Cause Of Action Research Articles

The New Old Efficiency Theories of Causation and Liability

AbstractFor the last 40 years, efficiency theorists have attempted to demonstrate that tort liability in general and negligence liability in particular can best/only be explained by the hypothesis that judges are trying to maximize aggregate social welfare. Thirty years ago I published a pair of articles criticizing these attempts, noting especially the efficiency theorists’ inability to explain and justify the factual causation requirement in tort law. Nevertheless, the efficiency theorists have continued to make the same arguments. In this paper, I canvass the old arguments and their current restatements, including the attempts by some of the leading theorists to equate ex post analysis of actual causation with ex ante analysis of negligent conduct and attempts by others to explain the actual negligence liability rules. None of the rules proposed by the efficiency theorists is consistent with the practice of the courts, and none of them would promote efficient deterrence. Worse yet, the least descriptively plausible negligence liability rule proposed by the efficiency theorists is the one likely to be the least inefficient in actual practice, while the one assumed by most efficiency theorists will be the most inefficient. The fundamental problem with the efficiency theories is that they assume that the focus of law should be and is on the maximization of aggregate social welfare, rather than justice – the promotion of everyone’s equal external freedom in their interactions with others.

Compact Representations of Extended Causal Models

Judea Pearl (2000) was the first to propose a definition of actual causation using causal models. A number of authors have suggested that an adequate account of actual causation must appeal not only to causal structure but also to considerations of normality. In Halpern and Hitchcock (2011), we offer a definition of actual causation using extended causal models, which include information about both causal structure and normality. Extended causal models are potentially very complex. In this study, we show how it is possible to achieve a compact representation of extended causal models.

Causal Responsibility and Counterfactuals

How do people attribute responsibility in situations where the contributions of multiple agents combine to produce a joint outcome? The prevalence of over-determination in such cases makes this a difficult problem for counterfactual theories of causal responsibility. In this article, we explore a general framework for assigning responsibility in multiple agent contexts. We draw on the structural model account of actual causation (e.g., Halpern & Pearl, 2005) and its extension to responsibility judgments (Chockler & Halpern, 2004). We review the main theoretical and empirical issues that arise from this literature and propose a novel model of intuitive judgments of responsibility. This model is a function of both pivotality (whether an agent made a difference to the outcome) and criticality (how important the agent is perceived to be for the outcome, before any actions are taken). The model explains empirical results from previous studies and is supported by a new experiment that manipulates both pivotality and criticality. We also discuss possible extensions of this model to deal with a broader range of causal situations. Overall, our approach emphasizes the close interrelations between causality, counterfactuals, and responsibility attributions.

STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS AND BEYOND

AbstractRecent accounts of actual causation are stated in terms of extended causal models. These extended causal models contain two elements representing two seemingly distinct modalities. The first element are structural equations which represent the “(causal) laws” or mechanisms of the model, just as ordinary causal models do. The second element are ranking functions which represent normality or typicality. The aim of this paper is to show that these two modalities can be unified. I do so by formulating two constraints under which extended causal models with their two modalities can be subsumed under so called “counterfactual models” which contain just one modality. These two constraints will be formally precise versions of Lewis’ (1979) familiar “system of weights or priorities” governing overall similarity between possible worlds.

A Regularity Theoretic Approach to Actual Causation

The majority of the currently flourishing theories of actual (token-level) causation are located in a broadly counterfactual framework that draws on structural equations. In order to account for cases of symmetric overdeterminiation and preemption, these theories resort to rather intricate analytical tools, most of all, to what Hitchcock (J Philos 98:273–299, 2001) has labeled explicitly nonforetracking counterfactuals. This paper introduces a regularity theoretic approach to actual causation that only employs material (non-modal) conditionals, standard Boolean minimization procedures, and a (non-modal) stability condition that regulates the behavior of causal models under model expansions. Notwithstanding its lightweight analytical toolbox, this regularity theory performs at least as well as the structural equations accounts with their heavy appliances.

What is the ‘Cause’ in Causal Decision Theory?

A simple counterfactual theory of causation fails because of problems with cases of preemption. This might lead us to expect that preemption will raise problems for counterfactual theories of other concepts that have a causal dimension. Indeed, examples are easy to find. But there is one case where we do not find this. Several versions of causal decision theory are formulated using counterfactuals. This might lead us to expect that these theories will yield the wrong recommendations in cases of preemption. But they do not. The explanation, I argue, is that the ‘cause’ that has been the target of counterfactual analyses is a specific relation, ‘actual causation’, that is not needed for prospective deliberation. A simple counterfactual theory of causation seems to capture the notion of cause needed for causal decision theory. This shows, in opposition to some critics, that counterfactual theories of causation are not barking up the wrong tree.

