Campaign Finance System Research Articles

Examining public perceptions of US campaign finance over time through survey experiments

In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the US Supreme Court ruled that campaign finance regulations “are appropriate legislative weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence.” Using data from multiple survey experiments repeated across six CCES surveys from 2012 to 2020, we test whether varied information regarding US campaign finance institutions and laws alter public perceptions of the campaign finance system and campaign finance reform across time, including the perception of improper influence. Respondents had more negative attitudes toward candidates who received support from Super PACs. However, respondents were not moved by primed differences in expenditure limits, coordination, or donation disclosure. Ultimately, we find that the majority of Americans dislike and distrust the campaign finance system and generally remain unmoved by any experimentally-primed differences. These experimental findings remain consistent across time, indicating that attitudes toward the US campaign finance system are stable and resistant to change.

Campaign Contributions as Crime: The Case of Contribution Influence on US Economic and Environmental Policy

Although the current campaign finance system in the US allows private donations to campaigns, an increasing body of evidence suggests that these contributions influence policy and could potentially lead to social injury. This leads to an important question: Do campaign contributions constitute crime? The present article takes up this question. After an overview of the famous debate between Tappan and Sutherland on the role of social injury in determining whether something is a crime—and a concise summary of different types of political crime (e.g. corruption, bribery, state crime, and state-corporate crime)—an analysis is conducted to assess the connection, if any, between campaign contributions and two types of social injury: economic harm/inequality and environmental harm. Findings from the analysis show that campaign contributions can, indeed, cause social injury. It is therefore concluded that campaign contributions sometimes constitute crime under Sutherland’s framework. Numerous campaign finance reform options are discussed—all with the intent of limiting the social injury created by campaign contributions.

Money matters: The impact of gender quotas on campaign spending for women candidates

Despite concerns that women candidates are hampered by gender gaps in campaign financing, few scholars have examined how gender quotas impact women candidates’ access to campaign funds. We examine the effect of a party-based gender quota on women candidates’ financing and electoral success in Ireland. Under the gender quota, the number of women candidates increased and parties acted strategically to provide women challengers with increased financial support. However, women challengers spent less candidate funds than men challengers and were less likely to have prior officeholding experiences associated with fundraising. Women challengers’ disadvantage is concerning because candidate expenditures are associated with winning votes. Our findings show that the effectiveness of a gender quota is partly determined by how the quota interacts with the campaign finance system and the political opportunity structure.

Identity in Campaign Finance and Elections: The Impact of Gender and Race on Money Raised in 2010–2018 U.S. House Elections

Disproportionate rates of congressional representation based on gender and race are especially stark considering the symbolic and substantive meaning derived from descriptive representation (Mansbridge 1999). Using an original data set consisting of candidate demographics, district characteristics, and campaign finance reports, we analyze an understudied barrier to representation: unequal access to campaign receipts. We argue that it is the simultaneous gendering and racialization of the campaign finance system that produces gaps in campaign fundraising and representation (Crenshaw 1989). Our results underscore the limitations of unitary approaches which conclude that women no longer face a disadvantage in campaign fundraising. Unequal access to campaign receipts serve as a barrier to the descriptive representation of women of color. By analyzing the interaction of both race and gender on campaign receipt totals in U.S. House elections from 2010 to 2018, we assert the path to representation is not equal for all.

Accountability Dysfunction in Campaign Finance Regulations: A Case Study of the 2018 Jambi Simultaneous General Elections

The regulations of campaign finance have highly problematic for local electios (Pilkada) in Indonesia. However, the campaign finance system changed gradually over the following years, many alleged campaign violations committed by candidates during local elections. In this study, the researcher wants to assess campaign finance regulations based on the accountability concept. The measurement of accountability in the campaign finance regulations has been divided into two perspectives, which are legal and finance. The study used a qualitative method with a case study approach in Jambi's three regions, which held local elections (Pilkada) in 2018. This study argues that the current regulations have not solved the whole problem of campaign funds. The level of corruption by candidates remains stubbornly high due to less authority and weak sanctions. At the same time, most campaign finance regulations have never been enforced. As a result, revising Acts on the election, enhancing law enforcement, and raising public awareness need to promote for ensuring the quality of local democracy.

