The decision of the former Acting President of China, Li Tsung-jen, to end his self-imposed exile in the United States, appeared to many as an anti-climax to turbulent career. As the chief figure in the powerful Kwangsi clique, Li had been the focus of several national movements in pre-war China, standing in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek. During the period prior to 1949, however, Li had not been considered as serious personal rival to Chiang for national leadership. His opposition was principleand policy-oriented, based upon divergent conception of China's problems and the strategies necessary to achieve their solution. Both men were aware of the need for national unity and the necessity of strong military power for its realization. But during the period between 1925 and 1936, General Li Tsung-jen hesitated to cooperate on behalf of national unity at the cost of sacrificing all local and provincial autonomy. He frequently referred to the dangers inherent in building nation-state from the top and the center. Unity founded and maintained merely on military and political manipulation represented both an expensive and an ephemeral deceit in his view. The high point of Li's career as national figure in 1948-49 may be considered classical exercise in political futility. First as Vice-President and later as caretaker President, he was supported by the remaining liberal elements in China at moment when the Republic was on the brink of military disaster and when its morale and legitimacy were at the lowest ebb. When Li chose exile in the United States, it was decision when Li's basic mood toward the two major forces in Chinese politics was best expressed by the oft-repeated phrase, a plague on both your houses, and with the hope that an aseptic and democratic third force could still be established. General Li was often fond of referring to himself as the son of Kwangsi peasant. Although his family had formerly been of middle-peasant status, their fortunes declined while he was still boy. He studied the classics and traditional histories for time and then entered nearby military academy, where he secretly joined the revolutionary T'ung Meng Hui. After graduation from the academy in 1912, he was appointed commander of company of local troops and soon found himself involved in local conflicts among the Kwangsi warlords. The first few years after the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty were characterized by rapid political disintegration in Kwangsi, as in the rest of
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