Abstract In the mid-1970s, when women born immediately after the Second World War were at full reproductive age, the demographic transition in Europe could be considered concluded. Birth and death rates were around 10 per thousand (a quarter compared to a century earlier), fertility was around two children per woman, and the differences in fertility between countries were modest. It seemed like the end of a path towards a new demographic stability. In reality, for subsequent cohorts, things continue to change: fertility in many countries declines, while differences between countries grow. The fertility of women born around 1980 in Europe is not far from two children for France and Northern Europe, around 1.6 children in Central and Eastern Europe, around 1.4 children in Southern Europe. Although these differences may seem minimal, the medium-long term consequences on age distributions are enormous. It would be wrong, however, to say that no similar patterns of fertility exist after the end of the demographic transition. First of all, as already mentioned, there are strong similarities between countries and regions of the same geographical area: Italian fertility patterns, for example, are similar to those of other countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and the Balkan states. Furthermore, all European countries share a progressive increase in the age at birth, both of the first and subsequent children, while late fertility (35+ years of age) increases greatly. The differences between countries are far from irrelevant. However, the variability between countries has been progressively decreasing for thirty years now. These changes in reproductive behaviours are intertwined with other important changes in Europe's natural demography. The most important is undoubtedly aging, determined by the lengthening of the average lifespan, especially by the spectacular increase in survival beyond fifty years of age. This phenomenon has also been very diversified among European states, less accentuated in particular in Eastern Europe and Russia. The imbalances in the age structure of the population generated by the joint effect of low birth rates and high survival of the elderly are attenuated by consistent and growing immigration flows from poor countries, where – contrary to what happened in Europe – the working age population grows. These population movements are accompanied by those within Europe, in particular from Eastern and Balkan countries to the other part of the continent. The future prospects of European demography are traced starting from this global description, underlining in particular what can reasonably be predicted about reproductive behaviour.
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