BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol Research Articles

Exploring the Feasibility of Quantum-Based Secure Communications for Nuclear Applications

Recent advancements in reactor designs could offer new revolutionary capabilities, including remote monitoring, increased flexibility, and reduced operation and maintenance costs. Embracing new digital technologies would allow for operational concepts such as semiautonomous or near-autonomous control, and two-way communications for real-time integration with the upcoming smart electric grid. However, such continuous data transmission from and toward a reactor site could potentially introduce new challenges and vulnerabilities, necessitating the prioritization of cybersecurity. Conventional information technology–based encryption schemes, which rely mostly on computational complexity, have been shown to be vulnerable to cyberattacks. With the advent of quantum computing, practically any asymmetric encryption could be potentially compromised. For example, it has been shown that a RSA-2048 bit key could be broken in 8 h. To address this challenge, we explore the feasibility of quantum key distribution (QKD) to secure communications. QKD is a physical layer security scheme relying on the laws of quantum mechanics instead of mathematical complexity. QKD promises not only unconditional security but also detection of potential intrusion, as it allows the communication parties to become aware of eavesdropping. To test the proposed hypothesis, a novel simulation tool (NuQKD) was developed to allow for real-time simulation of the BB84 QKD protocol between two remote terminals. A reference scenario is proposed, generic enough to cover various internal and external communication links to a reactor site. Using NuQKD, the internal and external data links were modeled, and receiver operating characteristic curves were calculated for various QKD configurations. A performance analysis was conducted, demonstrating that QKD can provide adequate secret key rates with low false alarms and has the potential of addressing the nuclear industry’s high standards of confidentiality for distance lengths up to 75 km of fiberoptics. Using a conservative estimation, QKD can provide up to 21.5 kbps of secret key rate for a distance of 1 km and 14.4 kbps at 10 km. The target secret key rates for the corresponding links were estimated at 16 kbps and 80 bps, respectively, based on the analysis of real data from a PUR-1 fully digital reactor. Consequently, QKD is shown to be compatible with existing and future point-to-point reactor communication architectures. These results motivate further study of quantum communications for nuclear reactors.

Software defined network implementation of multi-node adaptive novel quantum key distribution protocol

<p>Access to information can destroy nations and change the course of history altogether. Communication is very important, and in today's internet age, nothing moves without real-time information support. For securing communication, a commonly know technique is to use cryptography and public channels. Engineers have been working to create a better and more secure cryptographic system. Quantum key distribution stands at the top of this security system. Although QKD, based on principles of physics, provides a near-perfect security solution. It has a few drawbacks of its own, like low key generation rates and vulnerability to cyberattacks. Owning to these limitations, authors propose an adaptive quantum key distribution system based on software-defined networks. The authors propose to introduce redundancy in the key generation, thereby increasing the key generation rate and improving the resilience to cyberattacks. A performance comparison of novel quantum key distribution was done with BB84 and B92 quantum key distribution protocols.</p>

Security of the Decoy-State BB84 Protocol with Imperfect State Preparation.

The quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote users to share a common information-theoretic secure secret key. In order to guarantee the security of a practical QKD implementation, the physical system has to be fully characterized and all deviations from the ideal protocol due to various imperfections of realistic devices have to be taken into account in the security proof. In this work, we study the security of the efficient decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol in the presence of the source flaws, caused by imperfect intensity and polarization modulation. We investigate the non-Poissonian photon-number statistics due to coherent-state intensity fluctuations and the basis-dependence of the source due to non-ideal polarization state preparation. The analysis is supported by the experimental characterization of intensity and phase distributions.

Enhancing the Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Detector-Blinding Attacks via the Use of an Active Quantum Entropy Source in the Receiving Station.

