Chinese Military Research Articles

A People’s Liberation Army’s Experiment Went Awry Or A Well-Thought-out Chinese Military Operation to Stymie the World Without Firing a Shot?

Ever since the Covid19 virus brought the deadly pandemic, starting December 2019, the world’s attention has been fixated at the much-maligned Wuhan Virology Lab (WVL) in Hubei province of China. Number of scientists and intelligence agencies across the world believed that the virus was unnatural and leaked from the WVL and therefore they remained glued to the lab to trace the truth affiliated with the origin of the virus. However, classified documents from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) revealed that, Wuhan was a calculated bogey and a strategic subterfuge employed by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to deflect the world’s attention from its biological weapons research and military use of bioweapons.

Study on the Construction of the Image of Chinese Peacekeeping Forces and its External Publicity Strategies-a Case Study on the Peacekeeping Reports of the English Version of Chinese Military Website

中国维和军人；身份构建；外宣策略；中国军网英文版

Comparative Study of Korean and Chinese Military Terms

Comparative Study of Korean and Chinese Military Terms

"Cabbage strategy" as a method of ensuring China’s sovereignty on the China-Indian border

In May 2020, one of the largest conflicts in recent decades occurred on the Sino-Indian border. Against the background of discussion of heated armed clashes, observers have also noted that in the past years China has been using hybrid tactics as means of ensuring its control over the Line of actual control on the border with India. This article examines the hybrid tactics of the Chinese side to ensure sovereignty on the border with India the PRC's policy of installing military and civilian infrastructure in disputed and border areas. In the areas claimed by India and Bhutan, Chinese objects for various purposes appear - from camouflaged barracks and installations of unclear purpose to residential villages. These installations testify to the application by China of the so-called "сabbagestrategy" - the gradual "surrounding" the enemy with its infrastructure in order to establish de facto Chinese military and economic control over the disputed territories. In addition, Beijing has launched a large-scale development program for the border Tibet Autonomous Region in order to strengthen its borders. Such actions are hybrid tactics used by China in other territorial disputes, for example, around the islands in the South China Sea. They allow the PRC to have a military superiority over the opponent, to intimidate him with its economic and military influence in the region. Such actions fit into the framework of one of the priorities declared by the current Chinese leadership: the protection of national borders and the restoration of sovereignty over the territories “lost” during the so-called century of humiliation.

Russia–US–China: Motives and Risks of Russian–Chinese Military Rapprochement

A military alliance between China and Russia does not currently appear to be justified in terms of the broadly understood security interests of the Russian Federation. Such an alliance would significantly reformat the structure of world multipolarity, causing significant radicalization and increased tensions in it. This alliance would probably exacerbate the security problem of the Russian Federation rather than contribute to its solution. At the same time, given other foreign policy conditions, Russia, by its own motivations, and China by its own, can return to the idea of creating a military alliance if they consider it a necessary and urgent means of ensuring their security in the confrontation with the United States. The US withdrawal from the arms control treaties, in particular from START III, means the consolidation of this state’s orientation towards sole dominance in strategic arms. This development of events overrides most of the arguments against an alliance between Russia and China. The scale and forms of the current military cooperation between the Russian Federation and China are adequate in the existing foreign policy conditions of Russia. However, it should not overstep the “red line” yet. Such a boundary should be mutual clear guarantees of the participation of both sides in repelling an external threat.

Chinese Open Source Data Collection, Big Data, And Private Enterprise Work For State Intelligence and Security: The Case of Shenzhen Zhenhua

China is collecting vast amounts of open source data to support influence and intelligence operations through private enterprises it then sells to state institutions. Here we present one database collected on 2.4 million individuals around the world from sectors China deems as targets for a variety of purposes ranging from political influence to intellectual property targeting. The data appears used to support Chinese intelligence, military, security, and state operations in information warfare and influence targeting. The data covers a broad array of public and non-public data with classifications and rankings on individuals and institutions designed to assist Chinese analysts. The company also provides big data analytics as well as other functionality to support Chinese military and intelligence analysts. Individuals and institutions in open liberal democracies need greater understanding and privacy rights based upon the asymmetric information warfare being undertaken by the Chinese Communist Party and state security intelligence.

Xiaobing Li, Building Ho’s Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam

Xiaobing Li, <i>Building Ho’s Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam</i>

A Thought on Applicability of Sun Tzu’s Strategy on Marketing Strategy

Sun Tzu’s strategy is actually an art of war used by Chinese military under Sun Tzu to win the war. Its application has been widespread beyond the military strategy. It has also been adopted for business strategy. This manuscript is to examine applicability of Sun Tzu’s strategy on marketing. In particularly it examines if Sun Tzu’s strategy can be applied as marketing strategy. Review manuscripts in related topics and a case study on a company are the method for the examination. The result indicates that Sun Tzu’s strategy is applicable in marketing and can be related with specific marketing terms.

Factors Influencing the Mental Health of Firefighters in Shantou City, China.

