Cartel Practices Research Articles

THE COMPETITIVENESS OF COMMODITIES SEAWEED USING POLICY ANALYSIS MATRIX (PAM)

Seaweed products from the city of Tarakan have been traded to outside areas such as Makassar and Surabaya before being exported overseas. This study aims to analyze the competitiveness of seaweed in Tarakan City using the policy analysis matrix (PAM) method. The PAM method is used two main indicators for measuring competitiveness, namely the Private Cost Ratio (PCR) as an indicator of competitive advantage and the Domestic Resource Cost Ratio (DRCR) which is an indicator of comparative advantage. The results showed that seaweed in Tarakan City had a PCR value of 0.37 and a DRC of 0.08, the private profit (PP) obtained was Rp 6,444,319 financially has a competitive advantage at the business level farmer. Social profit (PS) of Rp 30,386,901 economically or the economy as a whole has a comparative advantage which means efficient use of resources. The impact of government policies on the output of seaweed cultivation is not protective with an NPCO value of 0.34. The impact of government policies on seaweed cultivation inputs is not protective with an NPCI value of 1.29, meaning that farmers have not received positive incentives from the current input subsidy policy. The EPC value of 0.31 means that the overall impact of government policies on input-output is protective and provides positive incentives to farmers, but is still relatively weak and very vulnerable if policy changes occur. The regional government is expected to provide protection to seaweed cultivators in the form of setting costs for purchasing seaweed and also to strictly supervise cartel practices in the seaweed trading system.

Cartel Practices in Relation to Rice Supply Chains

This study discusses cartel practices in the rice supply chain with a focus on the implications of the Indonesian Farmer Shop (TTI) program. The complex rice supply chain has affected the price of consumer rice and farmers' grain. This study uses a qualitative approach with a normative juridical method and organized crime theory. The results of the study show that although the TTI program has a clear basis, cartel practices emerge due to the domination of actors in rice marketing and laxity in implementing policies. The TTI program creates shorter supply chains, but cartel practices still exist. This research reveals that cartel practices arise from the implementation of the TTI program which is controlled by certain parties with strong control. Obstacles in bookkeeping and supply management also influenced the emergence of cartels. Cartel practices arise not because of regulations, but because of their implementation which tends to be abused by cartel actors.

Cartel Practices in Indonesian Tyre Industry: Assessing the Role of the Indonesian Tyre Business Association

This study examines the legal standing of the Indonesian Tyre Business Association (APBI) in light of the KPPU Decision Number 08/Pdt.G/KPPU-I-2014 concerning tire cartel violations in the Indonesian automotive industry. Utilizing normative legal research methods focusing on positive legal norms, the study identifies and systematizes violations of business competition rules by six major APBI member companies between 2008 and 2012, and critically analyzes and interprets the evidentiary basis of these findings. The companies allegedly colluded on tire pricing, manipulating the market for Passenger Car Radial (PCR) tires and inducing unfair business competition. The study asserts that, while the APBI's role in facilitating this collusion was apparent, its legal liability remains unclear due to the association's ability to influence member practices without a binding enforcement mechanism. These findings raise critical implications for market competition and cartel law enforcement, necessitating a re-evaluation of the legal provisions surrounding business associations, especially in the context of Indonesia's anti-monopoly and unfair competition laws.Highlights:
 
 APBI's facilitation of cartel behavior among its members.
 Unclear legal liability of business associations in anti-competitive practices.
 Need for re-evaluation of legal provisions surrounding business associations.
 
 Keywords: Cartel, Indonesian Tyre Business Association (APBI), Unfair Business Competition, Competition Law, Indonesian Tyre Industry

Kenaikan Harga Minyak Goreng Dalam Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha Dan Ekonomi

The current increase in cooking oil prices greatly affects purchasing power and greatly impacts the community's economy. Various ways have been taken by the government to suppress the rate of cooking oil prices, ranging from issuing a ministerial regulation of trade to cooking oil subsidies. However, these policies have not been able to suppress the rate of cooking oil prices. This study is carried out to analyze whether there are cartel practices that have caused the current soaring cooking oil prices, as well as their impact on the economy. The research was conducted using a normative juridical method with the results of the study. It is strongly suspected that the existence of cartel practices caused this situation to continue. Based on the findings made by the KPPU, namely the discovery of evidence of alleged violations of articles 5, 11, and 19 letter c of Law No. 5/1999 where it is alleged that there has been an oligopoly practice of the national cooking oil market structure by fixing prices and regulating production. However, there are some shortcomings in Law no. 5/1999 in ensnaring the perpetrators of this cartel is about the criteria for a cartel which has not yet been specifically defined, so it is not easy to win a cartel case in court.

