Berlin – Cuba: The Interrelationship of the Cold War Crises in the Strategic Assessments of the Superpowers1961–1962

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to identify real and potential interconnections between the Berlin and the Cuban crises in the strategic assessments of the Soviet and US leadership in 1961-1962. Author demonstrates that the contemporaries (political leaders, diplomats, military and intelligence experts of the two superpowers) saw the two, the most dangerous crises of the Cold War not as separate events but as those ones which could intensify each other. Essay is based on the variety of published and archival evidence on the Soviet and U.S. estimates made in 1961–1962. Article concludes that Moscow and Washington judged the Berlin and the Cuban Crises as interrelated in many ways. The Kremlin, being vigorously determined to solve the “Berlin question” before August 1961, changed the tactics after the construction of the Wall and tried to use the situation around the West Berlin as a means to camouflage the Soviet actions in regard to Cuba. For the White House, the August 1961 wasn’t the clear termination of the Berlin Crisis. In 1961–1962, there were numerous voices in Washington which speculated that USSR didn’t abandon its attempts to force the Western troops out of Berlin. For a long period of time, the U.S. decision-makers regarded the “Cuban question” through the lens of the Berlin one. Though the relationship between Berlin and Cuban Crises didn’t materialise, it influenced seriously the strategic estimates of the superpowers and, through the estimates, made an impact on the Soviet and U.S. actions at the height of the Cold War.