Abstract
We examine legislative activity to determine when Congress threatens the Fed and whether this pressure affects monetary policy. By the late‐1980s Congress shifted from threatening when unemployment was high to threatening when inflation was high. We use the Romer and Romer monetary shocks to isolate changes in the federal funds rate that cannot be explained by economic conditions and ask whether these shocks respond to pressure. In the 1970s, the Fed responded to bills credibly threatening Fed powers by lowering the federal funds target below that prescribed by current and forecast economic conditions. However, this accommodation ceased in the mid‐1980s.
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