Arab-Israeli War Research Articles

The Mediator's Portable Guide: Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process. . Sydney D. Bailey.

The Mediator's Portable Guide: Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process. . Sydney D. Bailey.

Truman and Israel (review)

132 SHOFAR Truman and Israel, by Michael 1. Cohen. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990. 342 pp. $24.95. This book by Michael 1. Cohen, the author of several previous volumes on the emergence of Israel, is the most thorough of many studies of the "decisive diplomatic role" (p. xi) of President Harry S Truman. Cohen begins by examining Truman's outlook before he became president, going all the way back to childhood influences, and then analyzes the activities of both the "Zionist lobby" and the "anti-Zionist forces" before proceeding with an essentially chronological account of President Truman's policies relating to "refugee Zionism" and then to the establishment of the Jewish state (the U.N. Partition Resolution and the "retreat from partition" in favor of a trusteeship, the recognition of Israel, the First Arab-Israeli War and the Bernadotte Plan, the 1948 presidential elections, and post-election policies through January 1949). Cohen has made extensive use of various archives and other primary sources-some of which, as in the case of White House staff-member Max Lowenthal's private diaries, had not been available to other scholars. The author brings out a great deal that is new. Especially notable is the revelation of the role of Lowenthal as "the unsung hero"-"the 'back-room boy' [among the pro-Zionist White House staff, also including David Niles, that took control of Palestine policy during 1947] who supplied the argumentation to Clark Clifford, the 'court-house lawyer'" (p. 178). Any idea that Truman was committed in principle to the goal of a Jewish state is shattered. While supporting the idea of Palestine as a refuge for displaced Jews in Europe, Truman saw "Zionist aspirations" in terms of "a racial or theocratic state" in conflict with pluralistic, secular principles (p. 55). Cohen shows that even the trusteeship proposal (the adverse reaction to which allowed the White House advisers again to take the reins) had been approved by Truman, who was angry with the State Department only because of political damage caused by the timing of the announcement (pp. 196-197). . Not only did Truman slowly come around to supporting a Jewish state but, with intense pressure from those in the State Department and elsewhere in the government who saw this as a threat to American national interests, his support wavered to an extent that has generally not been understood. Cohen clearly documents the decisive nature of Truman's purely opportunistic concern over votes and "Jewish finance" (p. 69). Particularly memorable is the picture of funds being so low that "radio speeches were sometimes cut off in mid-course," and the whistle-stop campaign already underway was about to be cut short until "Eddie Jacobson flew to meet Truman with the money in his pocket" (p. 74). One is left wondering why Volume 10, No.2 Winter 1992 133 "Jewish" sources loomed so large and also about how this meshes with the author's claim that Truman's past connections with the corrupt Pendergast machine "reinforced his already strong determination to be his own man" (p. 19). Cohen also shows that Jacobson's influence was not limited to the one meeting that has been well known. Along with Abraham Granoff, another of the president's old Jewish friends from Kansas City, Jacobson had regular access to Truman. The author presents evidence that at the end of the period under consideration-ironically just as Washington's ultimatum to Israel over the invasion of Sinai superficially looked like a move away from backing the Jewish state-a "strategic reassessment" took place in the State Department (and slowly took hold in London as well) that gave Israel "the halo of Western realpolitik" (p. 268). I doubt whether the "strategic asset" idea actually prevailed that early, although Cohen will possibly find more evidence of such if he eventually continues his study into Truman's second term and beyond. I found the analysis of Truman's "complex and ambivalent" attitude toward Jews particularly interesting. Despite his personal friendships with Jews, he often mouthed bigoted phrases-like, in his earlier years, referring to New York as "kike town" (p. 9). Since the Palestine conflict...

The Clergy's Concepts of Rule in Egypt and Iran

In the wake of the current cycle of Islamic resurgence, which began at the time of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the question of rule has been at the center of clerical discourse. This article analyzes this question in the debates of the Egyptian and Iranian ` ulama'. While they agree upon the perception of Islam as both religion and state and upon the need to base public law upon the shari`a (the holy law of Islam), they differ on the role of secular rulers, the relevance of jihad, identifying apostates, calling for rebellion, authorizing the ` ulama' to rule society, and endowing Islamic states with extraordinary powers. The debate will continue to focus on these issues in the future, as Islamic groups press the case for full implementation of the shari`a in all areas of life, not only in Egypt and Iran but in all Muslim societies.

