Closure Principle Research Articles

Have a Cake and Eat it Too: Identifying a Missing Link in the Skeptical Puzzle

The skeptical puzzle consists of three allegedly incompatible claims: S knows that O, S doesn’t know that ~U, and the claim that knowledge is closed under the known entailment. I consider several famous instances of the puzzle and conclude that in all of those cases the presupposition that O entails ~U is false. I also consider two possible ways for trying to make it true and argue that both strategies ultimate fail. I conclude that this result at least completely discredits any solution that denies the principle of epistemic closure. At most, denying that O entails ~U can itself be seen as a novel solution to the puzzle, preferred to any other solution: it accommodates both non-skeptical and skeptical intuitions but does not require us to give up the principle of closure, embrace contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, or deny any commonly accepted principle of epistemology or logic.

Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure

Carter and Pritchard (Philos Stud 173(4):969–990, 2016) and Pritchard (Nous 44(2):245–268, 2010, Epistemological disjunctivism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, Epistemic angst: radical scepticism and the groundlessness of our believing, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2016) have tried to reconcile the intuition that perceptual knowledge requires only limited discriminatory abilities with the closure principle. To this end, they have introduced two theoretical innovations: a contrast between two ways of introducing error-possibilities and a distinction between discriminating and favoring evidence. I argue that their solution faces the “sufficiency problem”: it is unclear whether the evidence that is normally available to adult humans is sufficient to retain knowledge of the entailing proposition and come to know the entailed proposition. I submit that, on either infallibilist or fallibilist views of evidence, Carter and Pritchard have set the bar for deductive knowledge too low. At the end, I offer an alternative solution. I suggest that the knowledge-retention condition of the closure principle is not satisfied in zebra-like scenarios.

The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox

The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution to the radical sceptical paradox. A sceptical paradox purports to indicate the inconsistency within our fundamental epistemological commitments that are all seemingly plausible. Typically, sceptics employ an intuitively appealing epistemic principle (e.g., the closure principle, the underdetermination principle) to derive the sceptical conclusion. This paper will reveal a dilemma intrinsic to the sceptical paradox, which I refer to as the self-hollowing problem of radical scepticism. That is, on the one hand, if the sceptical conclusion turns out to be true, then the epistemic principle employed by sceptics would lose its foundation of plausibility; on the other hand, if the sceptical conclusion does not follow, then the sceptical problem would not arise. In either case, the so-called sceptical paradox cannot be a genuine paradox. This new solution has three theoretical merits: it is undercutting, less theory-laden, and widely applicable.

HOW TO FORMULATE ARGUMENTS FROM EASY KNOWLEDGE, AND MAYBE HOW TO RESIST THEM

Abstract Arguments from "easy knowledge" are meant to refute a class of epistemological views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present arguments from easy knowledge in their strongest form, and explain why other formulations in the literature are inferior. I criticize two features of Stewart Cohen’s presentation (2002, 2005), namely his focus on knowing that one’s faculties are reliable, and his use of a Williamson-style closure principle. Rather, the issue around easy knowledge must be understood using a notion of epistemic priority. Roger White’s presentation (2006) is contaminated by the so-called lottery puzzle, which is best kept separate. Distinguishing basic from non-basic visual contents limits the force of the examples discussed by Cohen, White, and Crispin Wright (2007). Finally, I present a new strategy for resisting even the best-formulated arguments from easy knowledge.

Unspoken Rules: Resolving Underdetermination With Closure Principles.

When people learn normative systems, they do so based on limited evidence. Many of the possible actions that are available to an agent have never been explicitly permitted or prohibited. But people will often need to figure out whether those unspecified actions are permitted or prohibited. How does a learner resolve this incompleteness? The learner might assume if an action-type is not expressly forbidden, then acts of that type are permitted. This closure principle is one of Liberty. Alternatively, the learner might assume that if an action-type is not expressly permitted, then acts of that type are prohibited. This closure principle would be one of Residual Prohibition (Mikhail, 2011). On the basis of principles of pedagogical sampling (e.g., Shafto, Goodman, & Griffiths, ), we predicted that participants would infer the Liberty Principle (LP) when trained on prohibitions, and they would infer the Residual Prohibition Principle when trained on permissions. This is exactly what we found across several experiments. We also found a bias in favor of Liberty insofar as participants trained on both a prohibition and a permission rule tended still to infer the LP. However, we also found that if an action is potentially harmful, this diminishes the tendency to infer the LP.

