British Defence Research Articles

British defence ‐ the chief of the defence staff's lecture 2000

(2001). British defence ‐ the chief of the defence staff's lecture 2000. The RUSI Journal: Vol. 146, No. 1, pp. 1-7.

Lawrence Freedman, The Politics of British Defence, 1979–98. NewYork: St.Martin's Press, 1999. 259 pp. $65.00.

January 01 2001 The Politics of British Defence, 1979–98 LawrenceFreedman, The Politics of British Defence, 1979–98. NewYork: St.Martin's Press, 1999. 259 pp. $65.00. Ian Clark Ian Clark University of Wales, Aberystwyth Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Ian Clark University of Wales, Aberystwyth Online Issn: 1531-3298 Print Issn: 1520-3972 © 2001 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2001 Journal of Cold War Studies (2001) 3 (1): 128–130. https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2001.3.1.128 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Ian Clark; The Politics of British Defence, 1979–98. Journal of Cold War Studies 2001; 3 (1): 128–130. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2001.3.1.128 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsJournal of Cold War Studies Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2001 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2001 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The making of British Defence Policy

(2000). The making of British Defence Policy. The RUSI Journal: Vol. 145, No. 5, pp. 21-24.

The British Withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia: Influence of the Labour Party on the Decision

When Labour came to power in October 1964, British defence and foreign policy remained unchanged. However, within three years, Prime Minister Wilson had announced military withdrawal from Singapore. In Defence White Paper of July 1967 this was planned for mid-seventies, but in January 1968 date was moved forward to end of 1971. This was only marginally altered by Conserva tive policy to station some troops in Singapore under Five-Power Defence Arrangement. This decision brought to an end imperial presence in Southeast Asia which had lasted 150 years, representing a major break in defence and foreign policy. The Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement was last British commitment to assist automatically another country in its defence. Secretary of State for Defence, Healey, talked of the great est transformation of defence policy in history of Britain' * and Gor don Walker called withdrawal a revolution in Britain's defence posture and an epoch-making and revolutionary decision.1 In discussion about decision-making process of with drawal, too much emphasis seems generally to be laid upon eco nomics.2 The economic situation was alarming indeed; enormous balance of payments deficits which were to a great extent caused by military expenditure overseas, appeared regularly in 1960s. Other factors also influenced decision-making. The international con text, that is, first signs of detente, end of confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia, London's approach and formal application to enter EEC, and so forth, played a role. The press, especially Guardian after mid-1965, and informed opinion ? elitist discus sion among academics, senior civil servants, and officers ? also had a bearing upon this process. In addition there were strong factions in all three parliamentary parties which favoured a military withdrawal from east of Suez.3

Blood on the hills: the Canadian Army in the Korean War

The Korean War represented a series of firsts for Canadian soldiers - their first military action under UN auspices, their first under U.S. corps and army command, their first in Asia as ground troops, and their first in which people at home initially ignored their efforts, and then forgot about them. David Bercuson evokes the tastes and smells, the frustrations, the unfamiliar terrain, the international complexities, and the heroism that made the Korean War an unforgettable experience for those who fought there. Caught by surprise with only a phantom army, the Canadian government in the summer of 1950 was forced by its major allies to promise a ground combat contribution to the UN effort to push back the Communist invasion of South Korea from the north. The Canadian Army Special Force, as the Korean contingent was first called, was hurriedly raised, trained, and sent to Korea, ill-prepared for a mountain war against a determined, well-armed enemy. Canadian soldiers fought bravely, often against impossible odds, to carry out their mission, but they were hindered by several factors - cautious UN Command strategy, poor British and Canadian defence doctrine, uneven leadership, and inadequate equipment and training. They did their duty, and more, in stopping Communist aggression in its tracks, but the Canadian army chose not to remember the lessons of Korea, even though that conflict, as a limited war, set the pattern for virtually all those that followed. Blood on the Hills is the first full, non-official history of the Canadian army's operations in the Korean War. The book covers the period from the start of that war to the cease-fire in July 1953 and describes and analyses the mobilization of the Canadian contingent, its training, manning, and equipment, and its efforts in combat. David Bercuson focuses on the many consequences of the army's unreadiness for combat in Korea and on the army's lack of success in learning lessons from its experience in an active theatre of war.

