Australian Air Research Articles

Australian SASR in Borneo: The strategic contribution of the Australian SAS Regiment (SASR) during the Konfrontasi (1965-1966)

The Konfrontasi (Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation) signaled the first combat deployment of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment (SASR). Between 1965 and 1966, two SASR squadrons were deployed and involved in secretive Claret Operations. The SASR’s operations were concentrated in the jungles of Borneo, along the porous and mountainous borders of Sarawak and Indonesia’s Kalimantan. The SASR had conducted reconnaissance missions collecting intelligence and track-and-ambush missions inside Indonesia’s territory. The SASR was also involved in ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns, building trust and partnerships with local aborigines in remote jungle areas to serve as friendly informers. This article assesses the tactical and strategic impact of SASR’s operations on the campaign’s overarching grand strategy. The SASR’s strategic value in the Konfrontasi albeit limited at the tactical level, yielded handsome strategic utility with lasting political benefits for Australia and Malaysia. This article provides a balanced evaluation of SASR’s performance and lessons for contemporary special forces operations.

SleepSync: Early Testing of a Personalised Sleep-Wake Management Smartphone Application for Improving Sleep and Cognitive Fitness in Defence Shift Workers.

Shift work, long work hours, and operational tasks contribute to sleep and circadian disruption in defence personnel, with profound impacts on cognition. To address this, a digital technology, the SleepSync app, was designed for use in defence. A pre-post design study was undertaken to examine whether four weeks app use improved sleep and cognitive fitness (high performance neurocognition) in a cohort of shift workers from the Royal Australian Air Force. In total, 13 of approximately 20 shift-working personnel from one base volunteered for the study. Sleep outcomes were assessed using the Insomnia Severity Index (ISI), the Patient-Reported Outcomes Measurement Information System (PROMIS), Sleep Disturbance and Sleep-Related Impairment Scales, the Glasgow Sleep Effort Scale, the Sleep Hygiene Index, and mental health was assessed using the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale-21. Sustained attention was measured using the 3-min Psychomotor Vigilance Task (PVT) and controlled response using the NBack. Results showed significant improvements in insomnia (ISI scores 10.31 at baseline and 7.50 after app use), sleep-related impairments (SRI T-scores 53.03 at baseline to 46.75 post-app use), and healthy sleep practices (SHI scores 21.61 at baseline to 18.83 post-app use; all p < 0.001). Trends for improvement were recorded for depression. NBack incorrect responses reduced significantly (9.36 at baseline; reduced by -3.87 at last week of app use, p < 0.001), but no other objective measures improved. These findings suggest that SleepSync may improve sleep and positively enhance cognitive fitness but warrants further investigation in large samples. Randomised control trials with other cohorts of defence personnel are needed to confirm the utility of this intervention in defence settings.

The Spirit of the Service: Dash, Discipline, and Flying Accidents in the Royal Australian Air Force, 1921–48

From its establishment in 1921, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) attracted political and public critique for flying accidents. This article explores how its nascent institutional ethos developed in relation to a problematic safety record. Military aviators were expected to balance airborne “dash” against obeying flying orders, risking castigation if they proved either too timid or too reckless. Despite vigorous attempts to isolate their service from scrutiny, Air Force leaders were forced to adapt the RAAF's safety culture in response to civilian expertise, media pressure, political machinations, and comparisons with other air arms — particularly Britain's Royal Air Force. Through the 1930s and the Second World War, responsibility was increasingly channelled toward individual personnel. Tactics included severe punishments, signed attestations that confirmed compliance with orders and an “endorsement” system that permanently recorded infractions in errant flyers' log books. These measures risked producing timorous and inadequately skilled pilots, unprepared to exploit their aircraft's capabilities to the full. In 1945, the establishment of a Directorate of Flying Safety profoundly changed the RAAF's institutional safety culture, but its accident record remained problematic. Over 1921–48, the “sweet spot” between initiative and dependability eluded the RAAF's quest to inculcate an enduring “spirit of the service”.

Characterising the physical demands of critical tasks across the Royal Australian Air Force.

