Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has gained a lot of attention over the past few years, but the implementation of quantum security applications is still challenging to accomplish with the current technology. Towards a global-scale quantum-secured network, satellite communications seem to be a promising candidate to successfully support the quantum communication infrastructure (QCI) by delivering quantum keys to optical ground terminals. In this research, we examined the feasibility of satellite-to-ground QKD under daylight and nighttime conditions using the decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol. We evaluated its performance on a hypothetical constellation with 10 satellites in sun-synchronous Low Earth Orbit (LEO) that are assumed to communicate over a period of one year with three optical ground stations (OGSs) located in Greece. By taking into account the atmospheric effects of turbulence as well as the background solar radiance, we showed that positive normalized secure key rates (SKRs) up to 3.9×10−4 (bps/pulse) can be obtained, which implies that satellite-to-ground QKD can be feasible for various conditions, under realistic assumptions in an existing infrastructure.
Highlights
The advent of quantum computing may affect classical key cryptography in the decades, setting a large part of cryptosystems insecure
We presented a thorough design study and a feasibility analysis on Quantum key distribution (QKD) satellite deployment devoted for Greek quantum communication infrastructure (QCI)
Using the installation parameters of optical ground stations (OGSs) hosted in Greek observatories, a decoy-state BB84 QKD link between a satellite constellation consisting of 10 Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites and three OGSs was discussed
Summary
The advent of quantum computing may affect classical key cryptography in the decades, setting a large part of cryptosystems insecure. The maximum ground-based communication range achieved is 509 km in fiber [9] and this limitation for repeaterless links sets a major obstacle in the way towards a quantum-secured global mesh network. Where Hrad W/m2sr μm corresponds to the background radiance energy density, ΩFOV(sr) is the field of view of the receiver’s aperture, Ar(m2) is the receiver’s capture area, and ∆λ (μm) is the receiver’s band pass optical filter width. To insert this value to the QBER, we expressed the solar background noise power level in watt reaching the receiver in counts per second. It is clear that a narrow bandpass filter combined with a limited receiver’s field of view (FOV) is necessary to keep the background noise to acceptable levels
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