Book Justice Research Articles

Owning Up: Dworkin on Responsibility

The concept of responsibility is frequently discussed in Ronald Dworkin's important book Justice for Hedgehogs.11 Hereinafter JfH. In an evaluative system with the holistic character of Dworkin's, ...

Borderline Personality Disorder: An Evidence-Based Guide for Generalist Mental Health Professionals - Anthony W. Bateman & Roy Krawitz, Oxford University Press, 2013, £24.99, pb, 240 pp. ISBN: 9780199644209

Borderline Personality Disorder: An Evidence-Based Guide for Generalist Mental Health Professionals Anthony W. Bateman, & Roy Krawitz Oxford University Press, 2013, £24.99, pb, 240 pp. ISBN: 9780199644209 A 350-word review is not enough to do this book justice. Written by two psychiatrists, one

Public Reason and Child Rearing: What's a Liberal Parent to Do?

The ways in we raise and educate children can appear to be at odds with basic liberal values. Relationships between parents and children are unequal, parents routinely control children's behaviour in various ways, and they use their authority to shape children's beliefs and values. Whether and how such practices can be made to accord with liberal values presents a significant puzzle. In what follows I will look at a recent and sophisticated attempt to resolve these tensions offered by Matthew Clayton in his book Justice m Child Rearing in the context of general account of the proper limits of parental authority. I argue that Clayton is unsuccessful in ways that point to fundamental and pervasive questions about the place of liberal values in child rearing and education that remain unanswered.

Comic book crime: truth, justice, and the American way

Acknowledgments1 Holy Criminology, Batman! Comics and Constructions of and Justice 2 Crime Doesn't PayA Brief History of and Justice Themes in Comic Books 3 The World Is ShiftingTerrorism, Xenophobia, and Comic Books after 9/11 4 A Better TomorrowApocalypse, Utopia, and the Problem 5 That's the Trouble with a Bad SeedVillains and the Embodiment of Evil 6 Aren't We Supposed to Be the Good Guys?Heroes, Deathworthiness, and Paths to Justice 7 Take Down the Bad Guys, Save the GirlGender, Sexual Orientation, and Comic Book Justice 8 Aren't There Any Brown People in This World?Race, Ethinicity, and Fighting 9 Apocalyptic IncapacitationThe Maximum-Maximum Response to 10 ConclusionUltimate Justice Appendix: Sample and methodology Notes Bibliography Index About the Authors

Ronaldo Dworkino filosofinės revoliucijos nesėkmė

Straipsnio tikslas – įrodyti Dworkino knygoje „Teisingumas ežiukams“ bandytos įgyvendinti filosofinės revoliucijos nesėkmę. Ši revoliucija nepasisekė dėl dviejų priežasčių. Pirma, Dworkino mokslo poveikio etikos teorijai kritika yra suaugusi su pirmenybės mokslui teikimu. Kritikuodamas etikos pajungimą mokslinio mąstymo epistemologijai, šis autorius nori ją sieti su moksline pasaulėžiūra. Antra, Dworkinas pernelyg susiaurina metaetikos kritiką, apsiribodamas polemika su mokslo epistemologijos jai primestu „išoriniu skepticizmu“. Metaetika yra daug didesnė filosofinė klaida, negu atrodo Dworkinui. Mokslas veikia ne tik teorijos, bet ir „įprasto požiūrio“ lygmeniu.

The World According to Boaz: Wealth, Power, and Justice in the Book of Ruth

Článek přináší literárně-teologickou studii postavy Bóaze v knize Rút. Analyzuje narativní charakteristiku Bóaze jako "muže úspěšného a vlivného" a sleduje funkci, jakou Bóazovo postavení hraje při rozvíjení ekonomických, sociálních a teologických motivů v knize Rút. V závěru příspěvku věnuje autor pozornost napětí mezi tradiční interpretací postavy Bóaze jako jednoznačně kladné postavy a mezi novějšími přístupy, které tento tradiční obraz zhusta dekonstruují.

