The British Withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia: Influence of the Labour Party on the Decision

Abstract

When Labour came to power in October 1964, British defence and foreign policy remained unchanged. However, within three years, Prime Minister Wilson had announced military withdrawal from Singapore. In Defence White Paper of July 1967 this was planned for mid-seventies, but in January 1968 date was moved forward to end of 1971. This was only marginally altered by Conserva tive policy to station some troops in Singapore under Five-Power Defence Arrangement. This decision brought to an end imperial presence in Southeast Asia which had lasted 150 years, representing a major break in defence and foreign policy. The Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement was last British commitment to assist automatically another country in its defence. Secretary of State for Defence, Healey, talked of the great est transformation of defence policy in history of Britain' * and Gor don Walker called withdrawal a revolution in Britain's defence posture and an epoch-making and revolutionary decision.1 In discussion about decision-making process of with drawal, too much emphasis seems generally to be laid upon eco nomics.2 The economic situation was alarming indeed; enormous balance of payments deficits which were to a great extent caused by military expenditure overseas, appeared regularly in 1960s. Other factors also influenced decision-making. The international con text, that is, first signs of detente, end of confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia, London's approach and formal application to enter EEC, and so forth, played a role. The press, especially Guardian after mid-1965, and informed opinion ? elitist discus sion among academics, senior civil servants, and officers ? also had a bearing upon this process. In addition there were strong factions in all three parliamentary parties which favoured a military withdrawal from east of Suez.3