How Super PACs Have Transformed the Federal Campaign Finance System: A Political Scientists' Amicus Brief to the Supreme Court.

This paper served as an amicus brief to the Supreme Court concerning Representative Ted Lieu et. al vs. Federal Election Commission, a petition for review of the 2010 D.C. Circuit Court decision that legalized Super PACs. The brief finds that Super PACs accepting unlimited contributions spend nearly one in every four federal election campaign dollars, concentrated on the most competitive races. They enable million-dollar donors to support organizations marketing and conducting themselves as extensions of candidates’ and parties’ campaigns — regardless of federal contribution limits applying to those campaigns. Thus Super PACs undermine the contribution limits that are the very basis of the federal campaign finance system.

Partisan Consumerism: Experimental Tests of Consumer Reactions to Corporate Political Activity

To what extent do consumers’ preferences change when they learn about firms’ partisan allegiances? We address this question by conducting a series of experiments in which Democrats and Republicans were presented with factual information about corporate political donations. Outcomes were measured through expressed shopping intentions as well as a revealed consumer preference. Respondents became significantly more (less) likely to patronize chains that support (oppose) their party. The effects are found for both convenience samples and representative national samples and when information is conveyed in the context of a survey or unobtrusively via direct mail. Effects are especially large among those with strong partisan attachments. We conclude by arguing that the potential for partisan consumerism has risen with the advent of social media but may be undermined by a campaign finance system that increasingly allows for undisclosed corporate donations.

Why Are There So Many Lawyers in Congress?

Scholars have long sought to explain the overrepresentation of lawyers in Congress. This article draws on a wealth of data to explore the causes and consequences of this representational imbalance. While lawyers enter politics at higher rates, self‐selection at best provides a partial explanation. Conditional on running, lawyers win at twice the rate of candidates from other backgrounds. Contrary to prevailing theories in the literature, voters do not reward candidates with backgrounds in law. Rather, lawyers win because of a sizable competitive advantage in early fundraising, owing in large part to their professional networks. This study has important implications for who runs for office, who wins, and the demographic composition of Congress. It also identifies an underexplored mechanism by which the US system of campaign finance sustains deep representational imbalances.

Diversifying the Donor Pool: How Did Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program Reshape Participation in Municipal Campaign Finance?

In this article, we evaluate whether an innovative new campaign finance program in Seattle, Washington, shifted the composition of campaign donors in local elections. In 2015, voters in Seattle approved the creation of the Democracy Voucher program with the intent of broadening representation in the campaign finance system and expanding participation from marginalized communities. Every registered voter in Seattle was provided with four 25-dollar vouchers that they could, in turn, assign to the local candidate(s) of their choice. Through an analysis of the inaugural implementation of the program in 2017, we investigate whether this innovative public financing system increased participation, broadened involvement from underrepresented groups, and led to a donor pool that was more representative of the electorate. Compared to cash donors in the municipal election, we report that voucher users are less likely to be high-income and more likely to come from poor neighborhoods. While older residents are overrepresented among voucher users, there is little difference in the racial composition of cash donors and voucher users. Our analysis confirms that the Democracy Voucher program successfully moved the donor pool in a more egalitarian direction, although it remains demographically unrepresentative of the electorate. The lessons from Seattle's inaugural implementation offer key insights for other municipalities considering public financing policies, and these lessons have the potential to reshape the national policy debate about the influence of political money.