Kajian Dugaan Praktik Kartel PT Garuda Indonesia, Tbk Mempengaruhi Pergerakan Harga Saham di BEI

ABSTRACT The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of the alleged cartel practices carried out by the airline PT Garuda Indonesia, Tbk, namely by the increasingly high price of airline tickets and how their impact on the stock price movement itself. This practice is not permitted in Indonesia and almost all countries in the world, but this becomes very dilemmatic in the current aviation business if the ticket price is not raised the company will bear substantial losses but on the other hand consumers are very disadvantaged and can sacrifice the country's economy if countries that depend heavily on air transportation such as Indonesia. Considering that PT Garuda Indonesia, Tbk is a state-owned company of the Republic of Indonesia which has been listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange under the GIAA stock code, whether news of alleged cartel practices by GIAA could affect the public investors in the capital market in making a decision to make a selling or buying transaction on GIAA shares.Keywords: cartel practices, garuda indonesia, capital markets

PENGGUNAAN INDIRECT EVIDENCE (ALAT BUKTI TINDAK LANGSUNG) OLEH KPPU DALAM PROSES PEMBUKTIAN DUGAAN PRAKTIK KARTEL (STUDI DI KANTOR KOMISI PENGAWAS PERSAINGAN USAHA WILAYAH I MEDAN)

Provisions regarding business competition law in Indonesia are regulated in Law Number 5 of 1999 concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition which regulates various prohibitions on actions that cause unfair business competition from activities or agreements between business actors, one of which is cartels. This study aims to analyze the use of indirect evidence by KPPU in the process of proving allegations of cartel practice and to analyze the factors that hamper the use of indirect evidence by KPPU in the process of proving alleged cartel practices. The use of research as a contribution to knowledge in the field of legal science, especially business competition law related to indirect evidence in cartel evidence and to add insight to legal practitioners, legal consultants, especially in the field of law regarding indirect evidence by the KPPU. This research is a normative legal research using the approach method in this research is a statutory approach and a case approach.

Optimal deterrence: Exploring business cartels in Indonesia and their impact on the economy

A business cartel is a business that is carried out by business actors to obtain market power by regulating the market by fixing prices, for example, by limiting the availability of commodities on the market. This paper examines in detail business cartel practices in Indonesia, explores their impact on the economy, and analyzes KPPU as an unfair business eradication body. In so doing, this paper analyzes eight business cases in Indonesia to describe and evaluate the practices of economic cartels in the industry. Those cases were randomly chosen for different periods and different industrial sectors. Using a qualitative analysis method, it is found that business cartels, unfortunately, are still rather common practice in Indonesia. It is also found that business cartels harm economic development, citizens and customers, since they tend to be monopolistic practices so that the customers will have to pay high prices for limited commodities. In addition, KPPU needs to be reformed, and the amendment of current antitrust law also needs to be executed. Consequently, judges and lawmakers should understand the balance of business interest and public interest at the same time.

The Impact of Government Policies on The Competitiveness Of Clove Commodity In Tolitoli Regency: Multi Period PAM Approach

This study aims to determine the competitiveness of clove commodities in Tolitoli Regency in terms of competitive and comparative advantages and to determine the impact of government policies on the sustainability of clove farming in Tolitoli Regency. The method of determining respondents using a simple random sampling method and obtained as many as 87 samples of clove farmers. The data analysis method used is the Multi-Period PAM (Policy Analysis Matrix). The results of this study indicate that the clove commodity in Tolitoli Regency has competitiveness in terms of competitive and comparative advantages with a PCR value of 0.415 and DRCR 0.412. The impact of government policies on the output of clove farming in Tolitoli is protective against farming systems with an NPCO value of 1.088, but tends to be weak. While on the other hand, the impact of government policies on clove farming inputs is unprotective with an NPCI value of 1.061, meaning that farmers have not received positive incentives from the current input subsidy policy. The impact of government policies on input-output as a whole is protective and provides positive incentives to farmers, but the value of the coefficient shows the level of protection that is still relatively weak and very vulnerable if there is a change in policy. The regional government is expected to provide protection to clove farmers in the form of setting the cost of clove purchases and also to exercise strict supervision of cartel practices in the clove trade system.

The Future of the Leniency Program as an Efforts to Reveal Cartel Practices in Indonesia

The Future of the Leniency Program as an Efforts to Reveal Cartel Practices in Indonesia

The effective public enforcement of the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements: which factors influence the high percentage of annulments of Dutch cartel fines?