Working on the inside: Ronald Dworkin's moral philosophy

In my 2009 book Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine, I argued that morality is objective in several distinct though overlapping senses, and I further maintained that questions about the objectivity of morality are substantive moral questions (albeit usually at high levels of abstraction). In the course of that book, I made several laudatory references to Ronald Dworkin’ s well-known 1996 article ‘ Objectivity and Truth’ as well as to some of his other writings. In regard to the two main themes of my book that have just been mentioned, I took myself to be firmly allied with Dworkin. Though Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine adverts only occasionally to his work, it makes clear my esteem for his reconception of meta-ethics as a branch of ethics. At a few other junctures in my 2009 volume, however, I criticized Dworkin. My criticisms were focused not on his legal philosophy ─ with which I have sustainedly taken issue elsewhere ─ but instead on some of his ethical positions. One such position to which I took exception is his value-monism. That is, I took exception to his opting for the hedgehog side of the ancient hedgehog/fox dichotomy that was made famous in modern times by Isaiah Berlin. Dworkin’ s allegiance to the former side of that dichotomy is starkly proclaimed by the title of his sprawlingly ambitious recent book Justice for Hedgehogs. In what follows, I will leave aside many sections of that impressive tome in order to concentrate on the main portion that deals with meta-ethics and on one portion that deals with the putative unity of value. Given that I am almost entirely in agreement with the former portion and largely in disagreement with the latter, this brief review will naturally impugn Dworkin’ s assumption that his anti-Archimedeanism and his value-monism are integrally connected

Clarissa RileHayward and ToddSwanstrom (eds.) 2011: Justice and the American Metropolis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

A review of the book Justice & the American Metropolis, edited by Clarissa Rile Hayward and Todd Swanstrom is presented.

Jennifer Summit, Memory’s Library: Medieval Books in Early Modern EnglandMemory’s Library: Medieval Books in Early Modern England. Jennifer Summit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. Pp. x+343.

<i>Jennifer Summit</i>, Memory’s Library: Medieval Books in Early Modern England<i>Memory’s Library: Medieval Books in Early Modern England</i>. Jennifer Summit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. Pp. x+343.

The Role of Political Argument in Justice as Impartiality

Brian Barry's justice as impartiality relies upon Thomas Scanlon's contractual device of ‘reasonable rejection’. Many have criticised both Barry and Scanlon for not defining precisely what reasonable is, further suggesting that what is reasonable or rational is culturally specific and cannot underlie a universal account of justice, such as justice as impartiality. In this article I try to uncover the role of rationality, reasons and reasonable agreement in Barry's book Justice as Impartiality, in part by looking back at his first book, Political Argument. I specify in what sense the theory provides a universal account of justice and in what sense it is compatible with weak relativism. I argue that it is a liberal theory in two, very different, senses: first, because of its universalist structure, even though that structure at certain times and places is compatible with what we would now consider as illiberal social justice; second, because it now entails what we see as liberal principles of justice.

Working on the Inside: Ronald Dworkin’s Moral Philosophy

In my 2009 book Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine, I argued that morality is objective in several distinct though overlapping senses, and I further maintained that questions about the objectivity of morality are substantive moral questions (albeit usually at high levels of abstraction). In the course of that book, I made several laudatory references to Ronald Dworkin’s well-known 1996 article ‘Objectivity and Truth’ as well as to some of his other writings. In regard to the two main themes of my book that have just been mentioned, I took myself to be firmly allied with Dworkin. Though Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine adverts only occasionally to his work, it makes clear my esteem for his reconception of meta-ethics as a branch of ethics.At a few other junctures in my 2009 volume, however, I criticized Dworkin. My criticisms were focused not on his legal philosophy ─ with which I have sustainedly taken issue elsewhere ─ but instead on some of his ethical positions. One such position to which I took exception is his value-monism. That is, I took exception to his opting for the hedgehog side of the ancient hedgehog/fox dichotomy that was made famous in modern times by Isaiah Berlin. Dworkin’s allegiance to the former side of that dichotomy is starkly proclaimed by the title of his sprawlingly ambitious recent book Justice for Hedgehogs. In what follows, I will leave aside many sections of that impressive tome in order to concentrate on the main portion that deals with meta-ethics and on one portion that deals with the putative unity of value. Given that I am almost entirely in agreement with the former portion and largely in disagreement with the latter, this brief review will naturally impugn Dworkin’s assumption that his anti-Archimedeanism and his value-monism are integrally connected.

