We examine legislative activity targeting the Federal Reserve to determine when Congress takes an interest in the Fed and whether this interest has an effect on monetary policy. Using a keyword search of the THOMAS catalogue for the period from January 1973 through December 2010, we identify 1575 bills in the House and 728 bills in the Senate pertaining to the Federal Reserve. We classify these bills into several categories including those that expand Fed powers and those that threaten or usurp Fed powers. Using the Romer and Romer (2004) series of monetary policy shocks, we find that, prior to the early 1980s, the Fed responded to bills credibly threatening Fed powers by lowering the federal funds target below that prescribed by current and forecast economic conditions. However, this accommodation ceased following the end of the non-borrowed reserves targeting period in October 1982. Analyzing the determinants of bill sponsorship, we find that high unemployment, high inflation, and high long-term real borrowing costs— failures of the Fed along the three dimensions of its mandate—all lead to a greater number of bills seeking to alter the Fed’s powers. Importantly, we also find that the relative importance of these three dimensions has changed over time. Under Chairmen Burns and Miller, Congress took greater interest when unemployment was high. Under Chairman Greenspan, Congress took greater interest when inflation was high. We believe that these findings are consistent with the view that the lessons of the Great Inflation changed the public perception of the Fed’s macroeconomic responsibilities, which in turn better aligned Congressional views on policy with those of the Fed, and allowed the Fed to better resist remaining Congressional pressure to its independence.