Militaries have historically utilised generic physical fitness tests to assess physical readiness, but there has been a recent shift to develop physical employment standards (PES) based on actual job demands. The purpose of this investigation was to characterise the physical demands of critical tasks performed by Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel to inform PES development. Job task analysis were performed for 27 RAAF trades. Criterion tasks were identified through a systematic approach involving workshops and field-observations. The identified tasks were assessed for dominant physical capacity and grouped into movement-based clusters. Psychophysiological measures were collected from personnel performing the tasks. Of 87 criterion tasks, 92% were characterised as manual handling dominant. Across these 87 tasks the principal physical capacities were: muscular strength (59%), muscular endurance (52%) and cardiorespiratory endurance (39%). The most common movement clusters were Lift to Platform (44%) and Lift and Carry (38%). Lift to Platform tasks required lifting to a median height of 1.32 m (1.20 -1.65 m) and a median mass of 25.0 kg (21.0 -28.9 kg) per person. Median carry mass was 25.0 kg (22.4 -36.1 kg) per person and distance was 26.0 m (17.5 -50.0 m). Median task mean 'Vdot;O2, HR and RPE were 1.8 L.min-1 (1.5-2.2 L.min-1), 137 b.min-1 (120-144) and 13 (12-14). The high proportion of manual handling criterion tasks emphasises the importance of these activities and the underlying physical capacities for RAAF personnel. Current fitness assessments are unlikely to predict job task performance.

Pointless or Populism?

This article began as a response to Daniel Cook’s recent article on ‘Turning the Tap Off – Stopping the Flow of Pointless Jobs in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)’ (Cook, 2023); as such, it will address some of the points raised in that article within the context a broader trend towards what I term ‘military populism’.

Surveillance is the first step to preventing injury among fast jet aircrew: results of a 2-year prospective cohort study

ObjectivesInjury surveillance is imperative for injury prevention but difficult in military populations. Our objective was to accurately describe the pattern of musculoskeletal complaints among Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) fast...

The RAAF's Frozen Middle Part Two

The concept of the "frozen middle" has become a common phrase in the business world, and it refers to the group of middle managers who are often resistant to change. These managers are known to be stuck in their ways, resistant to new ideas, and hesitant to take risks. The frozen middle is a significant problem for many organisations such as the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), as it hinders innovation, slows down decision-making processes, and stifles progress. To understand how the frozen middle can impact organisational efficiency, it is essential to explore why this phenomenon exists and how it can be addressed. In my previous post I used Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs as a lens to describe a possible reason why the problem exists (Williamson, 2023). In this post, I will provide an alternative explanation from a cognitive lens.

Deterrence by Deception: Historic Lessons and Contemporary Methods

This paper examines how the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has incorporated deception into its ground operations historically, and what lessons can be identified from this experience. Lessons include acknowledging the importance of engaging both experts and the wider public in deception efforts; and recognising that deception is both a passive and active means of deterrence. The paper then explores how the RAAF can apply deception in new and innovative ways. This work focusses on the airpower ground environment for two reasons: (1) deception is less widely employed compared to other means of deception applied for airborne capabilities; and (2) deception can be more effective, cheaper and easier to implement compared to other means of denial applied in the ground environment. These reasons make the inclusion of deception measures attractive in the current Defence environment.

Microplastics in Australian indoor air: Abundance, characteristics, and implications for human exposure

Studies on airborne microplastics (AMPs) have reported higher abundance of AMPs in indoor air compared to outdoors. Most people spend more time indoors compared to outdoors, and it is therefore important to identify and quantify AMPs in indoor air to understand human exposure to AMPs. This exposure can vary among different individuals as they spend their time in different locations and different activity levels, and thus experience different breathing rates. In this study, AMPs ranging from 20–5000 μm were sampled across different indoor sites of Southeast Queensland using an active sampling technique. The highest indoor MP concentration was observed at a childcare site (2.25 ± 0.38 particles/m3), followed by an office (1.20 ± 0.14 particles/m3) and a school (1.03 ± 0.40 particles/m3). The lowest indoor MP concentration was observed inside a vehicle (0.20 ± 0.14 particles/m3), comparable to outdoor concentrations. The only shapes observed were fibers (98%) and fragments. MP fibers ranged from 71 to 4950 μm in length. Polyethylene terephthalate was the prominent polymer type at most sites. Using our measured airborne concentrations as inhaled air concentrations, we calculated the annual human exposure levels to AMPs using scenario-specific activity levels. Males between the ages of 18 to 64 were calculated to have the highest AMP exposure at 3187 ± 594 particles/year, followed by males ≥65 years at 2978 ± 628 particles/year. The lowest exposure of 1928 ± 549 particles/year was calculated for females between the ages of 5 to 17. This study provides the first report on AMPs for various types of indoor locations where individuals spend most of their time. Considering acute, chronic, industrial, and individual susceptibility, more detailed human inhalation exposure levels to AMPs should be estimated for a realistic appraisal of the human health risk, including how much of the inhaled particles are exhaled. SynopsisLimited research exists on the occurrence and the associated human exposure levels to AMPs in indoor locations where people spend most of their time. This study reports on the occurrence of AMPs at indoor locations and associated exposure levels using scenario-specific activity levels.