Justice at Guantánamo: Absent Presentee

Justice at Guantánamo:Absent Presentee Claris Harbon (bio) Kristine A. Huskey , Justice at Guantánamo: One Woman's Odyssey and Her Crusade for Human Rights (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2009), ISBN 9781599214689, 285 pages. I. Prologue When you hurt people, they begin to love you less. That's what careless words do. They make people love you a little less. ~ Arundhati Roy1 In her book Justice at Guantánamo: One Woman's Odyssey and Her Crusade for Human Rights,2 Kristine Huskey3 describes her journey as a lawyer in general, and as a human rights advocate in particular. The book, written like a journey-memoir, takes the reader into Kristine Huskey's major personal-professional constitutive life events. Like a traveler, she stops at certain places and memories, reflecting on their importance and role in shaping and reshaping her life. These events, from life in Angola, to living in New York City and working as a waitress and model, to traveling the world, to going to law school, and to working as an associate in a private law firm, finally led her to become one of the first lawyers who dared to take a controversial and leading role in defending detainees at Guantánamo, even "when it was too controversial to represent a detainee."4 Kristine Huskey and a team of lawyers in the private law firm where she worked challenged the validity of their clients' detentions. They argued that detaining their clients as enemy combatants violated both their procedural rights, such as the constitutional right to due process and access to counseling, and substantive rights, "including guarantees against torture."5 Eventually, after "two and half years of continuous litigation,"6 confronting a strong wall of judicial refusal to recognize [End Page 627] the detainees' rights to due process, let alone fundamental human rights, the case culminated in the landmark US Supreme Court decision Rasul v. Bush.7 Reversing the decisions of lower courts, the Supreme Court held that federal courts had "the jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions of prisoners at Guantánamo"8 and that anyone held "in the custody of the United States . . . can challenge [their] detention-regardless of where [they] are being held or who [they] are."9 The book is divided into two main parts, each comprised of several chapters. Part I, entitled "Life Then," focuses on a few major events that have had important constitutive effects on Kristine Huskey. These events led her to become a lawyer who later found herself involved in defending detainees in Guantánamo. Part II, entitled "Life Now," elaborates on the processes leading her to take the first few detainees' cases. It tells the "inside story" of representation itself, eventually leading her to embark on a new journey, going from the corporate world, to the clinical legal program at the University of Texas. [End Page 628] In this regard, the book allows the reader an important glimpse into the world of a key actor in one of the most controversial, tragic dramas of our time. Operating like the mechanical system that pulls the theatre curtain up and down, masking the backstage from spectators, the book gives the audience the opportunity to observe what has happened backstage, the story-within-a-story, before the rise of the curtain, during, and after the show. The book is easily read. One of the strongest themes of the book is its inclusive nature. Kristine Huskey does not fall into the trap of using complex legalistic language, excluding non-professional readers. Instead, she manages to simplify complex legal terms (e.g. habeas corpus and due process), enabling the reader to understand themes, concepts, and principles that are traditionally and exclusively monopolized by lawyers and academics. Using language that can be understood by readers other than academics and professionals, ones who have had the privilege to acquire education and possess the power to access certain words and language, breaks the hegemonic control and monopoly they have over knowledge. This is of special importance for me, as a feminist lawyer and scholar coming from an underprivileged community, who has dedicated her life to working with the poor, the excluded, and the silenced...

Justice in Love. By Nicholas Wolterstorff

Justice in Love was originally conceived as a chapter in Wolterstorff's much-discussed 2008 book Justice: Rights and Wrongs and grew into a companion volume. The theme of the book is the relationship between the idea of justice, as re-formulated by Wolterstorff in terms of rights grounded in human worth, and the Christian concept of agape-love. As in Justice: Rights and Wrongs, Wolterstorff explores his theme by means of both philosophical and theological argument and through biblical exegesis. The book is divided into four parts: in the first, headed ‘Benevolence-Agapism’, Wolterstorff discusses what he calls ‘modern day agapism’ as expressed by Anders Nygren, Soren Kierkegaard and Reinhold Niebuhr. In the second part, Wolterstorff develops his own alternative understanding of agape-love as care. Part Three is headed ‘Just and Unjust Love’ but three of its five chapters are concerned with the question of forgiveness. The final part is entitled...

