British Defence Research Articles

British home air defence planning in the 1920s

British home air defence planning in the 1920s

Mad Dogs and Englishmen: British Rearmament, Deterrence, and Appeasement, 1934-35

Historical accounts of appeasement have underestimated the British government's attempts to develop a comprehensive strategy of deterrence, one that resembles recent theories of conventional deterrence. The decisions of 1934-35 to increase British armaments were based on these assumptions: that appeasement and military deterrence were compatible in a dual policy of conciliating and confining Germany and Japan; that the attainment of adequate levels of peacetime strength constituted the best deterrent, although the simultaneous demonstration of force and the will to rearm might restrain the dictators. While British defense policy had not anticipated the possibility of conflict with Italy, the British used a show of force in the Mediterranean in 1935 both to protect their interests and to support the League of Nations against Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. The failure either to prevent or to limit Italian aggression in this crisis convinced most British policymakers that threatening force before completing rearmament would not deter a Fascist regime from territorial expansion, and that deterrence should be defined more narrowly.

FALL‐OUT FROM TREACHERY: PETER WRIGHT AND THE SPYCATCHER CASE

The Political QuarterlyVolume 59, Issue 2 p. 206-218 FALL-OUT FROM TREACHERY: PETER WRIGHT AND THE SPYCATCHER CASE D. CAMERON WATT, D. CAMERON WATT D. Cameron Watt is Stevenson Professor of International History at the LSE. Chairman of the Sea Use Programme at LSE and historian of the organization o f British defence policy 1945–64 at the Cabinet Office.Search for more papers by this author D. CAMERON WATT, D. CAMERON WATT D. Cameron Watt is Stevenson Professor of International History at the LSE. Chairman of the Sea Use Programme at LSE and historian of the organization o f British defence policy 1945–64 at the Cabinet Office.Search for more papers by this author First published: April 1988 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1988.tb02393.xCitations: 4Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume59, Issue2April 1988Pages 206-218 RelatedInformation

THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN QUESTION: INDUSTRY AS CLIENTS AND CONSTITUENTS OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

The Political QuarterlyVolume 59, Issue 1 p. 56-62 THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN QUESTION: INDUSTRY AS CLIENTS AND CONSTITUENTS OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS D. CAMERON WATT, D. CAMERON WATT Donald Cameron Watt is Stevenson Professor of International History at the LSE, Chairman of the Sea Use Programme at LSE and historian of the organization of British defence policy 1945–1964 at the Cabinet Office. From 1974–1985 he was Chairman of the Greenwich Forum, a group concerned with the development of a coordinated marine policy for Britain.Search for more papers by this author D. CAMERON WATT, D. CAMERON WATT Donald Cameron Watt is Stevenson Professor of International History at the LSE, Chairman of the Sea Use Programme at LSE and historian of the organization of British defence policy 1945–1964 at the Cabinet Office. From 1974–1985 he was Chairman of the Greenwich Forum, a group concerned with the development of a coordinated marine policy for Britain.Search for more papers by this author First published: January 1988 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1988.tb02381.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume59, Issue1January 1988Pages 56-62 RelatedInformation

The Westland helicopter crisis: Implications for the British defense industry

The Westland helicopter crisis: Implications for the British defense industry

DEFENCE ECONOMICS REVIEW

Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World, London,John Roper (editor), The Future of British Defence Policy London,Christian Schmidt (editor), The Economics of Military Expenditure London, MacMillan 1987, pp. 520, (cloth).Franklin C. Spinney edited by James Clay Thompson,

The Decline of Britain as a Military Power

JLt was a British prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli, who argued that political life was dictated not by logic but by experience. The conventional extension of this axiom in British political life is better known as dedicated procrastination or muddling through. When in doubt, sit still. Precipitous action can only lead to confusion, while stern choices and daring decisions can always be put off for another day. The axiom has been faithfully observed by political factions since Parliament won acclaim as the great talking shop of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it is often alleged that the British empire was built in a fit of loquacious inadvertence and not by conscious design. Its dismembering was not the result of careful planning, for that matter, and neither was the gradual winding down of Britain's economic or military strength since 1945. The actual seepage or dilution of power was never abrupt or convulsive. Unlike the turmoil suffered by France or West Germany, Britain encountered no terrible defeats on colonial battlefields and little political upheaval at home. British defense capabilities were never abruptly scaled down, and no sudden step was made to give up the status of a great power. On the contrary, during twenty-five years of Conservative and seventeen years of Labour governments, military strength was gently run down. Governments slowly and grudgingly changed spending patterns as financial resources were depleted and as Britain's economy fell into decline. Basically, Britain's leaders relied on the special relationship with the United States in order to obtain preferential treatment,

