PurposeThis paper aims to provide insights into how the New Zealand Office of the Auditor-General (NZOAG) legitimised the selection of topics for performance audit in the New Zealand public health sector over a 10-year period, 2003-2013, by fulfilling the key actors’ “taken for granted beliefs” of the dual roles of the NZOAG: its independence and accountability.Design/methodology/approachThis paper uses evidence gathered from interviews with representatives of the District Health Boards, the Ministry of Health (including Health Advisory Committee members) and NZOAG staff, along with publically available documentary evidence over a 10-year period. The authors draw on Suchman’s (1995) authority on institutional legitimacy to inform the research findings.FindingsThe New Zealand Auditors-General (NZAGs) get inputs from various sources such as their own audit teams, parliamentary deliberations, the Ministry of Health, the District Health Boards, media and public concerns and complaints. These sources initiate ideas for performance audits. Subsequently, the NZAGs use the recurring themes and risk assessment criteria while simultaneously consulting with the auditees (the MOH and the DHBs) and other actors, such as health advisory groups, to select topics for such audits. This signals to the key actors, such as the MOH and the DHBs, that the NZOAG is addressing the topics and concerns relevant to the former while discharging its public accountability role. Furthermore, the consultative approach acts as a catalyst, ensuring that the actors involved with public sector health service delivery, specifically the auditees, accept the selected topic. This leads to a lack of resistance to and criticism of the topic; the selection process, therefore, is legitimatised, and credibility is added to the audits. Because of the consultative approach taken by the NZAGs, the actors, including the performance auditors, continue to believe that the Office acts independently from third party influence in selecting their audit topics, elevating the NZAGs’ moral legitimacy with respect to their public accountability role.Research limitations/implicationsThe study’s focus group does not include parliamentary representatives, only representatives from the DHBs, the MOH and the NZOAG; therefore, the conclusions on effective discharge of the NZOAG’s accountability role and Parliamentary acceptance is not conclusive – the NZOAG acts on behalf of the Parliament in discharging its accountability role and the latter is also the formal recipient of the reports.Practical implicationsThe implications for practitioners and policymakers are that the use of a consultative approach to select topics for performance audit in the absence of performance auditing standards ensures auditee readiness and acceptance of such audits. This also promotes mutual benefits and “trust” between the AG and auditees. Such audits can be used to bring about efficacy in health service delivery.Social implicationsThe selected topics for audits will have an impact on citizens’ lifestyles, with improved health services delivery.Originality/valueThere is a dearth of research on who initiates the ideas for performance auditing and how the Office of the Auditor-General selects topics for such audits. This study adds a new dimension to the existing performance auditing literature. The authors reveal how the NZOAG seeks to legitimise the selection of topics for such audits by consulting with the auditees and other actors associated with public sector health service delivery, while upholding its independent status and making transparent how it discharges its accountability role within the context of performance auditing.
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