Topology Optimization Analysis of Separation Mechanism for the Rice Trans-Planter

A mechanical topology regeneration design method based on the basic chain was presented which was reducing invalid topology design workload and improving optimization design efficiency. And it is used for configuration topology research of planetary separation mechanism of rice transplanting machine to verify its feasibility and effectiveness, which mainly consists of crank-rocker-separation mechanism, mechanical frame, planet carrier, total input shaft, and seedlings folder, and moving trajectory equation of seedling folder point A for the crank-rocker-separation mechanism is obtained according to the quadrangle vector closure principle. The topological synthesis diagram for motion chain for the CRSM was analysis by means of generalized treatment method based on theoretical optimization conditions and topological regeneration path design. The 6 kinds of topology diagram satisfying the design task for motion chair with high motion pair were obtained and the implemented mechanism diagram of kinematic chair for separation mechanism was designed based on the basic chain topology design method. The results show that topology design for the CRSM is relatively simplified for basic chain structure. And theoretical analysis of motion trajectory for the CRSM is relatively the same as the experimental results in the curve trend and relative error of angular displacement is reasonable and effective through test-rig comparative analysis with motion trajectory of crank-rocker-separation mechanism.

On the use of the phase closure principle to calculate the natural frequencies of a rod or beam with nonlinear boundaries

The calculation of natural frequencies of rods and beams with stiffness boundaries is a common problem encountered by vibration engineers. For linear springs attached to the boundaries, this is a straightforward problem, and the natural frequencies can be calculated using several well-known approaches. One approach that facilitates insight into the way in which the boundaries affect the natural frequencies of the system, is the use of the phase-closure principle. In this paper, this approach is applied to a rod and a beam with nonlinear stiffness boundaries, where the nonlinearity is of the hardening or softening type. The phases of the reflection coefficients, which are a function of frequency and vibration amplitude for a nonlinear boundary, are first calculated. They are then used in the application of the phase closure principle to determine the natural frequencies of the system. To illustrate the approach, examples are presented for both the rod and the beam. It is shown that while the hardening nonlinearity has a marginal effect in both cases, the softening nonlinearity can have a profound effect on the phase of the reflection coefficient, inducing some instabilities.

Lyapunov-Based Anomaly Detection in Highly-Clustered Networks

Network formation models explain the dynamics of the structure of connections using mechanisms that operate under different principles for establishing and removing edges. The Jackson–Rogers model is a generic framework that applies the principle of triadic closure to networks that grow by the addition of new nodes and new edges over time. Past work describes the limit distribution of the in-degree of the nodes based on a continuous-time approximation. Here, we introduce a discrete-time approach of the dynamics of the in- and out-degree distributions of a variation of the model. Furthermore, we characterize the limit distributions and the expected value of the average degree as equilibria, and prove that the equilibria are asymptotically stable. Finally, we use the stability properties of the model to propose a detection criterion for anomalies in the edge formation process.

Epistemic presentism

Commonsense functionalism is taken to entail a version of the extended mind thesis, according to which one’s dispositional beliefs may be partly constituted by artifacts. As several opponents of the extended mind thesis have objected, claiming so can generate a cognitive/knowledge bloat, according to which we may count as knowing the contents of trusted websites, even before looking them up (!). One way to retain commonsense functionalism, but avoid the ensuing “cognitive/knowledge bloat” worry is to introduce epistemic presentism—the view that there are no dispositional beliefs and that we can only believe, and thereby know, things in the present. Independently of the above problem, epistemic presentism can be further motivated by shedding light on two central epistemological questions: (1) how to understand the distinction between doxastic and propositional justification and (2) how to interpret the closure principle. The view also aligns with strong intuitions about what we may take ourselves to know, what the relation between action and belief is, and what may count as part of our minds.