Abstract The Dutch enforcement of the European and Dutch cartel prohibition is characterized by high rates of litigation and successful litigation. Several studies have devoted attention to these phenomena, all unraveling parts of the puzzle as to how the occurrence of these percentages can be explained. The subject of this article, an analysis of the factors which influence the rate of successful litigation, is however missing in this body of literature. To begin with, a theoretical framework of possible influencing factors is designed on the basis of relevant academic literature. In order to evaluate whether the factors identified in the literature can explain the Dutch practice, an assessment is carried out using several means, including a further analysis of the Dutch cartel practice, interviews with involved stakeholders, and comparisons with other Member States and Dutch market supervisors. The article concludes that specific factors that are woven into the Dutch practice (including specific court, party, and case characteristics), in combination with the nature of competition law, influence the Dutch annulment rate.

Legitimacy Test for Criminal Sanction: Antitrust Law Perspective

The issue of imprisonment as a means to deter competition law offences is widely debated in doctrine. The purpose of this article is not to expound the ideas already mentioned in the legal literature on the advantages/disadvantages of such a sentence. This paper will focus on the question of whether imprisonment is a legitimate punishment to deter anti-competitive behaviours, regarding the theoretical, legal and/or practical difficulties encountered for a successful policy of European antitrust criminalization. To answer this question, the prison sentence issue against managers involved in cartel practices requires the application of a legitimacy test. Regarding this test, three conditions must be examined to legitimize the imprisonment of individuals responsible for an anticompetitive practice: the seriousness of the practice, the risk of type 1 error, and the social consensus on the seriousness of market violations.

MODEL PENCEGAHAN PRAKTIK KARTEL IMPOR DAGING SAPI DIKAITKAN DENGAN DAYA BELI MASYARAKAT

The ability of consumer purchasing power of beef after cartel practice is the effect of the increase of beef price to consumer behavior varies, among others there are buy in fixed amount before and after price increase, there is a decrease the quantity of purchase and some are switching to consume chicken meat. Legal protection is preventively applied to provide legal protection and legal certainty for consumers so that with the prevention of the government in making policy or drafting legislation more carefully so that the interests of consumers or the wider community is not neglected. The purpose of this study is to discuss how to regulate beef imports in Indonesia, the implementation of beef imports categorized as cartels, as well as legal protection for consumers of beef as a result of the practice of imported cartels. The research method used in this research is the normative juridical approach, namely the law is conceptualized as norms, rules, principles or dogmas / jurisprudence. The results of this research are: 1) The regulation on beef import trade in Indonesia has undergone many changes following the market condition, 2) The form of violation of beef import trade in Indonesia occurring in Jabodetabek area is a cartel practice violating Article 11 of Law no. 5 Year 1999, 3) Business activities are not always done honestly by business actors. The act of business actor is not infrequently to the consumer, it is necessary to protect the consumer's rights.

Information exchanges between competitors from a competition law perspective – the problem of premature exchanges of sensitive information in the context of merger control (Gun Jumping)

The topic of information exchanges between competing undertakings is central to competition law. These are practices that enhance market transparency and, as such, can generate significant efficiencies. However, they can also give rise to serious competition concerns, often because they afford competitors the possibility of reaching focal points of coordination. The analysis of information exchanges has traditionally taken place in the context of the legal framework that prohibits cartels. This article reviews, at first, the approach taken in Europe by competition authorities and courts, firmly grounded in the Commission Guidelines and in the most recent case law of the European Court of Justice. After discussing the relevant legal framework and the main criteria for the assessment of information exchanges in detail, the article elaborates on the specific problem that premature exchanges of information between competitors can create in the context of a merger transaction. As the competitors that they are, at least until closing of the deal, it is essential that contracting parties ensure that their due diligence exercise and the planning of the integration of their businesses are carried out in a manner that is consistent with competition rules, avoiding behaviour that can be interpreted as gun-jumping or as a cartel practice and, as a consequence, financial penalties and judicial claims.

Unfolding the Layers of Leniency Programme - A Must for Cartel Detection in India

This paper discusses, in light of the growth of mushrooming cartels and problems associated with their detection, the concept of leniency programme as contained in the Antitrust Law of India i.e. Competition Act, 2002 (‘Act’). The rhetoric of leniency programme is very much a part of the contemporary discourse of Competition Authorities across the globe, including the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’). Leniency programme refers to grant of immunity from penalties for violation of antitrust laws in exchange for cooperation with the antitrust enforcement authorities. The first and second part of this paper highlights the concept of cartel and theory and practice of the leniency programme in antitrust enforcement. Third part discusses the legal framework with respect to the cartel detection in India. Next part highlights the pattern and success of leniency programme in United States and EU. Last leg of this paper focuses on the benefits of the successful implementation of leniency programme and concludes with some minor suggestions for providing a kick start to the programme in India.The key point of discussion in the present paper is that weak leniency programmes i.e. one without clear and consistent guidelines, procedures and application can create obstacles for an antitrust enforcer more than it helps. Therefore, what is important is that the Antitrust agencies must remember to treat companies that come to them, appropriately if they want their leniency programmes to be effective and respected. It is submitted that there is still room in the Act to refine the concept of the leniency programme, so as to provide a complete kick start to it.