Israel: The warrior nation in search of peace

Since mid-century, oil supply disruptions from the Middle East have been linked to Arab-Israeli wars. Following the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, Israel has begun to feel more secure and more willing to negotiate with its Arab neighbours. Palestinian hopes for an autonomous Palestine may be channelled into pressure for Jordan to welcome more Palestinians and possibly turn into a Palestinian state. In any case the era of radical Israel behaviour as a beleaguered warrior nation has ended for now.

Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, by Alexander L. George

Part 1 Framework of the study: is research on crisis management needed?, Alexander L. George plan of the study, Alexander L. George the tension between military logic and the requirements of in crisis management, Alexander L. George a provisional theory of crisis management, Alexander L. George. Part 2 Inadvertent wars: introduction, Alexander L. George the Crimean War, Richard Smoke the role of crisis mismanagement in the outbreak of the World War I, Jack S. Levy the US-China War in Korea, Allen S. Whiting the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Janice Gross Stein the Suez War of 1956 - communication in crisis management, Christer Jonsson. Part 3 Crisis management without war: introduction, Alexander L. George the Berlin Blockade crisis of 1948-1949, M. Steven Fish the Cuban missile crisis, Alexander L. George the Sino-Soviet border crisis of 1969, Arthur A. Cohen. Part 4 Superpower involvement in Middle East conflicts: introduction, Alexander L. George the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Yaacov Bar-Simon-Tov the war of attrition, 1969-1970, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov. Part 5 Factors influencing crisis management: introduction, Alexander L. George strategies for crisis management, Alexander L. George the role of intelligence in crisis management, Stan A. Taylor and Theodore J. Ralston crisis bargaining codes and crisis management, J. Philip Rogers rules of engagement, Scott D. Sagan the impact of crisis-induced stress on policy makers, Jerrold M. Post. Part 6 Prospects - new challenges, new opportunities: introduction, Alexander L. George crisis management in Europe - old mechanisms and new problems, Phil Williams the future of military diplomacy in US-Soviet relations, Kurt M. Campbell. Part 7 Findings and recommendations: Alexander L. George.

Women in contemporary arabic and francophone fiction

This essay recreates the female drama in the Arab World as incarnated by a few heroines during key periods of the Arabs’ contemporary history, in the belief that art imitates reality and also moulds it, as it is changing and becoming. The essay broadly re-enacts patterns of behavior quite typical of the male-female relationships in the Arab World, as they are constantly changing and becoming. Our story unfolds between that of Amina, Naguib Mahfouz’s heroine in hisTrilogy and a few Lebanese heroines who have lived the civil war in Beirut (1975–1990) in Emily Nasrallah’s fiction. In between, we move from Mahfouz’s Egypt, to Tayeb Salih’s Sudan, to T.Y. Awwad’s Lebanon, to Taher Ben Jelloun’s Morocco, and back to Lebanon, making halts during World War I, pre-Nasserite Egypt, post-independent Sudan, the Arab-Israeli War, and the war-torn Lebanon of the last two decades.

The Egyptian Military Defeat of 1967

Studies on the military dimensions of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War have failed to establish many direct links with the 1967 conflict. The failure has proved most pronounced in the Egyptian case, because western scholarship still tends to focus on developments in the Israeli army to the culpable neglect of the Egyptian military. Yet, after their resounding defeat in 1967, the Egyptians faced the difficult challenge of rebuilding their shattered armed forces, and the direction of reforms would in large measure be determined by the painful experience of 1967. Unlike many previous studies on military aspects of the ArabIsraeli conflict, this article relies on both Egyptian and Israeli military sources to help analyse the reasons behind the Israeli success in defeating the Egyptian army in 1967. Special attention, however, is given to the Egyptian perspective so as to identify major areas the Egyptians would have to correct for the next conflict in 1973. Among the most prominent Egyptian writers used in this study are General Muhammad Fawzi, Chief of the General Staff in 1967 and then Commander-in-Chief between 1967 and 1971; General 'Abd alMohsen Kamal Murtagui, the front commander in the 1967 war; Lieutenant General Salah al-Din al-Hadidi, the commandant of the Nasir Higher Military Academy before the Six Day War; and Amin Huwaydi, Minister of War from 1967 to 1968. These military writers have critically analysed the numerous internal problems that plagued the Egyptian military before and during the war. This article addresses selected key issues that directly affected the outcome of the

Egypt and Beyond: The Jews of the Arab Countries in Modern Times - Gudrun Krämer. The Jews in Modern Egypt, 1914–1952. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989. x, 319 pp.