A Cross-Sequential Study of the Effect of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic on the Risk of Anxiety and Depression of Royal Flying Doctors Staff, an Australian Air Medical Organization

ObjectiveThis cross-sequential study examines whether the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic affected the mental health of staff working at an Australian air medical service, the Royal Flying Doctors Service South Eastern (RFDSSE) Section. MethodsThe risk of anxiety and depression was measured using a prospective anonymized online survey using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, which was answered by 119 employees. This cross-sequential study was completed in December 2021 with reference to 2 time points: now and the beginning of the pandemic. A high risk of anxiety was defined using a Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale score of 11 to 21 (low risk: 0-10). Chi-square testing was used to compare subgroups at single time points. McNemar testing was used to compare the risk of anxiety and depression between the beginning of the pandemic and December 2021. ResultsEmployees recalled a higher risk of anxiety at the beginning of the pandemic (29%) compared with December 2021 (16%) (P = .012). At the beginning of the pandemic, nonoperational staff members were more anxious than operational staff (P = .019). One third (31%) of operational staff members were concerned about dying at the beginning of the pandemic. ConclusionOur findings demonstrate that RFDSSE employees recalled higher levels of anxiety at the beginning of the pandemic compared with their risk in December 2021. Operational and nonoperational staff have different mental health needs; anxiety experienced by nonoperational staff during a pandemic should not be underestimated. The overall prevalence of anxiety and depression is high, suggesting health care staff in an air medical service may require extra psychological support. Other air medical organizations may reflect on our study findings and plan how to better support their own staff as a result.

Turning the Tap Off - Stopping the Flow of Pointless Jobs in the RAAF

WGCDR Borg’s monograph Royal Australian Air Force 2025: A new organizational structure to optimise combat effectiveness in an era of great power competition (Borg, 2023) included a statement that is more telling than it appears at first glance: 'We are too busy mopping the floor, we don’t have time to turn off the tap.' - Anonymous The opening quote accurately depicts the current feeling across many squadrons, wings and groups across the RAAF today.” (Borg, 2023, p. 29)

Is The RAAF Seeking Combat Effectiveness

The question being asked is sometimes more important than the answer. WGCDR Borg’s thesis Royal Australian Air Force 2025: A new organizational structure to optimize combat effectiveness in an era of great power competition (David Earl Borg, 2021) provides a more efficient structure for the RAAF to improve combat effectiveness. This is based on the assumption that the RAAF wants to be more combat effective. This assumption needs to be scrutinised more thoroughly: does the RAAF truly want to be a more combat effective force?

Turning the Tap Off - Stopping the Flow of Pointless Jobs in the RAAF

WGCDR Borg’s monograph Royal Australian Air Force 2025: A new organizational structure to optimise combat effectiveness in an era of great power competition (Borg, 2023) included a statement that is more telling than it appears at first glance: “‘We are too busy mopping the floor, we don’t have time to turn off the tap. - Anonymous The opening quote accurately depicts the current feeling across many squadrons, wings and groups across the RAAF today.” (Borg, 2023, p. 29)

The RAAF’s frozen middle

It is a relatively common trend that solving an organisational strategic issue reveals another. With the implementation of digital technology, came the resistance to change and implementing change agents brought about the awareness of having a safe-to-fail culture. As of late, the awareness is again on middle management with the term “Frozen Middle.” To the short sighted eye, each solution seems to produce another strategic issue to solve. However, these problems have always been present and organisations, such as the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), are simply peeling back the layers of issues to reveal them, like an onion one layer at a time. The “Frozen Middle” is a term used to stereotype the middle management of organisations today (Spreitzer &amp; Quinn, 1996). Typically this is referring to middle managers that are slowing organisational progression due to a lack of motivation or a reluctance to take risks. In this paper, I will break down three potential factors as to why they have developed the stereotype and a possible method to treat the issue.

Pointless or Populism?

This article began as a response to Daniel Cook’s recent article on ‘Turning the Tap Off – Stopping the Flow of Pointless Jobs in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)’ (Cook, 2023); as such, it will address some of the points raised in that article within the context a broader trend towards what I term ‘military populism’.