True randomness is necessary for the security of any cryptographic protocol, including quantum key distribution (QKD). In QKD transceivers, randomness is supplied by one or more local, private entropy sources of quantum origin which can be either passive (e.g., a beam splitter) or active (e.g., an electronic quantum random number generator). In order to better understand the role of randomness in QKD, I revisit the well-known "detector blinding" attack on the BB84 QKD protocol, which utilizes strong light to achieve undetectable and complete recovery of the secret key. I present two findings. First, I show that the detector-blinding attack was in fact an attack on the receiver's local entropy source. Second, based on this insight, I propose a modified receiver station and a statistical criterion which together enable the robust detection of any bright-light attack and thus restore security.

Dissipative dynamics in quantum key distribution

Using the IBM Quantum Experience platform, we simulate the dissipative dynamics in the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol. We employ the Jaynes–Cummings model to simulate the attenuation in an optical fiber during the information transmission process and calculate the quantum bit error rate (QBER). The results of QBER as a function of the distance give a satisfactory agreement with experimental data when the system is in a Markovian regime.

Robust polarization state generation for long-range quantum key distribution.

We present a new compact and robust polarization state transmitter designed to execute the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol. Our transmitter prepares polarization states using a single commercial-off-the-shelf phase modulator. Our scheme does not require global biasing to compensate thermal and mechanical drifts, as both of the system's two time-demultiplexed polarization modes share a single optical path. Furthermore, the transmitter's optical path entails a double-pass through the phase modulation device for each polarization mode, allowing multiple phase rotations to be impinged on each light pulse. We present a proof-of-concept prototype of this transmitter topology and demonstrate a mean intrinsic quantum bit error rate below 0.2% over a 5 hour measurement.

Reference-frame-independent quantum key distribution based on passive light source monitoring

In quantum key distribution (QKD), the users need to share the same reference frame. If their reference frames are inconsistent, the QKD system will not function properly. The most widely used method today is the active real-time calibration of both communication reference frames by using classical communication. In order to get rid of the real-time calibration operation of the reference frames, a QKD protocol independent of reference frame is proposed, called reference-frame-independent QKD (RFI-QKD). The RFI-QKD protocol is immune to the effects of slowly changing reference frame drift, requiring that only one set of bases should be aligned by Alice and Bob, and the remaining two sets of bases can slowly change in the channel. In the real QKD system, a set of basis vectors can always be found to maintain a stable alignment. However, some assumptions are made for the sources in most reported researches, i.e. with a trusted and fixed photon-number distribution (PND), which usually cannot be satisfied in practical implementations. Those unreasonable assumptions will inevitably compromise the security of practical QKD systems. To solve the problem, in this work, we present a passive light source monitoring (PLSM) scheme for RFI-QKD, which is accomplished by a passive monitoring module consisting of a beam splitter and two detectors on the source side. Through the PLSM module, we can have four monitoring events by using two local detectors and then precisely estimate the bounds of source distributions. Specifically, we take the three-intensity decoy-state-based RFI-QKD for example for illustraing the events. Compared with the original RFI-QKD, our PLSM method can passively monitor the PND and has many advantages, with light source fluctuations, finite-size effects and reference frame deflection angles taken into account.

Quantum Key Distribution Using a Single-Photon Added–Subtracted Squeezed Coherent State

We investigate the security of continuous-variable BB84 quantum key distribution protocol using a single-photon added and then subtracted squeezed coherent state (SPASSCS). We find that the SPASSCS is a non-Gaussian and nonclassical state; its non-Gaussianity and nonclassicality are exhibited through the Wigner function. We show that the proposed state is generally robust against the eavesdropping strategies, such as intercept-resend attack and superior channel attack. Further, a comparative study proves the strong efficiency of the proposed state over the coherent state, squeezed coherent state and photon-added then subtracted coherent state. In our analysis, we employ bit error rate, mutual information, and secure key gain.