Gudrun Krämer's study on the Jews of Egypt is divided into five sections: Communal Structure and Composition; Communal Organization; Socioeconomic and Political Change (1914–1918); Jewish Reactions to Political Change: Egyptian Patriotism, Communism, and Zionism; and The Beginning of the End: Egyptianization, the Arab-Israeli War, and the Burning of Cairo.

Water Rights in the Occupied Territories

In the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel gained control of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip, Sinai, and the Golan Heights. With the exception of the Sinai, Israel continues to occupy these territories, controlling all of historic Palestine and the Golan Heights. While the issue of Jewish settlements on the territories has been widely discussed and analyzed under applicable international law, the issue of water rightscrucial in light of water's great importance in the Middle East and its implications for the future of the territories-has not. The climate of Israel/Palestine is intermediate between the subtropical rainy climate of Lebanon in the north and the arid conditions of the Negev and Sinai deserts in the south. More than 85 percent of the water resources are located in the northern half of the country. 1 Water is derived primarily from rivers, springs, wells, and floodwater runoffs, with almost all of the water resources shared by two or more states. The rainfall, which serves both as a direct source of irrigation and as replenishment for underground

Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War, 1949-56

The thirtieth anniversary of the 1956 Suez crisis has sparked renewed scholarly interest in this milestone in twentieth-century history. Current research on the subject has been spurred by the recent declassification of American, British and Israeli diplomatic papers from the period which provide unprecedented insight into the many questions still surrounding the crisis.1 Among these is the central issue of Egypt-Israel relations in the period leading up to Suez. Events arising from the Egypt-Israel conflict helped precipitate the political crisis (e.g. the influence of Egypt's continuing purchase of Soviet arms and resistance to Western peace initiatives on America's decision to withdraw financial support for the Aswan Dam), and provided a pretext for its military conclusion, the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. The second Arab-Israeli war signified the culmination of over seven years of growing tensions on the Egypt-Israel border. The basis for this escalation lay in a subjective factor: conflicting Egyptian and Israeli interpretations of the Armistice Agreement, and two objective factors: deficiencies in the Armistice and the inherent instability of the Egypt-Israel border. The deleterious impact of these constant factors was increasingly exacerbated by changing circumstances on the domestic, regional and international levels: internal developments in Egypt and Israel, inter-Arab competition for regional domination, and Great Power rivalries and policies in the Middle East. The border war had its primary origin in the conflicting interpretations of the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement (EIAA), signed in Rhodes in February 1949. Egypt, together with the other Arab states, held to the strict definition of an armistice according to international law, viz. that such an agreement did not end a state of war but was merely a declaration of truce. This position, repeatedly