Deconstructing Biphobia

The authors deconstructs and analyzes ‘biphobia,’ understood as the structural oppression bisexual persons experience. The author's account is based on the belief that a traditional emphasis on ‘discrimination,’ rather than ‘oppression,’ when referring to nonheterosexual sexual orientations, has failed to shine light on some core problems related to the asymmetric relations between privileged and non-privileged groups. To introduce the concept of oppression the author takes as a point of departure the five faces of oppression described by Iris Marion Young in her book Justice and the Politics of Difference. To these faces the author adds three more faces he found meaningful in relation to the points presented in this text. To illustrate the theories presented, the author takes as a point of departure his experiences as activist in lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) networks. This text is to be understood within the tradition of critical theory and postmodernism. Because it has a postpositivist ontology and epistemology, it takes distance from essentialized assumptions about sexualities, sexual orientations, sexes, genders and gender identities.

Response to My Commentators

This article is a response to the commentaries on my book Justice: Rights and Wrongs in the previous contributions in this issue of Studies in Christian Ethics (23.2) .

The “Scriene” and the Channel: England and Spain in Book V of The Faerie Queene

This essay analyzes the figures of language and of landscape that allow Edmund Spenser to consider in an international context the virtue at the center of Book V of The Faerie Queene, justice. How, he asks, is justice projected from one society into another in an act of empire? Spenser's thinking on this issue is conditioned by his participation in a way of figuring empire through the palus, or the wooden stake that marks the boundary of civil society in a colonial setting, often under English rule. The alternative way of figuring imperial power on the landscape during this period is the via, that is, the way or channel that penetrates indigenous territory. Spenser also explores teleiopoesis, or the making of imaginative effects at a distance, an imaginative force that complements and drives across the figures of the palus and via. The essay argues that justice in Book V must be understood through these figures and in the international context that Spenser evokes in his exploration of justice. Such an approach does not cancel out but augments many of the traditional readings of this virtue in The Faerie Queene.

Remembering and Imagining the Holocaust: The Chain of Memory (review)

Reviewed by: Remembering and Imagining the Holocaust: The Chain of Memory David Jortner Remembering and Imagining the Holocaust: The Chain of Memory. By Christopher Bigsby. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006; pp. vii + 407. $38.00 cloth. In the first chapter of his book Remembering and Imagining the Holocaust, Christopher Bigsby lays out his thesis: "This book . . . is a meditation on memory, on the ways in which memory has operated in the work of writers for whom the Holocaust was a defining event. But it is also an exploration of the ways in which fiction and drama have attempted to approach a subject so resistant to the imagination" (4). While this gives the reader a good sense of the structure of the book, Bigsby's statement also underscores the difficulty in reviewing this text for Theatre Journal. As a work of scholarship on Holocaust, memory, and narrative, his work is exemplary; he profiles nine of the most prominent Holocaust writers, all linked through their use or exploration of memory, and examines the biographical and sociocultural connections in their work. From the point of view of theatre scholarship, however, the book is somewhat disappointing. While Bigsby includes several playwrights among his subjects (including Rolf Hochhuth, Peter Weiss, Arthur Miller, and Frances Goodrich and Albert Hackett, who dramatized Anne Frank), he fails to develop fully the idea of theatre as a repository for memory and the challenges this presents. In order to do this book justice, therefore, I feel compelled to write this review in two parts, first from the standpoint of a scholar interested in memory theory and Holocaust studies, and second as a theatre historian. Remembering and Imagining the Holocaust is an excellent work of scholarship in the field of Holocaust literature. Bigsby begins with a discussion about the simultaneous importance and unreliability of memory as a form of witness; this is a theme he will return to in examining respective authors' works throughout the book. He then includes chapters and analyses of major Holocaust writers who explore ideas of memory/testimony in their work; these include W. G. Sebald, Rolf Hochhuth, Peter Weiss, Arthur Miller, Anne Frank, Jean Améry, Primo Levi, Elie Wiesel, and Tadeusz Borowski. He follows these sections with a fascinating chapter titled "Memory Theft," which examines the writings of several well-known Holocaust impersonators—authors who falsely claimed to have survived the Holocaust—and illustrates how their works were originally embraced. One of the strengths of the book is the number and variety of authors Bigsby chooses to study. He analyzes the use of memoir, documentary, and memory in works as diverse as Weiss's The Investigation, and Wiesel's Night, and the mnemonic stylization in the novels of Sebald. In addition, Bigsby's subjects span a range of nationalities and Holocaust voices, including those who had been interned in the camps, both Jews and non-Jews, as well as postwar German and American writers (again, some Jewish, some not) who felt compelled to address the issue. Bigsby's new-historicist approach accentuates the differing voices of each writer; it is fascinating to see how, for example, in the work of Sebald, a German gentile whose father served in the army under the Nazis, the desire for "restitution" surfaces in the actions and memories of fictional (yet autobiographical) characters. Bigsby also does the reader a tremendous service by demonstrating how these authors' texts and memories interact with one another. Undoubtedly, some of the controversies and dialogues will be well-known to Holocaust scholars and historians (such as Cynthia Ozick on the "ownership" of Anne Frank). However, presenting Sebald's comments on Weiss (much of the book uses Sebald's scholarship as a launching point) as well as the dialogue among the works of authors such as Levi, Améry, and Wiesel allows Bigsby to address the difficult nature of memory and history. As a scholar of Holocaust literature, I find Bigsby's book an invaluable resource. However, as a work of theatre scholarship, Remembering and Imagining the Holocaust has a narrow appeal. As mentioned above, Bigsby does spend a significant amount of time on playwrights. The sections on Hochhuth and Weiss deal with the one...