BackgroundFirefighters are routinely exposed to occupational stress and are therefore vulnerable to psychological problems.Patients and MethodsThis study assessed the prevalence of mental health symptoms and potential contributing factors in a sample of firefighters in Shantou city, in the Guangdong Province of China. We conducted a cross-sectional survey with 335 firefighters, including 329 male and 6 female firefighters. We used a questionnaire which assessed anxiety and depression, as indicated by the Zung Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (SAS) and Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS), as well as other mental health symptoms, using the Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90). Basic information and potential-related factors were also collected.ResultsThe average age of participants was 27.38 (SD ± 6.11) years. Assessed by the indexed score of different scales, SAS and SDS positive screening rates were 6.86% and 22.68%, respectively. SCL-90 scores indicated that 6.86% of participants had mental health symptoms. Logistic regression analysis showed that educational level, firefighter rank, and birth order were associated with mental health outcomes. Firefighters in Shantou were also shown to have better mental health outcomes than the Chinese military, but worse than the national population of firefighters.ConclusionThese findings indicated the mental health of firefighters is not good. It is necessary to explore effective approaches to help preventing and treating mental disorder in firefighters.

Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N. D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019. ix+768 pp. US$24.95 (paper).

Previous articleNext article No AccessReviewsChairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N. D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019. ix+768 pp. US$24.95 (paper).You JiYou JiUniversity of Macau Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The China Journal Volume 84July 2020 Published on behalf of the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/708992 Views: 66Total views on this site For permission to reuse, please contact [email protected]PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Building Hồ’s Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam, by Xiaobing Li. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019. viii+283 pp. US$50.00 (cloth).

<i>Building Hồ’s Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam</i>, by Xiaobing Li. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019. viii+283 pp. US$50.00 (cloth).

First-aid Training for Combatants Without Systematic Medical Education Experience on the Battlefield: Establishment and Evaluation of the Curriculum in China

For combatants without systematic medical education experience (CSMEE), it is necessary to participate in first-aid on the battlefield, but currently there is no effective training curriculum for CSMEE in Chinese military. A list of first-aid techniques based on expert consensus was formed, and then a curriculum was established according to the list. The effectiveness of the curriculum was further evaluated by comparing the scores among group A (the reserve officers trained by this curriculum), group B (the reserve officers in the military medical college trained by professional medic training system), and group C (the fresh officers trained by the Outline of Military Training and Assessment of Chinese military), through a 5-station assessment in a simulated battlefield environment, which included the following 5 techniques: tourniquet for massive extremities hemorrhage, thyrocricocentesis, thoracentesis, fixation of long bone fractures, and wound dressing with hemostatic bandage. The training curriculum entitled "Implementation and Assessment Standards of First-aid Training for Combatants on the Battlefield" was established. The comparison of average scores in the 5-station assessment showed that group A had better scores than group C in tourniquet for massive extremity hemorrhage, thyrocricocentesis, and thoracentesis, with no significant differences compared with group B. Also, no significant difference between groups A and B in overall completion time and overall scores was observed, whereas an excellent candidate rate in overall score of group B was better than that of group A (87.4% vs. 80.9%, χ2=4.40, p=0.036), and group A was better than group C (80.9% vs. 37.5%, χ2=62.01, p<0.001). The established training curriculum is indeed effective, which improved the CSMEE's first-aid capacity on the battlefield, and is equivalent to the level of medics.

Views of Chinese Military Experts on the Essence and Content of Information Warfare in the Present-Day Context

Views of Chinese Military Experts on the Essence and Content of Information Warfare in the Present-Day Context

Do China’s New Islands allow it to militarily dominate the South China Sea?

ABSTRACT Since the start of China’s island-building efforts, there has been widespread concern that these islands would host long-range sensors and munitions and thereby facilitate Chinese military dominance in the South China Sea. This article explains that the military advantages that these islands provide are overstated. The interplay of geography and constraints on sensor coverage leaves China ill-positioned to detect ships and aircraft throughout the South China Sea, let alone to target them. While these technical constraints place hard limits on Chinese military capabilities, ameliorating them would likely face severe political constraints and major tradeoffs in force structure. Consequently, there are grounds for considerable skepticism of widely held concerns about the military implications of China’s island-building efforts. The military balance in the South China Sea has not been greatly altered and China’s anti-access capabilities, such as they are, have not been fully extended into the South China Sea.

Analysis of Occupational Stress and Its Relationship with Secretory Immunoglobulin A in the Xinjiang Plateau Young Military Recruits.