Our Campaign Finance Nationalism

This Article chronicles the history, structure, and contours of our finance I use this term to describe a system in which the funding of campaigns at the federal, state, and local levels is national in scope, despite the fact that voting is not. It is a system in which everyone is free to donate to a candidate across state lines, although only a resident of the candidate’s district can vote for him. Part I contrasts our campaign finance nationalism with our voting rights federalism. The law views voting and campaigning as distinct activities, and each is governed by its own body of law. For the most part, voting is governed by state law. Since state law regulates voting differently in each state, the law of voting is emblematic of America's voting rights federalism. The law of campaigning, by contrast, is national in scope. A major portion of it involves the doctrine of free speech. Since the First Amendment applies equally to all citizens, our campaign finance system largely ignores the federalism of voting. The only participation limits that our campaign finance system sets are based on national citizenship, as “foreign nationals” are precluded from making contributions or expenditures to influence any federal, state, or local election. In Part II, I chronicle the history of our campaign finance nationalism. Concern with the influence that foreigners had over U.S. policymaking led Congress to enact the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) in 1938. This law prohibited the agents of foreign principals from making contributions to political candidates. However, FARA's statutory scheme contained loopholes. In 1974, when Congress was debating its amendments to the Foreign Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), it adopted Senator Lloyd Bentsen's proposal to ban foreign nationals from influencing U.S. electoral campaigns directly. After Citizens United was decided, this prohibition on foreign nationals was challenged in Bluman v. FEC, but the Bluman court upheld the ban on the grounds that foreigners are not members of the American political community. As Part III explains, our campaign finance nationalism has several consequences. One is that it prevents individual states from restricting nonresident campaign contributions. Over the years, several states have tried to place limits on nonresident contributions, only to have their efforts be struck down. A second consequence is that the system readily encourages political candidates to seek campaign contributions from all across the country. As a result, candidates develop two distinct groups of people to whom they owe allegiance: voters and donors. I marshal evidence to show how, over time, members of Congress have become increasingly dependent on nonresident donors. Many academic authors, including Richard Briffault, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Anthony Johnstone, Todd Pettys, and John Paul Stevens, have undertaken efforts to understand the effects of nonresident contributions and the justifications for them. Part IV examines the difficulties of regulating our campaign finance nationalism. The provisions of the law prohibiting foreign spending in American elections have many loopholes, and policing them also turns out to be very hard to do in practice. If Russia's aggressive actions during the 2016 election taught us anything, it is that our campaign finance system is vulnerable. I conclude by examining various efforts now being undertaken in Congress to prevent foreign influence from infiltrating American electoral campaigns.

A Realistic Version of Campaign Finance Reform and Two Essential Steps Toward a Return to Effective Governance

This essay is a contribution to a symposium on The Administration of Professor Pierce argues in support of a system of campaign finance reform that would eliminate all limits on contributions to candidates and require all candidate campaigns and PACs to report promptly all contributions. He argues that such a system would respect freedom of speech, reduce the amount of irresponsible negative advertising and allow the members of the public to decide whether they want to vote for a candidate who accepts money from sources they dislike or distrust. Professor Pierce also urges major changes to our methods of selecting candidates for office, the rules that determine whether a Bill can be considered on the floor of the House, and the rules for choosing the leadership of the House of Representatives. He explains why he believes that replacement of the use of primaries to choose candidates for office with a peer-based method, elimination of the Hastert rule, and changing the rules applicable to electing the leadership of the House are critical to our ability to continue to function as an effective Democracy.

