the Cold War's uptick in the summer of 1961 prompted the first Soviet assistance package of its kind to the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, or MPLA), and Agostinho Neto, the MPLA's leader. Preoccupied by Berlin, U.S. President John F. Kennedy fell behind Moscow in taking advantage of the opportunity Angola presented. Telepneva demonstrates the initiative of the middle-ranking mezhdunarodniki in the Soviet bureaucracy—specifically men like Petr Evsyukov—in stepping forward and making tangible progress for their African clients as a liaison between them and Soviet political leaders.Sino-Soviet competition for influence in these Third-World conflicts proved a complicating factor in the internal dynamics of the liberation movements. In chapter four, Telepneva emphasizes the aggressive Chinese promotion of a peasant-led, popular revolution based on race and nation over class that fundamentally differed from the Soviet model. The issue of multiracial and assimilado (“civilized” Portuguese) leadership, which dominated both the MPLA's and the PAIGC's top ranks, differed from the non-white, unifying makeup of the Chinese model, risking the accentuation of existing divisions along ethnic, linguistic, and racial lines. The Chinese influence waned as a result, and African revolutionary leaders grew skeptical of Maoism. In chapter five, Telepneva covers the onset of guerrilla campaigns and the militarization of Soviet involvement in Africa in the mid-1960s. Her research from newly available archival materials casts doubt on previous scholarly accounts that depict Soviet policy in Africa as moving away from revolution after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. In fact, declassified documents show a determined attempt to develop relationships with the security and military ranks of Moscow's African allies. The Soviet Union then became the principal supplier of military equipment and training to Lusophone guerrilla movements. Chapter six delves into the impact of détente on Soviet policy in the Third World, a subject of intense debate. Relaxation of tensions with Europe in the 1970s stood in contrast to the continuation of the Cold War in the Third World. Telepneva argues that Soviet policy toward the liberation movements resulted from events in the anti-colonial campaigns, not from détente. Again, the role of the mezhdunarodniki and their emphasis on personal relationships with African liberation leaders is the focus rather than détente. Running along parallel tracks, Soviet diplomats and Leonid Brezhnev oversaw superpower détente, whereas the Soviet Communist Party's International Department, the Soviet state security organs, and the Soviet military pursued the Cold War in Africa. Despite occasional hopes for diplomatic solutions, Soviet leaders came to favor military means to achieve their goals. Finally, chapter seven argues that the Soviet response to decolonization was connected with events in Portugal more than previously thought. Shortly after the 1974 coup in Lisbon that overthrew the repressive Estado Novo regime, the leader of the Portuguese Communists, Álvaro Cunhal, arrived in the capital to a hero's welcome after years in exile. Worried about a countercoup, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Portugal and lobbied the African revolutionaries to ease their pressure on Lisbon during decolonization talks in the spring and summer of 1974. Echoing Odd Arne Westad, Vladimir Shubin, and Piero Gleijeses, Telepneva addresses lingering questions of Soviet-Cuban cooperation in Angola by drawing on new documents detailing the Soviet decision to resolve the Angolan conflict militarily rather than via diplomatic means.In this detailed and thoroughly researched examination of the Soviet Union's relationship with African guerrilla movements in former Portuguese colonies, Telepneva provides new insights that substantially update the roles of China, Cuba, and other East European countries in the liberation struggles of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Because of the book's stated focus on the Soviet protagonists who shaped the African military response to Portugal's hesitant decolonization, Telepneva says relatively little about the role of the United States. (For more on the role of the United States and any continuity of policy from the Johnson administration, readers can look to the work of R. Joseph Parrott.)Telepneva carefully leads the reader through a dizzying array of acronyms and actors in this multi-generational struggle, while never losing sight of her central thesis: the vital part played by the Soviet bureaucracy in the armed postcolonial liberation struggle and the African revolutionaries who used diplomacy to initiate and increase Soviet support for their cause. This is important reading for those interested in the agency of African liberation leaders and the divide between existing narratives of individual anti-colonial movements and those of superpower competition in sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War.