Chinese Military Research Articles

Frequency of Suffixal Morphemes as a Characteristic of Chinese News Military Discourse

Frequency of Suffixal Morphemes as a Characteristic of Chinese News Military Discourse

Empirical Analysis on Unexpected Information Effect of Monetary Policy and Stock Price Fluctuation: Taking Military and Defense Enterprises as an Example

The existing studies have shown that the unexpected information effect of monetary policy (IEOMP) would affect the fluctuation of stock prices. This paper tests the effect of unexpected IEOMP on stock prices in China. Taking Chinese listed military and defense enterprises, for example, the author further explored how the influence of unexpected IEOMP over stock price varies between industries. The empirical analysis reveals that, despite the industrial heterogeneity of the said influence in China, the stock price of Chinese listed military and defense enterprises is still affected by unexpected IEOMP. Our analysis enables Chinese military and defense enterprises to build a more robust market mechanism for the military and defense market, open more effective channels for the industrial chain, capital chain, and private capital, and drive the national economy with the sci‐tech results of defense. In addition, policymakers are recommended to keep an eye on the price fluctuation in the stock market and important economic information from stock price fluctuation in order to effectively identify the potential risks in the future economy and to improve the predictability of the feedback mechanism of monetary policy.

DAMPAK PAKTA PERTAHANAN TRILATERAL AUKUS TERHADAP KONDISI REGIONAL INDO-PASIFIK

This article was compiled to discuss the AUKUS Trilateral Defense Pact which is a collective security effort taken from the aggressiveness appointed by China in the Indo-Pacific region. There have been a variety of positive and negative responses from Australia from countries in the region, particularly China, which views the defense pact as a very responsible threat and an open challenge to their growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. This discussion is important because AUKUS is considered to be very detrimental to regional peace and security, and endangers efforts to destroy nuclear weapons, although it can be considered that this agreement will be a decisive step taken to take predatory tendencies from China. On the purpose of AUKUS and the reasons why Australia is more concerned with security than what is examined in this article, considering the ownership of supported vessels will support Australia's understanding to carry out longer patrols to maintain the Indo-Pacific security conditions that are often caused by the presence of a strong Chinese military in the area. AUKUS will be an important action in building the foundation that becomes a barrier for China to stop confronting other countries, commit violations at the borders of the Indo- Pacific region, and as a retaliation for aggressive actions against several countries in the region.

THE INTRODUCTION OF NET-PLATFORM-CENTRIC WARFARE IN THE CHINESE ARMY (PLA)

It is no surprise that just like the previous years, this year as well China has expanded its military budget, put another ship to sea, demonstrated new weaponary at the military parade, etc. For the last two decades, all the combat arms of the Chinese army has been developing at a high rate. Many authors claim very specific reasons for the Chinese armaments especially highlighting the conflicts with its immediate neighbors. From a geopolitical point of view, an interesting balance of power is being formed in the East. It’s been several years now that there are some precise problems in China-Japan conflict related to the power over some islands. China actively builds artificial islands which can serve as military bases far away from its shores approximately at an operative depth. And this matter deeply concerns the Philippines and Vietnam. In this light, it would be very interesting to study the balance of forces in the region and to analyze the American military doctrine on the one hand and the Chinese specific military and military-political attempts to appose it on the other hand. It is common knowledge that in political and professional circles in the USA are concerned about the actions and capabilities of China and Russia, which can considerably restrict the US access to key regions of Eurasia: Today, China and Russia have great potential to influence on the traditional American Net-platform weaponary, Air Forces, Navy, command and control networks, and even the orbital groupings. The two countries mentioned above, which are perceived as potential adversaries in the USA, strive to reach the level of the American military by all possible means and develop powerful techonologies. Russia and especially China are designing powerful satellite systems, various long-range missiles, fighter jets, UAVs, etc. New Electronic Warfare (EW) systems are being developed, to suppress or weaken the command and management systems of the US or its allies. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China also has the capacity to destroy settelites, disrupt extraterrestrial intelligence, wreck command and control networks, etc. According to experts, there is no guarantee that the armed forces of the USA can ensure reliable and secure communication and conncetion during conflicts on the theater of military operations, in particular on operational and strategic levels.

