REVIEWS I59 Neither position was satisfactoryfor the Ukrainian community in Canada, leading to deteriorating relations between the nationalist organizations and the state officials.To complicate mattersfurther,the government'sexpertson EasternEurope, such as Tracy Philippsand ProfessorGeorge Simpson, were often more sympatheticthan their superiorsto Ukrainian concerns. Both lost theirjobs in I944 when Canada began building friendly relations with the USSR, and the nationalistappealsfromCanadian Ukrainiansforthe creation of an independent Ukraine became a subjectof Soviet diplomaticprotestsand a source of embarrassmentfor the Canadian government. More important, the bureaucracy dismissed Philipps'sidea of accommodating the minorities' special interests. The view that ethnic organizationswere primarilysecurity concerns triumphed.The police repeatedly,if unsuccessfully,investigatedthe Ukrainian nationalistassociationsfor their suspectedGerman connections or Nazi sympathies.Canadian officialsignored the Ukrainian appeals and tried to prevent anti-Sovietpublic statements. By the war's end, it was clear that the government had failed to 'manage' the Ukrainian problem. Its sponsorship of the creation of an umbrella organization,the UkrainianCanadian Committee, backfiredby providingthe nationalistswith a coordinating body. The work of the Nationalities Branch of the Department of National War Services came to a standstillbecause of the absence of a clear officialpolicy on the minorities.In 1944, the Canadian bureaucracyeven considered grantingdiplomatic recognition to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a way of undermining the nationalists' demand for Ukrainian independence. However, this idea was abandoned afterthe Soviets attemptedto tie Canada'srecognition of Soviet Ukrainewith the Sovietrecognitionof Canada as a separatecountry.Feelinginsecureabout Canada's own internationalstatus,Ottawa shied away from the discussionof Ukraine'sstatehood.Likewise,by I945 Canadianauthoritiesweredetermined to keep their distance from ethnic politics. During the following decade, the Cold War and the mass influx of Ukrainian 'displacedpersons' into Canada would renderthese policies obsolete. Canadaand the UkrainianQuestionwill be indispensable for any future discussionof Canada's wartime foreign policy and nation-building,as well as of the political evolution of the Ukrainian Canadian community. This fine book will appeal to historiansof Canada, Eastern Europe, and international relations. Departments of Germanic & RussianStudiesandHistorg SERHY YEKELCHYK University of Victoria, Canada Ro'i, Yaacov. IslamintheSoviet Union: FromWorld War II toPerestroika. Hurstand Company, London, 2000. xxvii + 764 pp. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. ?65.oo. BYthe late 1970s, the Soviet Union had over 45 million Muslim citizens, the sixth largestMuslim population in the world. The overwhelmingmajorityof Soviet Muslims were Sunnis (as, for example, in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan,but unlike Iran, which is Shia). Over half the Soviet Muslims were i6o SEER, 8i, I, 2003 located in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, approximately 20 per cent in Azerbaijanand North Caucasus, and the remaining 20 per cent in European USSR. When the Soviet Union disintegrated,six of the independent successor states had majority Muslim populations, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Within the Russian Federation there were also large Muslim communities, particularly in the autonomous republicsof the Volgaregion and the Caucasus. Abundantreservesof hydrocarbonsand othervaluablemineralssoon made the newly independent statesof CentralAsia and Transcaucasusthe focus of considerable international interest. However, there were also concerns that these so-called 'Muslim'stateswould fallprey to radicalIslamistmovements. These fears were heightened by conflicts in Chechnya, Karabagh and Tajikistan.This seemed to some to presage the rise of militant Islam.Yet this was an oversimplificationof the situation.In the Karabaghconflictthere was no discerniblereligiouselement, while, in Chechnya and Tajikistan,Islamism was not so much a force in itself,but ratherwas co-opted by variousregional groupings in their pursuit of local power. Today, the Chechen conflict continues to erupt sporadically,while the Karabagh conflict has been frozen for some time. The Tajikcivilwar was halted when the hostile factionssigned a peace treatyinJune I997. However, during the i99oS centres of radical Islamism did emerge in Central Asia and the North Caucasus. The main focus of activityto date has been in the FerghanaValley, where the territoriesof Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan converge. Adherents of Islamist movements are allegedly responsiblefor actsof terrorism;also, it is claimed, they have been involvedin cross-border armed insurgencies and drug smuggling. There is a growing conviction, at least in some officialcircles,thatIslamicradicalismrepresentsa threat to regional, and possibly to global, security.There is some indication that Islamistmovements in Central Asia and in the North Caucasus may be linkedto the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Yet information is scant, and often highly unreliable...