Britain, France and the Saint‐Malo declaration: Tactical rapprochement or strategic entente?*

The December 1998 Anglo‐French summit in Saint‐Malo marked the sudden convergence of British and French policy towards European security institutions and laid the basis for EU leaders’ agreement a year later at the Helsinki summit to develop the capability to deploy a European military force. This essay argues that the Saint‐Malo Declaration represents a radical shift in British and French defence identities in response to challenges to British and French national identities and the legitimacy of both states in the post‐Cold War era. It points to the changed international security dynamic as a result of the end of the Cold War and the gradual emergence of a European security community, relative economic decline, and generational change in British and French policy élites as critical factors.

Profiles in Toxicology

John M. Barnes, the first director of the Toxicology Research Unit of the British Medical Council, was educated as a physician and spent his early years at the Sir William Dunn School of Pathology, University of Oxford. One day in 1938—as he himself related the story to me and my wife, Christine, in 1966 during a relaxed evening in a Swiss mountain resort—he was approached by a colleague who had developed what looked to be a most promising drug. Before treating people, however, the investigator thought that some toxicity evaluation was in order, and so he asked Barnes to do a few rudimentary tests. Barnes took the compound, injected it intraperitoneally into three mice, found them alive and well the next morning, and reported his findings as “your drug seems not to be toxic.” He then was offered to participate in further evaluations of the drug, but declined because, as he told me, he did not really believe in miracle drugs. The investigator who had approached him was Howard Florey, the drug was penicillin, and as Barnes admitted somewhat ruefully, with his disbelief in miracle drugs, he simply had talked himself out of a Nobel Prize. In 1942, Barnes joined the British Defense Research Establishment in Porton. A paper describing some of his research at the time deserves to be mentioned. (Barnes eventually would publish around 120 papers, half of which were original research and reviews, the other half matters concerning the safe use of chemicals and the hazards they present to man). This particular paper coming out of Porton, “The development of anthrax following the administration of spores by inhalation” (Barnes, 1947) would not have raised much interest a few months ago, but now certainly has some new actuality. Some of the conclusions seem not to fit with current perceptions of the disease and its threat to mankind: “Evidence obtained during the carrying out of the spore count on the lungs of exposed animals (rabbits, guinea pigs and mice) suggest that the anthrax spores find the lung a very uncomfortable medium in which to germinate” and “Much higher minimum lethal doses of anthrax spores are necessary to produce infection by inhalation than by subcutaneous injection.” In 1947, the Medical Research Council established the Toxicology Research Unit, charged with experimental investigations of toxicological problems, with special reference to industrial hazards. Barnes was appointed its first director, a post he held until his untimely death in 1975. Other members were F. A. Denz, V. H. Parker, and W. N. Aldridge, eventually a winner of the Society of Toxicology Merit Award (Johnson, 2001). The first scientific problem studied in the unit was the toxicity of beryllium (Aldridge et al., 1949). During his entire career at the Medical Research Council, Barnes continued to maintain a high interest in beryllium, particularly its immunogenic properties, and was actually to some extent chagrined that research on beryllium toxicity mostly dealt with biochemical mechanisms of liver cell death rather than to address what seemed to be the real problem, pulmonary disease. Other early research efforts focused on dinitro-ortho-cresol (Parker et al., 1951), research that later led to some fundamental studies on the uncoupling of oxidative phosphorylation, and on the toxicity of new organic phosphorus compounds that were being developed as promising pesticides (Aldridge and Barnes, 1952). After the unit moved to Carshalton, Barnes became instrumental in developing and maintaining an excellent research climate. He was very encouraging toward young people and fully supported their growth as truly independent investigators. He cared deeply for the quality of science that was conducted in the unit, but he also saw to it that the results of fundamental research were used for practical purposes wherever possible. Although he gave much encouragement to what might be called “mechanistic” research these days, he was truly a biologist and genuinely committed to pathology. He made several unexpected findings in his research and recognized their broader implications: delayed skin sensitivity caused by beryllium in guinea pigs, single-dose carcinogenesis by nitrosamines, behavioral changes caused by trimethyltin, and two types of poisoning caused by pyrethroid pesticides. Beginning in the 1950s, Barnes had become a very much sought-after consultant for the World Health Organization, particularly in regard to the worldwide use of pesticides. He was firmly convinced that pesticides, responsibly used, would benefit mankind by improving food production and would not constitute an undue health hazard, particularly not at the low levels found as food residues. He believed that research eventually would enable toxicologists to deal with the problem of 1 For correspondence via fax: (530) 752-5300. E-mail: hrwitschi@ ucdavis.edu. TOXICOLOGICAL SCIENCES 68, 267–269 (2002) Copyright © 2002 by the Society of Toxicology