Security of Bennett–Brassard 1984 Quantum-Key Distribution under a Collective-Rotation Noise Channel

The security analysis of the Ekert 1991 (E91), Bennett 1992 (B92), six-state protocol, Scarani–Acín–Ribordy–Gisin 2004 (SARG04) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, and their variants have been studied in the presence of collective-rotation noise channels. However, besides the Bennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84) being the first proposed, extensively studied, and essential protocol, its security proof under collective-rotation noise is still missing. Thus, we aim to close this gap in the literature. Consequently, we investigate how collective-rotation noise channels affect the security of the BB84 protocol. Mainly, we study scenarios where the eavesdropper, Eve, conducts an intercept-resend attack on the transmitted photons sent via a quantum communication channel shared by Alice and Bob. Notably, we distinguish the impact of collective-rotation noise and that of the eavesdropper. To achieve this, we provide rigorous, yet straightforward numerical calculations. First, we derive a model for the collective-rotation noise for the BB84 protocol and parametrize the mutual information shared between Alice and Eve. This is followed by deriving the quantum bit error rate (QBER) for two intercept-resend attack scenarios. In particular, we demonstrate that, for small rotation angles, one can extract a secure secret key under a collective-rotation noise channel when there is no eavesdropping. We observe that noise induced by rotation of 0.35 radians of the prepared quantum state results in a QBER of 11%, which corresponds to the lower bound on the tolerable error rate for the BB84 QKD protocol against general attacks. Moreover, a rotational angle of 0.53 radians yields a 25% QBER, which corresponds to the error rate bound due to the intercept-resend attack. Finally, we conclude that the BB84 protocol is robust against intercept-resend attacks on collective-rotation noise channels when the rotation angle is varied arbitrarily within particular bounds.

A Combination of BB84 Quantum Key Distribution and An Improved Scheme of NTRU Post-Quantum Cryptosystem

The BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is based on the no-cloning quantum physic property, so if an attacker measures a photon state, he disturbs that state. This protocol uses two channels: (1) A quantum channel for sending the quantum information (photons polarized). (2) And a classical channel for exchanging the polarization and the measurement information (base sets or filters). The BB84 supposes that the classical channel is secure, but it is not always right, because it depends on the methods used during the communication over this channel. If an eavesdropper gets the sender or the receiver filters or both of them, he can leak some or all bits of the constructed key. In this context, we contribute by creating a protocol that combines the BB84 protocol with an improved scheme of NTRU post-quantum cryptosystem, which will secure the transmitted information over the classical channel. NTRU is a structured lattice scheme, and it is based on the hardness to solve lattice problems in Rn. Actually, it is one of the most important candidates for the NIST post-quantum standardization project.

A Hybrid Cryptosystem based on Latin Square and the Modified BB84 Quantum Key Distribution

A new algorithm to improve the security of the transmitted data over the communication channels is presented in this paper. This algorithm is combining Latin square with the modified version of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution protocol. As the order of the Latin square increases, then , which is the total number of Latin squares of order- , increases quickly. Moreover, the modified BB84 key distribution protocol is a secure method to exchange the encryption keys between two parties. The reason behind that is that the modified BB84 uses the Legendre symbol to generate the quantum key, and it uses the quantum channel only to perform the distribution process instead of using both channels, classic and quantum, as in the standard BB84 protocol. Therefore, the proposed algorithm is secure, reliable and efficient for future communications

Security of the traditional quantum key distribution protocols with finite-key lengths

Quantum key distribution (QKD) in principle can provide unconditional secure communication between distant parts. However, when finite-key length is taken into account, the security can only be ensured within certain security level. In this paper, we adopt the Chernoff bound analysis method to deal with finite-key-size effects, carrying out corresponding investigations on the relationship between the key generation rate and security parameters for different protocols, including BB84, measurement-device-independent and twin-field QKD protocols. Simulation results show that there exists a fundamental limit between the key rate and the security parameters. Therefore, this study can provide valuable references for practical application of QKD, getting a nice balance between the key generation rate and the security level.

