From the Luxembourg compromise to codecision: Decision making in the European Union

Abstract

The process of European integration today is significantly affected by the legislative procedures that apply to different policy areas. In the high politics areas still governed by vestiges of the Luxembourg compromise, that is by unanimity voting in the Council of Ministers, the pace of integration is determined by most recalcitrant member government. All other policy areas under the European Union's jurisdiction are now subject to qualified majority voting in the Council, but outcomes can be expected to vary across procedures. The position of the Commission is strongest—and hence the pace of integration is likely to be fastest—under the consultation procedure. The Commission must share agenda setting power with the Parliament under the cooperation procedure. This will not slow the pace of integration, however, unless the Parliament comes to be more responsible to the citizens of Europe. Finally, the new codecision procedure of the Maastricht treaty significantly weakens the Commission and strengthens the Council of Ministers by transferring agenda setting power from the Commission to the Council. The Parliament's agenda setting power was replaced with veto power. As a result, the likely policy consequence of codecision will be to slow the pace of integration in areas under its jurisdiction.