Chinese Scholars on the Progress and Outcomes of the Military Reforms in Russia (from the 1990s till Present)

Since the early 1990s, Russia and China have come a long way in developing military cooperation. It began with an exchange of delegations, the reduction of troops along the border, the adoption of confidence-building measures, and, by now, has transformed into a strong partnership. Two countries annually conduct several joint military exercises and develop military training cooperation. In this regard, the Chinese assessments of the Russian military policy after the collapse of the USSR are of particular interest. The survey of specialized publications shows that Chinese scholars commenced studies on the Russian military reforms in the mid-1990s. The author notes that there was a spike of research activity on that matter in 2009 soon after the start of radical reforms of the Russian Armed Forces. Chinese scholars usually identify four waves in the Russian military reforms, each determined by a combination of domestic and external political and economic factors. Chinese military and academic experts assessed these reforms both in terms of their impact on the global balance of power in the military-political sphere and their potential relevance to similar reforms in China. The first two phases of the Russian military reforms (from 1992 to 1997 and from 1997 to 1999) are usually assessed negatively. The general failure of military reforms is attributed to the economic challenges, the lack of political will, and the absence of an adequate theoretical and methodological basis for such transformations. Subsequent reforms (from 2001 to 2004, and, particularly, after 2008) are generally assessed positively. In that regard, Chinese experts emphasize the importance of the processes of political power consolidation and economic recovery that took place in Russia in that period, as well as the role of lessons learned by the Russian military from local wars and armed conflicts. Nevertheless, according to Chinese assessments these reforms still have certain drawbacks, particularly, associated with hasty and misguided attempts to copy the Western military models at the turn of the 2000s — 2010s. In general, Chinese civilian and military experts conclude that throughout a long and difficult process of military reforms Russia has made a significant progress in rearmament and increasing the combat potential of its armed forces. Moreover, such reforms could serve as a valuable source of experience and an example for further development and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA).

Origin of the coronavirus

Сoronavirus created all over the world a fear of death. How this virus was originated? The standard explanation from the Chinese was that in the wet market of Wuhan as there are Bat meat and Pangolean meat, virus was originated there and gradually spread all over Wuhan and other areas of China and then all over the world. However, serious doubts are now raised in the non-Chinese world. The reason is Bat was not sold in the wet market of Wuhan. There are active research going on in the Institute of Virology in Wuhan on various deadly virus, under the control of the Chinese military. Questions are raised whether accidentally virus was released from that Institute or it was deliberate.

Continuity in Indonesia’s Strategy in the South China Sea Under Joko Widodo

This study seeks to address two interrelated questions: Does Indonesia underbalance against China? Why does President Joko Widodo stick with the strategy of to this day? The study lays out three main arguments. First, there are two types of strategies: the appropriate and inappropriate one (under-balancing). Indonesia, under the first and beginning of the second term of Jokowi presidency, adopts the prudent strategy. Thus, it does not underbalance against the Chinese military threats in the South China Sea. Such prudent strategy consists of several dimensions: facilitating the United States’ security presence in Asia, engaging major powers such as China in bilateral and multilateral economic and political–military ties to socialise China into a peace-loving country. Second, Indonesia’s non-balancing action, which is the second-best strategy after a more traditional direct internal and external military balancing, is considered a prudent choice, for three main reasons: (a) it is predicated on the assessment that China is perceived as a risk-averse limited-aims revisionist power; (b) Indonesia has very limited capacity to directly balance China and (c) the United States is perceived to be willing and able to balance China. Lastly, the continuity of this strategy, which started during the post-Cold War era, is partly related to the positive feedback effects or self-reinforcing process of existing formal institutions.

Bill Gertz: Deceiving The Sky: Inside Communist Chinaʼs Drive for Global Supremacy.