Regulating Campaign Finance through Legislative Recusal Rules

Regulating Campaign Finance through Legislative Recusal Rules

Contributors

Previous articleNext article FreeContributorsPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreMariana Craciun is assistant professor at Tulane University. Her research examines the construction and legitimation of knowledge in the field of mental health. She is writing a book that traces the rise and practical consequences of evidence-based mental health treatments.Jennifer A. Heerwig is assistant professor of sociology at SUNY–Stony Brook. Her work on the American campaign finance system examines the changing role of individual donors in federal elections.Tom VanHeuvelen is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His research interests include wage and income inequality, economic development, and comparative and historical sociology.Elizabeth Hirsh is associate professor of sociology and Canada Research Chair in Inequality and Law at the University of British Columbia. Her research focuses on employment discrimination, organizational practices, and the law. Current projects include an analysis of the effectiveness of corporate diversity practices, legal interpretations of caregiver discrimination, and a qualitative study of workers’ legal consciousness.Youngjoo Cha is associate professor of sociology at Indiana University. Her current major research investigates how the trend toward long work hours reinforces gender inequality and how this tendency can be challenged. Her other research investigates occupational heterogeneity in the gender wage gap and how stereotypes of Asian men and women across different locations in the income distribution affect their labor market outcomes.John R. Logan is professor of sociology at Brown University. Among his major research projects is an intensive study of residential segregation and neighborhood change during the urban transition of 1880–1940, based on 100% mapped geocoded census data for major cities.Matthew J. Martinez is a research analyst at Rice University. Currently his research focuses on historic individual outcomes of students in a large urban area in 1930–40 using a variety of data sources, including the 100% geocoded census data. In addition, he participates in numerous projects investigating the root causes of educational attainment gaps for students in Houston, Texas. Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by American Journal of Sociology Volume 123, Number 4January 2018 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/696211 © 2018 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

DEMOCRACIA ROMANTIZADA, FRAGMENTAÇÃO POLÍTICA E O DECLÍNIO DO GOVERNO NORTE-AMERICANO

A romantização democrática norte-americana contribui para a disfuncionalidade das instituições de seu governo, ou, ao menos, é o que alega este artigo. Três linhas de pensamentos que modelam esse argumento são desenvolvidas. Primeiro, para entender a paralisia do atual governo norte-americano, é tão importante focar o problema da “fragmentação política”, quanto a extrema polarização dos partidos políticos. Por fragmentação, compreendo a difusão interna do poder político que se distancia das lideranças partidárias e se aproxima das mãos de seus membros individualmente, mas também a difusão externa do poder, distanciando-se dos partidos em direção a organizações não-partidárias. A polarização política de hoje é um produto de um processo histórico de longo prazo e possivelmente duradouro; como resultado, acordos que atravessam linhas partidárias são mais prováveis de vir de líderes de partidos, que possuem o forte incentivo de manter a legenda partidária atraente ao maior eleitorado possível. Mas líderes de partidos só conseguem fazer isso se puderem pressionar seus membros recalcitrantes a se juntar ao acordo; a fragmentação política torna isso mais difícil de se alcançar. Além disso, a revolução das comunicações e a captação de fundos online agora permite que os representantes funcionem mais como empresários independentes do que no passado. Segundo, a ímpar cultura democrática e o desenho institucional norte-americanos contribuem para a fragmentação política. Nosso sistema é muito mais individualista e populista, em sua estrutura, do que o de outras democracias maduras. Leis de financiamento de campanhas, por exemplo, são mais baseadas na ideia de um sistema de eleições individualista e centrado no candidato, do que naquela em que as organizações centrais da política – os partidos políticos – desempenham um papel central. Na particular versão norte-americana da “responsabilidade democrática”, nossos mandatários estão sujeitos a eleições mais frequentes, contemplando-se as primárias, do que representantes eleitos em qualquer outro lugar; nós elegemos muito mais agentes, incluindo-se juízes e promotores, do que qualquer outro país; muitos de nossos esforços para reformas políticas perseguem um maior papel participativo de cidadãos individualmente. Grande parte das atuais propostas para mudar o financiamento de campanhas eleitorais, por exemplo, busca fortalecer “pequenos doadores” ou conceder vouchers a cidadãos, individualmente, que eles podem usar para financiar candidatos. Porém, há motivos para temer que tais práticas alimentarão a fragmentação política e dificultarão a governança efetiva, à medida que doações individuais tendem a desaguar em candidatos ideologicamente mais extremos e polarizados. Terceiro, uma direção distinta para reforma buscaria fortalecer as forças do centrismo e focar mais o poder de organizações do que o poder de indivíduos. Para resistir à fragmentação política, esforços para reforma podem procurar fortificar o papel de partidos políticos e líderes de partidos, de modo que membros individualmente terão menos do que um efetivo poder de veto. Este artigo sugere várias políticas específicas diferentes na área do financiamento de campanhas eleitorais que podem fazer isso ao conferir um papel mais relevante aos partidos políticos no sistema de financiamento de campanhas.