Defence Strategic Review and Adapt: Implementing DSR as a Wargame

Australia’s Defence Strategic Review (DSR) has been completed, with the final report handed to Government (Prime Minister of Australia, 2023). In considering priorities for Defence capability and assessing force structure, posture and preparedness1, the DSR is likely to recommend difficult choices for a relatively small Defence Force which must live within necessarily-limited means. Much like in war itself, Defence’s ability to adapt to DSR outcomes will be crucial. Indeed, former defence official Paul Dibb has warned Defence requires ‘serious historical and cultural change’ to implement the DSR’s recommendations (Hurst, 2023). Such change could be painful, especially if each service views the DSR’s recommendations through the lens of a zero-sum game, with winners and losers. Doing so not only misses the point of the review itself, but diverts our attention away from an important—arguably unique—opportunity offered by the DSR: using it as a wargame to practise the kind of adaptability we will need to fight the next war. Australia’s current strategic circumstances, and their trajectory, mean we cannot afford to miss such an opportunity. This article discusses how the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) can use the DSR as a wargame to test its adaptability in a joint environment, and why doing so is an effective way to practice applying air and space power effects into the joint force, in preparation for the next war.

Escape Your Echo Chamber

When I was younger, I was very black and white in my thinking. Many would argue that I still am! Although I am finding the beauty in shades of grey (don’t say it!). Yet despite trying to grow my empathy and to appreciate the differences of thoughts for the constructive challenges and opportunity for growth – I still fall into the trap of comfort. I don’t always want to deal with people whose views I find offensive, idiotic, or more often than not – both. So despite being aware of the echo chamber phenomena, and its dangers, I wilfully stay with my chamber to learn and hear voices I already agree with, already support, and think very similar to myself. Is that so wrong?

The politics of military procurement: the F-35 purchasing process in Canada and Australia Compared

ABSTRACT The willingness of defence departments to select the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for their fifth-generation multirole fighter has frequently been analyzed as stemming from the close historical connections allies such as Japan or Canada have with the United States. However, such an approach glosses over or ignores the operation of military procurement processes which are more idiosyncratic and subject to many pushes and pulls from different actors and directions. This article compares the experiences of Australia and Canada in procuring the JSF. Both countries are British Commonwealth members, with a long history of supporting western, and in particular, US alliances. But while Australia has secured its F-35 procurement and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has already received its F-35s, Canada has only recently overcome a lengthy F-35 procurement battle that remains mired in controversy and will not deliver to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) an aircraft for several years yet. This comparative case study between Australian and Canadian defence priorities offers a new explanation for this disparity of procurement success based on the need to both create and maintain alignment between government strategic defence policy and military service doctrine if major platform purchasing decisions are to survive.

What role do tourism stakeholders play in air route development? Lessons from Australia

This paper aims to assess the role of tourism stakeholders in air route development (ARD). The differences in the ARD processes and engagement relationships among airports, airlines, and destination management organisations (DMOs) are analysed. The Australian air transport and tourism sectors, which exemplify a light-handed regime with low competition among airports due to Australia's large territory and liberalised economic environment, were selected as a case study. In-depth semi-structured interviews with 22 ARD experts/executives from airports, airlines, and DMOs and with independent consultants were used as the primary data collection tool. In the Australian case study context, tourism stakeholders play a crucial role in stakeholder engagement, particularly in regional and emerging international airports. Both international and Australian airlines agree on the relative uniqueness of Australian DMOs' stakeholder engagement approaches and strategies (at national, state, and regional levels) compared to those in other parts of the world. Some interviewees even identify tourism authorities as ARD influencers who can play a significant role in the Australian ARD post-COVID-19 recovery phase.

Emulating the “pucker factor”: Faith, fidelity and flight simulation in Australia, 1936–58

In the two decades after 1936, the assessment and instruction of aviators was transformed by adopting synthetic training aids. These devices were typified by the Link Trainer, an ersatz aeroplane that taught basic piloting skills and instrument flying. Purchased both by Australian civil operators and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), Link Trainer use proliferated from 1939. After 1945, an escalating accident rate led the RAAF to consider an emergent technology: flight simulators. Developed in the UK and USA, Dehmel-style flight simulators were powered by analogue computers to emulate specific aircraft types. Drawing upon Korean War experience and Canadian precedents, in 1956 the RAAF took delivery of Australia's first flight simulator, Redifon's model C.773 for the Avon Sabre fighter. Integrating both military and civilian experience, this article argues that western faith in flight simulators often ran ahead of their capabilities and fidelity to ‘seat of the pants’ flying.