The United States' approach to China since the Communist regime in Beijing began the period of reform and opening in the 1980s was based on a promise that trade and engagement with China would result in a peaceful, democratic state. Forty years later the hope of producing a benign People's Republic of China utterly failed. The Communist Party of China deceived the West into believing that the its system and the Party-ruled People's Liberation Army were peaceful and posed no threat. In fact, these misguided policies produced the emergence of a 21st Century Evil Empire even more dangerous than a Cold War version in the Soviet Union. Successive American presidential administrations were fooled by ill-advised pro-China policymakers, intelligence analysts and business leaders who facilitated the rise not of a peaceful China but a threatening and expansionist nuclear-armed communist dictatorship not focused on a single overriding strategic objective: Weakening and destroying the United States of America. Defeating the United States is the first step for China's current rulers in achieving global supremacy under a new world order based an ideology of Communism with Chinese characteristics. The process included technology theft of American companies that took place on a massive scale through cyber theft and unfair trade practices. The losses directly supported in the largest and most significant buildup of the Chinese military that now directly threatens American and allied interests around the world. The military threat is only half the danger as China aggressively pursues regional and international control using a variety of non-military forces, including economic, cyber and space warfare and large-scale influence operations.

Revolution knows no boundaries? Chinese revolutionaries in North Vietnam during the early years of the First Indochina War

This article analyses the roles and activities of three groups of Chinese communist revolutionaries in the early phase of the First Indochina War. The author argues that although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not begin to provide substantial aid to North Vietnam until 1950, the involvement of Chinese communists, including members of both the CCP and the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), in the First Indochina War started at the very moment the war broke out in 1946. Although the early participants were not as prominent as the Chinese political and military advisers who arrived after 1949, their activities deserve to be examined, not only because they were the forerunners of later actors, but also because they had already made concrete contributions to the Vietnamese revolution before the founding of the People's Republic of China and the arrival of large-scale Chinese military and economic aid. Moreover, interactions between early Chinese participants and the Vietnamese revolutionaries established a pattern that would characterise Sino–Vietnamese relations in the subsequent decades.

Chinese Military Adventurism and Assertive Behaviour

China’s expansionist vision has led to the violation of its neighbouring countries’ territories, antagonising many Indo-Pacific member states. Beijing’s resolution to unilaterally change the physical status quo in the South China Sea (SCS), and in the Himalayan plains has resulted in military stand-offs and clashes, while exacerbating China’s bilateral relations. China’s belligerent adventurism in the SCS has triggered several flashpoints and consequently, tensions have escalated in the region. China’s highhandedness as well as aggressive posturing in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh has led to the culmination of one of the biggest bloody military clashes between India and China since 1962. India has responded to China’s belligerence in a befitting manner that has rattled its adversary by using various tools of statecraft to stage its strong displeasure and signalled that it will no longer cow down to any sort of pressure.

IMPACT OF NEW MEDIA ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE MILITARY MEDIA

IMPACT OF NEW MEDIA ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE MILITARY MEDIA

Third wave of COVID-19 Epidemic in Pakistan


 
 
 Third wave of COVID-19 is thought to be intensifying in Pakistan in March 2021. It was confirmed by government officials that the spread was started from the areas where many Pakistanis from UK were residing. Genome sequencing of coronavirus by National Institute of Health, Pakistan revealed that it is UK strain that has started spreading in country.1,2 By March 25, 2021 confirmed cases of COVID were 640,988 with 37,985 active cases, 14,028 deaths and 588, 975 recoveries.3 An alarming situation is developing in the country again as mortality rate due to new strain in high.1 The situation of vaccination is not up to the need of country and Pakistani is lagging behind if we compare it with other countries like India.2 On February 1st, 2021 Pakistan received its first coronavirus vaccine made by Chinese company Sinopharm as a donation from Chinese military to Pakistan army. This vaccine was later contributed to the Pakistan national vaccine drive to provide it to health workers all over the country.4 Now Pakistan is also vaccinated the people over the age of 60 and has received more vaccines from China.5 However, we must be aware that COVID-19 is a highly infectious disease and scientists are yet not fully aware about the behavior of coronavirus. The best practice for the prevention and control of this virus is still relies on taking appropriate precautionary measures.
 