The principle of deductive closure of knowledge and contextualism

The hypotheses of radical skeptics are so conceived to put the attributor of knowledge in such position that she can?t ascribe knowledge to anyone, because the subject can?t get proper evidence to exclude skeptical alternatives. There are several versions of the skeptical arguments by which she tries to point out the impossibility of knowledge ascriptions as direct consequence of the impossibility to rule out skeptical alternatives. All of those arguments are based on a very intuitive epistemological principle: if we know p, and if we know that p implies q, then we know q as well. This principle is called the principle of deductive closure of knowledge (or simply closure). In this paper, the author analyzes the most important contextualist solutions to the skeptic paradox, those that accept the closure principle, and those that reject it as well.

Is Materialism a Consequence of Natural Science

Naturalism is neither a consequence nor a presupposition of natural science in a threefold way: (1) the principle of matter, (2) the principle of supervenience and (3) the principle of the causal closure of the world are metaphysical principles. They are true, if naturalism is true. So, if you are a naturalist, you should find reasons for your worldview which are independent from natural science. But it is hard to see how this could work.

圆光栅测角传感器在线自校准系统研制与实验

In order to solve the online calibration problem of the angle measuring system in practical application, an online self-calibration system of circular grating angle sensor was designed. Based on the principle of round closure and Fourier series, the relationship between the measured value and the error of single reading head was established, and the single reading head self-calibration was realized. The self-calibration system consisted of a reading head, a glass circle grating, a single-axis turntable and a multi-channel acquisition control system. The experimental result shows that the accuracy of the single reading head of the self-calibration system is 5.90, which is close to the accuracy of the harmonic compensation method with external reference standard, the measuring repeatability is less than 0.76. Self-calibrated measurement system could realize the online calibration of circular grating angle measuring system, which meets the requirement of precision and reliability in precision measurement field.

Précis of Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology

The paper presents the key themes of my Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put forward against Humean skepticism, epistemic relativism, the closure principle, the transmission of warrant principle, as well as on the applications of the extended rationality view to the case of the principle of the uniformity of nature, testimony, and the justification of basic laws of inference.

Form IV: From Ruyer's Psychobiology to Deleuze and Guattari's Socius

From the point of view of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Raymond Ruyer's work appears to bear out two distinct tendencies of unequal appeal. On the one hand, Ruyer appears to be an anti-Aristotelian thinker of formation, rejecting any hylomorphic account of the production of reality. However, and notably despite his serious commitment to the work of the sciences of his day, he remains wedded to the ultimately conservative Leibnizian principle of closure. Nowhere is this dichotomy more striking than in his account of human society. The aim of this paper is to show how his positive account of form(ation) finds a significant and convincing extension in Deleuze and Guattari's notion of social surface or socius in Anti-Oedipus.

A Simplified Self-Calibration Method for Cylindrical Grating

Cylindrical grating angle sensor is a common angle measuring device with high precision. Due to the reflecting arc surface of the cylindrical grating the effects of relative displacement of graduation line and gap variation will interact. Significant residual errors still exist even with high precision cylindrical grating and multiple reading heads around the scale disc .In this paper, based on the principle of circumference closure, the principle of self-calibration is deduced and analyzed in detail. The calibration curve is obtained by obtaining the deviation between the certain position and an ideal position of the graduation line position in real time. A simple self-calibration method of cylindrical grating is acquired. It can calibrate random errors and system errors with time and improve the angle measurement accuracy. The method has the advantages of simple structure and strong maneuverability, and provides technical means for the miniaturization and high precision of cylindrical grating.

The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments

It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure’s holding it in place, but because we’ve already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate.

Closure and Epistemic Modals

According to a popular closure principle for epistemic justification, if one is justified in believing each of the premises in set Φ and one comes to believe thatψon the basis of competently deducingψfrom Φ—while retaining justified beliefs in the premises—then one is justified in believing thatψ. This principle isprima faciecompelling; it seems to capture the sense in which competent deduction is an epistemically secure means to extend belief. However, even the single‐premise version of this closure principle is in conflict with certain seemingly good inferences involving the epistemic possibility modal ♢. According to other compelling principles concerning competent deduction and epistemic justification, one can competently infer ¬♢φfrom ¬φin deliberation even though there are cases in which one can justifiably believe ¬φbut would be unjustified in believing ¬♢φ. Thus, as we argue, philosophers must choose between unrestricted closure for justification and the validity of these other principles.