Quantum Key Distribution: Modeling and Simulation through BB84 Protocol Using Python3.

Autonomous “Things” is becoming the future trend as the role, and responsibility of IoT keep diversifying. Its applicability and deployment need to re-stand technological advancement. The versatile security interaction between IoTs in human-to-machine and machine-to-machine must also endure mathematical and computational cryptographic attack intricacies. Quantum cryptography uses the laws of quantum mechanics to generate a secure key by manipulating light properties for secure end-to-end communication. We present a proof-of-principle via a communication architecture model and implementation to simulate these laws of nature. The model relies on the BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with two scenarios, without and with the presence of an eavesdropper via the interception-resend attack model from a theoretical, methodological, and practical perspective. The proposed simulation initiates communication over a quantum channel for polarized photon transmission after a pre-agreed configuration over a Classic Channel with parameters. Simulation implementation results confirm that the presence of an eavesdropper is detectable during key generation due to Heisenberg’s uncertainty and no-cloning principles. An eavesdropper has a 0.5 probability of guessing transmission qubit and 0.25 for the polarization state. During simulation re-iterations, a base-mismatch process discarded about 50 percent of the total initial key bits with an Error threshold of 0.11 percent.

Generation of entangled photons with a second-order nonlinear photonic crystal and a beam splitter

We discuss the generation of entangled photons using a nonlinear photonic crystal and beam splitter. In our method, the photonic crystal is assumed to be composed of a material with a large second-order nonlinear optical susceptibility . Our proposal relies on two facts: (1) A nonlinear photonic crystal changes coherent incident light into squeezed light. (2) A beam splitter transforms the squeezed light into entangled light beams flying in two different directions. We estimate the yield efficiency of pairs of entangled photons per pulse of the very weak coherent light for our method at 0.0783 for a specific concrete example. Our method is more effective because the conversion efficiency (entangled biphotons per incident pump photons) in the spontaneous parametric downconversion is of the order of . The only drawback is that it requires very fine tuning of the frequency of signal photons fed into the photonic crystal; for example, an adjustment is given by Hz for the signal light of Hz. We investigate the application of entangled photons produced by our method to the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, and we explore how to detect an eavesdropper. We suggest that our method is promising for decoy-state quantum key distribution using weak coherent light.

Overview of applications of heralded single photon source in quantum key distribution

In this paper, we mainly introduce the preparation and physical properties of the heralded single-photon source, the development history and its applications in three typical quantum key distribution protocols, including BB84, measurement-device-independent and twin-field quantum key distribution protocols. Moreover, we make comparisons of the above quantum key distribution protocols between using heralded single-photon source and using weak coherent sources, and analyze their advantages and disadvantages. Besides, according to the characteristics of single-photon interference in twin-field quantum key distributions, the limitations of separately applying heralded single-photon sources to twin-field quantum key distributions are revealed, and possible solutions are discussed. Therefore, this work may provide valuable references and help for the practical implementation of quantum secure communication in the near future.

LEO Satellites Constellation-to-Ground QKD Links: Greek Quantum Communication Infrastructure Paradigm

Quantum key distribution (QKD) has gained a lot of attention over the past few years, but the implementation of quantum security applications is still challenging to accomplish with the current technology. Towards a global-scale quantum-secured network, satellite communications seem to be a promising candidate to successfully support the quantum communication infrastructure (QCI) by delivering quantum keys to optical ground terminals. In this research, we examined the feasibility of satellite-to-ground QKD under daylight and nighttime conditions using the decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol. We evaluated its performance on a hypothetical constellation with 10 satellites in sun-synchronous Low Earth Orbit (LEO) that are assumed to communicate over a period of one year with three optical ground stations (OGSs) located in Greece. By taking into account the atmospheric effects of turbulence as well as the background solar radiance, we showed that positive normalized secure key rates (SKRs) up to 3.9×10−4 (bps/pulse) can be obtained, which implies that satellite-to-ground QKD can be feasible for various conditions, under realistic assumptions in an existing infrastructure.