 
 

Building Ho’s Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam, written by Xiaobing Li

Building Ho’s Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam, written by Xiaobing Li

Weaponising Blockchain

This article presents the first open source assessment of how the US, Chinese and Russian militaries discuss the application of blockchain technologies in warfare. Bilyana Lilly and Sale Lilly examine mentions of blockchain in the official military publications of each country – in their respective native languages – to identify the similarities and differences in each military’s blockchain outlook, ranging from mitigating cyber security vulnerabilities to supply chain management and battlefield logistics management. They conclude by offering several policy implications and observations for defence planners.◼

Causes and Solutions: Corruption in Chinese Military Enterprises

Causes and Solutions: Corruption in Chinese Military Enterprises

Catching sovereignty fish: Chinese fishers in the southern Spratlys

In recent years, Chinese fishers have been involved in a number of incidents in disputed areas of the East and South China Seas. Their presence in contested space is due to a combination of factors, including the individual initiative of private fishing boat owners and state policies that seek to leverage Chinese fishers to achieve political aims. These factors differ depending on the area in question. This article examines the case of Chinese fishing in the southernmost sections of China’s claims in the South China Sea, in waters that fall within the exclusive economic zones of Indonesia and Malaysia. It argues that while most Chinese fishing in these waters is driven by private fishing boat owners pursuing economic gain, the Chinese government has played a decisive role in enabling and supporting their activities. This article also offers evidence that some PRC fishers operate there at the direction of the Chinese military, in their capacity as members of China’s “maritime militia.”

Xi Jinping, “China Dream”, and Chinese Military Diplomacy to ASEAN

The rise of Xi Jinping has brought together the idea of the ‘China Dream’ as a great revival of China. Since the dream referred to the nationalism spirit of a ‘century of humiliation,’ it has made national security issues as the core of China’s diplomacy. While the national security-related foreign policy has enhanced the military's role in China’s foreign policy-making, it brings consequences for China’s tougher stance in protecting China’s national security. However, Xi Jinping’s notion of using military diplomacy has started uneasy relationships between China and some ASEAN countries resulting in ‘ongoing negotiation without progress’ for the South China Sea dispute. The research examines the impacts of the military’s growing role in China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping to its military diplomacy in ASEAN. The results show that Xi Jinping’s leadership and vision of the China Dream, which uses military diplomacy as a key tool for advancing its whole diplomatic goals, has been seen as a sign of growing assertiveness.

Imagining the Post-American World War: Geopolitics, Technology, and the Representation of Chinese and Chinese Americans in Singer and Cole's <em>Ghost Fleet</em>

Field Trip 13 Imagining the Post-­ American World War: Geopolitics, Technology, and the Representation of Chinese and Chinese Americans in Singer and Cole’s Ghost Fleet Yuan Shu If Chinese invasion fiction as a literary genre has been grounded in what Edlie Wong calls “counterfactual histories” and has served as a part of the Yellow Peril discourse,1 which historically informed and reshaped U.S. immigration laws and policies concerning ethnic Chinese exclusively, then Peter Singer and August Cole’s (2015) speculative fiction on the Third World War between the United States and China, Ghost Fleet, defines a new moment in the genre evolvement. Not only has the novel been noted for the two authors’ background and connection to the military, the intelligence , and Hollywood, particularly their “thorough research in defense technology with ongoing geopolitical developments” (Bearden 2015) but it has also been praised for its inclusion of nonconventional combatants for military leadership, such as women and LGBTQ individuals.2 However, while celebrating the vision of the authors on future wars and military technology, which encompasses utilization of rail guns and incorporation of cyberspace and outer space into war as new battlegrounds, even the most favorable book reviews cannot help raising questions on “why the war started” in the first place (Freeman 2015). And its detractors simply dismiss the novel as “another fearmongering piece written by another advocate for a bigger defense budget” (Frizzell 2016, 160) because the archipelago of U.S. military bases in the Asia Pacific is not even mentioned in the text: “If it is a plea for the administration to sit up and take notice of China as a threat, it does not do a good enough job of explaining why all the elements of U.S. national power supposedly are completely defunct” (160). Indeed, why would the Chinese military emulate the Imperial Japanese Army of the 1930s and launch a similar sneak attack upon Pearl Harbor after its discovery of a gas field in the Mariana Trench? Why does the novel render into oblivion the so-­ called hub-­ and-­ spoke system of bilateral military alliances between the United States and its allies, which has been implemented and sustained for more than seventy years (Twining 2007, 79), and the forward-­ deployed capabilities of the U.S. military installations in a region reconfigured as the “Indo-­ Pacific”?3 In this contribution, I read Ghost Fleet against what media critic Fareed Zakaria calls the “post-­ American world,” by which he means the “rise of the rest” vis-­à-­vis the West, and explore how the authors appropriate the 14 Field Trip historical interregnum in terms of a military threat posed by the rest—­in this case, embodied and exemplified by China in its technological advancement and military investment. Specifically, I argue that the two authors, by imagining the “aggressive act” of China as the logical consequence of its forty-­ year phenomenal economic development and as the effect of its possibly modeling on nineteenth-­ century American expansionism epitomized by Alfred Mahan’s notion of sea power, conflate the Chinese military with the Japanese war machinery of the 1930s, the first rise of a non-­Western power in human history, which failed because of its military aggressiveness,4 to highlight a possible similar fate awaiting the Chinese in their challenge to the U.S.-­ centered global order. What enables a defensive United States to triumph over an offensive China in the fiction is more than American cutting-­ edge technology and strategic alliances in the Indo-­ Pacific but the fundamental American values of individualism, innovativeness, and democracy compounded by the notions of diversity and multiculturalism. If the novel concludes with maintenance of status quo antebellum to nobody’s satisfaction, it affirms what I call a paradigm shift in the representation of Chinese and Chinese Americans from “cheap labor” to “high-­ tech” spies. 6 The Post-­American World: The Rest and the West In his 2008 book ThePost-­AmericanWorld, Fareed Zakaria announces from the outset that his work is “not about the decline of America but rather about the rise of everyone else” (Zakaria 2008, 1) and then articulates the present moment in terms of “the third great power shift of the modern...