Beyond the Shultz Initiative: The New Administration and the Palestinian Problem

BEYOND THE SHULTZ INITIATIVE: THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM John P. Hannah and Martin Indyck JLi April 1988, in the midst of his third trip of the year to the Middle East trying to revive the Arab-Israeli peace process, Secretary of State George Shultz noted that the e/fect of the Palestinian uprising, or intifadah , in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was "in many respects to make my task harder."1 In his own understated way, the secretary was acknowledging a reality that most outside observers were also coming to recognize: rather than increasing the chances for a breakthrough on the peace process, violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians had actually made a negotiated settlement of the conflict more difficult to achieve. Eight months and one trip later, there is little basis for taking issue with Shultz's pessimistic assessment. Indeed, in some ways, the situation has worsened. The uprising has settled into a state of chronic disorder, increasing the costs of the status quo to both Israel and the Palestinians, while reinforcing the hatred, fear, and suspicion that have made the conflict so intractable. Jordan's King Hussein—for twenty years, Israel and the United States' preferred partner for negotiations— has, for the moment, severed his kingdom's ties to the West Bank, thereby removing Jordan from the role of primary Arab interlocutor in the peace process. 1. John M. Goshko, "Shultz Seems Resigned that Mideast Peace will Elude Him," The Washington Post, April 10, 1988, A22. John P. Hannah is a fellow at, and Martin Indyck is executive director of, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Respectively, they served as rapporteur and convener of the institute's Presidential Study Group on U.S. Policy in the Middle East. This article is based on the group's report, "Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East." 87 88 SAIS REVIEW Although the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) seems to be creeping toward a more pragmatic posture, all indications are that its actions will fall far short of the minimum steps necessary to demonstrate that it is committed to peace and therefore an acceptable partner for negotiations. The new U.S. president, then, is almost certain to enter office in 1989 with the peace process still stalled and Israelis and Palestinians locked in a protracted intercommunal battle. While the uprising, by itself, represents more of a chronic irritant to U.S. policy than an acute threat to American interests, it will have to be a source of concern for the new administration. The continued festering of the Palestinian problem heightens tensions in an already dangerous Middle East environment. In particular, several recent developments have increased the chances of a new Arab-Israeli war: Syria has accelerated its military buildup and continues to insist that the conflict with Israel can be resolved only by force; the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and chemical weapons and their use with great effectiveness in the war between Iraq and Iran have escalated the regional arms race to a new, more destabilizing level; and the end of the Iraq-Iran War leaves the Arab states of the Persian Gulf with huge military arsenals and the option of eventually refocusing their energies from the conflict with Iran to the conflict with Israel. It is this danger of eroding stability and war, to which the uprising contributes, that poses the real threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East. As part of a larger strategy to contain that threat, the new president will need to make the management and resolution of the Palestinian problem a priority on his foreign policy agenda. Along with deterring Syria, stabilizing the Arab-Israeli military balance, and promoting an accommodation between Israel and Arab states, the president must seek to promote a process that encourages reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. However, before leaping into the fray with a new Middle East peace initiative, the new administration must soberly assess how recent developments have affected the climate for resolving the conflict. In particular, it will need to understand why Secretary Shultz's determined effort during the first six months of 1988 failed to produce a...

Intervention threats in short Arab—Israeli wars: An analysis of Soviet crisis behavior

(1988). Intervention threats in short Arab—Israeli wars: An analysis of Soviet crisis behavior. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 437-467.

Forty Years since the Seizure of Palestine

Forty years ago, on the eve of 15 May 1948, the leaders of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish settler community in Palestine declared the establishment of a Jewish state, which they called Israel. This came about amid bloody clashes between Arabs and Jews, which followed the 29 November 1947 United Nations General Assembly resolution that partitioned Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish. The fighting escalated when five Arab states joined the fighting against Israel, in what became known as the first Arab-Israeli war. This war ended, officially and in fact, with the signing of the armistice agreements between Israel and her four Arab neighbors, Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria, during the first months of 1948. By then Israel had succeeded in gaining control of about 70 percent of the area of Mandatory Palestine, territory from which most of the, Palestinian Arab inhabitants had left. The remaining 30 percent of the country comprised two areas. The larger of these, in central Palestine, which later came to be known as the West Bank, was officially annexed by Jordan. The smaller, the Gaza Strip in southern Palestine, came under the control of the Egyptian army. This marked the start of what came to be known in international

A predator-prey model of guerrilla warfare

Guerrilla warfare has emerged as one of the principal forms of modern warfare. Mutual deterrence, as achieved by the arms race and arms control, has made nuclear warfare not impossible but at least improb able, the major potential initiator of a nuclear war probably being miscalculation, accident, or escalation rather than premeditation or preemption.1 Traditional large-scale warfare, as in the case of both World Wars, is also improbable in view of potential superpower involvement and fear of escalation. What remains are three pos sibilities. First, there are wars confined to a particular region, and without direct superpower involvement, such as the Arab-Israeli wars, the India-Pakistan wars, the Iran-Iraq war, or the Falklands War. Second, there are civil wars such as those in Nigeria and Chad. Third, there are guerrilla wars, such as those in Malaysia, Vietnam, the Sudan, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. The purpose of this paper is to analyze guerrilla warfare by means of a dynamic model.2 The model suggests specific paths for the evolution of such wars and how such wars might be fought or combatted.