&lt;i&gt;Our Fire Survives the Storm: A Cherokee Literary History&lt;/i&gt;, and: &lt;i&gt;The Truth about Stories: A Native Narrative&lt;/i&gt; (review)

Reviewed by: Our Fire Survives the Storm: A Cherokee Literary History, and: The Truth about Stories: A Native Narrative Drew Lopenzina Daniel Heath Justice. Our Fire Survives the Storm: A Cherokee Literary History. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006. 296 pp. Paper, $20.00. Thomas King. The Truth about Stories: A Native Narrative. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. 184 pp. Cloth, $24.95. Our Fire Survives the Storm is Daniel Heath Justice’s contribution to an emerging edifice of Native literary criticism that builds upon the ground most recently cleared by Robert Warrior, Jace Weaver, and Craig Womack—that triumvirate of contemporary Indigenous scholarship whose works call for Indigenous writers to forge a productive critical engagement with their own intellectual traditions. Borrowing most strongly from Womack’s aesthetic of identifying and paying homage to a tribally centered literature, Justice presents a “Cherokee literary history” that, as the subtitle suggests, grounds itself exclusively in the perspectives, culture, and textual productions of the Cherokee. While one might argue that there is no shortage of works that focus on Cherokee history or literature, few prior to Justice have considered “Cherokee literature” as a discrete entity worthy of its own study. This alone makes it a worthwhile project. In this book Justice covers a period from the pretextualized era of Cherokee narrative to the more contemporary works of authors such as Thomas King, Robert J. Conley, and Diane Glancy. It is not, however, a preliterate-postliterate binary that is important here. Like Womack in his book Red on Red, Justice is not so much concerned with the ruptures of forced assimilation as with the continuance of Cherokee tradition and community that delineates itself in the overall literature. He begins by establishing a critical paradigm rooted in Cherokee epistemologies and that is perhaps best represented in the histories of Nanye’hi and Tsiyu Gansini, who embody, respectively, what Justice identifies as “the Beloved Path” and “Chickamauga consciousness.” [End Page 356] Both figures were active leaders in their communities, and both resisted the forces of violent colonial appropriation that were tightening around them in the mid-eighteenth century. But while the one-time woman warrior Nanye’hi ultimately opted for peaceful resistance, or the Beloved Path, Tsiyu Gansini’s Chickamauga consciousness led to armed confrontation. Both, in their own manner, are seen as helping to clear a path for the slender generation of relative peace that ensued, Tsiyu Gansini by forcing the colonists into making treaties and Nanye’hi by seeking peace and cultivating life-sustaining strategies. According to Justice, the two are “champion[s] for Cherokee survival” and represent the necessary balance that lies at the heart of traditional Cherokee belief systems. Far from creating a binary opposition, Justice finds the forces represented by these two figures as working, if not in cooperation, then in tandem with one another, creating a “necessary tension” that is vital to the preservation of Cherokee community and identity. He suggests that this paradigm can serve as a “guidepost” for comprehending other significant stops in the literary history of the Cherokee. Disentangling oneself from colonial paradigms and locating an Indigenous literary history from within a tribal matrix can be a difficult enough project, even for someone firmly rooted within that matrix. Justice does a particularly good job of revisiting the scene of the Cherokee removal and freeing it from the relentless narrative tropes by which this history has so often been related. He notes that removals have been an historical reality for many peoples, and the Cherokee, like most Indigenous nations, have their own “migration stories” that speak of earlier such upheavals. This is not in any way to minimize the trauma and inherent violence of the widespread ethnic cleansing campaign that took place in the American Southeast during the mid-nineteenth century but to remember that this is neither the defining historical moment for the Cherokee nor the beginning or end of political upheavals, the uprootings of Cherokee lives, in our transient modern world. By working within the Beloved Path–Chickamauga consciousness paradigm, Justice attempts to reconsider the difficult dynamic between the opposing parties of the nation during the time of removal, noting how John Ross as well...

