Two-stroke or Turbine? The Aeronautical Research Committee and British Aero Engine Development in World War II

Abstract

Two-stroke or Turbine? The Aeronautical Research Committee and British Aero Engine Development in World War II ANDREW NAHUM All the ascendancy of the Hurricanes and Spit­ fires would have been fruitless but for this sys­ tem . . . which had been devised and built before the war. ... It had been shaped and refined in constant action, and all was now fused together into a most elaborate instrument of war, the like of which ex­ isted nowhere in the world. [Winston Churchill, The Second World War]1 During the 1930s, the growing apprehension in Britain about air attack began to provoke a shift in strategic thinking away from a purely retaliatory posture, which relied on a bomber force to counter the threat of bombers, toward a mixed strategy in which defensive interceptor fighters were to have a vital role. This new per­ ception stimulated an intensive program of research and develop­ ment in radar, in the control of fighters from the ground, and in aero engines. A connection between radar developments and a shift Mr. Nahum is senior curator of the National Aeronautical Collection at the Science Museum, London. He gratefully acknowledges the support of the museum in the conduct of this research, and thanks his colleagues Timothy Boon, Sir Neil Cossons, Dr. Robert Bud, and Dr. Alan Morton for many helpful comments. John Bagley, the author’s predecessor as curator of the aeronautical collection, provided a unique insight into the organization of government science from his time at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE), Farnborough, and gave immense encourage­ ment for the undertaking of this work. Dr. David Edgerton at the Imperial College was generous with his comments. Finally, the author is grateful to the editor and referees of Technology and Culture for invaluable suggestions. ’Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2 (London, 1949), pp. 293-94. This is taken from a description of Churchill’s visit to the fighter control center at Northolt on September 15, 1940, the turning point ofthe Battle ofBritain. It conveys his instinctive appreciation of the way in which the functional integration of the British air defense system had created a pivotal strategic asset.© 1997 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. 0040-165X/97/3802-0002$01.00 312 British Aero Engine Development 313 in policy in the mid-1930s to support jet engine development has previously been surmised.2 This study goes farther and establishes a direct linkage between early secret knowledge of radar and a wide range of British high-power aero engine work. The relationship between these programs casts light on contem­ porary planning for air defense and reveals a remarkably holistic approach to the pressing problem ofbomber interception. This gave rise to an integrated defense system which was, at that time, uniquely powerful and on which national survival in the Battle of Britain was to be critically dependent. There is a conventional stereotype of British defense science in this period. A lone inventor or “boffin,” committed, passionate, dis­ organized, inspirational, is pitted against the rigidity of officialdom (which is ultimately overcome). It is a scenario that has done great service to motion picture makers, for example in The Dam Busters, where the eccentric genius Barnes Wallis eventually sells his idea for a bouncing bomb to skeptical officials and Royal Air Force (RAF) officers.3 A more purposeful and technocratic vision of British defense re­ search can be found in the official histories of World War II or in a work such as Margaret Gowing’s Britain and Atomic Energy. More recently, there hasbeen an even stronger claim to characterize Britain as a “militant and industrial nation” with the contention that “the English state chose the aeroplane as its key strategic technology.”4 The account here differs from these models. It does not seek to locate the roots of British air defense uniquely in government or “the state,” nor in the insights of exceptionally inventive engineers. Rather, it portrays these roots as diffused to a remarkable extent through a both formal and informal network ofindividuals who, for the most part, were already in a social and professional relationship reaching back to World War I. Some were indeed government...