Does The U.S. Campaign Finance System Favor Republicans

There is a common belief that the pro-regulatory approach of Democrats, makes them more determined in the fight against big money in campaign elections, whereas Republicans, supporting recent Supreme Court decisions in Citizens United v. F.E.C. and McCutcheon v. F.E.C., benefit from the system more than their political counterparts. The aim of the article is to analyze the real character of the U.S. campaign finance regulations, both from legislative and judicial perspective, and to determine which political party benefits from the system: Republican or Democratic? By underlining the Buckley rule that ‘money is speech’ the Author suggests that campaign contributions and spending are deeply rooted in the character of American political system determining the political future of candidates of both political parties. The article refers to election cycles since 1970s, but it mainly focuses on recent election cycles, including the 2016 presidential election. Key words: campaign finance, Republicans and Democrats, U.S. politics and law

Regulation and Upper Class Bias in Campaign Finance Systems

In the campaign finance system in the U.S., organizations representing business and upper income actors numerically dominate those representing the middle class and the poor, raising the concern that policy outcomes are skewed toward the wealthy. Some campaign finance regulations are specifically designed to alter the mobilization of organized interests, yet we have limited knowledge of whether these laws actually work as intended. In this article I take advantage of variation in state campaign finance laws to examine how laws banning and regulating corporate and labor campaign contributions and expenditures shape the mobilization of upper class actors (i.e., business groups and professional associations) and labor groups, and ultimately “bias” in the U.S. states. Descriptively, I demonstrate that bias in state campaign finance systems is substantial. The multivariate analysis covering data from the early 1990s to 2010 shows that bans on direct contributions from corporations and labor unions reduce the mobilization of these groups and ultimately structure bias in the organizational population in state campaign finance systems.

Why Are There So Many Lawyers in Congress?

For centuries, scholars have puzzled over why so many lawyers are elected to Congress. This paper draws on a wealth of new data to weigh in on why this age-old representation imbalance has endured. While lawyers enter politics at much higher rates, self-selection at best offers a partial explanation. Conditional on running, lawyers win at twice the rate of candidates from other backgrounds. Contrary to prevailing theories in the literature, voters do not reward candidates with backgrounds in law. Rather, lawyers win because of a sizable competitive advantage in early fundraising, owing in large part to their professional networks. This study has important implications about who runs for office, who wins, and the consequences for the demographic composition of Congress. It also identifies an underexplored mechanism by which the U.S. system of campaign finance sustains deep representational imbalances.

State Responses to U.S. Supreme Court Campaign Finance Decisions

Recent federal court decisions have deregulated state campaign finance systems to a significant degree. These decisions are not only rooted in First Amendment jurisprudence but also raise issues of federalism. Although most studies of federal–state conflict focus on disputes between state officials and elected federal policy makers, courts are also policy-making institutions, and in the absence of policy making by other federal branches, courts have become the critical federal policy maker in this area. In response to U.S. Supreme Court rulings that deregulate campaign finance rules and are out of step with the policy preferences of many state electorates and officials, states are attempting to resist these rulings, but using different approaches than are used by states in disputes with the Congress or President. We discuss these rulings and state responses to them. We also describe the implications of these dynamics for federalism.

“Outsiders with Deep Pockets”: The Nationalization of Local School Board Elections

Recent election cycles have seen growing attention to the role of “outside” money in urban school board elections. Using an original data set of more than 16,000 contributions covering election cycles from 2008 to 2013 in four school districts (Los Angeles, CA; New Orleans, LA; Denver, CO; Bridgeport, CT), we show how large national donors play a significant role. Our study links two dynamic fields that are rarely studied together: (1) the behavior of wealthy donors in a changing national campaign finance system and (2) the evolving politics of urban education. By examining donor networks, we illuminate the mechanisms behind the nationalization of education politics and national donor involvement in local campaigns. We show that shared affiliations through education organizations are significantly associated with school board campaign contributions.