Background With the continuous improvement of the modernization of the Chinese military and the major adjustments made by the state to the recruitment policy, the newly recruited military undergone multiple pressures such as targeted high-intensity military training and environmental changes. The mental health of military has become a crucial factor of improving the fighting capacity effectiveness of the troops. Objectives To explore occupational stress of young recruits in the Xinjiang plateau environment during their basic military training period and analyze the relationship between occupational stress and secretory immunoglobulin A (sIgA) levels. Methods Using multistage stratified cluster random sampling, 625 recruits stationed at Xinjiang plateau command in 2014 were enrolled as subjects. Occupational stress was assessed by the Occupational Stress Inventory Revised Edition (OSI-R). sIgA in saliva was quantified by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. The resulting data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, nonparametric tests, and correlation analysis. Results Based on demographic characteristics, occupational stress was higher in the urban group than the rural group, coping ability for stress was greater in individuals who were students before joining the army than nonstudents, occupational stress was higher in smokers than nonsmokers, and coping ability for stress was higher in nonsmokers than in smokers (all P < 0.05). Being an only child, educational level and age were not significantly related to occupational stress scores (P > 0.05). Salivary sIgA level was higher in the high occupational stress group than in the low stress group (P < 0.01). Salivary sIgA was positively correlated with scores on the occupational role and personal strain questionnaires (rs = 0.229, rs = 0.268, P < 0.01). Conclusion Demographic characteristics influenced occupational stress among young recruits in cold and high-altitude area. Further, there were some relationships between occupational stress and salivary sIgA in young military recruits.

新冷戦時代における米中の軍事戦略と軍事パワーゲームの様相 インサイド・アウトとハイブリッド

新冷戦時代における米中の軍事戦略と軍事パワーゲームの様相 インサイド・アウトとハイブリッド

Law as a Battlefield: The U.S., China, and Global Escalation of Lawfare

Law is increasingly being used as a weapon of war. Unable or unwilling to challenge other states militarily, states use legal strategies to weaken the enemy’s legitimacy. Such “lawfare” can be used to achieve a kinetic objective, to forestall one, to degrade the enemy’s will to fight, and to shape the narrative of war. The Chinese military prioritizes lawfare as one of the “Three Warfares” that shape its military’s influence operations. Meanwhile, the U.S. has no similar lawfare doctrine or strategy, even as China is forcing it to fight back. This Article argues that the U.S. needs to develop a lawfare strategy to combat its adversaries. It will first define the concept of lawfare and discuss how its use has evolved and escalated globally in recent years. It will illustrate this phenomenon by examining three different case studies of lawfare between China and the U.S. or its allies: international arbitration over China’s claims to the Spratly Islands, China’s non-uniformed maritime militias, and litigation involving the U.S. and Huawei. After discussing the rise of lawfare globally, including lawfare efforts by Russia and the U.S., the article concludes with some recommendations for a U.S. lawfare strategy.

Camouflaged Histories

Lei Yan 雷燕, whose artistic practice was shaped by a decades-long career in the Chinese military, began a period of transition through participation in a 2002 restaging of the Communist Red Army’s 1934 Long March as a multi-sited international art project. Her resulting encounter with US feminist art icon Judy Chicago raised questions about the potential neocolonial influence of global feminist art. The work Lei subsequently produced performs an autoethnographic excavation of the sociohistorical categories—woman soldier, military artist, and woman artist—that made her as both artist and woman. She works from within a national representational corpus, subjecting it to various experiments to reveal the fields of violence it has enacted from the Sino-Vietnamese War to the Great Sichuan earthquake. Lei Yan’s meditation through photography upon national, revolutionary iconography evolved into soft sculpture objects in cloth and paper. Their arrested ephemerality decenters the human subject, drawing attention to haunting absences in conventional stories of art, feminism, and nation. In comparison with the monumental work of Ai Weiwei 艾未未, who also created pieces in response to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, Lei’s art serves not to admonish but to bring back into consciousness lost lives and camouflaged histories.

Китай: военно-технические и военно-морские аспекты лидерства

The rapid growth of Chinese military capabilities and the increasing role of the military – especially the naval – factor in the PRC politics in recent years can be perceived as a shift away from Beijing’s policy dating back to the “Reform and Opening-up”, which was expressly passive and peaceful. Meanwhile, the overall Chinese military potential growth is the result of the systematic implementation of policies rooted in the Deng Xiaoping’s era decisions. At the moment, the PRC is quickly closing the gap between the U.S. and Russia in the development of military technologies, and is even gaining leading positions in some areas. The study is aimed at revealing the origins of the current rise of China’s military power and its capability to reinforce its new proactive approach to world politics with necessary military resources. The main focus is on the analysis of the PRC naval forces as – along with the nuclear forces – they are the main tool for global projection of the state power. The study also addresses China’s other military capabilities, which enable it to influence the shaping of a new world order. It seems that in the 2020s, the PRC will already be able to support its foreign policy by using force efficiently, whereas containing China can be very costly and risky. The new Chinese blue water Navy will provide the mainstay of these capabilities, which will be additionally supported by the growing expeditionary capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force and the PLA Ground Force. The far-reaching plans to develop a maritime component for the PRC nuclear forces is another important factor influencing the Chinese naval development in a major war. The expected expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and the possibility of the country’s approach to a third great nuclear power status will greatly limit the U.S. ability to deter China in Asia and around the world.

Polityka nuklearna Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej

China has made in recent years much progress in the development of strategic nuclear forces and means necessary for their transfer. This is the result of the deep modernization of the Chinese military. Modernising based primarily on the transition from a quantitative model for a high-quality mechanical era of an information-age model. In connection with these changes are also developing Chinese nuclear forces, which is used primarily to ensure the so-called real possibility second shot.