British defence policy: the breakdown of inter-party consensus

In 1983, for almost the first time since the end of the Second World War, defence became a major party political issue at a general election. In that year it was one of the major campaign issues between the political parties and, according to one poll, ranked second only to unemployment as an issue influencing voter behaviour. Indeed, poll evidence indicated that the Conservatives held an unprecedented and overwhelming 54 per cent lead over Labour on the question of British retention of nuclear arms. Furthermore, of those who thought of defecting from the Labour Party, 42 per cent gave defence as the main reason. Such figures as these suggest strongly that by 1983 the inter-party consensus which had governed defence issues since 1945 had broken down, particularly in view of the fact that the question of defence had not been raised as an issue affecting voting intentions in the 1979 election. The breakdown of consensus may thus be judged by the emergence of defence as a party political issue. It might even be said that in 1983 it was an electiondeciding issue, especially when one set of policies could be represented by opponents as being contrary to the continuation of British membership of NATO, the one issue on which all parties were agreed. Defence thus moved from being a peripheral issue to one at the centre stage of the election campaign and it had a major impact on the outcome of the election. However, the.demise of inter-party consensus was not reflected in the electorate as a whole, which chose to continue to support the tried, and trusted policies of the past rather than adopt the radical alternative presented by the Labour Party, If a new consensus is to emerge—and it is beyond the limits of this particular paper to consider whether a consensus in defence policy is desirable—then all parties will have to review their present policies. However, before turning to the reasons for the breakdown, it is instructive to consider the nature of the post-1945 consensus and the origins of its apparent demise.

The theory of a ‘French air menace’, Anglo‐French relations and the British home defence air force programmes of 1921–25

The theory of a ‘French air menace’, Anglo‐French relations and the British home defence air force programmes of 1921–25

Book reviews : Lifetimes: under apartheid By NADINE GORDIMER and DAVID GOLDBLATT (London, Jonathan Cape, 1986). 115pp. £15.00 The Child is Not Dead: youth resistance in South Africa 1976-86 Compiled by ANN HARRIES, ROGER DISKI and ALASDAIR BROWN (London, British Defence and Aid Fund/ILEA, 1986). 64pp. A History of South Africa By MARGARET HOLMES and NIGEL WEST with others (Leeds,

Book reviews : Lifetimes: under apartheid By NADINE GORDIMER and DAVID GOLDBLATT (London, Jonathan Cape, 1986). 115pp. £15.00 The Child is Not Dead: youth resistance in South Africa 1976-86 Compiled by ANN HARRIES, ROGER DISKI and ALASDAIR BROWN (London, British Defence and Aid Fund/ILEA, 1986). 64pp. A History of South Africa By MARGARET HOLMES and NIGEL WEST with others (Leeds,

Book reviews

All Fall Down: America's Fateful Encounter with Iran By Gary Sick. London: I. B. Tauris & Co., Ltd, 1985. 380 pp. £16.50. Nuclear First Use By Professor Neville Brown and General Sir Anthony Farrar‐Hockley. London: Buchan and Enright, for RUSI, 1985. 108 pp. £5.50. Small is Dangerous (Micro‐states in a Macro World) A Report from the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Affairs. Edited by Sheila Harden. London: Frances Pinter, 1985. 212 pp. £17.50 The Fallacy of Star Wars: Why Space Weapons Can't Protect Us Edited by John Tirman. New York: Vintage Books, 1984. 293 pp. $US 4.95 (pbk). A Defense That Defends: Blocking Nuclear Attack By Gregory Fossedal and Daniel O. Graham. Old Greenwich, CT: Devin‐Adair, 1984. 158 pp. $US 17.50. From H‐Bomb to Star Wars: The Politics of Strategic Decisionmaking By Jonathan B. Stein. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath & Co., 1984. 118 pp. $US 20.00. Relationship Between Yugoslavia and Albania Edited by Dr. Ranko Petkovic. Belgrade: Review of International Affairs, 1984. 304 pp. YD 600, $US 2.20. A Strategy for Terminating a Nuclear War By Clark C. Abt. London: Westview Press, 1985. 253 pp. £23.75. The Senate and US Troops in Europe By Phil Williams. London: Macmillan Publishers, 1985. 315 pp. £30. Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea By Ken Booth. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985. 231 pp. £7.95. Soviet International Behavior and US Policy Options Edited by Dan Caldwell. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Co. (UK distributors: Gower Publishing Co.), 1985. 292 pp. £36. The Future of British Defence Policy Edited by John Roper. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Co., for NIESR, PSI, RIIA (Joint Studies in Public Policy No. 11), 1985. 205 pp. including index. £18.50. Paying for Defence: Military Spending and British Decline Malcolm Chalmers. London: Pluto Press, 1985. 200 pp. including index. £3.95 (pbk).

British Defense Policy Under Thatcher

British Defense Policy Under Thatcher

Sīstān in British Indian frontier policy

Sīstān (Sijistān or Sāgistān) came within the scope of British Indian frontier defence during the Napoleonic era. Lord Minto sent out missions to the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, Afghanistan and Persia in order to acquire reliable information about the borderlands. Captain Charles Christie and Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger in 1810 explored the route westward into Persia from Baluchistan. Christie separated from the others at Nushki and travelled to Herat via Sīstān before joining Pottinger in Iṣfahān. According to Christie: Seistan is a very small province on the banks of the Helmind, comprising not more than five hundred square miles, bounded on the north and northeast by Khorasan, on the west by Persia, and on the south and south-east it is separated from Mukran by an uninhabited desert.