Buying Time: Protecting Free Speech and Functional Democracy by Distinguishing Between Expenditures

Many in campaign finance community suggest there is no room for further debate over constitutionality of statutory limits upon independent and contributions. Pro-reform groups perceive democracy as vulnerable to systemic from plutocratic influences and thus endorse regulatory oversight of campaign spending. Pro-speech groups assert pillar of democracy is participation in of information, and subsequently reject restriction of campaign financing even when advanced in name of anti-corruption. Since Citizens United, latter view has largely carried day in court.But what if pro-reform and pro-speech views are not at odds after all? Since Buckley v. Valeo, reformers have sought to limit contributions or expenditures in name of preventing corruption or political equality. These blunt paradigms have failed. But there is another way forward. For forty years, Congress and Court have unnecessarily examined all of money as an undifferentiated class subject to same restrictions. It is time to abandon this framework and pursue a new approach tailored to a new interest.The Court has long viewed First Amendment as protecting a for clash of different views and conflicting This of (or, marketplace) rests upon two principles: and free trade. The principle recognizes speech, not less, is governing rule of First Amendment. This protects entry into market and ensures a diversity and multiplicity of ideas. The free principle recognizes the ultimate good desired is better reached by trade in ideas and that best test of truth is power of thought to get itself accepted in competition of market. This protects competition within market and ensures best win through competition on merits. But if marketplace of ideas is more than just a catchy slogan, then what does winning provide? What limited resource does market allocate based on this free trade in ideas? The answer is time. a fleeting existence we have but little time to find truth through discourse. When content freely competes in of and wins on its merits, best rise to top, gain greater acceptance, and earn a larger market share of audience time and attention. And just as some contracts in economic enhance competition while others restrain competition, so too do some in ideational enhance competition while others do not. By distinguishing between these expenditures, we can raise unexplored questions and craft a campaign finance system aligns with First Amendment.Part I briefly surveys history of campaign finance debate. After examining problems posed by existing approaches and weaknesses of anticorruption and political equality interests, theory abandons faulty premises underlying those paradigms. Rather than assuming government's interest must cut against speech, theory proposes aligning government's interest with speech. And, rather than assuming all serve First Amendment purposes and asking how much protection should be afforded to these expenditures, theory asks which advance purposes of First Amendment and which undermine purposes of First Amendment.Part II proposes a new approach to reform based on differences between competitive and anticompetitive in ideational marketplace. By revealing Buckley and its progeny to be an inevitable judicial response to a clumsy legislative framework, theory makes room for a more tailored statute rooted in constitutional principles. Here, theory distinguishes between for creation of content (all of which help content enter market and are protected by principle) and for dissemination of content (some of which allow content to compete for market share on merits — and thus are protected by free principle — and some of which bypass competitive process for earning market share — and thus violate free principle).Part III proposes a new government interest: preserving competition in of ideas. By passing legislation curbs anticompetitive restraints upon trade, Congress could protect ideational market's natural role in safeguarding speech and self-rule. And, just as our antitrust laws curb restraints to protect economic competition (without regard to particular or products), so too would a antitrust law curb restraints to protect ideational competition (without regard to particular or ideas). Such a law would not favor particular speakers or equalize any more than antitrust laws favor particular businesses or equalize market share.Part IV discusses elements and application of a legislative proposal, forecasts standard of review to be applied, addresses likely objections to such a scheme, and evaluates various advantages of employing such an approach. In short, this Article sets out a constitutional theory and legal framework for understanding what so many Americans already know: they are not heard in halls of Congress, process has shut them out, and their compelling concerns cannot compete in a system where money matters more than merits.