Quantum Key Distribution by Drone

A cryptographic communication system is secure from a practical point of view if the encryption scheme can be broken after X years, where X is determined by security needs and existing technology. Quantum cryptography does not offer a complete solution for all cryptographic problems: secure keys, encryption algorithms based on them, message authentication and finding ways to detect/prevent interception; but it can be seen as a complement to standard symmetric cryptographic systems. This paper presents the implementation of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol on mobile systems - Amov-lab’s Z410 drone with T-engine 2216 - and tracks the error rate obtained in flight conditions.

Quantum dynamics of mixed polarization states: effects of environment-mediated intermode coupling

We study the quantum dynamics of mixed polarization states represented by the two-mode boson system interacting with an environment. Using the form of general dynamical equations for averaged operators that preserve normal ordering, we show that the dynamical regimes of the averaged Stokes operators crucially depend on the anisotropy of the relaxation operator resulting from the intermode coupling induced by the anisotropic environment. We analyze how this coupling impacts the quantum bit error rate in the well-known single-photon polarization-coding quantum key distribution protocol BB84.

Optimizing the decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol parameters

Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols allow for information theoretically secure distribution of (classical) cryptographic key material. However, due to practical limitations the performance of QKD implementations is somewhat restricted. For this reason, it is crucial to find optimal protocol parameters, while guaranteeing information theoretic security. The performance of a QKD implementation is determined by the tightness of the underlying security analysis. In particular, the security analyses determines the key-rate, i.e., the amount of cryptographic key material that can be distributed per time unit. Nowadays, the security analyses of various QKD protocols are well understood. It is known that optimal protocol parameters, such as the number of decoy states and their intensities, can be found by solving a nonlinear optimization problem. The complexity of this optimization problem is typically handled by making a number of heuristic assumptions. For instance, the number of decoy states is restricted to only one or two, with one of the decoy intensities set to a fixed value, and vacuum states are ignored as they are assumed to contribute only marginally to the secure key-rate. These assumptions simplify the optimization problem and reduce the size of search space significantly. However, they also cause the security analysis to be non-tight, and thereby result in sub-optimal performance. In this work, we follow a more rigorous approach using both linear and nonlinear programs describing the optimization problem. Our approach, focusing on the decoy-state BB84 protocol, allows heuristic assumptions to be omitted, and therefore results in a tighter security analysis with better protocol parameters. We show an improved performance for the decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol, demonstrating that the heuristic assumptions typically made are too restrictive. Moreover, our improved optimization frameworks shows that the complexity of the performance optimization problem can also be handled without making heuristic assumptions, even with limited computational resources available.

Studies on the readability and on the detection rate in a Mach–Zehnder interferometer-based implementation for high-rate, long-distance QKD protocols

We study the way that chromatic dispersion affects the visibility and the synchronization on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols in a widely-used setup based on the use of two fiber-based Mach-Zehnder (MZ) interferometers at transmitter/receiver stations. We identify the necessary conditions for the path length difference between the two arms of the interferometers for achieving the desired visibility given the transmission distance -- where the form of the detector's window can be considered. We also associate the above limitations with the maximum detection rate that can be recorded in our setup, including the quantum non-linearity phenomenon, and to the maximum time window of the detector's gate. Exploiting our results we provide two methods, depending on the clock rate of the setup, to perform chromatic dispersion compensation techniques to the signal for keeping the correct order of the transmitted symbols. At the end, we apply our theoretical outcomes in a more realistic QKD deployment, considering the case of phase-encoding BB84 QKD protocol, which is widely used. Our proposed methods, depending on the transmission distance and on the photon emission rate at transmitter station, can be easily generalized to every fiber-optic QKD protocol, for which the discrimination of each symbol is crucial.