A unified framework for weighted parametric multiple test procedures

We describe a general framework for weighted parametric multiple test procedures based on the closure principle. We utilize general weighting strategies that can reflect complex study objectives and include many procedures in the literature as special cases. The proposed weighted parametric tests bridge the gap between rejection rules using either adjusted significance levels or adjusted p-values. This connection is made by allowing intersection hypotheses of the underlying closed test procedure to be tested at level smaller than α. This may be also necessary to take certain study situations into account. For such cases we introduce a subclass of exact α-level parametric tests that satisfy the consonance property. When the correlation is known only for certain subsets of the test statistics, a new procedure is proposed to fully utilize this knowledge within each subset. We illustrate the proposed weighted parametric tests using a clinical trial example and conduct a simulation study to investigate its operating characteristics.

Scepticism, closure and rationally grounded knowledge: a new solution

Radical scepticism contends that our knowledge of the external world is impossible. Particularly, radical scepticism can be motivated by the closure principle (i.e., if one knows that P and one can competently deduce Q from P, then one is in a position to know that Q). Several commentators have noted that a straightforward way to respond to such arguments is via externalist strategies, e.g., Goldman (Justification and knowledge, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979, Epistemology and cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986), Greco (Putting skeptics in their places, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000), Bergmann (Justification without awareness, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006). However, these externalist strategies are not effective against a slightly weaker form of the argument, a closure principle for rationally grounded knowledge, \({closure}_{RK.}\) The sceptical argument, framed around the \(\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK}}\) principle (i.e., if S has rationally grounded knowledge that P, and S competently deduces Q from P, thereby forming a belief that Q on this basis while retaining her rationally grounded knowledge that P, then S has rationally grounded knowledge that Q), targets rationally grounded knowledge. Although externalist strategies are ineffective against this form of argument, its conclusion can nonetheless be resisted by combining, in a novel way, the resources of Wittgenstein and Davidson. In particular, I argue that the sceptic is assuming an unrestricted way of using the \(\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK}}\) principle, which is incorrect. Alternatively, I argue for The Conditionality of Rational Support Thesis, i.e., the thesis that rational support via competent deduction is conditional. In particular, rational support must be provided within an evaluative system in which hinge propositions are presupposed and contentful beliefs are being evaluated. In the end, we can resist the \(\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK }}\)-based sceptical argument while retaining the \(\hbox {closure}_{\mathrm{RK}}\) principle.

An alternative approach to overcome shortcomings with multiple testing of binary data in ecotoxicology

Binary data such as survival, hatching and mortality are assumed to be best described by a binomial distribution. This article provides a simple and straight forward approach for derivation of a no/lowest observed effect level (NOEL/LOEL) in a one-to-many control versus treatments setup. Practically, NOEL and LOEL values can be derived by means of different procedures, e.g. using Fisher’s exact test in coherence with adjusted p values. However, using adjusted p values heavily decreases statistical power. Alternatively, multiple t tests (e.g. Dunnett test procedure) together with arcsin-square-root transformations can be applied in order to account for variance heterogeneity of binomial data. Arcsin-square-root transformation, however, violates normal distribution because transformed data are constrained, while normal distribution provides data in the range \((-\infty ,\infty )\). Furthermore, results of statistical tests relying on an approximate normal distribution are approximate too. When testing for trends in probabilities of success (probs), the step down Cochran–Armitage trend test (CA) can be applied. The test statistic used is approximately normal. However, if probs approach 0 or 1, normal approximation of the null-distribution is suboptimal. Thus, critical values and p values lack statistical accuracy. We propose applying the closure principle (CP) and Fisher–Freeman–Halton test (FISH). The resulting CPFISH can solve the problems mentioned above. CP is used to overcome \(\alpha\)-inflation while FISH is applied to test for differences in probs between the control and any subset of treatment groups. Its applicability is presented by means of real data sets. Additionally, we performed a simulation study of 81 different setups (differing numbers of control replicates, numbers of treatments etc.), and compared the results of CPFISH to CA allowing us to point out the advantages and disadvantages of the CPFISH.