Of Miracles and Interventions

In Making Things Happen, James Woodward influentially combines a causal modeling analysis of actual causation with an interventionist semantics for the counterfactuals encoded in causal models. This leads to circularities, since interventions are defined in terms of both actual causation and interventionist counterfactuals. Circularity can be avoided by instead combining a causal modeling analysis with a semantics along the lines of that given by David Lewis, on which counterfactuals are to be evaluated with respect to worlds in which their antecedents are realized by miracles. I argue, pace Woodward, that causal modeling analyses perform just as well when combined with the Lewisian semantics as when combined with the interventionist semantics. Reductivity therefore remains a reasonable hope.

Introduction to Special Issue on ‘Actual Causation’

An actual cause of some token effect is itself a (distinct) token event (or fact, or state of affairs, …) that helped to bring about that effect. The notion of an actual cause is different from that of a potential cause—for example a pre-empted backup—which had the capacity to bring about the effect, but which wasn’t in fact operative on the occasion in question. Sometimes actual causes are also distinguished from mere background conditions: as when we judge that the struck match was a cause of the fire, while the presence of oxygen was merely part of the relevant background against which the struck match operated. Actual causation is also to be distinguished from type causation: actual causation holds between token events in a particular, concrete scenario; type causation, by contrast, holds between event kinds in scenario kinds.

Functions and Cognitive Bases for the Concept of Actual Causation

Our concept of actual causation plays a deep, ever-present role in our experiences. I first argue that traditional philosophical methods for understanding this concept are unlikely to be successful. I contend that we should instead use functional analyses and an understanding of the cognitive bases of causal cognition to gain insight into the concept of actual causation. I additionally provide initial, programmatic steps towards carrying out such analyses. The characterization of the concept of actual causation that results is quite different from many standard views: it is graded, context-sensitive, and extrinsic.

Inference for influence over multiple degrees of separation on a social network

States and behaviors of different individuals are expected to be correlated across a social network. Christakis and Fowler have proposed a 'three degrees of influence rule' to characterize the extent of such dependence. In this paper, we discuss three distinct interpretations of such a rule, one involving only associations (which is the interpretation for which Christakis and Fowler give evidence), one involving actual causation, generally referred to as contagion or social influence, and one involving direct effects. We discuss analytic procedures appropriate for assessing evidence for each possible interpretation and the increasingly difficult methodological challenges present in each interpretation.

Portable Causal Dependence: A Tale of Consilience

This article describes research pursued by members of the McDonnell Collaborative on Causal Learning. A number of members independently converged on a similar idea: one of the central functions served by claims of actual causation is to highlight patterns of dependence that are highly portable into novel contexts. I describe in detail how this idea emerged in my own work and also in that of the psychologist Tania Lombrozo. In addition, I use the occasion to reflect on the nature of interdisciplinary collaboration in general and on the interaction between philosophy and psychology in particular.

Actual Causation by Probabilistic Active Paths

Recently Halpern and Pearl and Hitchcock have presented influential accounts of actual (token) causation using Bayesian networks. These accounts have been deterministic. Here we present a probabilistic extension to these active path analyses of actual causation. The extension uses “soft” interventions to set distributions rather than just single values. The resulting account can handle at least as wide a range of examples as the original accounts, without assuming determinism.

Benign or malignant, early or delayed: the changing face of early repolarization

Early repolarization (ER) has historically been considered a benign electrocardiogram (ECG) variant, and is seen more commonly in young males and individuals who undertake high levels of athletic activity and/or are of black ethnicity.1 It has recently, however, been proposed as a marker for an increased risk of sudden cardiac death (SCD). In particular, ER in the inferior ECG leads has been associated with idiopathic ventricular fibrillation and has been termed as the ER syndrome.2,3 Although ER is a common ECG finding, the syndrome is rare. Indeed in a general population study, middle-aged individuals with inferior ER only had a three-fold increased risk of SCD which was not apparent until 10 years after their initial diagnostic ECG.3 Until recently, there have been no risk stratifiers for asymptomatic subjects with ER and no primary prevention therapy. Much of this has been complicated by uncertainties over the definition of ER, how to measure it, and its actual causation. It has therefore been impossible to make recommendations based on this incidental ECG finding in an asymptomatic individual and this has become a concern for the cardiology community. ### Historical perspectives and definitions The definition of ER has evolved. It was defined by Wasserburger1 in 1961 as elevated take-off of the ST-segment at the end of the QRS (the J junction) with downward concavity of the ST-segment and symmetrical T-waves seen particularly in the lateral ECG leads ( Figure 1C ). In 2008, it …

Actual causation in CP-logic

AbstractGiven a causal model of some domain and a particular story that has taken place in this domain, the problem of actual causation is deciding which of the possible causes for some effect actually caused it. One of the most influential approaches to this problem has been developed by Halpern and Pearl (Halpern, J. and Pearl, J. 2005. Causes and explanations: A structural-model approach. Part I: Causes.British Journal for the Philosophy of Science56(4), 843–887) in the context of structural models. In this paper, I argue that this is actually not the best setting for studying this problem. As an alternative, I offer the probabilistic logic programming language of CP-logic. Unlike structural models, CP-logic incorporates the deviant/default distinction that is generally considered an important aspect of actual causation, and it has an explicitly dynamic semantics, which helps to formalize the stories that serve as input to an actual causation problem.