Coping with Decline: US Policy toward the British Defense

Coping with Decline: US Policy toward the British Defense

Initial plastic surgery experience with the first telemedicine links for the British Forces

In January 1998, the first telemedicine link for the British Defence Medical Services was established between the British military hospital in Sipovo, Bosnia and the Royal Hospital Haslar, the main triservice hospital in the UK. Further links were established later in the year. These simple links use a high-resolution digital camera, the Olympus C1400L and the C1400XL, to capture still images. These are then transmitted without loss of definition as electronic mail attachments to obtain specialist opinions in plastic surgery as well as in radiology, dermatology, orthopaedics, urology, ophthalmology, general medicine, maxillofacial surgery and pathology. Its use is illustrated by representative case reports from the first 11 referrals from Sipovo and elsewhere to the Plastic Surgery Department at Haslar. This system is suitable for use within both a military and a civilian context, anywhere in the world. It can readily be adapted for use by general practitioners and hospital doctors to facilitate referrals to plastic surgery departments.

British - Czech Co-operation in a Mass Casualty Incident, Sipovo. From Aeromedical Evacuation from Bosnia to Discharge from Central Military Hospital, Prague

On Thursday 8 January 1998, a Czech Hip helicopter with 21 personnel on board crashed in Bos Krupa, northwest Bosnia, resulting in one of the largest mass casualty incidents involving...

RETHINKING THE JOINT PROJECT: AUSTRALIA'S BID FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 1945–1960

This article concludes that Australia was determined to possess nuclear weapons from the end of the Second World War. The best prospects for this lay in working with Britain through the so-called ‘joint project’. British defence planners knew that their small island would not survive a future atomic blitz and, therefore, needed ‘active’ deterrent weapons. The problem was that the US after 1946 moved to protect its atomic monopoly and denied Britain research, raw materials, and test facilities. Australia was, therefore, an invaluable partner in the British deterrent weapons programme, in all its aspects from research to testing, as long as the US refused co-operation. The quest for atomic weapons lies at the heart of many of Canberra's initiatives after 1945 – the decision to build an Australian National University; the construction of the vast Snowy Mountains scheme; and ultimately the decision to deploy Australian forces into South-East Asia in the mid-fifties. The height of Anglo-Australian co-operation coincided with the atomic tests after 1952, London's decision to help build atomic reactors in Australia, and the Suez crisis. Britain's acquisition of deterrent weapons in 1957, however, saw the end of imperial co-operation on atomic weapons and delivery systems.

Mass Casualty Incident At Hospital Squadron Sipovo, Bosnia Following A Czech Hip Helicopter Crash, 8 Jan 1998

On Thursday 8 January 1998, a Czech Hip helicopter with 21 personnel on board crashed shortly after take off from Bos Krupa, northwest Bosnia. Seventeen casualties (including six with severe...