The Israel-Jordan Peace Negotiations ( 1949-51 ): King Abdallah's Lonely Effort

The story of the negotiations between King Abdallah of Jordan and the new State of Israel has not yet been told in full, although the previously classified diplomatic documents, Israeli, British and American, have been available to the public for several years now. Even those well-versed in the history of the region will find much that is new to them. It emerges clearly that King Abdallah conducted the talks throughout with complete sincerity but with a singular lack of sober appraisal as to the possible outcome of all the changes that took place in Jordan as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Abdallah's prolonged exertions in pursuit of peace with Israel make an intricate story that deserves a full-blown monograph, in which the interactions between the participants the Jordanians, Palestinians, Israelis, British and Americans would be treated in extenso, supported by a full armoury of documentary references. This brief account will focus only on the salient points of the story. Abdallah was assassinated on 20 July 1951; on 27 June, just three weeks earlier, he had shown how very far he was from any accurate evaluation of the prospects for a settlement with Israel, when he unburdened himself to a US member of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission then visiting Amman, who recorded the talk in vivid detail. 'I am an old man', said Abdallah. [He was sixty-nine years old.] 'I know that my power is limited. I know that I am hated by my own son [Tallal]. I also know that my own people distrust me because of my peace efforts. I know I could get a peace settlement if only I had some encouragement.' A year earlier, the Arab League had passed two Resolutions (on 1 and 13 April 1950) to expel any member that made a separate peace with Israel. Abdallah was quite ready to defy this decision of the Arab League but not his own people, who, he was sure, would support him if only Israel were to offer Jordan what he termed 'reasonable concessions'. He concluded the conversation with

Intercultural communication between Israel and Egypt: deterrence failure before the Six-Day War

Can cultural differences between states affect the chances of success of deterrence strategy? If so, what differences are relevant and how do they influence outcomes? The following paper seeks to suggest some answers to these questions in the context of a discussion of the crisis that preceded the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Britain and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948

Britain and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948

Britain and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948

At midnight on 14 May 1948 the British High Commissioner for Palestine with all his staff left Palestine, and 28 years of British responsibility for the territory came to an end. As Rees Williams, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, told the House of Commons: ‘On the 14th May, 1948, the withdrawal of the British Administration took place without handing over to a responsible authority any of the assets, property or liabilities of the Mandatory Power. The manner in which the withdrawal took place is unprecedented in the history of our Empire’.1 What were the reasons behind the inexcus­ably abrupt and reckless fashion by which the British government chose to divest itself of the Mandate for Palestine? Very different answers are given to this question by the two nations most directly affected by the British decision. On the Jewish side the predominant view is that Britain walked out in the full knowledge that the surrounding Arab countries would immediately attack the fledgeling Jewish state. Zionist historiography is riddled with suspicions of dark plots hatched during the twilight of British rule in Palestine. A typical example is Jon Kimche’s claim that the Foreign Office, the Chiefs of Staff and the Palestine Administration wanted to see the physical destruction of the Jewish National Home and encouraged the Arabs to carry it out.2 Richard Crossman lent his authority to this Zionist charge: Once it had been decided … to end the mandate, Bevin’s aim, apparently, was to ensure that Abdullah’s Arab Legion should over-run most of Palestine, leaving a rump Jewish state, so weak that it would throw itself at the mercy of the British Government.3