Food-provoked eczema: A hypothesis on the possible role of systemic contact allergy to haptens present in both cosmetics and foods

Patients with eczema frequently associate relapses of their disease with ingestion of particular foods, however, the actual causation by food allergens can be confirmed only in a minority of them. In the present paper, a hypothesis is proposed on the possible causal link between eczema and food in cases not explainable by type I allergy to “classical” food allergens like egg, milk or peanut protein. It is proposed that eczema in such cases may be due to delayed-type allergy to haptens present in food – either natural components, contaminants, or food additives. A wide range of haptens are used in the production of both food and cosmetics. It is proposed that initial sensitization of the skin to a hapten may follow external exposure (e.g. from skin care products), while relapses in the course of eczema may be due to subsequent oral exposures to the same hapten from food (systemic contact dermatitis). This hypothesis also offers an explanation for cases of photoaggravated eczema by indicating on food haptens with photosensitizing properties. The proposed hypothesis is unifying recent scientific discoveries and clinical observations in the attempt at explaining cases of food-provoked eczema that could not be explained by the present mainstream views on food allergy. Nevertheless, it requires thorough verification through dedicated research aimed specifically at testing the proposed causal relationship between food-provoked eczema and haptens occurring in both cosmetics and foods. If confirmed, appropriate diagnostic methods (e.g. patch test panels with food haptens or specially devised in vitro tests) should be introduced into routine diagnosis of eczema. Furthermore, results of such studies will provide scientific evidence for possible restrictions on the use of food additives identified as potent sensitizers within the legal scheme of consumer protection policy.

Actual causation: a stone soup essay

We argue that current discussions of criteria for actual causation are ill-posed in several respects. (1) The methodology of current discussions is by induction from intuitions about an infinitesimal fraction of the possible examples and counterexamples; (2) cases with larger numbers of causes generate novel puzzles; (3) “neuron” and causal Bayes net diagrams are, as deployed in discussions of actual causation, almost always ambiguous; (4) actual causation is (intuitively) relative to an initial system state since state changes are relevant, but most current accounts ignore state changes through time; (5) more generally, there is no reason to think that philosophical judgements about these sorts of cases are normative; but (6) there is a dearth of relevant psychological research that bears on whether various philosophical accounts are descriptive. Our skepticism is not directed towards the possibility of a correct account of actual causation; rather, we argue that standard methods will not lead to such an account. A different approach is required. Once upon a time a hungry wanderer came into a village. He filled an iron cauldron with water, built a fire under it, and dropped a stone into the water. “I do like a tasty stone soup” he announced. Soon a villager added a cabbage to the pot, another added some salt and others added potatoes, onions, carrots, mushrooms, and so on, until there was a meal for all.

Structural equations and causation: six counterexamples

Hall [(2007), Philosophical Studies, 132, 109–136] offers a critique of structural equations accounts of actual causation, and then offers a new theory of his own. In this paper, I respond to Hall’s critique, and present some counterexamples to his new theory. These counterexamples are then diagnosed.

Causality and Counterfactuals in the Situation Calculus

Structural causal models offer a popular framework for exploring causal concepts. However, due to their limited expressiveness, structural models have difficulties coping with such concepts as actual (event-to-event) causation. In this article, we propose a new type of causal model, based on embedding structural considerations in the language of situation calculus. By using situation calculus as a basic language, we leverage its power to express complex, dynamically changing situations and, by relying on structural considerations, we can formulate an effective theory of counterfactuals within the situation-calculus.

Hitchcock’s (2001) treatment of singular and general causation

Hitchcock (2001a) argues that the distinction between singular and general causation conflates the two distinctions ‘actual causation vs. causal tendencies’ and ‘wide vs. narrow causation’. Based on a recent regularity account of causation I will show that Hitchcock’s introduction of the two distinctions is an unnecessary multiplication of causal concepts.

Emergence and the realist account of cause

The concept of emergence is routinely invoked in critical realist theory, but rarely examined. Yet emergence is fundamental to the realist account of cause. This paper aims to improve critical realism's understanding of emergence by discussing, first, what emergence is and how it works; second, the need for a compositional account of emergence; and third, the implications of emergence for causation. It goes on to argue that the theory of emergence leads to the recognition of certain hitherto neglected similarities between real causal powers and actual causation.