THE UNCERTAIN WELFARE EFFECTS OF RAILROAD COMPETITION AND RAILROAD REGULATION, 1870–1900

This essay, written for a memorial contribution on the works of Paul W. MacAvoy, discusses MacAvoy's first book, The Economic Effects of Regulation (1965), which addresses eastern railroad cartels in the United States between 1870 and 1900. The essay describes the many achievements of this book in terms of detecting and measuring cheating on cartel prices and its discussion of cartel practices of greater or lesser success. The essay also compares railroad practices for chiefly the transport of grain from Chicago to New York to practices over the same period for the transport of refined oil from Pittsburgh and Cleveland to various locations on the east coast. The principal difference as between grain and oil transport was the existence of competitive markets for grain shipment versus the monopsony of the Standard Oil Company over the shipment of refined oil. The net welfare effects of the grain cartels versus the oil monopsony remain unclear.

Prática de Cartel no Brasil: Um Estudo sobre as Decisões do CADE e o Perfil das Condenações por Cartel

The objective of this work is to analyze the cartel practice in Brazil, aiming to identify the effective use of the judiciary in control practices violations of the economic order. The study concludes, based on a methodology of theoretical and documentary research, that although there is in Brazil a good administrative structure to protect the competitive environment, this structure strengthened from the Law 12.529/2011, there remains a deficiency of knowledge of antitrust policy by the population, resulting in a small number of processes aimed at compelling infringing practices or work for the restoration of damage. Initially, the paper addresses the protection of competition in Brazil , and then analyzes the administrative structure and the Brazilian System of Competition Defense, after sets the focus on the analysis of cartel cases, sort of violation of the economic order, promoting the survey cases sentenced by the Administrative Council for Economic Defense - CADE between the years 2000 to 2013, and finally It is made a review analysis.

Cover Pricing and the Overreach of ‘Object’ Liability under Article 101 TFEU

This article uses the example of cover pricing to show a possible overreach of liability under Article 101 TFEU, in relation to arrangements deemed to have the ‘object’ of restricting competition. Cover pricing is where a bidder seeks a non-winning bid from a competitor so that he can participate in a tender process without securing the contract. The wide meaning of ‘concerted practice’ means that a potential breach of Article 101 may arise even where the party receiving the request refuses to provide a cover bid. It is important that a restriction by object (which leads to the finding of an infringement regardless of whether the practice was implemented or had any harmful effect) applies only to the most serious arrangements between undertakings. It is shown that cover pricing very rarely has any anti-competitive effect and indeed the alternative (lawful) behaviour, of openly announcing a non-intention to win the contract, is more likely to reduce competition. It is nevertheless treated as an object restriction, mainly because it involves direct communication between competitors of pricing intentions. Article 101 may therefore be unable to distinguish some arrangements with ambivalent effects from the most serious cartel practices. It is argued that a greater effects analysis is needed (either in applying the law or calculating penalties), to ensure fairness and proportionality.

Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring

This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm's continuation profit to the truncated current profits of the other firms. The mechanism applies to both price and quantity competition, and the main features are broadly consistent with common cartel practice identified by Harrington and Skrzypacz [24].

Cartel Theory and Cartel Practice: The Case of the International Aluminum Cartels, 1901–1940

The study of cartels is important to economists as well as business historians, but, on the whole, there has been little cross cultivation between the two academic fields. This article examines cartel theory developed by economists in the context of the historical case of international aluminum cartels in existence before 1940. By analyzing three basic theoretical questions—when cartels appear, when they break down, and when they are successful—in light of the empirical evidence of the aluminum industry, the article argues that economics and history, although they have very different approaches, can profit from using each other's methods when studying cartels.

Evolution of Cartel Practice in Croatia

This paper analyses the development of cartel enforcement practice in Croatia since the first Competition Act was adopted in 1995, i.e. since the Competition Agency was established in 1997. Until 2009 only five decisions have been adopted which deal with the issue of cartel arrangements between competitors. The facts of these cases are presented and main legal issues discussed. The authors point out to three underlying characteristics of the ten-year enforcement practice: (a) all cartel cases concerned explicit collusion; (b) in all cartel cases there was an association of undertakings that promoted collusion and/or helped to enforce the cartel; (c) undertakings gave self-incriminating statements in the proceedings before the Competition Agency. On the basis of these characteristics the authors conclude that the fight against cartels in Croatia is still in its infancy. Some awaited legislation changes (introduction of leniency, competence of the Competition Agency to decide on fines) should make cartel enforcement more viable in the future.