The Bones of the Others: The Hemingway Text from the Lost Manuscripts to the Posthumous Novels (review)

Reviewed by: The Bones of the Others: The Hemingway Text from the Lost Manuscripts to the Posthumous Novels Linda Patterson Miller The Bones of the Others: The Hemingway Text from the Lost Manuscripts to the Posthumous Novels. By Hilary K. Justice.Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006. 162 pp. Cloth $39.00. Most scholars recognize Hemingway as a writer who wrote what he knew, which means he wrote what he lived—sometimes even as he was living it. Many scholars also recognize how readers too often misread Hemingway's texts, drawing direct parallels between Hemingway's personal life and the narrative life so as to perpetuate biographical fallacies that ignore artistic nuance. Hemingway himself, as Hilary K. Justice argues in The Bones of the Others: The [End Page 140] Hemingway Text from the Lost Manuscripts to the Posthumous Novels, came to understand that fame defined his reading public's expectations for his work, a recognition that then inhibited his ability to write truly, or truthfully. This idea that "fame became of him" is not a new insight. What is stunningly new about Justice's book is her recognition that Hemingway's conflict between his private and public selves (what she calls the "Writer" who writes Personal books versus the "Author" who writes what people see as Authentic books) determined the overarching stylistic and thematic configurations of his life's work (which she defines in the aggregate as the "Hemingway Text"). As Hemingway's fame escalated following the publication in 1926 of The Sun Also Rises (which thrust him into the public arena as an Author), he began to devise artistic innovations that would allow him to mine the mother-lode of personal material that had inspired his stories written between 1923 and 1927. He would side-step personal exposure as a writer to the degree that he discovered ways to embed and perhaps to deflect the personal material within the text. These acts of transformation, as Justice describes it, began to transcend individual texts by cross-referencing multiple texts, thus creating the larger meta-text that Hemingway himself could not have anticipated as a young writer. He "could not yet have the perspective on his own creative process to articulate what in retrospect would become obvious: that in his Personal writing, he would always represent his emotional response to his current situation by refracting it through his past, finding emotional points of contiguity between his present and his past, and using this doubled emotional intensity to make his readers 'feel more than they understand,' the purpose of Hemingway's 'theory of omission'" (4–5). In the first chapters of her book Justice illustrates how Hemingway used this refractive process in his early stories, best seen as paired entities (the Nick Adams stories as aligned with the marriage tales, for example). Justice convincingly argues that Hemingway often worked almost simultaneously on two different stories, perhaps with one in the early generative stages as he worked to complete the other. This alignment allowed Hemingway to transform one narrative's conflict into the other narrative's resolution, thus deflecting the real personal issues in the material at hand. As Justice recognizes, Hemingway's difficulty in completing books during his later, post-World War ii period resulted from his juggling several works simultaneously, to the degree that "the experiences that informed [his] early works, as well as his experiences since writing them" complicated [End Page 141] his collective artistic consciousness even as it led to an increasingly intricate and more opaque style as a high modernist. As Hemingway summed it up for Harvey Breit in 1950, "'In writing I have moved through arithmetic, through plane geometry and algebra, and now I am in calculus. If they don't understand that, to hell with them'" (57). He would also declare in The Garden of Eden manuscript the importance of knowing "'how complicated it is'" so as to "'then state it simply'" (55). Hilary Justice's book cannot be easily "dissected" primarily because its thesis underscores the interdependent stylistic and thematic relationships of all of Hemingway's writing. To the degree, then, that the reader must regard Hemingway's work collectively and also non-sequentially...