The Falklands War: Britain versus the past in the South Atlantic

The Falklands War is an ideal showcase for how British policy evolved in the 1970s and 1980s. The background of the dispute over the island group in the remote South Atlantic (called Las Malvinas by the Argentines) is given first, then the events that precipitated the 1982 conflict and extensive examination of the military aspects of the war are provided. An overview follows of the many hypotheses offered for the British motivation to recapture the Falklands, showing that only those theories pertaining to the British perception of their national honor and the defense of democratic principles are significant. The Falklands War did not result in a dramatic shift in British defense policy, but did show the importance of external developments and political realism in policy formation, and these considerations are fully detailed here.

Samuel L. Morison and the Government Crackdown on the Leaking of Classified Information

In July 1984, Samuel Loring Morison took several satellite photos from the desk of a colleague at the Naval Intelligence Support Center, clipped off the secret classification, and sent the photos to a British military magazine. The magazine, Jane's Defence Weekly, published the photos which showed the Soviet Union's first nuclearpowered aircraft carrier under construction in a shipyard on the Black Sea. Morison was arrested, charged with espionage and theft, and convicted. He served eight months of a two-year sentence before he was paroled. Morison was the first person convicted under U.S. espionage laws for releasing classified information to the news media. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo were tried under the same laws for releasing the Pentagon Papers to the press in 1970. But the case against Ellsberg and Russo was dismissed because of government misconduct after it was revealed that people working for the government had broken into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. The purpose of this study is to answer the following research question: What circumstances led to the first successful prosecution for leaking to the news media under the Espionage Act? This article adds to our understanding of the prosecution of Morison by examining internal Justice Department memos obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, some of them previously classified as secret. The article also draws upon the Willard Report, an internal government document prepared by an interdepartmental team appointed to find ways to stop leaks of classified information. Research has tended to focus on the implications of the Morison case for the news media and not on the circumstances leading to Morison's prosecution. Eberhard discussed the case in some detail and concluded that it was basically a minor skirmish in the continuing war over secrecy between the government and the news media.1 Teeter and Le Duc stated that the case was important because it marked the first use of the Espionage Act to prosecute someone for leaking information to the media.2 Burkholder suggested that much of the press was slow to realize the significance of the Morison case for itself and for the public as a whole. 3 In an article in Harper's, Philip Weiss argued that the case was a quiet coup that gave the federal government a powerful weapon to use against leakers.4 Curry suggested that the implications of the case were enormous because it gave the executive branch almost total control over what information is released to the public.5 On August 8, 1984, a satellite photo of a nuclear aircraft carrier under construction in a Soviet shipyard appeared in the Washington Post. The same photo, along with two others, appeared in the August 11 issue of the British magazine Jane's Defence Weekly. At about the same time, one or more of these photos appeared in the New York Times and on the evening newscasts of the three major television networks. The photos showed a 75,000-ton nuclear-powered aircraft carrier being constructed in two large sections at the Nikolaiev 444 shipyard on the Black Sea.6 The photos in Jane's Defence Weekly reveal a level of detail that comes as a surprise to viewers accustomed to seeing previous satellite photos in the news media. Two of the photos were taken from a satellite at an oblique angle, and they clearly show large gantry cranes rising above the carrier in its dock at the shipyard. Captions published with the photos point out that the carrier was being built in two sections because it was too large to fit in the standard shipyard dock. The captions report some interpretation of the photos by analysts, including the statement that the carrier flight deck amidship appears to have been completed. Investigators for the U.S. Government identified the photos as classified photographs assigned to the Naval Intelligence Command for analysis and reported as missing on July 30, 1984. Samuel L. …

FEA Makes Airframes Safer

This article focuses on data gathered during the controlled destruction of a Boeing 747 airliner are helping engineers to identify ways of strengthening aircraft to make them less vulnerable to an internal explosion. Even though it may not help engineers understand the specific events in the crash of Flight 800, a controlled explosion of a Boeing 747 by the British Defence Evaluation Research Agency (DERA) , based in London, could point the way to controlling the damage from airliner explosions in the future. The 747-1 00 had been an attraction at the Bruntingthorpe Aerodrome in Leicestershire, England, before it was purchased by the British Ministry of Defence and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Initially, the meshes were too coarse for the dynamic analyses to be used in the test, so engineers refined them accordingly in the blast area. Using new features in MSC/DYTRAN 4, the team will model the airframe as a series of layers, which is representative of the lining concepts to be tested.