The Rule of Law in the U.S.-China Tech War

U.S. policy is increasingly being influenced by suspicion of links between Chinese companies and the Chinese party-state and military. Competition over the technological future between the world’s two largest economies has produced a legal thicket of statutes, regulations, and executive orders in areas including foreign investment, data storage and privacy, and access to the U.S. capital markets. These regimes were created or bolstered due to legitimate concerns about the geo-economic impact of transactions that implicate control over advanced technology and data. Yet regulatory uncertainty engendered by the legal landscape has greatly complicated many aspects of the prosaic but fundamental work of producing innovative companies and technologies: cross-border investment and data flow, mergers and acquisitions, and talent recruitment. In this chapter, we approach the big policy issues in the U.S.-China tech war from the ground up, by exploring how the legal regimes recently developed in both countries to wage the tech war and operationalize technological decoupling affect cross-border deal making and domestic innovation. We fear that ironically, the rule of law necessary to maintain continued vibrancy in U.S. high-tech sectors is being compromised by some of the very actions ostensibly taken to protect these sectors from malign foreign influence. We conclude by offering some concrete policy suggestions to improve the transparency and effectiveness of national security and data protection regimes in the U.S. while advancing a second crucial objective – maintaining a regulatory environment conducive to technological innovation.

The PLA's expeditionary potential in the context of Chinese Military strategy in the New Era

The sustained economic development of China with integration into the world economy and the implementation of macro-regional initiatives that go beyond the traditional localization of Chinese national interests have revealed the need to expand the capabilities of the People's Liberation Army of China. Along with the creation of a strong army, China is actively building up its expeditionary potential. Such kind of military potential allows to project power into strategically important zones. The proposed article is devoted to identifying indicators of increasing the ability of the Chinese armed forces to operate outside China's borders in the «New era». The hypothesis of the study is that China is currently entering an era of development of forces capable of operating around the world, providing military protection to China's expanding global economic and political interests. In the article, the authors rely on a systematic approach that allows us to identify and analyze the main structural characteristics of the PLA’s expeditionary potential at three levels: strategic, operational and tactical. The article analyzes military doctrines, concepts of the use of the PLA and the command structure. Special attention is also paid to the peculiarities of Chinese foreign operations and the logistical capabilities of the PLA to project its power in geographical spaces far away from the Chinese territory. The authors conclude that the PLA's expeditionary potential is becoming an increasingly popular means to achieve broad political and economic goals on a global scale. The increase in naval and air power projection facilities with an emphasis on the creation of competent ground units in this plane increases the mobility of the PLA to perform specific tasks. The military-civilian integration makes it possible to fill the lack of delivery vehicles and team sites.