Chimneys in the Desert: Industrialization in Argentina During the Export Boom Years, 1870-1930. By Fernando Rocchi. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006, Pp. xviii, 394. Tables. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $70.00 cloth.

Reviewed by: Chimneys in the Desert: Industrialization in Argentina During the Export Boom Years, 1870-1930 James Brennan Chimneys in the Desert: Industrialization in Argentina During the Export Boom Years, 1870-1930. By Fernando Rocchi. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006, Pp. xviii, 394. Tables. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $70.00 cloth. Fernando Rocchi's Chimneys in the Desert, forcefully disputes what he calls the "canonical version" of Argentina's modern economic history, namely of a stunted industrial development due to a hostile state or the influence of agro-export interests. In this boldly revisionist book, Rocchi builds on Adolfo Dorfman's classic study of Argentina's industrialization (Historia de la industria argentina [1942]) and depicts an even greater role for industry in the economy during the export boom than that suggested by Dorfman. Rocchi's superbly researched study demonstrates quite convincingly a relatively diversified industrialization, a "middling industrialization" in his words. Economies of scale were achieved in some industries, credit was not a particular problem, the state was not a consistent adversary and indeed sometimes was a generous benefactor, nor was the landowning class uniformly opposed to a complementary industrialization project. Any structural weakness that Argentine industry demonstrated, Rocchi suggests, had more to do with the small size of the domestic market than with exogenous forces. As part of what at times reads like an almost idyllic recasting of the story of Argentine industry, Rocchi writes—in what are his best chapters—about the growth of consumer society and the market for industrial goods. Though the history of consumption is a well-established field in both European and United States historiography, it is a relatively neglected subject for Latin America, including Argentina. In these chapters, Rocchi writes compellingly about the role of advertising, the rise of new merchandising techniques (such as department stores) and the creation of a new set of consumer dreams, all contributing to give Argentina the most diversified and industrial economy in Latin America in these years. [End Page 468] Rocchi's thesis is so provocative and his empirical findings so rich that a brief review cannot do the book justice. His study will be a source of debate among economic historians for years to come. Though he presents his findings at times with a tone of irrefutability, they are more likely to stimulate heated discussion, some to be questioned and perhaps a few disproved outright. Certainly the book ends on a most debatable proposition, that of a seamless transition from the liberal order to the Perón era. Rocchi argues that industrialization policies were essentially the same, different only in "degree." If by "degree" he means under Perón a state monopolizing foreign trade to promote industry, a nationalized banking system and new public banks intended to subsidize industry, social policies that increased enormously the size of the domestic market and greatly contributed to industrial growth, and even attempts at national economic planning through the two "Five Year Plans," one can agree with his characterization. Although it would be more accurate to acknowledge some significant, deep changes in industrial policy. This point also raises a methodological issue. At times, it is not entirely clear how representative are the firms from which Rocchi has chosen to make sweeping arguments and to dismiss earlier interpretations. For example, his rejection of the proposition of any discrimination in the capital markets or the scarcity of capital for industrialists seems a bit selective in its evidence. Certainly during the Perón years, industrialists complained insistently about both, and here again a too facile continuum from the liberal era to the Peronist years mars the final pages of the book. Self-financing from profits may have been a satisfactory strategy for the limited capital demands of this "middling industrialization" that he so ably analyzes, but it did not appear sufficient for a later generation of industrialists. Similarly, the Union Industrial Argentina (UIA), portrayed by Rocchi as a relatively effective spokesperson for industrial interests in the years of his study, was reviled by many industrialists during the Perón years precisely for inconsistent and often hapless ways. So rather than the final word, Rocchi's exemplary study plays the invaluable role...