Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution to the radical sceptical paradox. A sceptical paradox purports to indicate the inconsistency within our fundamental epistemological commitments that are all seemingly plausible. Typically, sceptics employ an intuitively appealing epistemic principle (e.g., the closure principle, the underdetermination principle) to derive the sceptical conclusion. This paper will reveal a dilemma intrinsic to the sceptical paradox, which I refer to as the self-hollowing problem of radical scepticism. That is, on the one hand, if the sceptical conclusion turns out to be true, then the epistemic principle employed by sceptics would lose its foundation of plausibility; on the other hand, if the sceptical conclusion does not follow, then the sceptical problem would not arise. In either case, the so-called sceptical paradox cannot be a genuine paradox. This new solution has three theoretical merits: it is undercutting, less theory-laden, and widely applicable.
Highlights
Radical scepticism argues that we do not possess any everyday knowledge that we ordinarily claim to possess
What I would like to emphasise is just that the validity of a theory-laden solution is conditional, since it is premised on its underpinning theory. This could be a noteworthy defect for an antisceptical solution, as any anti-sceptical proposal underpinned by a specific account of knowledge has to defend its underpinning theory before it can be applied to cope with scepticism
[Underdetermination-Based Radical Sceptical Paradox]: (PU1) If I lack better rational support which favours my beliefs of everyday propositions over that I am a BIV, I do not have everyday knowledge. [Underdetermination] (PU2) I lack better rational support which favours my beliefs of everyday propositions over that I am a BIV. (PU3) I have widespread everyday knowledge. Pritchard argues that this form of sceptical paradox, which is based on the underdetermination principle (i.e., “if a subject S knows that p is incompatible with q, and S lacks a rational reason for preferring p over q, S lacks knowledge that p”), fundamentally differs from the closure-based one, and requires a distinct solution
Summary
Radical scepticism argues that we do not possess any everyday knowledge that we ordinarily claim to possess. A genuine paradox is constituted by a set of plausible while inconsistent propositions. A sceptical paradox aims to reveal the inconsistency within our seemingly plausible fundamental epistemological commitments. Take the most-discussed closure-based sceptical paradox for example:. [Closure-Based Radical Sceptical Paradox] (PC1) If one knows that p and that p entails q, one knows that q. Closure is essential for extending our knowledge by deduction from what we already know.. Given PC1 and PC2, if I possess everyday knowledge, I know that I am not a BIV. The problem of radical scepticism is paradoxical and thorny
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