Hussein's Constraints, Jordan's Dilemma

HUSSEINS CONSTRAINTS, JORDAN'S DILEMMA Arthur Day JCOR JORDAN, THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS is more than a foreign-policy preoccupation; it deals with issues that lie at the heart of the country's domestic life. The line between external and internal issues is in any case a thin one for the kingdom, given its vulnerability to outside events and pressures. Where the Palestinian issue is concerned the line virtually disappears. Since 1948 the country has been an integral part of the Palestinian question. Even in East BankJordan itself, leaving aside the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Palestinians today constitute a majority of the population. In addition, Jordan still has responsibilities in and for the Palestinian territory of the West Bank, whose residents are also Jordanian citizens. The unfolding of the Palestinian problem will continue to affect domestic relationships and the future of theJordanian regime. In this area, King Hussein must play foreign and domestic policies carefully against one another, balancing crosscutting pressures from inside and outside his country. Beyond the practical considerations of policy, the Palestinian question stirs personal and dynastic responses that may be an equally important influence on Hussein's participation in the peace process. During World War II, his Hashemite great-grandfather, Hussein, King of the Hejaz, Grand Sharif, Ruler of Mecca and Guardian of the Holy Places, entertained the vision of an independent Arab world ruled by the Hashemites. This vision faded, but in the early 1920s Hashemites nonetheless governed the Hejaz, with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and Arthur Day served for twenty-eight years in various posts with the Department of State and the Foreign Service, including consul general in Jerusalem and deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. He is the author of the recently published Council on Foreign Relations book, East BankWest Bank:Jordan and the Prospectsfor Peace, on which this article is based. 81 82 SAIS REVIEW the entities of Iraq and Transjordan, which were created under the postWorld War I British Mandates. Before long the Hejaz was lost to the Saudis, but in 1948 the acquisition by Transjordan of parts of Palestine, including the holy city ofJerusalem, nourished the sense of family destiny. Today Iraq and Jerusalem have been lost, and all that remains of the Hashemite vision is East Bank Jordan. It is clear that Hussein feels this diminution keenly and is sensible of a personal responsibility to his Hashemite forebears to play the part in Arab affairs that appeared to be predestined for the family. In particular, he seems oppressed by an obligation to redress his loss of Jerusalem, won for the Hashemites by Abdullah, King Hussein's grandfather, at the cost of his life. For all these reasons, Jordan cannot escape a major role in the Palestinian issue and efforts to resolve it. Jordan's relationship to the issue, however, has changed in important ways over the years as the Palestinian national movement has evolved. Jordan was founded, in a sense, by being excluded from Britain's Palestine Mandate. Nevertheless, its first ruler, Emir and later king Abdullah , always eager to expand his realm, came to covet the territory of Mandate Palestine. When British intentions to relinquish the Mandate became clear in 1947, and the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish sections was in the wind, he set out to acquire whatever portion fell to the Arabs. With the end of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1949, accordingly , he annexed the West Bank and Jerusalem. In taking these territories, Abdullah established two patterns that have persisted ever since. First, he incorporated the regional Palestinian problem into Jordan's domestic life. And second, he set Jordan at odds with the indigenous Palestinian leadership — at that time represented by the Mufti ofJerusalem, Haj Amin Husseini—that sought to rule Palestine itself and bitterly resented Jordanian interference. The claim of the Palestinian leadership to self-rule was also supported by the leading Arab governments. The effect of Abdullah's move on Jordan's internal structure was overwhelming. More than 850,000 Palestinians were added to a Jordanian population of a little over 400,0UO.1 A very reluctant West Bank— politically and economically...

The Iran-Iraq Conflict: The Tragedy of Limited Conventional War

1 The statistics on major interstate wars are taken from Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills ca: Sage 1982), 89-102: World War II, 16 million battle deaths; World War I, 9 million; Korea, 2 million; Vietnam 1965-75, 1.2 million; Sino-Japanese 1937^41, 1 million. Battle death figures for the Iran-Iraq War are far from reliable at this point; estimates vary from 500,000 to 1 million: Washington Times, 14 March 1986. The next ranking war is the Lopez war in Latin America, 1865-75, 310,000 deaths. 2 Singer and Small (ibid, 92-3) report the following totals for the Arab-Israeli wars: 1948 (5000 Arabs, 3000 Israelis), 1956 (3000 Egyptians, 200 Israelis), 1967 (18,600 Arabs, 1000 Israelis), 1968-70 War of Attrition (5000 Egyptians, 368 Israelis), 1973 (13,400 Arabs, 3000 Israelis), for a total of 45,000 Arabs and 7,568 Israelis. Statistics on the 1982-5 Israeli invasion of Lebanon are far more speculative on the Arab side where for the first time in an Arab-Israeli conflict, civilian casualties have vastly exceeded military casualties: estimates are 20,000 Arab casualties in Lebanon, only a small portion of which represent plo, Syrian, Lebanese army, and militia casualties, and 654 Israelis. The total military battle death figures in these six episodes comes to approximately 50,000 on the Arab side, and 8200 Israelis. These figures do not include terrorist and counter-terrorist actions over the 40-year period.