The Decline of Britain as a Military Power

Abstract

JLt was a British prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli, who argued that political life was dictated not by logic but by experience. The conventional extension of this axiom in British political life is better known as dedicated procrastination or muddling through. When in doubt, sit still. Precipitous action can only lead to confusion, while stern choices and daring decisions can always be put off for another day. The axiom has been faithfully observed by political factions since Parliament won acclaim as the great talking shop of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it is often alleged that the British empire was built in a fit of loquacious inadvertence and not by conscious design. Its dismembering was not the result of careful planning, for that matter, and neither was the gradual winding down of Britain's economic or military strength since 1945. The actual seepage or dilution of power was never abrupt or convulsive. Unlike the turmoil suffered by France or West Germany, Britain encountered no terrible defeats on colonial battlefields and little political upheaval at home. British defense capabilities were never abruptly scaled down, and no sudden step was made to give up the status of a great power. On the contrary, during twenty-five years of Conservative and seventeen years of Labour governments, military strength was gently run down. Governments slowly and grudgingly changed spending patterns as financial resources were depleted and as Britain's economy fell into decline. Basically, Britain's leaders relied on the special relationship with the United States in order to obtain preferential treatment,