The Enigma Spy: An Autobiography

London: Century, 1997, xix, 203 pp, $34.95John Cairncross, KGB codename 'The Carelian,' was the last but by no means the least of the ring of Soviet spies recruited in the 1930s at Cambridge University. Set against the likes of Kim Philby, Anthony Blunt, Donald Maclean, and Guy Burgess, he was not a flamboyant figure or a high-flyer. Nor was he a natural for the sub rosa world. To his KgB-handlers he was a pure nightmare -- an agent unable to remember the details of clandestine meetings, vague about time, nervous in the extreme, and technically all thumbs. He was incapable of operating the Minox camera bestowed upon him and managed to ruin this stout little device. Nor was he a success behind the wheel of the car that the KGB bought him -- he failed his driving test several times and on one notable occasion stalled the car in front of a London bobby, with his KGB handler in the passenger seat and a pile of stolen documents on the floor. The nice policeman helped Cairncross get his car restarted and explained to him the working of the carburetor choke.But lest Cairncross seem like something out of a British 'Carry on' film, it needs to be recalled that he was also a holder of one of the Soviet Union's highest honours (the Order of the Red Banner), a man of notable intellectual skills who managed to pass first in his year in the entrance exams to the British Civil Service, and a very lucky fellow. Although he fell under suspicion in 1951, after the flight of Burgess and Maclean to Moscow, was interrogated by MI5, and let go from his post in the British government, he neither ended his days in Moscow nor did time in jail. Instead he led an agreeable life in Rome, Geneva, Bangkok, and Karachi, working for a variety of international organizations, before spending his sunset years in the south of France and, at the very end, managing a quiet return to his native England. Canadian readers might note with amusement that after his working career as a spy was ended he signed on with the CBC as a radio correspondent in Rome during the 1950s. Moliere specialists will recall him as a well-published expert on the French playwright. Those absorbed by polygamy will recall his enthusiastic book, After Polygamy was Made a Sin.Spurred into action by the publication of Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky's authoritative historical account, KGB: The Inside Story (1990) and by the appearance of an English translation of the memoirs of his one-time handler, Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (1994), Cairncross spent his last years in that most foolish of pursuits -- trying to deny the past. Both Andrew and Gordievsky and Modin had portrayed him as a serious spy, one of the most effective of the Cambridge Five. He provided the KGB with wartime intelligence on the atomic bomb and secrets from that holy of holies of British intelligence, the code-breaking centre at Bletchley Park. After the war, he passed on bucketloads of information on British defence policy, economic decision-making, and nato arrangements from his posts in the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence. …

Labour's defence and security policy

Since the last Labour government, the world has changed dramatically and Britain's defence, and security emphasis accordingly. The Labour Party has assessed this shifting situation during its period in opposition and produced a policy based on international cooperation, consensus and a firm backing of the defence industry. In a presentation given before the General Election while Labour Party spokesman on defence, Dr David Clark here sets out his party's defence policy, highlighting the emphasis, on building national consensus in defence and instituting a strategic defence review looking to the looking‐term to restore stability and cohesion to the armed forces and British defence planning.

British security and defence policy

With the approach of the General Election and with the political parties defence plans for the next five years coming‐under scrutiny, Menzies Campbell here lays out the Liberal Democrat views, on British defence. Stressing the central importance of the NATO partnership, he emphasises that a strong commitment by the US to its European partners is vital and should be cultivated as the US looks to Europe to take a larger share of the defence burden. Britain's defence needs and responsibilities must be under‐stood in the context of the commitments she already has, such as its permanent membership of the UN Security Council, senior, membership of NATO, membership of the G7, and of the‐EU and WEU. It is vital, however, that security is not seen only in terms of military prepar edness but in the complex context of political, social, economics and environmental factors. The changed circumstances of national and international security, he concludes, call for a serious defence debate on meeting new challenges to which the political parties must turn their attention.

