Co-decision Procedure Research Articles

A new approach to EU environmental policy-making? The Auto-Oil I Programme

The Commission's Auto - Oil I Programme was initially hailed as a model for future environmental legislation. It constituted a departure from previous European Union car emission policy - making based on the incremental tightening of car emission limits in line with the advancement of the best available technology. The Auto - Oil I Programme was developed within a 'tripartite dialogue' between the Commission and the automobile and oil industries. It aimed at achieving environmental quality objectives through the adoption of the most cost - effective regulation. This article explains why the Commission's 'new approach' was rejected by the Environmental Council and the European Parliament which adopted significantly more stringent standards within the codecision procedure.

Institutional Reform and Co-Decision in the European Union

This paper studies the Treaty of Amsterdam's reform of the co-decision procedure in the European Union. The paper presents spatial models of the procedure, and examines whether the Treaty significantly alters it. The theory analyzes the implications of the Treaty for the equilibrium EU policies and the institutions' powers. It characterizes sets of policies the Commission can successfully propose under the old procedure, and sets of policies the Council and the Parliament can successfully propose as joint texts under the new procedure. The paper concludes that the new procedure does not lead to a further increase in the Parliament's powers, as intended by the drafters of the Treaty. Rather it finds that the Treaty eliminates the Commission's power under co-decision and may increase indecision.

Behind the scenes: an examination of the importance of the informal processes at work in conciliation

The intergovernmental conference which was completed in 1991, the result of which was the Treaty on European Union, introduced the codecision procedure. This procedure gives the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament equal legislative powers in adopting legislation in certain policy areas. The article examines this procedure, from a European Parliament perspective. Through an examination of conciliation negotiations on the Packaging Directive and three public health programmes, it highlights how the adoption of informal working procedures has contributed to the successful operation of codecision-making.

The Inclusiveness of European Decision Rules

European Union Member States increasingly draw attention to the choice between and within various decision rules. Two prominent approaches, relative voting power studies and spatial models, assess the choice within the standard, cooperation, and co-decision procedures. However, they cannot sufficiently explain the Member States' choice of these rules. In this article, we present our model on absolute inclusiveness and relative decisiveness referring to two aspects of Member States' choice: their absolute chances to be incorporated in collective decision-making and their relative chances to be decisive actors thereby. We argue that the combination of both power aspects gives insight into the choice of rules, and we apply both indices to the actual power distributions in the Council of Members.

European Community Legislative Procedures After Amsterdam

When it enters into force on 1 May 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam will bring amendments to, among other things, the legislative process of the European Community. There will be no change as far-reaching as the introduction of the so-called “co-decision procedure” by the Treaty on European Union (TEU), but a genuine attempt is made to streamline the process, to render it more transparent and to enhance democratic accountability. Inevitably, though, not all the changes will be for the better. Two steps forwards and one back is, as ever, the favoured locomotive style of the Union’s constitution-makers.

3 European Community Legislative Procedures After Amsterdam

When it enters into force on 1 May 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam will bring amendments to, among other things, the legislative process of the European Community. There will be no change as far-reaching as the introduction of the so-called “co-decision procedure” by the Treaty on European Union (TEU), but a genuine attempt is made to streamline the process, to render it more transparent and to enhance democratic accountability. Inevitably, though, not all the changes will be for the better. Two steps forwards and one back is, as ever, the favoured locomotive style of the Union’s constitution-makers.

Amsterdam, the Intergovernmental Conference and Greening the EU Treaty

The environment was not high on the IGC agenda. The environmental improvements of the Amsterdam Treaty are nevertheless remarkable. Sustainable development has been made a Union objective, together with the principle of a high level of environmental protection; the provisions of Article 100A (the environmental guarantee) have been clarified; the integration principle has been strengthened; all EC environmental legislation will now be drafted following the improved co-decision procedure; the horizontal principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will have to be tailored to environmental policy; the case for making the Union more transparent and the declaration on the improvement of Community legislation could benefit environmental policy; and finally, the uncertainty surrounding the "right to protection of the environment" prevented its inclusion in the Treaty. The changes made in Amsterdam with respect to environmental policy are more than merely cosmetic.

The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union

The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union

Early days: The European Parliament, co‐decision and the European Union legislative process post‐Maastricht

Since the European Parliament's first vote on a Council common position submitted under the co-decision procedure in January 1994 the practice of co-decision has been scrutinized carefully within Parliament and the other European Union (EU) institutions. However, such scrutiny has produced differing interpretations. This article seeks to assess these respective claims by analysing the first thirty-two legislative proposals processed under co-decision, and so to make an initial assessment of the legislative impact of the European Parliament under the new procedure. Under co-decision Parliament is a more equal partner in the EU's legislative process, and now has a rightful place alongside Council in several important policy areas - despite the weighting of the procedure towards Council. Certainly, informal inter-institutional linkages have expanded as a result of co-decision and, whatever their qualitative effect, there has been an undeniable quantitative increase in the interactions between Parliament and Council. The net result of the dialogue between Parliament and Council is the confirmation of an increasingly bipartite bargaining process and this, in turn, has placed the Commission in a considerably more ambiguous, and weaker, position than in the co-operation or consultation procedures.

Comparative Advertising Law in the European Community: Will the Proposed Directive Harmonize across the Atlantic?

Almost 20 years after its first proposal, the European Community (EC) is once again attempting to both authorize and control comparative advertising within its borders. The authors examine the current proposal and the new co-decision procedure under which the proposal and future Community efforts to regulate and harmonize the marketing function will be considered. They then analyze U.S. case law and policy concerning comparative advertising to determine the similarities and differences between it and the EC's proposal and the prospects for harmonization across the Atlantic.

From the Luxembourg compromise to codecision: Decision making in the European Union

The process of European integration today is significantly affected by the legislative procedures that apply to different policy areas. In the high politics areas still governed by vestiges of the Luxembourg compromise, that is by unanimity voting in the Council of Ministers, the pace of integration is determined by most recalcitrant member government. All other policy areas under the European Union's jurisdiction are now subject to qualified majority voting in the Council, but outcomes can be expected to vary across procedures. The position of the Commission is strongest—and hence the pace of integration is likely to be fastest—under the consultation procedure. The Commission must share agenda setting power with the Parliament under the cooperation procedure. This will not slow the pace of integration, however, unless the Parliament comes to be more responsible to the citizens of Europe. Finally, the new codecision procedure of the Maastricht treaty significantly weakens the Commission and strengthens the Council of Ministers by transferring agenda setting power from the Commission to the Council. The Parliament's agenda setting power was replaced with veto power. As a result, the likely policy consequence of codecision will be to slow the pace of integration in areas under its jurisdiction.

The Limits of Self-Reform:

In this article, I investigate the potential for reform within the European Union (EU). Spatial models are employed to explore the extent to which domestic considerations prevent the organization from intensifying cooperation among member states. I show that intergovernmentalism will ultimately remain the predominant decision-making mode despite recent introduction of the codecision procedure which yields unconditional blocking power to the European Parliament. The capacity for institutional innovation is limited because of the coexistence of intergovernmentalist and supranationalist agenda-setting procedures. This dualism offers opportunities to overturn legislative decisions. After experiencing a defeat in the domain of `low politics' governments may create `negative spillovers' by asking for compensation in the unanimity-ruled area of `high politics'.