The future of British defence policy

Journal Article The future of British defence policy Get access The future of British defence policy. Edited by John Roper. Aldershot, Hants: Gower for National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Policy Studies Institute, and Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1985. 205pp. Index. £18.50. ISBN 0 566 00922 6. David Bolton David Bolton 1Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 62, Issue 2, spring 1986, Page 279, https://doi.org/10.2307/2618366 Published: 01 April 1986

‘Greenwoodery’ and British defence policy*

Any reader of books or articles on British defence policy in the period since 1945 is likely to be struck by the consensus which seems to exist about the general trend and direction of that policy. Titles like The long retreat, The long recessional and The collapse of British power reveal a commonly held view that the United Kingdom's postwar security policy has been characterized by a continuous process of contraction and decline. 1 The reader is left with the strong impression that British defence policy in the postwar world is a depressing story of withdrawal from Empire, concentration first on Europe, then within it, declining financial and manpower resources, and reductions in equipment. There also s'eems to be agreement on a further point: that this decline in the United Kingdom's military power has been forced upon successive governments by the continuous deterioration of the economy over the same period. The economy, however, is not the only villain of the piece: Labour governments, with a predilection for well-advertised defence reviews and cuts in defence expenditure, are also frequently thought to share much of the responsibility for this sorry state of affairs. Whether this is a true and fair reflection of the evolution of British defence policy is a question which has until recently received little attention. Although British spending on defence has increased in the 1980s, the conventional picture of 'an ideology of failure' continues to be widely reflected in current defence literature, and appears to be accepted equally widely by most commentators and laymen.2 Since 1974, however, one particular commentator has attempted a reassessment which challenges the conventional wisdom on nearly every point. David Greenwood, director of the Centre for Defence Studies at the University of Aberdeen, and a leading defence economist, has written a series of articles criticizing many of the assumptions of writers such as W. P. Snyder, R. Rosecrance, C. J. Bartlett and L. W. Martin, whose work has dominated the study of postwar British defence policy.3

British defence R and D

In his thoughts on British defence R and D in the August issue of Physics Bulletin (p308), Dr Parkinson has referred to the 'salient points' in the early development of radar. These seem to call for some comment.

Ian Beckett and John Gooch, editors. Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy, 1845-1970. Dover, N.H.: Manchester University Press. 1983. Pp. xxii, 202. $20.00.

Ian Beckett and John Gooch, editors. Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy, 1845-1970. Dover, N.H.: Manchester University Press. 1983. Pp. xxii, 202. $20.00. - Volume 17 Issue 2

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND DEFENSE POLICY

Books reviewed in this articles:Ian F. W. Beckett and John Gooch (eds.), Politicians and Defense; Studies in the Formulation of British Defense PolicyGavin Kennedy, Defense Economies

The economic consequences of reduced UK military expenditure

The last few years have seen a variety of proposals for UK disarmament, for a re orientation of defence policy towards a less expensive, non-nuclear stance, more commen surate with Britain's present economic position in the world. Unfortunately, these proposals become suddenly coy and tentative as they approach the economic implications of their programme, in complete contrast to the detailed quantitative calculations they pro vide for other aspects. The Alternative Defence Commission (1983) and Prins (1983) are typical examples of this. The difficulties this lacuna creates are illustrated by the ordeal the Labour Party faced in the 1983 election campaign. They advocated, it appears, a reduc tion of British defence expenditure, which now accounts for just over 5% of GDP, to about the European average of around 3 • 5%. But they proved unable to counter the claim of the Conservative Defence Secretary, Mr Heseltine, that this policy would cost 400,000 jobs.1 The hesitancy with which proponents of reductions in military expenditure approach the economic consequences is surprising given the near unanimity in the technical litera ture. Two major studies in the UK (EIU, 1963 and Brown, 1964), studies in the US, Leontief (1965), and a recent survey (Kennedy, 1983), all indicate that disarmament represents an economic opportunity rather than an economic problem. Nonetheless, the tenor of the recent policy literature suggests that it would be useful to provide a detailed assessment of the economic consequences of a reduction in UK military expenditure from 5% to 3 ■ 5% of GDP. Since the results obtained below are broadly in line with those of the studies cited above, the contribution of this paper does not lie in the novelty of its conclusion. Rather, it provides a detailed quantitative review of the economic issues cur rently involved in a transition to lower levels of military expenditure. Since there is a wide literature already available which provides arguments to suggest that such a transition could provide real security benefits, the strategic aspects will only be mentioned in passing (D. Smith, 1980 and Alternative Defence Commission, 1983 provide detail on this).

Some thoughts on trends in British defence R and D

It is often stated that the conduct of defence research and development in the UK is inefficient and occupies too large a proportion of our scientific manpower to the detriment of our civil industries. This view was well exemplified by the recent programme on BBC2, entitled 'The Malvern link'.