Two-stroke or Turbine? The Aeronautical Research Committee and British Aero Engine Development in World War II

Two-stroke or Turbine? The Aeronautical Research Committee and British Aero Engine Development in World War II ANDREW NAHUM All the ascendancy of the Hurricanes and Spit­ fires would have been fruitless but for this sys­ tem . . . which had been devised and built before the war. ... It had been shaped and refined in constant action, and all was now fused together into a most elaborate instrument of war, the like of which ex­ isted nowhere in the world. [Winston Churchill, The Second World War]1 During the 1930s, the growing apprehension in Britain about air attack began to provoke a shift in strategic thinking away from a purely retaliatory posture, which relied on a bomber force to counter the threat of bombers, toward a mixed strategy in which defensive interceptor fighters were to have a vital role. This new per­ ception stimulated an intensive program of research and develop­ ment in radar, in the control of fighters from the ground, and in aero engines. A connection between radar developments and a shift Mr. Nahum is senior curator of the National Aeronautical Collection at the Science Museum, London. He gratefully acknowledges the support of the museum in the conduct of this research, and thanks his colleagues Timothy Boon, Sir Neil Cossons, Dr. Robert Bud, and Dr. Alan Morton for many helpful comments. John Bagley, the author’s predecessor as curator of the aeronautical collection, provided a unique insight into the organization of government science from his time at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE), Farnborough, and gave immense encourage­ ment for the undertaking of this work. Dr. David Edgerton at the Imperial College was generous with his comments. Finally, the author is grateful to the editor and referees of Technology and Culture for invaluable suggestions. ’Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2 (London, 1949), pp. 293-94. This is taken from a description of Churchill’s visit to the fighter control center at Northolt on September 15, 1940, the turning point ofthe Battle ofBritain. It conveys his instinctive appreciation of the way in which the functional integration of the British air defense system had created a pivotal strategic asset.© 1997 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. 0040-165X/97/3802-0002$01.00 312 British Aero Engine Development 313 in policy in the mid-1930s to support jet engine development has previously been surmised.2 This study goes farther and establishes a direct linkage between early secret knowledge of radar and a wide range of British high-power aero engine work. The relationship between these programs casts light on contem­ porary planning for air defense and reveals a remarkably holistic approach to the pressing problem ofbomber interception. This gave rise to an integrated defense system which was, at that time, uniquely powerful and on which national survival in the Battle of Britain was to be critically dependent. There is a conventional stereotype of British defense science in this period. A lone inventor or “boffin,” committed, passionate, dis­ organized, inspirational, is pitted against the rigidity of officialdom (which is ultimately overcome). It is a scenario that has done great service to motion picture makers, for example in The Dam Busters, where the eccentric genius Barnes Wallis eventually sells his idea for a bouncing bomb to skeptical officials and Royal Air Force (RAF) officers.3 A more purposeful and technocratic vision of British defense re­ search can be found in the official histories of World War II or in a work such as Margaret Gowing’s Britain and Atomic Energy. More recently, there hasbeen an even stronger claim to characterize Britain as a “militant and industrial nation” with the contention that “the English state chose the aeroplane as its key strategic technology.”4 The account here differs from these models. It does not seek to locate the roots of British air defense uniquely in government or “the state,” nor in the insights of exceptionally inventive engineers. Rather, it portrays these roots as diffused to a remarkable extent through a both formal and informal network ofindividuals who, for the most part, were already in a social and professional relationship reaching back to World War I. Some were indeed government...

The cold war, great‐power traditions and military posture: Determinants of British defence expenditure after 19451

Since 1945 the UK has changed from Great Power to leading nation status. The stylised facts are outlined and the determinants of UK defence spending are analysed using social welfare and public choice models. The military criteria for leading nation status are considered and the costs of such status are estimated. The conclusion suggests a possible UK defence budget for a medium‐size economy.